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Every healthcare system faces unlimited demands and limited resources, creating a need to make decisions that may limit access to some new, potentially effective technologies. It has become increasingly clearer that such decisions are more than technical ones. They require social value judgements - statements of the publics distributive preferences for healthcare across the population. However, these value judgements largely remain ill-defined. The purpose of this thesis was to explicate distributive preferences of the public to inform funding/coverage decisions on new health technologies. It contains six papers. The first comprises a systematic review of current coverage processes around the world, including value assumptions embedded within them. The second paper presents findings from an expert workshop and key-informant interviews with senior-level healthcare decision-makers in Canada. A technology funding decision-making framework, informed by the results of the first paper and the experiences of these decision-makers, was developed. Their input also highlighted the lack of and need for information on values that reflect those of the Canadian public. The third paper provides a systematic review of empirical studies attempting to explicate distributive preferences of the public. It also includes an analysis of social value arguments found in appeals to negative coverage decisions. From the results of both components, possible approaches to eliciting social values from the public and a list of factors around which distributive preferences may be sought were compiled. Such factors represented characteristics of unique, competing patient populations. Building on findings from the third paper, the fourth paper describes a citizens jury held to explicate distributive preferences for new health technologies in Alberta, Canada. The jury involved a broadly representative sample of the public, who participated in decision simulation exercises involving trade-offs between patient populations characterized by different combinations of factors. A list of preference statements, demonstrating interactions among such factors, emerged. The fifth and sixth papers address methodological issues related to citizens juries, including the comparability of findings from those carried out in the same way but with different samples of the public, and the extent to which they changed the views of individuals who participate in them.

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The current dissertation had three primary objectives, categorized into two MTurk studies with capital juror-eligible community members: (a) cross-validate the psychometric properties of the JQVV, (b): explore the role of legal attitudes via the JQVV in mock capital sentencing decisions, and (c): examine the JQVV's ability to detect juror social desirability in capital voir dire. Impressively, Study 1 (N = 552) and Study 2 (N = 313) provided strong and consistent evidence for the JQVV's reliability and construct validity. In the mock juror paradigm, punitive legal attitudes on the JQVV (i.e., Crime-Neg, Convict, and Death-Pos), did not directly affect sentencing decisions, however they indirectly influenced the perception of nearly all other legally relevant variables (e.g., evidence type). For example, participants with more punitive criminal justice attitudes evaluated aggravating evidence more favorably which, in turn, increased death sentence verdicts. Study 1 also underscored the concerningly low levels of comprehension jurors have regarding judicial instructions and other relevant legal knowledge (e.g., the definition of aggravating). In Study 2, the support-life and support-death groups evidenced divergent patterns of social desirability, although support-death participants did not dramatically alter their scores between the genuine and social desirability condition. Additionally, the JQVV Pros-Cyn and Justice-Pos scales were moderately effective at identifying social desirability, marking the first ever questionnaire to examine juror response styles. Implications for research, professional practice in capital jury selection, and legal policy are discussed.

The ability of jurors and juries to comprehend and utilise scientific evidence in Australian criminal trials has been examined. From mock jury surveys relating to DNA profiling evidence, it was determined that most respondents were able to comprehend some basic and applied statistics, although their ability was in part related to their knowledge of English and their level of education. The point at which mock jurors were prepared to convict an accused solely on the basis of DNA profiling evidence was examined and found to be low compared with the strength of DNA profiling evidence commonly presented in Australian courts. Mock jurors also demonstrated the ability to process evidence that was presented in a Bayesian framework; commencing with prior odds, introducing new information and culminating in posterior odds. From a survey of Australian forensic scientists, including fraud investigators, it was found that most practitioners' concerns could be addressed by greater pre-trial consultation between experts and legal advocates. Improved knowledge within the legal profession concerning the jargon, principles, procedures, limitations and conclusions to be drawn from different scientific disciplines, prior to presenting this evidence in court, is recommended as the means by which complex evidence can be better adduced from expert witnesses and better presented to juries in criminal trials. Finally, from interviewing actual jurors in criminal trials in the Australian Capital Territory it was determined that where jurors' expectations of scientific evidence, particularly DNA profiling evidence, are not met, high levels of juror frustration and speculation may culminate in hung juries. The adversarial setting of criminal proceedings was also found to produce an environment in which jurors felt that information that would assist them in reaching a verdict was being deliberately withheld. The ability of the jury to ask questions and the allowed nature of those questions were also examined, with the resultant recommendation that juries be given more explicit information at the commencement of trials to inform them about their rights and obligations when asking questions.

Le présent mémoire se penche sur la constitutionnalité des articles 517 et 539 C.cr., qui prévoient des ordonnances de non-publication à l'enquête sur mise en liberté provisoire ainsi qu'à l'enquête préliminaire. L'auteur présente d'abord les modalités d'application de chacune de ces ordonnances. Suit ensuite un portrait de la jurisprudence sur la constitutionnalité de ces deux dispositions. L'auteur applique par la suite aux dispositions le test élaboré dans l'arrêt Oakes. Il conclut que l'objectif des dispositions, qui consiste à assurer un procès équitable à l'accusé, est urgent et réel. L'auteur constate ensuite que le critère du lien rationnel n'est pas satisfait puisque, ordonnance ou pas, les informations préjudiciables pour un accusé seront de toute façon dispersées dans le public, notamment grâce aux nouvelles technologies de l'information. À défaut de profiter d'informations fiables retransmises par les médias, le public devra se concentrer sur les rumeurs non vérifiables propagées par le Web. Le critère de l'atteinte minimale est également examiné. L'auteur estime que ni les récusations motivées, ni le changement de venue, ni les directives aux jurés ne sont en mesure de remplacer des ordonnances de non-publication. Enfin, l'auteur estime que les articles 517 et 539 C.cr. échouent le critère de proportionnalité entre les effets préjudiciables et les effets bénéfiques. En conclusion, comme alternative aux interdits de publication, l'auteur propose une réforme du processus de récusations motivées. / This thesis examines the constitutionality of sections 517 et 539 of the Criminal Code, which permits the judge presiding over a bail hearing or a preliminary inquiry to impose a publication ban. The author explains the way these bans are applied. He then reviews the existing case law regarding the constitutionality of these sections of the Criminal Code. In the second part of his thesis, the author applies the Oakes test to both sections. He first deals with the contextual factors to be considered in the analysis. He then examines the objective of the sections, which is to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial. He concludes that this objective is pressing and substantial. On the other hand, the rational connection test is not satisfied, because even with a ban, the prejudicial information will still be transmitted to the public through new technologies such as the Internet. If no information is allowed to be published by the journalists, the public will have to rely solely on rumours and possibly false news circulating on the Web. The minimal impairment test is also examined. Neither challenge for cause, nor change of venue or judicial instructions can replace effectively publication bans. Applying the last part of the Oakes test, the author fails to find that the deleterious effects of publication bans are proportionate to their salutary effects. In conclusion, the author briefly proposes a reform of the challenge for cause process.

Le présent mémoire se penche sur la constitutionnalité des articles 517 et 539 C.cr., qui prévoient des ordonnances de non-publication à l'enquête sur mise en liberté provisoire ainsi qu'à l'enquête préliminaire. L'auteur présente d'abord les modalités d'application de chacune de ces ordonnances. Suit ensuite un portrait de la jurisprudence sur la constitutionnalité de ces deux dispositions. L'auteur applique par la suite aux dispositions le test élaboré dans l'arrêt Oakes. Il conclut que l'objectif des dispositions, qui consiste à assurer un procès équitable à l'accusé, est urgent et réel. L'auteur constate ensuite que le critère du lien rationnel n'est pas satisfait puisque, ordonnance ou pas, les informations préjudiciables pour un accusé seront de toute façon dispersées dans le public, notamment grâce aux nouvelles technologies de l'information. À défaut de profiter d'informations fiables retransmises par les médias, le public devra se concentrer sur les rumeurs non vérifiables propagées par le Web. Le critère de l'atteinte minimale est également examiné. L'auteur estime que ni les récusations motivées, ni le changement de venue, ni les directives aux jurés ne sont en mesure de remplacer des ordonnances de non-publication. Enfin, l'auteur estime que les articles 517 et 539 C.cr. échouent le critère de proportionnalité entre les effets préjudiciables et les effets bénéfiques. En conclusion, comme alternative aux interdits de publication, l'auteur propose une réforme du processus de récusations motivées. / This thesis examines the constitutionality of sections 517 et 539 of the Criminal Code, which permits the judge presiding over a bail hearing or a preliminary inquiry to impose a publication ban. The author explains the way these bans are applied. He then reviews the existing case law regarding the constitutionality of these sections of the Criminal Code. In the second part of his thesis, the author applies the Oakes test to both sections. He first deals with the contextual factors to be considered in the analysis. He then examines the objective of the sections, which is to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial. He concludes that this objective is pressing and substantial. On the other hand, the rational connection test is not satisfied, because even with a ban, the prejudicial information will still be transmitted to the public through new technologies such as the Internet. If no information is allowed to be published by the journalists, the public will have to rely solely on rumours and possibly false news circulating on the Web. The minimal impairment test is also examined. Neither challenge for cause, nor change of venue or judicial instructions can replace effectively publication bans. Applying the last part of the Oakes test, the author fails to find that the deleterious effects of publication bans are proportionate to their salutary effects. In conclusion, the author briefly proposes a reform of the challenge for cause process.

The conflict between the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment is not new nor is it easily decipherable. Both amendments appear to have absolute priority, yet they appear to conflict (Erickson, 1977). The First Amendment declares unequivocally, "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press[,]" while the Sixth Amendment states with equal force, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed..." (U.S. Constitution, Amendment I, Amendment VI). Free speech and an unrestricted press can lead to a partial jury, but a jury unbiased by the media may mean restricted speech. In the judicial system the debate about how to balance these two competing constitutional rights has raged for decades, but one critical area—the nature and characteristics of requests for judicial "gag" orders—has been largely ignored. This thesis analyzed 103 cases from the Media Law Reporter volumes 19 through 33 (approximately 1991-2005) where gag orders were requested because of pretrial publicity. Those 103 cases were evaluated for the type of case, the reason for the case, when the gag order was requested, who requested the gag order, why they requested the gag order, who opposed the gag order, why they opposed the gag order, and why the gag order was granted or denied. It was found that although the issue of gag orders and their use in trials is not settled there is a general pattern to how they tend to be used. This study found that gag orders are most commonly used by judges in serious criminal trials, particularly at the federal level. Further, these cases usually involved juries, and the targets of the gag order were the parties involved in the trial, not the press.