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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

雙邊投資協定之理論模型 / A theoretical explanation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)

曾蕙玲, Tseng, Huei Lin Unknown Date (has links)
直覺上,跨國資本的自由流動對投資國與被投資國的經濟均有益處,亦可促使資源在國際間以更有效率的方式分配,增進雙方的福利。然而實際上被投資國卻對外來投資加以限制,並且須透過雙邊協商的方式移除此限制。因此,前述自由投資增進兩國福利的直覺似乎與既存的眾多雙邊投資協定相互矛盾。本文建立一基本的理論模型,考慮直接投資以及兩國的策略性投資政策,藉以說明 Nash Equilibrium 為兩國相互課稅,且無單邊降稅的動機。因此,只有透過雙邊簽署投資協定的方式共同降稅,方能消除課稅所產生的無謂損失。 / Intuitively, the free mobility of transnational capital not only benefits home countries and host countries, but also allocates resources globally in a more efficient way, which makes their welfare increase. However, host countries actually implement many restrictions on cross-border capital and try to remove these through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the intuition that free investment between two countries will increase their economic welfare seems to be contradictory to many existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This article provides a theoretical model with foreign driect investment (FDI) and strategic investment policies, first, as to explain the Nash Equilibrium is that two countries will tax investors' FDI behavior. Second, it explains both countries do not have any motivation to reduce taxes unilaterally. Therefore, only when these two countries decide to remove all restrictions on foreign capital mutually by signing bilateral investment treaties do they eliminate the deadweight loss which restraints bring about.
2

雙邊投資協定徵收條款之研究---以台灣,韓國比較研究為中心 / A study on the expropriation clause in the bilateral investment treaty--focused on a comparative study of Taiwan and south Korea--

朴栽亨 Unknown Date (has links)
「雙邊投資協定」是「發展中國家」為積極引進外國資本,與「已開發國家」為有效保護本國投資者間之互惠保障機制。於1990年代以來,因跨國企業數擴大而增加投資活動,因此也擴大投資的規模,故而對投資規範之需求必要性愈來愈增加。「雙邊投資協定」作爲目前最通用的國際投資規範,最近全世界所簽訂之雙邊投資協定的數量為約2,700多個(約180個國家),惟由於世界上就雙邊投資協定内容還沒統一的形態,而且協定規定上缺乏具體性基準,針對協定内容,已開發國家與發展中國家之間見解往往相左。 其中「徵收條款」是理論解釋上最引起爭論的領域之一。不過迄今與徵收有關協定之實踐過程中,資本輸出國(已開發國家)和資本輸入國(發展中國家)間之理解有很大的差異,即在於絕對多數的雙邊投資協定中,對於徵收條款沒有判斷標準(如間接徵收)、補償標準(如赫爾規則)、補償額價格估價方式(如公平市場價格)之具體基準。 本論文基於雙邊投資協定之現行趨勢,想要研究雙邊投資協定的一般概念與徵收的相關具體内容,尤其為準備臺灣與韓國間簽訂雙邊投資協定的可能性,先觀察最近韓國、臺灣與各國所簽訂的雙邊投資協定之現況,其次則想要比較該協定的徵收條款,進一步嘗試關於未來臺、韓兩國之雙邊投資協定徵收條款之制定方向提出若干意見。

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