Investment screening can be defined as host state’s sovereign judicial and/or administrative authority to monitor the investments, specifically foreign direct investments of the foreign investors. Naturally, host states would use their rights for legislative power especially in sensitive sectors by nature such as defence systems, energy, transportation, natural resources; or sectors that are vulnerable for the host state. However, on the other edge of the investment, it is clear that, foreign direct investments have an important role for financial growth and direct and indirect effects such as employments. Theoretically it is being accepted that there must be a balance between host states’ legislative power and security of the foreign investment. Hence; investment screening regime is on one side and protection of investors/investments are on the other side.

The analysis of this thesis is to examine whether foreign investors can fully rely on the standard of FPS in BITs for the protection of their investments in the territories of host States which has been mandated to States by international law. This question cannot be answered without giving insights into the content and structure of the origin of FPS standard and adopts a dynamic based-perspective of the interpretation of FPS under VCLT 1969, encompassing the relationship between FPS and CIL. It investigates the tribunals' interpretation of the clause using case laws and literatures to identify and explore the underlying explanatory process behind tribunals' case findings and outcomes. The study examines the critical realism that the obligation of FPS standard does not place absolute liability to a host State, rather the exercise of a reasonable degree of vigilance. It evaluates the controversy surrounding the relationships between FPS and FET, and illuminates on how the two standards may co-evolve which has led to various arbitral tribunals' divergence opinions interpretation of the two principles. The evaluation of the application of FPS to digital assets is dynamic in this research as it addresses the nature of threats investors face globally today over cyber attacks of digital investments. The thesis also emphasis on balancing up investors' rights and obligation, which explains the measures that States can apply to prevent foreign investors from engaging in illegitimate activities. Having look at all these issues, circumstances, and the controversies surrounding FPS standard, the result found is that there is a existence of a gap in this area of the law, that would mean that foreign investors cannot completely rely on the principle of FPS for the protection of their investments in the territories of the host unless this lacunae is properly filled by both the States and arbitral tribunals, especially the tribunals' interpretative meaning of the standard of FPS.

One of the most notorious dilemmas of international rules on the protection of foreign investment is how to decrease the tension between a state’s regulatory freedom and private property rights in addressing indirect expropriation. Bilateral investment treaties need to achieve a crucial balance: to protect the interests of foreign investors and support rights of states to regulate in pursuit of sustainable development. In dealing with indirect expropriation past tribunals relied on different approaches and adopted mutually inconsistent positions. By demonstrating this incoherence, this thesis reviews the most recent BITs and identifies an archetype of investment treaty provisions and language that may result in the interpretation of indirect expropriation most compatible with states being free to act to achieve sustainable development.

Over the last decades technological companies have grown significantly and impacted our societies both politically and economically.The significant amount of user data these companies collect and manage have economic as well as political impacts on our societies.  The busines model of social media companies has raised alerts and provoked calls for regulatory measures. The thesis investigated whether social media platforms ‘data’ can constitute a protected investment under a Bilateral Investment Treaty, and what is the position of the international investment law if any about the digital economy. The author made an analysis of data localization regulation to determine if tech companies can claim protection under a BIT to avoid potential issues of a domestic regulation. After the analysis of international legal instruments, BITs and scholar literature the results of the study concluded that data could constitute a protected investment under the wording of certain BITs.

The topic of this thesis is the protection of foreign investments. This topic can be considered to be very current due to the present trends in the world economy, when globalization is constantly intensifying the international economic relations and foreign investments have therefore become more important in recent years. The aim of the thesis is to introduce to the reader the basics of the legal regulation of foreign investment protection. The first chapter introduces the very concept and definition of the term "investment". Therefore, the first chapter presents various definitions of the term investment that can be encountered. The following chapter briefly outlines the historical evolution of this protection, starting from the period of colonialism up to the present times. The next chapter then includes the sources of foreign protection that are the result of historical development. Particular attention is paid to bilateral and multilateral investment protection agreements, as the investment protection system consists primarily of such agreements. In this context it should be noted that the protection of foreign investments is greatly fragmented due to the large number of such agreements and, at the same time, the absence of a universal multilateral treaty. In the fourth chapter, special...

We analyze the effect of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on bilateral foreign portfolio investment in equity and debt securities. We find that expropriation risk and the level of a BIT’s investor protection are complementary. Applying a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood model to a panel of 60 home and 39 host countries from 2002 to 2017, we find that host countries receive 40% more bilateral equity investment when they protect foreign investors with a BIT. This effect almost doubles when investment protection of BITs is strong, and the political risk of the host country is high.

This thesis contributes to a better understanding of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). The second Chapter investigates the potential downside of BITs on sovereign default risk. The legal risk of arbitral proceedings imposed by BITs might increase sovereign default risk. This risk channel is especially relevant in countries with low executive constraints. Even if a sovereign does not expropriate, there may be negative effects on sovereign bond prices. Thus, sovereign debt may become more expensive after a BIT signature. The third Chapter investigates how BITs affect foreign portfolio equity investment. BITs with strong investor protection increase bilateral portfolio equity investments in countries with high political risk. In low-risk countries, no effect is detected. Policymakers should consider their political risk when deciding on investment treaties. When the political risk is low, one cannot expect an investment-enhancing effect from BITs. The fourth Chapter encourages policymakers to comply with concluded investment treaties. The first arbitral proceeding permanently lowers the bilateral portfolio investments, even from countries not involved in the investment dispute. A conviction of the host state seriously deters foreign portfolio investors. However, initiating proceedings and decisions favoring the respondent state can also deter some portfolio investors. Concerning portfolio investments, policymakers should avoid arbitral proceedings as far as possible.

<p>Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash / Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries.</p>

The purpose of my thesis is to analyse Bilateral Investment Treaties between the EU and China. The question that passes through the entire work is whether there is indeed a homogeneous relationship in FDI between the EU and China as a whole, or whether the practice is rather different relationship with the EU members with some common and different elements. I have chosen the theme of this thesis because I am interested in investment relations, and China is a very attractive destination for the investment, that has from a European point of view its specific features. The thesis is composed of six chapters. In the chapter one I decided to take historical approach by researching the needs and motivations that inspired and influenced the emergence of the BIT program between the EU and China. From a historical approach to the development of FDI in China is obvious that the policy of FDI in China follows the national interests of China. From the beginning FDI was an unwanted tool for China that did not correspond with national policy, however it provided the necessary capital. Over time, China has changed its approach from receiving investment indiscriminately into the consistent direction of flow of FDI into desired sectors. The second chapter provides an analytical view of the current legal framework...

直覺上，跨國資本的自由流動對投資國與被投資國的經濟均有益處，亦可促使資源在國際間以更有效率的方式分配，增進雙方的福利。然而實際上被投資國卻對外來投資加以限制，並且須透過雙邊協商的方式移除此限制。因此，前述自由投資增進兩國福利的直覺似乎與既存的眾多雙邊投資協定相互矛盾。本文建立一基本的理論模型，考慮直接投資以及兩國的策略性投資政策，藉以說明 Nash Equilibrium 為兩國相互課稅，且無單邊降稅的動機。因此，只有透過雙邊簽署投資協定的方式共同降稅，方能消除課稅所產生的無謂損失。 / Intuitively, the free mobility of transnational capital not only benefits home countries and host countries, but also allocates resources globally in a more efficient way, which makes their welfare increase. However, host countries actually implement many restrictions on cross-border capital and try to remove these through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the intuition that free investment between two countries will increase their economic welfare seems to be contradictory to many existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This article provides a theoretical model with foreign driect investment (FDI) and strategic investment policies, first, as to explain the Nash Equilibrium is that two countries will tax investors' FDI behavior. Second, it explains both countries do not have any motivation to reduce taxes unilaterally. Therefore, only when these two countries decide to remove all restrictions on foreign capital mutually by signing bilateral investment treaties do they eliminate the deadweight loss which restraints bring about.