In response to public opposition to the insanity defense, the Guilty But Mentally Ill(GBMI) verdict was enacted with the intention of limiting the number of insanity acquittals and alleviating the public’s concerns. Prior research suggests, however, that many jurors are making verdict decisions with limited knowledge of the dispositional consequences of the GBMI and NGRI verdicts. Further, jurors may erroneously assume that the GBMI verdict is a compromise between a NGRI and guilty verdict, which mitigates punishment. In reality, the dispositional consequences of a GBMI verdict are equivalent to or more restrictive than a guilty verdict. The current study examined the impact of informing jurors of the dispositional consequences of the GBMI and NGRI verdicts. In addition, it explores whether mock jurors’ attitudes toward the insanity defense, individuals with mental illness, and perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness strengthens or attenuates the impact of informing mock jurors of dispositional consequences. Participants (N = 488) read a case summary of an apparently mentally ill male defendant charged with first-degree murder. Half of the participants were informed of the dispositional consequences of GBMI and NGRI verdicts, while the other half of participants received no such information. Then, they were asked to choose individual verdicts and complete a questionnaire that assessed attitudes toward the insanity defense, attitudes toward individuals with mental illness, and perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness. Results indicate that informing participants of dispositional consequences of the GBMI and NGRI verdicts increases the likelihood that the NGRI verdict is selected over the GBMI verdict. In addition, participants who had more favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense and perceived the defendant as less dangerous selected the NGRI verdict over the GBMI verdict at an even higher rate when they were informed of dispositional consequences. The implications for educating jurors in trials that include the GBMI verdict option are discussed.

This dissertation examines predictors of juror-determined damage awards among 377 juror eligible mock jurors. Citizens reporting for jury duty in a large metropolitan county on five days when the study was conducted were invited to participate. Scenarios were created that varied both case facts and witness emotion during trial testimony. Results indicate that Affect Control Theory can be applied to the situation of juror-determined damage awards and is helpful in scientifically explaining some of the variation of both compensatory and punitive damage awards.

Our jury system is predicated upon the expectation that jurors engage in systematic processing when considering evidence and making decisions. They are instructed to interpret facts and apply the appropriate law in a fair, dispassionate manner, free of all bias, including that of emotion. However, emotions containing an element of certainty (e.g., anger and happiness, which require little cognitive effort in determining their source) can often lead people to engage in superficial, heuristic-based processing. Compare this to uncertain emotions (e.g., hope and fear, which require people to seek out explanations for their emotional arousal), which instead has the potential to lead them to engage in deeper, more systematic processing. The purpose of the current research is in part to confirm past research (Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Semmler & Brewer, 2002) that uncertain emotions (like fear) can influence decision-making towards a more systematic style of processing, whereas more certain emotional states (like anger) will lead to a more heuristic style of processing. Studies One, Two, and Three build upon this prior research with the goal of improving methodological rigor through the use of film clips to reliably induce emotions, with awareness of testimonial details serving as measures of processing style. The ultimate objective of the current research was to explore this effect in Study Four by inducing either fear, anger, or neutral emotion in mock jurors, half of whom then followed along with a trial transcript featuring eight testimonial inconsistencies, while the other participants followed along with an error-free version of the same transcript. Overall rates of detection for these inconsistencies was expected to be higher for the uncertain/fearful participants due to their more effortful processing compared to certain/angry participants. These expectations were not fulfilled, with significant main effects only for the transcript version (with or without inconsistencies) on overall inconsistency detection rates. There are a number of plausible explanations for these results, so further investigation is needed.

abstract: In a trial, jurors are asked to set aside their emotions and make judgments based solely on evidence. Research suggests jurors are not always capable of this, particularly when exposed to gruesome photographic evidence. However, previous research has not looked at the potentially moderating effect of when and for how long jurors are exposed to emotionally disturbing photographs, nor how many photographs they see. In two experiments I tested the impact of the timing of and extent of exposure to gruesome photographs on jurors’ emotions, verdicts, and punishment recommendations. In Study 1, I investigated the effect of timing and exposure duration to a single gruesome photograph of a victim in a murder case (no exposure, brief early exposure, brief late exposure, and prolonged exposure) on mock jurors’ emotions and case judgments. Prolonged exposure (relative to no or brief exposure, regardless of timing) increased disgust, which in turn was associated with harsher punishment. Contrary to previous research, the photograph manipulation did not influence verdicts. The results were mixed and inconclusive regarding brief early versus late exposure. In Study 2, I compared repeatedly viewing a single gruesome photograph to viewing a set of four similar, but unique gruesome photographs—holding the exposure time constant—to assess the impact of quantity of photos on jurors’ emotions and case judgments. Viewing multiple gruesome photos (relative to no photos) led to increase in guilty verdicts through increased disgust, replicating previous research. Viewing a single gruesome photo (relative to no photo) led to increase in guilty verdicts through disgust, differing from Study 1 findings. Viewing multiple gruesome photos and a single gruesome photo led to more disgust, compared to viewing no photo. However, differing from Study 1, gruesome photographs did not lead to an increase in punishment recommendations. There were no significant differences between exposure to a single or multiple gruesome photos on disgust, verdicts, or punishments. Overall, greater exposure to gruesome evidence led to increased disgust and punitiveness, relative to those with less exposure. However, jurors with greater exposure to the same or different photographs did not differ in reported emotions, verdicts, or punitiveness. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Psychology 2020

Whether the capital sentencing statute in Texas provides a vehicle for jurors to give effect to mitigation evidence has been a critical factor when the United States Supreme Court has sought to determine its constitutionality. Unlike the majority of other American jurisdictions which maintain capital punishment as a penalty, Texas utilizes a particularly unique scheme which places an assessment of the defendant’s dangerousness at the center of the sentencing decision. Using data gathered from personally conducted interviews with forty-six former capital jurors and trial transcripts from each trial in which they served, this thesis demonstrates how the current sentencing scheme in Texas fails to provide jurors with an adequate vehicle for considering mitigation evidence. Beginning with an analysis of the process of jury selection this study examines the various ways in which the sentencing scheme is explained to potential jurors by the judge, prosecution, and defense attorneys. Of crucial importance is how the mitigation instruction is reconstituted by trial judges and prosecutors into an extension of the defendant’s potential future dangerousness. Emerging from this analysis is the central role that the interpretation of the sentencing statute by legal actors play in determining how jurors view the evidence presented throughout the trial, as well as what factors they believe they are legally permitted to consider in sentencing. The findings of this study strongly suggest that the focus of the sentencing scheme on the defendant’s dangerousness inhibits jurors’ ability to view mitigation evidence unrelated to the crime as mitigating. Thus, the Texas capital sentencing statute in its application appears to prevent jurors from giving effect to personal mitigation, an essential element of a constitutionally satisfactory death penalty statute.

No description available.

No description available.

The present series of studies examine how jurors and public defenders evaluate different pieces of evidence and integrate them into a coherent conclusion within the context of a criminal case. Previous research has shown that in situations where both sides of the case are compelling, decision-makers nevertheless come to highly confident and polarized decisions, called coherence shifts (Simon, 2004). The present research sought to expand on coherence effects, improve upon the methodology of previous studies, and explore potential moderators of coherence. In Study 1, mock jurors (n = 306) read about a criminal case and evaluated multiple pieces of evidence at various points throughout the case. Results indicated that participants exhibited pronounced coherence shifts (i.e., their evaluations of the various pieces of evidence (a) became more consistent as the case progressed, and (b) were evaluated in line with their initial leanings) using an improved methodology that randomized evidence order and evidence valence. Furthermore, participants’ interim leanings of guilt or innocence biased their subsequent evaluations of ambiguous evidence. The direction and magnitude of participants’ coherence shifts were predicted by their pretrial dispositions towards prosecution and defense. Participants lacked awareness of how their perceptions of the evidence have shifted. Coherence shifts were not, however, moderated by asking mock jurors to justify their decisions, or by asking mock jurors to play devil’s advocate while considering each piece of evidence, underscoring the pervasiveness of this cognitive bias. Study 2 examined whether actual public defenders experience coherence shifts and how those shifts relate to the plea bargaining process; however, no coherence shifts were observed. Study 3 examined whether the timing of the defense’s presentation of their case could reduce coherence effects; results indicated that reading about the defense’s case immediately after the prosecution’s case (c.f. following a delay) marginally (p = .09) reduced coherence effects among jurors who acquitted the defendant, suggesting one potential strategy to mitigate this bias.