In the current investment climate, most investor-state disputes are settled through investment arbitration. Investor-state arbitration enables the foreign investor to bring a case before a neutral forum, whose decision is binding and enforceable in countries across the world. In instances where the dispute is governed by an arbitration clause, the clause places the disputing parties under the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. In the event of achieving a victory, the investor may nonetheless come up against the obstacle of state sovereignty, even though the state party has ostensibly waived sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. If a state rejects to comply with an award, then investors must commence a worldwide search (forum-shopping), with a view to retrieving the assets that have been awarded. In instances where the state party is victorious, there is a danger that the award payment will not be made if the foreign investor has already declared bankruptcy. Although there are two Conventions (ICSID and the New York Convention) that facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards, neither one is sufficient to preclude the emergence of the enforcement issue. In both instances, this issue is damaging as it wastes time and money, ultimately contributing to wider inefficiencies and uncertainties in investor-state arbitration. In addressing themselves to this problem and aspiring to the reduction of the obstacle of sovereign immunity from execution, scholars and practitioners have put forward two practical solutions; firstly, a hybrid sovereignty act has been proposed; secondly, it has been suggested that the World Bank could take punitive action, refusing to provide the state party with further loans until the award is resolved. However, these proposals have, to date, not been practically applied or developed. This thesis has two primary objectives: firstly, it attempts to analyse previous solutions that have been addressed to the enforcement issue of ICSID awards: secondly, it addresses itself to two alternatives: 1) that the ICSID Administrative council can review compliance with awards; 2) that countermeasures can be initiated against the failing state under the law of state responsibility (the ILC Articles on State Responsibility). In concluding, the thesis will consider the various advantages and disadvantages associated with each of the aforementioned solutions, ultimately proposing an approach that is best-suited to upholding the interest of the victorious party at the enforcement stage.

In 2011, Korea ratified the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS-FTA). This treaty remains controversial in Korean society, particularly because many Koreans claim that the indirect expropriation doctrine under investor-state arbitration in the investment chapter will allow global investors to challenge governmental regulation justified by the Korean constitution. Despite such criticism, the KORUS-FTA indirect expropriation doctrine and the Korean constitutional property doctrine share more than might be expected in practice. However, this substantive doctrinal convergence between national and global legal systems does not eliminate all risks of conflict between the nation-state and global investors; conflicts can occur whenever two actors interpret the same text differently. Once an investment dispute happens, independent investor-state arbitration reviews governmental action according to independent interpretative rules. Systems theory suggests that nation-states can turn such global challenges into opportunities by taking contextual control over global investment in relying on the global investment legal system of the global investment regime. The nation-state can convince global investors that the nation-state respects transnational investment mechanisms, whilst indirectly imbuing norm-making with minimum national interest without incurring serious damage to its reputation. To be specific, the nation-state can attract more foreign investors by accepting the indirect expropriation doctrine and the investor-state arbitration respected by global investors. Simultaneously, the nation-state can secure minimum control over global investment under legitimate regulatory power reflected in the same indirect expropriation clause. In addition, the nation-state can guide the investment tribunal to secure a balance between investment protection and the regulatory power of the host state by prescribing the proportionality principle. Contextual control can be a sub-optimal choice for the nation-state in the sense that it avoids a worst-case scenario by securing proportionality and predictability. In order to make this measure more effective, the current global investment legal system needs to secure more commensurate autonomy or autopoiesis by furthering simultaneous and balanced structural coupling with a greater variety of social powers. In this context, global constitutionalism provides national constitutional tools for the nation-state; specifically, democratic participation in national treaty-making procedures and autopoietic structuralisation of the investment arbitration mechanism can make the substantive contents and application of global investment law fairer and more acceptable, not only to global investors and strong states, but also to social movements and smaller countries. In the context of the KORUS-FTA, the Korean government needs to make the treaty terms of indirect expropriation clearer through democratic participation. At the same time, the Korea should pay attention to making arbitration process reflexive to more various social interests, whilst protecting its operation from inappropriate influences. Such measures can prevent KORUSFTA tribunals from making extremely unacceptable decisions to actors of the global investment regime, including the Korean government, although they could not guarantee ideal decisions that stratify all actors perfectly.

For the last two to three decades there has been an on-going legitimacy debate surrounding Investment Treaty Arbitration. States, scholars and public opinion argue that reform is needed. The European Union proposes the reform of Investor-State Arbitration through the creation of an Investment Court System. This is exemplified by recent European Union negotiated trade agreements such as the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement and the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement. This thesis discusses whether an Investment Court System is a step towards solving the legitimacy concerns or whether an Investment Court System will thrust Investor-State Arbitration into the relative unknown, exacerbating the validity questions enveloping Investor-State Arbitration. The thesis observes the criticisms raised by eminent scholars, States and campaigners against Investor-State Arbitration and the reforms proposed by the European Union Commission and European Union Parliament, in the form of an Investment Court System. Finally, the study looks briefly at how certain countries who have become disenfranchised with Investor-State Arbitration are approaching reform internationally, and comparatively discusses whether these options would be more beneficial to the Investor-State Arbitration community, rather than the European Union proposed Investment Court System.

This study critically examines rulings of Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) tribunals. Under the North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) Chapter 11, ISDS provides foreign investors with the tools to launch a claim against signatory countries should they feel their investment was inhibited by local regulations. Empirically this study draws upon Windstream Energy LLC. v. the Government of Canada as a case study to analyze the competing responses exchanged during the tribunal’s hearings. The claim by Windstream Energy LLC against the Government of Ontario (GoO) serves as both a central and relevant example for examining the ramifications of ISDS, as it is one of Canada’s most recent defeats featuring the largest award outside a pre-tribunal ISDS settlement. Information was drawn from tribunal documents, referred to as a Memorial and Counter Memorial, which outline each party’s argument and supporting claims. Additionally, the tribunal publishes their final decision and justifications. A critical discourse analysis method, theoretically informed by the corporate crime literature and Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, helps in critically examining the economic, political, and cultural assumptions that influenced the tribunal’s decision and the state’s approach to foreign investment. Overall, dominant voices reinforced neoliberal beliefs about transnational market expectations and the role of the state under a globalized capitalist system. Justifications rooted in market logics prioritized the accumulation of foreign capital over the potential dangers of Windstream’s project. Ultimately, it is the inclusion of corporate safeguards, like ISDS, in free trade pacts that help to (re)produce neoliberal capitalist ideals and further reinforce status-quo economic relations.

This research examines and critically analyses to what extent the host states might use their sovereignty in a manner that may be counterproductive to the interests of foreign investors on their territory; and the role played by international investment law in its regulation. Further, it considers the extent to which investor-state arbitration, under both the inter-state bilateral investment treaty (BIT), and investment contract, can be used to rebalance the uneven investment relationship arising from the adverse effect of host state sovereignty. The importance of the investor-state arbitration is based on the fact that such a process will be of no value if its award is not enforceable against sovereigns. It is therefore argued that arbitration enforcement against states must be augmented by further safeguards mechanisms. Challenges are faced by international investment law to minimise the possible adverse effect of host state’s sovereignty, in order to require states to respect investment agreements. Responsibility will be asserted by a wronged foreign investor if the state breaches customary international law when it hosts the foreign investment and if there is a violation of the specific investment agreement. Such challenges expose the limitations on how states can use their sovereign powers (whether legal, economic or political), against foreign investors and question the clarity of such boundaries. An unsuccessful litigant state will often seek to resist award enforcement, claiming sovereign immunity against its execution. International investment law and applicable national and regional bodies must find a balance between the interests of the foreign investor and the host state. This research concludes that the adjudication system used in England provides a framework in which a foreign investor can seek recognition of its claim and thus enforce a foreign arbitral award against recalcitrant states, but improvements could still be made as explained in thesis.

The enforcement mechanism of international investment arbitral awards is an es- sential safeguard for resolving investment disputes. Under the existing machinery, the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention provide an effective legal framework for the enforcement of international arbitral awards. Many countries have provided a favorable domestic statutory regime for investor-state arbitral awards enforcement.  With China's accession to the ICSID Convention and the signing of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties with many countries, China has become more open and active in international investment in recent years. At the same time, some legal risks in settling investment disputes have emerged. For instance, one of the most significant issues is whether investor-state arbitral awards can be ef- fectively enforced in the PRC.  Though the New York Convention was primarily designed to enforce commercial arbitral awards, it is widely accepted that it also permits the enforcement of awards against sovereign states. However, it is risky for overseas investors resort- ing enforcement in the PRC based on the New York Convention since China left the commercial reservation clause when acceding to the New York Convention.  Thus, the ICSID Convention is more beneficial for foreign investors when entering into contracts with the PRC. However, the execution of ICSID awards is subject to the domestic law of the enforcement forum, but China does not provide specific domestic legislation that complies with the ICSID Convention. Therefore, some legal obstacles should be carefully considered during the enforcement phase, such as sovereign immunity and public policy.  This thesis focuses on the enforcement regime of investor-state arbitral awards under the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention. It also predicts the legal risks of enforcing investor-state arbitral awards in the PRC, thus putting 2 forward suggestions for overseas investors and for improving the Chinese arbitra- tion legal system.

International investment agreements largely cover today’s transnational investments. These agreements confer certain substantive rights to foreign investors while simultaneously obliging host-states to act in a given manner so as to not interfere with the investments. Most international investment agreements further contain an arbitration clause which provides the investor with the means to enforce the substantive rights of the agreement by directly bringing a claim against the host-state before an arbitral tribunal. Consequently, privately contracted arbitrators have the authority to scrutinize and overrule essentially any sovereign act of the host-state that may affect the investment – judicial and legislative acts included. This practice affects not only the parties of the dispute; when the arbitral award claims superiority to the state’s electoral choices, it further constrains the exercise of sovereignty by the population of the host-state. As a result, the arbitrators who manage the disputes and the investors who initiate them have become central power-holders in the context of both international and domestic law. Meanwhile, the arbitrators and investors alike seem to be unaccountable to the states and individuals who are adversely affected by their power assertions. A commonly accepted feature of democracy is that those who govern and wield power should be accountable to those who are governed and subjected to this power. This thesis relates this notion to a Foucauldian understanding of power, domination and resistance. The primary aim of the thesis is to examine the interplay between the prominent subjects involved in investor-state arbitration and to what degree these subjects hold power in the form of transformative capacity. After this investigation into the relations of power, the thesis scrutinizes the subjugated subjects’ ability to exercise effective resistance through institutionalized accountability mechanisms. The thesis detects an accountability deficit in the regime and concludes that foreign investors and arbitrators hold a dominant position within the context of investor-state arbitration, while states and individuals find themselves in a state of domination. The international investment regime, as it currently stands, is thus found to suffer from a democracy deficit, while it concurrently seems to undermine domestic democratic institutions.

In 1965, amid antagonism between capital-importing and capital-exporting states over investment protection, the World Bank created ICSID. ICSID facilitates the resolution of disputes between foreign investors and states. Since major initiatives to create investment rules have failed within the UN and OECD, ICSID is the only successful attempt to create a multilateral, inter-state organization dedicated to investment. This thesis probes the intellectual, political, and economic forces behind the creation and early development of ICSID. This study combines archival work, oral histories, and interviews with econometric work. On this basis, it illuminates how ICSID's creators-mainly staff in the World Bank's Legal Department-adapted their ideas to suit the charged political context. When disseminating the idea of ICSID to states, they relied on ambiguity, expertise, and incrementalism. These three characteristics constitute an approach to organization building that I term "modest multilateralism" since the World Bank's President praised ICSID as "a modest proposal." By illustrating how this approach operated in ICSID's case, I generate insights that are applicable to other international organizations. ICSID's creation differs from the expectations of institutionalist IR theory in important ways. First, there was little state leadership, and ICSID's founding Convention is devoid of substance-it merely outlines a procedure. In this way, it takes the idea of ambiguity to its extreme. Second, ICSID's founders took steps to shield the organization from the politics of investment protection: they asked states to send legal experts, not elected representatives, and avoided deliberative debate. Third, ICSID's design was explicitly evolutionary. ICSID can operate alongside changing substantive rules-multilateral, bilateral, or domestic. Finally, contrary to previous accounts, in this thesis the ICSID Secretariat emerges as a dynamic agent. The Secretariat actively pursued ratifications and advance consents to investor-state arbitration. The creation of ICSID fostered a community of practice, which subsequently redefined international investment law through treaty making and arbitral practice.

O novo contexto do Direito Internacional tem buscado acomodar interesses econômicos às exigências de proteção ambiental, em linha com o desenvolvimento sustentável. Nesse particular, o investimento estrangeiro é elemento-chave e contribui para a aproximação entre Direito Internacional do Investimento Estrangeiro e Direito Internacional Ambiental, tanto em relação à elaboração de normas substantivas quanto aos processos de adjudicação. Embora já existam diversos trabalhos voltados a demonstrar como os investimentos estrangeiros podem contribuir com a preservação ambiental, pouco se tem escrito sobre os aspectos mais práticos dessa interação. Durante muito tempo, o caráter vago e impreciso da redação dos tratados ambientais dificultava sua aplicação às operações dos investidores. Contudo, a crescente consciência de parcela significativa da população mundial sobre a proteção ao meio ambiente está dando vida a cláusulas com conteúdo ambiental até então dormentes. Nesse contexto, o objetivo do presente trabalho é analisar empiricamente qual o tratamento concedido às questões ambientais suscitadas nos casos decididos pelos tribunais do Centro Internacional para Resolução de Disputas de Investimento (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes), o ICSID, no período entre 2000-2013. Para tanto, a pesquisa foi dividida em três partes. A primeira parte é dedicada ao contexto histórico que permitiu a aproximação entre Direito Internacional do Investimento Estrangeiro e do Direito Ambiental Internacional. Na segunda parte o ICSID é apresentado, de modo a compreender sua organização e funcionamento e, principalmente, de que forma as questões ambientais podem ser suscitadas no âmbito das disputas de investimento. E, por fim, os resultados obtidos a partir da pesquisa empírica das decisões proferidas pelos tribunais do ICSID são apresentados, sistematizando os argumentos apresentados pelas partes, bem como aqueles utilizados pelos tribunais ao decidir os litígios de investimento compreendendo a matéria ambiental. / The new context of International Law pursues the accommodation of economic interests to the needs of environmental protection, in line with the sustainable development. To that particular, the foreign investment is a key element and contributes to a closer relation between the Foreign Investment International Law and the Environmental International Law, inasmuch as in relation to the enactment of substantive laws, as towards to enforcement procedures. Although there are several studies aiming at demonstrating how foreign investments may contribute to the environmental protection, few has been written about the most practical aspects of such interaction. For a long time, the vague and imprecise character of the provisions in environmental treaties turn harder their enforcement towards the investment transactions. However, the growth in conscience on environment protection of a substantial portion of the world population has given life to clauses with environmental content that were dormant until recently. In this context, the objective of this study is to make an empiric analysis on the treatment granted to environmental matters raised in cases decided by the tribunals of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the ICSID, in the period between 2000 and 2013. For that, this research is divided in three parts. The first one is dedicated to the historical context that allowed the approximation between Foreign Investment International Law and Environmental International Law. In the second part the ICSID is presented, to allow a better comprehension of its organization and functioning and, mainly, the forms in which environmental matters can be raised within the scope of investment disputes. And, finally, the results obtained with the empiric research on the decisions enacted by the ICSID tribunals are presented, with a systematization of the arguments used by the involved parties, as well as the arguments adopted by the tribunals to decide the investment disputes comprising environmental matters.

No contexto de avanço da globalização, o Investimento Estrangeiro Direto (IED) mostra-se como um dos principais veículos para a inserção internacional dos países. Como os objetivos das empresas transnacionais e dos Estados hospedeiros não são os mesmos, há a necessidade de adoção de políticas que levem à convergência. No plano legal, observou-se nas últimas décadas a consolidação do regime internacional dos investimentos, com o crescimento exponencial do número de tratados de investimento e de arbitragens investidor-Estado fundadas nos mesmos. Mas há insatisfações de parte a parte com o sistema. Por um lado, os países tentam limitar o ativismo dos árbitros mediante a revisão de seus tratados. Por outro, tanto os investidores como os Estados começam a perceber que não há vencedores reais na arbitragem, dadas as suas diversas deficiências. Nomeadamente: custos elevados, longa duração, incoerência nas decisões e desgaste para as relações investidor-Estado no longo prazo. Nesse diapasão, surgem propostas de alternativas. Pensadores do sistema, valendo-se do Planejamento de Sistemas de Disputas, têm desenvolvido Políticas de Prevenção de Controvérsias. Tais políticas fundamentam-se nas dinâmicas de busca de soluções baseadas em interesses contrapostas às baseadas na força e nos direitos seguindo processos de administração precoce de conflitos. Diversos países, em diferentes níveis de desenvolvimento, têm tido êxito na implementação dessas políticas. A difusão das melhores práticas, movimento apoiado por organizações internacionais, oferece oportunidades para a melhora da governança, através da promoção de maior coerência e coordenação nas ações do Estado, da transparência e do império da lei. O tema é de interesse para o Brasil, país que, diferentemente dos demais, nunca ratificou um único tratado de investimento. Isso porque já surgem vozes na indústria clamando por uma mudança de posição, diante da emergência do país também como um exportador de capital. Caso tal inflexão se confirme, o Brasil tem a oportunidade de tomar partido das melhores experiências internacionais, usando tais tratados como instrumentos na sua estratégia de desenvolvimento. / Against the background of globalization, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is perceived as one of the key vehicles in the pursuit of countries for global insertion. Since the purposes of transnational corporations and host States do not coincide, there is a need to implement policies leading to convergence. In the legal dimension, the last two decades have witnessed the consolidation of the international investment regime, with an exponential growth in the number of investment treaties and investor-State arbitration proceedings based on them. However, both sides are experiencing discontent with the current system. On the one hand, countries attempt to limit arbitrators activism, undertaking a review of treaties they are parties to. On the other, both investors and States have come to realize that there are no true winners in arbitration, in light of its several shortcomings. Namely: high costs, long duration, discrepant decisions and damages to the long term relationship between investors and States. In line with these concerns, several proposals for alternatives have come to light. System thinkers, based on concepts of Dispute Systems Design, have been developing Dispute Prevention Policies. Such policies are rooted in seeking interest-based solutions as opposed to power and rights-based ones following processes of early conflict management. Several countries, with varying levels of development, have succeeded in implementing such policies. Spreading best practices, an initiative supported by international organizations, allows for improvements in domestic governance, through the promotion of greater coherence and coordination in State actions, transparency and the rule of law. This matter is of interest to Brazil, a country that, unlike others, has never ratified a single investment treaty. There are now growing demands from Brazilian corporations for a shift in position, in view of the countrys emergence as a source of outward FDI. Should such a shift take place, Brazil has in its hands the opportunity to learn from international best practices and use such treaties as instruments in its development strategy.