<p>Uppsatsens syfte var att undersöka samspelet mellan porträttör och beställare i porträttets fält. Med hjälp av tre fallstudier med porträtt från tre olika tidsepoker har samspelet analyserats. De tre fallstudierna är Alexanders Roslins porträtt av Fredrik Sparre, Richard Avedons porträtt av Jacqueline och John F Kennedy och skolfotografens porträtt av eleven. Bourdieus sociologiska terminologi och betraktelsesätt har till viss del använts för att försöka förstå detta samspel. Man skulle kunna tro att ett porträtt skapas på ungefär samma vis varje gång men de olika porträttens historier i den här uppsatsen skiljer sig markant åt. Även om de olika </p><p>porträttörerna och de olika beställarna har haft olika syften med porträtten, och även om de olika fallstudierna är tagna från olika tidsepoker har gemensamma nämnare för alla tre studier framkommit. Det intressanta är att se att det finns bredvidaktörer som har stor betydelse för färdigställandet av porträtten. Porträttör och beställare verkar inte ensamma i fältet utan fler aktörer påverkar processen från idé till färdigt porträtt. Bredvidaktörer som utmärkte sig är i Roslins fall Greve de Cauylus, i Avedons fall Jacqueline Kennedy och i kolfotografens fall rektorn. Det är aktörer som är med i hela processen, från idé till färdigt porträtt. Porträttörens frihet i skapandeprocessen är i alla tre fall begränsad. Det visade sig snart att friheten var begränsad i alla tre fallstudier och av olika skäl. I Roslins fall var konkurrensen om uppdragen stenhård. Hans framgång med porträttet på Sparre berodde på hans förmåga att lyssna in och anpassa sig till betydelsefulla personer i porträttets fält. Avedon hade en stark längtan till att skapa porträtt med djupare innebörd, men kände att han inte lyckats med detta i porträttet på </p><p>Kennedys. Friheten begränsades av tidsbristen samt John F Kennedys motvilja att posera stillasittande. Skolfotografens frihet begränsas av strikta regler från företaget hur porträttet ska se ut och skolans snäva tidsram och normer.</p>

Uppsatsens syfte var att undersöka samspelet mellan porträttör och beställare i porträttets fält. Med hjälp av tre fallstudier med porträtt från tre olika tidsepoker har samspelet analyserats. De tre fallstudierna är Alexanders Roslins porträtt av Fredrik Sparre, Richard Avedons porträtt av Jacqueline och John F Kennedy och skolfotografens porträtt av eleven. Bourdieus sociologiska terminologi och betraktelsesätt har till viss del använts för att försöka förstå detta samspel. Man skulle kunna tro att ett porträtt skapas på ungefär samma vis varje gång men de olika porträttens historier i den här uppsatsen skiljer sig markant åt. Även om de olika porträttörerna och de olika beställarna har haft olika syften med porträtten, och även om de olika fallstudierna är tagna från olika tidsepoker har gemensamma nämnare för alla tre studier framkommit. Det intressanta är att se att det finns bredvidaktörer som har stor betydelse för färdigställandet av porträtten. Porträttör och beställare verkar inte ensamma i fältet utan fler aktörer påverkar processen från idé till färdigt porträtt. Bredvidaktörer som utmärkte sig är i Roslins fall Greve de Cauylus, i Avedons fall Jacqueline Kennedy och i kolfotografens fall rektorn. Det är aktörer som är med i hela processen, från idé till färdigt porträtt. Porträttörens frihet i skapandeprocessen är i alla tre fall begränsad. Det visade sig snart att friheten var begränsad i alla tre fallstudier och av olika skäl. I Roslins fall var konkurrensen om uppdragen stenhård. Hans framgång med porträttet på Sparre berodde på hans förmåga att lyssna in och anpassa sig till betydelsefulla personer i porträttets fält. Avedon hade en stark längtan till att skapa porträtt med djupare innebörd, men kände att han inte lyckats med detta i porträttet på Kennedys. Friheten begränsades av tidsbristen samt John F Kennedys motvilja att posera stillasittande. Skolfotografens frihet begränsas av strikta regler från företaget hur porträttet ska se ut och skolans snäva tidsram och normer.

When analyzing the policies of the John F. Kennedy administration towards the People’s Republic of China, previous historians have focused on the lack of substantive change, emphasizing the continuity of action with the prior polices of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. At the same time, a number of historians have noted that it was during the years Kennedy was in office that a majority of the American people began viewing communist China as a greater threat to world peace than the Soviet Union. However, none have sought to explain this sizeable shift in public opinion, or analyze its potential impact on policy. This thesis incorporates archival materials with contemporary print and visual media to make a connection between the sources of public opinion shifts and a change in the assumptions upon which U.S. China policy was based. Almost from the moment the new president assumed office, Robert Komer at the National Security Council and Chester Bowles at the State Department began pushing for changes in China policy based on the assumptions that the communist regime was not a “passing phase,” would only become more powerful and over time constitute an inexorable greater threat to U.S. interests in Asia, and that rapprochement, rather than isolation, was the best means of ameliorating this threat. Together with James Thomson, Roger Hilsman, and eventually Walt Rostow, they pushed for the adoption of what A. Doak Barnett would later term “Containment Without Isolation.” While the Sino-Soviet split accentuated charges of Chinese anti-white racism and the Great Leap Forward reinforced the sense of Mao’s irrationality, the Sino-Indian War confirmed both rising Chinese power and their leadership’s capacity for rational calculation. Meanwhile, in the popular culture, particularly motion pictures, the Yellow Peril enjoyed a revival as Chinese villains stepped to the fore, beginning to free themselves of their Soviet masters. However, while foreign Chinese were feared as never before, Chinese in America gained new acceptance. Laying the groundwork for the next five decades of China policy and enemy images, Kennedy’s Thousand Days constituted a turning point.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 484-407). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 484-407). Also available on the Internet.

The Cuban Missile Crisis has been considered by political scientists and historians as one of the most critical point in U.S. – Soviet relations during the Cold War and probably the only case of the possibility of the nuclear exchange was on highest level. The Cuban Missile Crisis was considered to be a part of continued political game of the ideological struggle between the leaders of United States and Soviet Union. However, the fact of the existence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba created situation for U.S. government to decide what course of actions should be taken and not escalate a further confrontation, which could lead to a mutual nuclear exchange. The suggestions to such course of actions were coming from different members of the Executive Committee of the National Council or EXCOMM, which did make impact on U.S. president’s decision making in relation to Soviet installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962.  The focus of this study relied on outcome of the decisions taken on secret meetings within the Executive Committee of the National Security Council or EXCOMM (included U.S. president as member of this committee) during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The results of this study show if inter – and intragroup conflicts within EXCOOM made such impact on decision making outcome.

Between 1953 and 1963, during the administrations of President Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy, the United States government transformed the way it formulated and executed foreign and defense policies. These changes gave the White House its own foreign policy staff, in the form of the National Security Council, and increased the powers of the Secretary of Defense. Most of these changes began under Eisenhower in the 1950s. Eisenhower, however, delayed making several key reforms despite the recommendations of his staff. He believed some reforms were unnecessary and remained ambivalent about others. Moreover, he wanted to avoid sending complex reorganization legislation through Congress, which Eisenhower feared would allow legislators to interfere in matters of the Executive Branch. Democrats in the 1960 presidential election capitalized on the failure to push through these reforms. The Democratic attacks proved remarkably compelling to a bipartisan audience. Kennedy used this bipartisan agreement to enact many of the reforms Eisenhower had ignored. The motivating factor for many of these decisions was not merely an attempt by either President to concentrate power in the White House, it was a belief that the post-1945 world was so unstable that only giving the White House unfettered access and oversight of the levers of power could ensure the safety of the nation. This work merges Diplomatic History with the field of American Political Development to examine these dramatic changes to the structure of the US government. Historians traditionally have examined these Kennedy era administrative changes in isolation. Studying them together with those that took place under Eisenhower yields a more complete picture of how the national security state developed. Despite Eisenhower’s reluctance to adopt some of the reforms embraced by Kennedy, both presidents believed that major reforms were necessary. Any sound analysis of the ways the contemporary United States makes its foreign and defense policies requires understanding momentous changes that took place during the transformational period of the early Cold War

The Space Shuttle Program at the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Brevard County made a significant impact on the aerospace industry, but what is unknown is how it impacted the county surrounding it, specifically through land use/land cover (LU/LC) change and population dynamics. This research collected land cover and population data throughout the program to determine the impact, while also creating a record of the state of LU/LC and population in Brevard County in general during the same period. Urbanization and tourism were also evaluated as possible catalysts for change when analyzing the LU/LC maps created in ArcMap and the population graphs from Microsoft Excel. Calculated area for different LU/LC classes were the main focus of this research, which led to the finding that urbanization has been a major factor of change in Brevard County through expanding residential areas rather than tourism and change from the Space Shuttle Program was centered in cities closest to the KSC. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (MS)--Florida Atlantic University, 2021. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Policy makers have long recognized the importance of considering past experience, history, and the use of Analogical reasoning when making policy decisions. When elite political actors face foreign policy crises, they often use their past experience, refer to history, and use Analogical reasoning to help them frame their decisions. In the case of the ill-fated invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the use of Analogical reasoning revolving around past covert successes may have created an environment for faulty foreign policy decision-making. Former members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) filled the ranks of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and held key positions within the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. OSS success with guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and intelligence gathering during World War II, coupled with early CIA covert successes (specifically in Guatemala), may have led President Kennedy to make the wrong policy decisions with regard to dealing with Fidel Castro and Cuba. This research explores the use of Analogical reasoning during the decision-making process by way of process-tracing. Process-tracing attempts to identify the intervening processes between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable. We look at six critical junctures and compare how Groupthink, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, and Analogical reasoning approaches help explain any causal mechanisms. The findings suggest that Analogical reasoning may have played a more significant role in President Kennedy's final decision to invade Cuba than previously thought. The findings further suggest that by using the Analogical reasoning approach, our understanding of President Kennedy's foreign policy in Cuba is enhanced when compared to the Groupthink and Bureaucratic Politics Model approaches emphasized in past research.

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