Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture Program, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät I--Zürich--Universität, 1990.

x, 244 p. / This dissertation presents a reading of the work of French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray, with a particular focus on her most recent texts, which explicitly concern the question of ethics. Responding to concerns that Irigaray's work displays a discontinuity, and that this "later" work is perhaps no longer useful for feminists, I argue that there is in fact a rigorous philosophical continuity to Irigaray's work. In particular, I claim that Irigaray's central philosophical contribution is a transformation of the concept of human subjectivity by way of the thinking of sexuate difference as what I call a "relational limitation." This concept is at once ontological and ethical, and it describes the way in which Irigaray's oeuvre, taken as a continuous whole, transforms philosophical understandings of language, being, and ethics by way of thinking them relationally, combining all of these terms together into a new understanding of human subjectivity that involves a new way of thinking about language and meaning as constitutively shared. I discuss the way in which Irigaray elaborates this new understanding in dialogue with male thinkers, in particular with Lacan and Heidegger. I identify an interest in the issue of relation in Irigaray's earlier work, notably through her engagement with Lacan, in whom she identifies what I call a "non-relational" limit, or a conception of human subjectivity and language that refuses the priority of relation. Through her dialogue with Heidegger, I argue, Irigaray comes closer to articulating her own vision of subjectivity as inherently structured by "relational limitation," but she must surpass both Lacanian and Heideggerian paradigms in order to articulate her own unique vision of sexuate difference as two different, yet interrelated, manners of the unfolding of language and of human subjectivity itself. Thus, my tracing of this continuity of Irigaray's project shows how her most recent work is extremely important for feminist theory, insofar as it elaborates a philosophical and ethical vision of how to improve the (often impoverished and/or violent) relations between men and women. In particular, the concept of a "non-relational" limitation versus a "relational limitation" provides a helpful way of understanding the underlying causes and dynamics of the distorted relationship between the sexes under patriarchy--a point that I illustrate with the example of domestic violence. / Committee in charge: Beata Stawarska, Co-Chair; Alejandro A. Vallega, Co-Chair; Theodore A. Toadvine, Member; Karen C. McPherson, Outside Member

Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Media, Music, and Cultural Studies, 2009. / Bibliography: p. 303-332.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis, the South African legal system's attempt to address sexual violence is explored through the lens of the work of the French feminist philosopher, Luce Irigaray. It will be argued that the South African equality jurisprudence lays the foundation for a strongly Irigarayan approach to the transformation of sex and gender relations in so far as our right to equality can be interpreted as being underpinned by an acknowledgment of embodiment, sexual particularity and difference. Our Constitution envisions equality as a value informed by difference rather than sameness and, in accordance with Irigaray’s work, it can be said that the implication of this is that the pursuit of the transformation of sex and gender relations on the one hand, and an acknowledgment of sexual difference on the other, are not mutually exclusive, but that sex equality instead calls for a fundamental recognition of sexual difference and an authentic response to the demands thereof. However, it will be argued that our newly reformed sexual violence legislation undermines the progress made on a constitutional level by entrenching a problematic approach to sexual difference in the definition of the crime of rape. This is done through firstly, defining the crime of rape in gender-neutral terms and secondly, retaining the concept of consent as the distinguishing characteristic between sex and rape. I will argue that through these features, our sexual violence legislation reflects the most basic mistakes that Irigaray identifies with the law. It will be argued that the legislation, on the one hand, denies sexual difference in a way that is prejudicial to women through its gender-neutral language, while at the same time, through the concept of consent, (re-)introducing a hierarchical construction of masculine and feminine sexuality into the Act in terms of which femininity is construed as derivative of, and inferior to, masculinity. Furthermore, the combination of the gender neutrality of the definition and the concept of consent exacerbates the situation, in so far as the gender neutrality masks the harmful construal of sexual difference that is incorporated in the definition through the concept of consent. Accordingly, judged from an Irigarayan perspective, the South African sexual violence legislation is deeply problematic. In addition, the legislation undercuts important constitutional developments, in so far as it ignores the constitutional insights that, firstly, sexual violence is a problem of sex inequality, and that secondly, the pursuit of the transformation of sex and gender relations is served, rather than undercut by a concern with particularities. On this basis, it is argued that the South African sexual violence legislation should be amended so that the concept of consent is removed and the crime of rape is defined in sex-specific language (while still allowing for male victims and female perpetrators) that facilitates judicial understanding of the complexities of the crime of rape. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis sal die Suid-Afrikaanse regsisteem se poging om seksuele geweld aan te spreek, deur die lens van die werk van Luce Irigaray, ‘n Franse feministiese filosoof, ondersoek word. Daar sal geargumenteer word dat die Suid-Afrikaanse gelykheidsjurisprudensie ‘n grondslag vir ‘n sterk Irigarayiese benadering tot die transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge lê, in soverre ons reg op gelykheid geïnterpreteer kan word om in ‘n erkenning van beliggaming, seksuele spesifiekheid en verskil (“difference”) begrond te wees. Ons Grondwet stel gelykheid as ‘n waarde wat deur verskil eerder as eenvormigheid geïnformeer is, voor oë, en in lyn met die werk van Irigaray, kan daar gesê word dat die implikasie hiervan is dat die nastrewing van die transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge aan die een kant, en die erkenning van geslagsonderskeid (“sexual difference”) aan die ander, nie wedersyds uitsluitlik is nie, maar dat geslagsgelykheid eerder juis ‘n fundamentele erkenning van geslagsonderskeid en ‘n outentieke reaksie op die eise daarvan, noop. Daar sal egter geargumenteer word dat ons nuuthervormde wetgewing oor seksuele geweld die vordering wat op ‘n grondwetlike vlak gemaak is, ondermyn deur ‘n problematiese benadering tot geslagsonderskeid in die definisie van die misdaad van verkragting te verskans. Dit word bewerkstellig deur eerstens, die misdaad van verkragting in geslagsneutrale taal te formuleer, en tweedens, om die begrip van toestemming as onderskeidende kenmerk tussen seks en verkragting, te behou. Ek sal argumenteer dat dit deur hierdie eienskappe is, wat ons wetgewing oor seksuele geweld die mees basiese probleme wat Irigaray in die reg identifiseer, weerspieël. Daar sal voorgehou word dat die wetgewing, aan die een kant, deur die geslagsneutrale taal, geslagsonderskeid ontken op ‘n manier wat vrouens benadeel, terwyl dit terselfdertyd, deur die begrip van toestemming, ‘n hiërargiese verhouding tussen die manlike en die vroulike in die wetgewing daarstel, in terme waarvan die vroulike as derivatief en minderwaardig tot die manlike verstaan word. Verder, die situasie word deur die kombinasie van die geslagsneutraliteit van die definisie en die begrip van toetsemming, vererger deurdat die geslagsneutraliteit van die taal die skadelike vertolking van geslagonderskeid wat deur die begrip van toestemming in die definisie ingesluit word, verberg. Dus, vanuit ‘n Irigarayiese perspektief is die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing oor seksuele geweld diep problematies. Verder, die wetgewing ondermyn belangrike grondwetlike ontwikkelinge in soverre dit die volgende grondwetlike insigte ignoreer: eerstens, dat seksuele geweld ‘n probleem van geslagsongelykheid is en tweedens, dat die strewe na transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge gedien, eerder as ondermyn word deur ‘n besorgdheid met die partikuliere. Op hierdie gronde word daar geargumenteer dat die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing oor seksuele geweld gewysig behoort te word, deur die begrip van toestemming te verwyder en die misdaad te definieer in geslagspesifieke taal (op ‘n manier waardeur manlike slagoffers en vroulike oortreders steeds ingesluit word) wat geregtiglike begrip van die kompleksiteite van die misdaad van verkragting bemiddel.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2007. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 112-115).

Thesis (M.A.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Dr. John Corrigan, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Religion. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 16, 2005). Document formatted into pages; contains v, 46 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 204-208). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

I trace Jacques Derrida's notions of self and truth in Circumfession. This text paints a gruesome self-portrait depicting the inescapable violence of subjectivity. The self is born in blood. Derrida courageously confesses to being a casualty of this lovelessness. Similarly, exploring the depth of patriarchy's inscriptions requires facing the painful truth of my bleeding self. Investigating these wounds seems to reopen them, making me complicit in my own oppression. Drawing from the rich narrative of Ingeborg Bachmann's novel Malina, I allow feminists such as Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Drucilla Cornell and bell hooks to engage Derrida's notions of the wounded and wounding self. Beginning in this bloody place, they attempt to write a way-out of the disempowering systems of subjectivity to which the female self seems confined. They write in order that love will bleed some light on the struggle for empowered female subjectivity, re-writing the self as a space of love rather than violence.

Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Media, Music, and Cultural Studies, 2009. / Bibliography: p. 303-332. / Carnal transcendence and sexual difference -- An amorous exchange -- Angels playing with placentas -- Fluid subjects -- Poetics -- Oneiric spaces -- Conclusion. / Carnal transcendence imagines a world in which the carnal has the weight and value of transcendence, and the divine is as liveable and readily evoked as the carnal. Carnal transcendence offers a means of thinking through difference in the work of Luce Irigaray, who asks: "why and how long ago did God withdraw from carnal love?" (1991a, p 16). This thesis argues that Irigaray enables her readers to explore the relationship between carnality, transcendence and difference, but resists elaborating it in her work. Carnal transcendence as difference risks remaining an exercise in rhetoric, rather than the transformative and creative philosophy that Irigaray imagines. -- Irigaray's resistance to the carnal is evident in her arguments for sexual difference, which offers our "salvation" if we think it through, and heralds "a new age of thought, art, poetry, and language: the creation of a new poetics" (1993a, p 5). Note the language of transcendence used here. When considered in the light of carnal transcendence, sexual difference imagines a differently sexed culture. This thesis argues that Irigaray's writing is contradictory on this point: it articulates the plurality of women's sexuality, but emphatically excludes theories of sex and gender that emphasise multiplicity. This thesis challenges these limitations by exploring the possibilities of the "other" couple in Irigaray's writing-mother and daughter - for thinking through carnal transcendence as difference. -- This thesis not only explicates a theoretical model for carnal transcendence as difference; it also attempts to put into practice a poetics - a playful rewriting of theory. This celebrates the carnality of Irigaray's writing - evident in her complex imagery of the two lips, mucus, the placenta and angels-and enables an exploration of the philosophical space of the "new poetics" that Irigaray is attempting to engender. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / 332 p. ill (some col.)