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My aim in this essay is wholly constructive: it is to present the lines along which a satisfactory utilitarianism may be developed. Such a theory is satisfactory in respect of its being able to over, come or evade objections to previous utilitarianisms, specifically, to previous act_utilitarianisms; I have picked several of these objections to form the rock upon which the strength of a utilitarian is to be tested. The objections in question all center around the question of whether, given his consequential account of rightness, an act_utilitarian can support the useful social rules and institutions of our society; or whether his position, because of its consequential account of rightness, commits him to acting in such a way as to undermine these rules and institutions. I shall argue that a new form of act_utilitarianism, which I call tempered act_utilitarianism, can both retain its consequential account of rightness and yet can (a) accommodate these rules and institutions within it, (b) allow its proponents on act_utilitarian grounds to advocate adherence to them, as providing us with the beet chance of doing the right or optimific thing, (c) cater to the views of the 'plain man' in this important respect, and (d) achieve all this without recourse to rule_utilitarianism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-37, 104-113).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2008. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on June 9, 2009) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 73 p.; also includes graphics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-73). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Supervisor: Jacqueline D. Woolley. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1974. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

A dual-process framework argues that both intuition and reflection interact to produce moral decisions. The present dissertation integrated moral identity and moral judgment to explain moral behavior from the dual-process model and its account was tested by three studies. A typical everyday moral behavior of interest in the present research was honest behavior. Participants were introduced to use their intuitive ability to predict the dice number demonstrated on a computer. The reward will base on their self-reported accuracy. Studies examined cheating behavior of individuals who had a chance to lie for money. In study 1, sixty participants with diversified background were recruited in a laboratory study. The results supported that honest behavior was more an intuitive result than a reflective outcome. Honest behavior resulted from the absence of temptation and priming moral constructs increased honest behavior. Study 2 contained two parts, in the first part, the researcher developed a Chinese version of moral identity based on Aquino and Reed’s (2002) work, in the second part, fifty-eight participants’ moral identity was investigated by the instrument in the first part. Their honest behavior was measured in the same task adopted in study 1. The result confirmed that different mechanisms led different people to behave ethically. For people who had strong moral identity, honesty resulted from the absence of temptation, while for individual with weak moral identity, honest behavior resulted from the active resistance of temptation. In study 3, moral identity and moral judgment were integrated to explain moral behavior. A Web-based survey with 437 subjects showed that the relationship between moral identity and moral judgment was significant. Individuals who viewed themselves as moral people preferred formalistic ideals to utilitarian framework when making moral judgment. The follow-up experimental study demonstrated that moral identity and moral judgment interacted together to determine moral behavior. When formalism was coupled with the motivational power of moral identity, individuals were most likely to behave morally.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse moral judgement in Newman's theology by examining his religious epistemology of the judgement of faith which he regularly illustrates with a moral analogy. Chapter one explains the philosophical and theological parameters of his religious epistemology in the 'University Sermons', and 'The Idea of a University'. This shows the primacy of the implicit reason of faith, and the secondary, but indispensable, function of explicit reason, manifest in Newmnan's explanation of liberal knowledge. Chapter two refines this by examining the 'Grammar of Assent, to show the objectivity and normativity of his epistemology in the concrete faith judgement of the illative sense. I show the primacy of personal assent in relation to the indispensable, but secondary, function of inferential investigation. Chapter three adopts the epistemology of the 'Grammar of Assent' to explain moral judgement. I introduce the term 'illative moral judgement' to show that concrete moral judgement can be a speculative truth of implicit reason which elicits a real assent of the imagination. There is a creative tension between concrete moral judgement and the abstract moral judgement entailed by the objective existence of the moral law; this is indicated by the moral sense of conscience within the context of his theology of a religious imagination. Moral judgement, action, and progress are connected by examining the role of the will and the influence of grace. The religious dimension of moral judgement is explained by understanding conscience's sense of duty in terms of intentionality within a horizon of belief. And his religious epistemology reveals the mode of reversing concrete moral judgement. Chapter four shows the relevance of Newman's proposals for moral judgement in contemporary moral theology.

This dissertation examines the moral character of civil disobedience. The discussion begins with a conceptual analysis of civil disobedience which eschews standard definitions in favour of a paradigm case approach, highlighting a parallel between the communicative aspects of civil disobedience and the communicative aspects of lawful punishment by the state. Foundations for a moral evaluation of civil disobedience are then laid down through, first, an examination of the nature of wrongdoing and justification, and second, a critique of contemporary defences of political obligation. The absence of political obligation, it is argued, does not immediately justify civil disobedience even in reprehensible regimes because, in all contexts, adherence to the law and disobedience of the law must be judged on the basis of their character and consequences. Various considerations relevant to the justifiability of civil disobedience are then examined before the discussion turns to the three principal claims defended in this thesis. The first is that people have a moral right to engage in civil disobedience irrespective of both the political regime and the merits of their cause. The second is that the reasons for which people engage in civil disobedience may be understood in terms of a pursuit of ideals. When motivated by a deep commitment to the genuine ideals of their society, disobedients may be said to demonstrate responsible citizenship. The third claim is that the law should treat disobedients differently from other offenders. When civil disobedience is morally justified, and sometimes when it is not, the law has reason to be lenient to its practitioners. In defending these claims, this discussion critiques not only the 'classical' narrow conception of civil disobedience as a public, non-violent, conscientious breach of law for which disobedients are willing to be punished, but also broader conceptions of civil disobedience which take a modest view of its justifiability and accord it limited status as a moral right.