1 The Influence of EU Common Investment Policy on the System of International Investment Law Abstract Extending exclusive European Union (EU) competence to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Lisbon Treaty has had profound implications. The EU began to develop its own investment policy, including negotiating either international investment agreements or comprehensive trade and investment agreements with third parties. Taking into account the magnitude of the EU economy and the fact that EU Member States have concluded almost 1 400 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) out of roughly 3 300 in force worldwide, the potential of European influence over the system of international investment, based principally on BITs, is enormous. The aim of this dissertation is to assess how and in which way the new EU competence changes the system. The EU investment policy has developed a specific approach towards investment protection and investment dispute mechanism which does not envision content declared at its beginning. According to initial documents such as the European Commission's Communication Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, the Union should have followed the available best practices of the Member States. Nevertheless, during the first bilateral negotiations with Canada and...

A presente dissertação é sobre a atuação do Estado na economia como acionista minoritário, focando, em especial, no caso do Brasil. Em um primeiro momento, tratamos das possibilidades do uso das participações minoritárias, apontando que, embora estejamos falando de propriedade pública sobre parcelas do capital social de empresas privadas, essas participações não configuram, somente, forma de exploração direta da atividade econômica, devendo ser compreendidas como uma técnica jurídica ou uma ferramenta da qual o Estado pode se valer para realizar as diferentes modalidades de atuação na economia. Nesse sentido, mostramos como as participações minoritárias possibilitam a atuação do Estado como empresário, regulador, fomentador e investidor. Em seguida, falamos dos mecanismos societários que a Administração Pública pode utilizar para que, mesmo como acionista minoritária, possa influenciar a direção das empresas público-privadas, tais como os acordos de acionistas e as golden-shares. Após cuidarmos da natureza jurídica e das vantagens comparativas da atuação estatal na economia por meio de participações minoritárias, passamos a analisar os limites dessa atuação. Desse modo, deve-se distinguir entre o uso das participações públicas como opção legítima de atuação na economia versus sua aplicação como burla ao regime jurídico aplicável às empresas estatais mediante o controle societário disfarçado e a simulação de contratações administrativas. Por fim, tratamos da questão da escolha de parceiros privados pela Administração Pública, bem como dos controles públicos que incidem sobre as empresas participadas. / This dissertation is about the state action in the economy as a minority shareholder especially focusing on the Brazilian case. At first, we discuss the possibilities of the use of minority equity stakes pointing out that, although we are talking about public ownership of shares of private companies, this equity participations do not constitute only a means of direct exploration of an economic activity, instead they should be considered as a legal technique or a tool which the state can rely on to accomplish the different modalities of economic action. This way, we show how the minority positions enable the state to act as an entrepreneur, a regulator, a promoter of private action and an investor. Then we talk about the corporate mechanisms that the Public Administration can use to, even as a minority shareholder, influence the direction of public-private companies, such as shareholders agreements and golden-shares. After dealing with the legal nature and the comparative advantages of the state economic action as a minority shareholder, we proceed to examine the limits of such action. Thus, we must distinguish between the use of minority equity as a legitimate option of state action in the economy versus its application as a way to elude the legal framework applicable to the state-owned enterprises by the disguised corporate control of private companies and the simulation of administrative procurement. At last, we deal with the issue of the choice of private partners by the Public Administration, as well as the public controls which apply to the invested companies.

A presente dissertação é sobre a atuação do Estado na economia como acionista minoritário, focando, em especial, no caso do Brasil. Em um primeiro momento, tratamos das possibilidades do uso das participações minoritárias, apontando que, embora estejamos falando de propriedade pública sobre parcelas do capital social de empresas privadas, essas participações não configuram, somente, forma de exploração direta da atividade econômica, devendo ser compreendidas como uma técnica jurídica ou uma ferramenta da qual o Estado pode se valer para realizar as diferentes modalidades de atuação na economia. Nesse sentido, mostramos como as participações minoritárias possibilitam a atuação do Estado como empresário, regulador, fomentador e investidor. Em seguida, falamos dos mecanismos societários que a Administração Pública pode utilizar para que, mesmo como acionista minoritária, possa influenciar a direção das empresas público-privadas, tais como os acordos de acionistas e as golden-shares. Após cuidarmos da natureza jurídica e das vantagens comparativas da atuação estatal na economia por meio de participações minoritárias, passamos a analisar os limites dessa atuação. Desse modo, deve-se distinguir entre o uso das participações públicas como opção legítima de atuação na economia versus sua aplicação como burla ao regime jurídico aplicável às empresas estatais mediante o controle societário disfarçado e a simulação de contratações administrativas. Por fim, tratamos da questão da escolha de parceiros privados pela Administração Pública, bem como dos controles públicos que incidem sobre as empresas participadas. / This dissertation is about the state action in the economy as a minority shareholder especially focusing on the Brazilian case. At first, we discuss the possibilities of the use of minority equity stakes pointing out that, although we are talking about public ownership of shares of private companies, this equity participations do not constitute only a means of direct exploration of an economic activity, instead they should be considered as a legal technique or a tool which the state can rely on to accomplish the different modalities of economic action. This way, we show how the minority positions enable the state to act as an entrepreneur, a regulator, a promoter of private action and an investor. Then we talk about the corporate mechanisms that the Public Administration can use to, even as a minority shareholder, influence the direction of public-private companies, such as shareholders agreements and golden-shares. After dealing with the legal nature and the comparative advantages of the state economic action as a minority shareholder, we proceed to examine the limits of such action. Thus, we must distinguish between the use of minority equity as a legitimate option of state action in the economy versus its application as a way to elude the legal framework applicable to the state-owned enterprises by the disguised corporate control of private companies and the simulation of administrative procurement. At last, we deal with the issue of the choice of private partners by the Public Administration, as well as the public controls which apply to the invested companies.

Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state of affairs are briefly explained below. The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations. Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike. This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes that may end-up in litigation or arbitration. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.