The problem considered in this thesis is whether or not there is an ethics of belief. The notion that it could be right or wrong to believe something is examined. William James, in The Will To Believe, advocated the right to believe, in certain cases, whatever most tempts one's will. William Kingdon Clifford had earlier argued in The Ethics Of Belief that it is always wrong to believe anything for which the evidence is insufficient. I have argued that belief is not an action that can be executed or refrained from at will but is the acceptance of something as being true. As such, it is not possible for us to believe what most appeals to us unless we deem it true. If 'belief’ is used in any other sense than 'deem true', the true-false distinction is vitiated. Since belief is not an action and is therefore not voluntary, the ethics of belief cannot apply to what is believed. The right or wrong of belief applies to the attitude we adopt to a certain proposition or to the manner in which we acquire our beliefs. The distinction is made between belief-cultivation and inquiry. A detailed analysis of The Will To Believe is then undertaken. The claim that religion is a hypothesis which we can verify is questioned. It seems that before one can 'test' the hypothesis, one must believe it already — thus there is really no test at all. The contrasts between science and religion are presented -- explanation being the main concern of the former and consolation that of the latter. The following six claims are called into question: 1) the decision regarding the truth or falsity of religion is forced and momentous, 2) no test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon, 3) there is a striking similarity between the potential religious believer and the scientific investigator, 4) the universe must have a purpose, 5) in religion, faith creates its own verification, 6) to believe in religion requires hope and courage while to doubt or disbelieve indicates fear and cowardice. It is concluded that even if religious belief influences or changes our actions and reactions, this is proof not of the truth of religion but of its utility, which may be helpful or harmful to the individual and to society. My thesis, in short, is that insofar as we attempt to proportion belief to our desires and not to the evidence, we risk losing the true-false distinction altogether. We thus risk loss of communication with others. And effective communication, I submit, is essential to the acquisition and transmission of knowledge — the raison d'etre of philosophy. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

William James came of age at a time of great social and intellectual change in the United States. During this period, new professional identities proliferated, and a new culture of professionalization developed with important ramifications for conceptions of individual and social identity. Professionalization was also closely related to key intellectual developments of the time, such as the application of scientific methods to social and human questions and the consolidation of intellectual work within the university. This thesis chronicles James's struggle to find a place within this society that both satisfied his personal desire for individual growth and freedom and established him within the context of professional academia, arguing that James's difficulties in finding a professional identity were inseparable from his development of a unique intellectual voice. The thesis then explores how James expressed his personal identity and insights in his work as professional academic and psychologist. / Graduation date: 2003

(Uncorrected OCR) Abstract of thesis entitled 'William James' Psychological Philosophy' submitted by Kwok Hang Wah Yvonne for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong in November 2002 The aim of this thesis is to suggest a way to better understand William James' philosophy by recognising its relation with his evolutionary psychology. In order to clarify James' version of 'evolutionary psychology', I will present it in contrast to Herbert Spencer's biological psychology. In Chapter Two, I will discuss how Spencer establishes his development hypothesis and how he understands the mind as a biological product being modified by environmental changes. In Chapter Three, I will interpret James' argument against Spencer's ideas that the mind operates passively, and that Spencer has overlooked the subjective factors in mental development. Through the discussion, we can understand the main difference between James' and Spencer's evolutionary psychologies. The fourth chapter will focus on James' psychology of the active mind. I will offer a more detailed explanatory account of James' views of three important mental functions, namely 'discrimination', 'association' and 'conception', as well as how they operate to construct experiences. In the last chapter, I will interpret one of the topics in James' philosophical discussions, so as to illustrate his psychological view in his philosophy. The discussion will show James' views of the different i roles of perception and conception in life, and his evolutionary concern of the functional use of concepts for experience. I will then explain how these views are related to James' argument against rationalism and his position in his radical empiricism. Through these discussions, I hope to shed light on the connection between James' evolutionary psychology and his philosophical ideas, which ultimately offers a better understanding to James' philosophy. ii / abstract / toc / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy

My study concerns the works of William James (1842--1910) and the Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu (circa fifth c.). In both cases there is a detailed examination of consciousness which looks at its physiological concomitants. Where James is concerned, this physiological study is found mainly within his Principles of Psychology (1890). In Vasubandhu's case the physiological preconditions of conscious life is inherited from traditional Buddhist psychology (skandhas), but are expanded into the Yogacara concept of the alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness). This novel form of consciousness has been interpreted as both a soul theory in Buddhism, and a form of metaphysical idealism. It is these elements that I juxtapose with similar notions found in Jamesian studies (self and idealism). Thus, Chapter One examines consciousness from the isolated perspective of each thinker, Chapter Two moves to an examination of self, and Chapter Three looks at the possibility of Idealism which is explicitly rejected by James, and is rejected also by many interpreters of the alaya-vijnana.

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Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía

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Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Curitiba, 2010 / Bibliografia: f. 203-208 / Esta pesquisa disserta sobre o empirismo radical de William James e suas teses acerca dos estados excepcionais da consciência. Entenda-se por excepcionais, os estados mentais de exceção à regra da consciência em vigília como a histeria, os transes hipnóti / This research examines William James' radical empiricism as well as his theses concerning the exceptional states of consciousness. By the term exceptional, we refer to mental states of exception to the rule of the waking consciousness, such as hysteria, h