The present investigations study the John Stuart Mill thinking and his position towards paternalism justification, taking into account the harm principle elaborated in his book “On Liberty”. Two are the objectives of this paper. In first place, the anti - paternalist tesis sustained by this autor will be analyzed to identify deficiencies and limitations. In second place, it is sought to determine to what extent they actually opposed such interventions, to verify the accuracy of that somewhat extended belief that sees Mill a strong opponent of paternalism. It is concluded that the defects of Mill’s theses are explained in good account due to an excess of optimism in the capacities of human beings for self-regulation, a strong skepticism about the capacity of the State to achieve effective paternalistic measures, granting From an excessively strong and unrealistic weight to individual autonomy, among other erroneous considerations. It is also concluded that it is not correct to say that John Stuart Mill has maintained an extremely broad or almost absolute antipaternalistic thesis. Although his famous principle of harm makes it impossible to validate many measures of this nature, a more detailed review of his entire work shows that Mill admitted the validity of many interventions in adults. / La presente investigación estudia el pensamiento de John Stuart Mill y su posición alrededor de la justificación del paternalismo, tomando en consideración el principio de daño elaborado en su obra “Sobre la libertad”. Dos son los objetivos de este trabajo. En primer lugar, se analizarán las tesis anti-paternalistas sostenidas por este autor para identificar sus deficiencias y limitaciones. En segundo lugar, se busca determinar hasta qué punto dichas tesis realmente se opusieron a dichas intervenciones, para verificar la exactitud de aquella creencia algo extendida que considera a Mill como un fuerte opositor del paternalismo. Se concluye que los defectos de las tesis de Mill se explican en buena cuenta debido a un exceso de optimismo en las capacidades de los seres humanos para la auto-regulación, un fuerte escepticismo sobre la capacidad del Estado para lograr medidas paternalistas efectivas, el otorgamiento de un peso excesivamente fuerte e irrealista a la autonomía individual, entre otras consideraciones erróneas. Asimismo se concluye que no es correcto afirmar que John Stuart Mill haya sostenido una tesis anti-paternalista sumamente amplia o casi absoluta. Si bien su famoso principio de daño permite excluir de validez a muchas medidas de dicha naturaleza, una revisión más detallada de toda su obra permite mostrar que Mill admitió la validez de muchas intervenciones en adultos.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo provar que há mais espaço para elaboração de regras morais no utilitarismo de Mill quando comparado ao utilitarismo de Bentham. Para que esta tese seja provada é necessário comprovar que a concepção de natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill é mais complexa do que a concepção de natureza humana de Bentham, pois é a ciência da natureza humana que constitui o fundamento das prescrições da moralidade. Esta tese provará que a natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Bentham resume-se a uma natureza humana dotada, principalmente, de uma razão capaz de formular cálculos complexos entre prazer e dor (que inclui a intensidade, proximidade, longinquidade, etc) para decidir sobre a melhor ação (aquela que aponta para o prazer, no cômputo geral do balanço). Em outras palavras, um apelo ao primeiro princípio, ao princípio de utilidade é efetuado a cada ação, questionando as regras do costume e reduzindo o espaço da moral a apenas ao princípio de utilidade. Para Mill, ao contrário, a natureza humana é mais complexa. Ela é composta, de leis da mente ou leis psicológicas, da tese hedonista (que significa que os indivíduos buscam prazer e evitam a dor, assim como para Bentham) e subteses da tese hedonista, como o fato de que os indivíduos, por natureza, agem por hábito, possuem faculdades elevadas das quais derivam prazeres de qualidade superior e possuem a capacidade de se transformar ao longo do tempo. Essas características da natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill permitem converter um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que prescreve que é correto buscar o prazer e fugir da dor como característica central, mas que ressalta que mais elementos precisam ser aventados para que se compreenda a busca do prazer ou a busca da felicidade. É precisamente quando a formulação do princípio de utilidade de Mill abre espaço para que mais elementos precisem ser expostos para que se entenda a busca do prazer ou a maximização da felicidade, que surge a possibilidade de elaboração de regras morais, preceitos ou princípios secundários que permitem que o agente guie-se no mundo prático. Em outras palavras, a natureza mais complexa do indivíduo teórico de Mill admite a elaboração de um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que dá margem à elaboração de uma moralidade também mais complexa, com mais regras morais (ainda que inicialmente embasadas em um cálculo de prazer) relativamente à moral de Bentham. / This work aims to prove that there is more place for the elaboration of moral rules in Mills utilitarianism when compared to Benthams utilitarianism. To prove this thesis it is necessary that Mills conception of human nature be more complex than Benthams conception of human nature, given the fact that it is science of human nature which holds the foundation of morality. This thesis will prove that human nature of Benthams individuals is resumed to a human nature which main feature is an instrumental reason, able to formulate complex calculations between pleasure and pain (which includes intensity, proximity, duration, etc of the pleasures and pains) to decide about the best action (the one which decides for pleasure, once made the balance). In other words, an appeal to the first principle, to the principle of utility is done in each action, questioning customary rules and reducing morality to the principle of utility. For Mill, on the contrary, human nature is more complex. It consists of laws of mind or psychological laws, of hedonistic thesis (which means that individuals look for pleasure and avoid pain in the same sense as Benthams individuals) and sub-thesis of hedonistic thesis, such as the fact that individuals act by habit, they have elevated faculties which derive pleasures of higher qualities and they hold the capacity of transforming themselves through time. Those human nature features of Mills individuals permits to formulate a more complex principle of utility which determines that it is right to look for pleasure and right to avoid pain as the main feature, but many more elements need to be sustained in order to achieve a better understanding of happiness. It is precisely when the formulation of Mills principle of utility opens room for more elements to explain the search of pleasure and the avoidance of pain or the maximization of happiness, that the possibility of formulation of moral rules becomes plausible. Secondary principles are necessary in Mills system to be formulated, so the agent can guide himself in the practical world without an appeal to the first principle in each action. In other words, Mills more complex individuals nature permits the elaboration of a more complex principle of utility which opens place for the elaboration of a more complex morality with more moral rules (even if, initially, those moral rules are grounded on a calculation between pleasure and pain) when compared to Benthams morality.

No description available.

The ideas of liberty presented in the important works of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, The Second Treatise of Government (1689) and On Liberty (1859), are often viewed as belonging to the same conceptual tradition, that of English liberalism. This thesis is an articulation of the diversity between the theories of liberty expressed by Locke and Mill in the Second Treatise and On liberty. \ am aiming to provide a corrective to the tendency to ignore or to gloss over very significant differences between the two men. The work concentrates on the philosophical aspects of each theory of liberty, arguing that they differ in four respects. These are; definitions of liberty; justifications of liberty; how much liberty and for whom they recommend it, and finally, who they believe threatens liberty and how this threat is to be curbed. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that in terms of these areas Locke and Mill are pursuing different ends. I conclude that Locke and Mill present strikingly different theories of liberty and cannot be thought of as belonging to the one conceptual tradition in terms of the definition, the justification, the prescription and the threat to liberty. Ultimately, I question the value of including Locke and Mill in the one conceptual tradition of liberty solely on the basis that they argue ‘freedom from.’

John Stuart Mill’s Representative Government argues that the ideal form of government is representative. In this paper, I interpret Mill’s argument as a utilitarian argument for a political system with the salient feature of authoritative public participation. Mill argues for this feature in the first three chapters of Representative Government. This argument is interpreted in the context of Mill’s utilitarian views as elaborated in Utilitarianism, with emphasis on Mill’s understanding of pleasure formation and high quality utility.

Habil.-Schr.--Bamberg--Univ., 1996. / Bibliogr. p. 215-245.

No description available.

Texte remanié de: Th. Ph. D.--University of Chicago. / Bibliogr. p. 167-214. Index.

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 364-372).

Theses (M.A.)--Marshall University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Includes abstract. Document formatted into pages: contains vi, 73 p. Bibliography: p. 70-73.