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Three years after Stalin's death, Khrushchev shocked the world by revealing much of the truth about the crimes of Stalin. Most affected by the revelations were the Communist Parties, who had held Stalin in god-like reverence. This thesis examines the effects, both of these revelations on the British Communist Party, and of the second cataclysmic event of that year - the Hungarian Uprising and its suppression by Soviet tanks. It appears that to many members, an opportunity was presented by Khrushchev's frankness, to renew the Communist movement and set aside the old dogmatic ways; this desire for real change did not, unfortunately, permeate the ranks of the British Party leadership. At all points, whilst allowing open debate to proceed, the leadership took positions and expressed views designed to consolidate and continue in the old mould. Demands for a rigorous analysis of the Stalinist period, including the role of the system of democratic centralism, were never fully taken up; the British Party leadership persisted in taking the Khrushchev line - that Stalin, and the cult of the personality, were responsible for the abuses. The questioning of basic Communist principles, such as democratic centralism was not permitted. Considerable debate did take place, however, within the Party press and in the unofficial journal 'The Reasoner', on many topics including Inner-Party Democracy, the rewriting of 'The British Road to Socialism', anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and unrest in Eastern Europe. The leadership eventually responded to demands for a Special Congress in recognition of the cataclysmic nature of the events. The British Party leadership sought primarily to defend what it knew best - the structures of the Party, and its unthinking loyalty to the Soviet Union. This latter feature proved a heavy strain on the Party when the leadership unconditionally supported the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Uprising. The combined effect of the events of 1956 led to a membership loss in the region of 7,000. 1956 appears to have been a tragically wasted opportunity for the international Communist movement. Having exposed and rejected the distortions of the Stalin period, the possibilities were not taken up. The man had gone, but the system remained unaltered. This thesis attempts to show, however, that whilst the British Party had been nominally independent since the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, it was, because of its historical development, psychologically subordinate to Moscow. For the leaders of the British Communist Party to have gone against the Soviet line, no matter how appalling their decisions, no matter now reasonable the arguments of the British Party dissidents, would have been inconceivable. For many British Communists, Marxism-Leninism had become an article of faith, rather than a political philosophy and practical tool; for many others however, the events of 1956 demonstrated that faith and reason could no longer be reconciled. Despite the departure of many, this dichotomy was to remain within the British Communist Party, along with the structures of democratic centralism, until its dissolution in November 1991.

In the annals of Soviet historiography, discord and rebellion mark the cultural form of the Khrushchev Thaw. Following the U.S.S.R.s loss of its Great Leader in 1953, a diffusion of political authority met a re-evaluation of established ideology; the dominant discourse of Soviet socialism shifted and, through the subsequent clash of orthodox and liberal forces, imparted a critical aesthetic to 1950s Soviet culture. But while the narrative of dissonance privileged by most historical texts cites the sharpness of post-Stalinist art, poetry, and literature as external evidence of a struggle, little attention has been paid to the internal logic of cultural production. Soviet cultural communication based itself on a mutual mythology that pursued both a dialogue of inclusivity and a sense of accountability. By re-examining how producers of culture managed their responsibilities to the state, to the public, and to their art against the Soviet ideal of the collective and its discourse of comradely persuasion, this thesis pursues the expression of Soviet thought by way of Soviet ideology in the malleable discourse of 1953-1958. / Graduate / 0582 / 0724

In the annals of Soviet historiography, discord and rebellion mark the cultural form of the “Khrushchev Thaw.” Following the U.S.S.R.’s loss of its Great Leader in 1953, a diffusion of political authority met a re-evaluation of established ideology; the dominant discourse of Soviet socialism shifted and, through the subsequent clash of orthodox and liberal forces, imparted a critical aesthetic to 1950s Soviet culture. But while the narrative of dissonance privileged by most historical texts cites the sharpness of post-Stalinist art, poetry, and literature as external evidence of a struggle, little attention has been paid to the internal logic of cultural production. Soviet cultural communication based itself on a mutual mythology that pursued both a dialogue of inclusivity and a sense of accountability. By re-examining how producers of culture managed their responsibilities to the state, to the public, and to their art against the Soviet ideal of the collective and its discourse of comradely persuasion, this thesis pursues the expression of Soviet thought by way of Soviet ideology in the malleable discourse of 1953-1958. / Graduate / 0582 / 0724

The aim of this thesis is an analysis of economic development in Soviet Union during the era of Nikita S. Khrushchev. The thesis examines reforms initiated after 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, primarily agriculture and industry. Simultaneously is analyzed socioeconomic situation of post-Stalinist Soviet Union and reasons obliging Khrushchev to plan and carry through with reforms. Efficiency of these reforms, their effect on soviet economy and on standard of living of soviet citizens will be evaluated. As a source will be used monographies, sub-studies and archive materials.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the topic of political control of literature within the Soviet Union. The specific scope of this examination includes an investigation of Nikita S. Khrushchev and his utilization of socialist realism as one of the primary methods of literary control during the period, 1960-1963. A study of literature and its political control will demonstrate the important and dynamic roles which the political control of literature fulfills in the political system.

The present study focuses on the activity of the Young Communist League (Komsomol) to promote the communist project during the so-called Thaw period in the Soviet Union (1953-1964). The term ‘communist project’ describes the complex temporal triangle in which the relevance of the present was rooted in its relationship to the heroic past and the bright future. Young people were supposed to emulate the heroism of previous generations while fighting remnants of the undesired past. This was presented as a precondition for achieving the communist future. The structure of this study reflects the chronology of the communist project. It analyzes the rhetoric used by the Young Communist League to promote the communist project and explores the strategies used to mobilize youth for building communism. The first chapter focuses on the organizational structure of the Komsomol and assesses its readiness for this task. Despite attempts to strengthen horizontal communication and control, streamline administration and reorganize its structure, the Komsomol remained hierarchal and bureaucratic. The second chapter explores the promotion of past heroism in rituals, social practices and the use of public space. The third chapter is also concerned with the past; it describes the Komsomol’s fight against ‘remnants of the past’, primarily religion and deviant behaviour such as hooliganism, heavy drinking and laziness. The final chapter focuses on the Komsomol’s attempts during the Thaw to bring about the future: its efforts in the economy, moral, political and cultural education, and the realm of leisure.

The main goal of the thesis was to find out why leaders decide the way they do. Using the example of the Cuban Crisis from 1962 I try to analyze the decision making process of the american president John F. Kennedy and the soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev. The Cuban Crisis was the most dangerous moment since World War II and the world got to the edge of a nuclear war. The lives of thousands of people were in the hands of the two leaders. Their decision making process was influenced by many internal and external factors and in this thesis I am trying to find out which factors and to what extent had the biggest influence on their decisions.

The main aim of this diploma work is to present the main topics of the soviet geopolitical thinking. The main thesis are presented at the beggining of the work and were influenced mainly by personality of Joseph Stalin. At the end of the first chapter those main goals of the soviet geopolitics are evaluated as well as the role of Stalin for the USSR. The timeline of this diploma work streches from 1953 - 1982 and the main events of this period are mentioned. At the end the role of the three soviet leaders is summarized and their actions evaluated.

Nikita Khrouchtchev est surtout connu en Occident comme étant celui qui a permis le relatif soulagement de la déstalinisation. Cette image est d’ailleurs aussi persistante dans les anciens pays de l’URSS. Lorsque Khrouchtchev accède au pouvoir, il aspire en effet à des modifications ambitieuses dans des domaines extrêmement variés. La dénonciation des crimes de Staline lors du XXème Congrès du PCUS ouvre la voie à l’expression d’un certain pluralisme intellectuel et artistique qualifié de « dégel » dont les effets seront irréversibles pour la société soviétique dans son ensemble. Le volontarisme du premier secrétaire conduit à une politique de réformes économiques et politiques aussi impromptues que déstabilisatrices. Cependant la déstalinisation sera pour les peuples soviétiques (tout spécialement pour les ukrainiens) une ère de déceptions autant que d’espoirs. En effet, l’Ukraine, un des plus solides bastions de la vie religieuse en Union soviétique, tiendra une place particulière dans cette campagne. Entre autres, les régions de l’ouest de l’Ukraine avaient échappées à la répression des années trente et constituaient un phénomène singulier avec leur vie religieuse vivace et leur refus de rejoindre l’orthodoxie. Ainsi la campagne antireligieuse de Khrouchtchev est une facette méconnue de la politique du successeur de Staline. Le comportement du nouveau premier secrétaire va ainsi être encore plus dur que celui de Staline l’ancien séminariste à l’égard de la religion. Ce dernier avait fait des concessions aux Eglises après 1943, alors que dès 1958, quelques années après l’accession au pouvoir de Khrouchtchev, la propagande antireligieuse redevient virulente. / Nikita Khrushchev is mainly known in the western countries as the one who has allowed a relative relief of the dictatorship thanks to the destalinization process. This opinion is also persistent in the former countries of the USSR. Indeed when Khrushchev seizes power, he wishes to proceed with many ambitious reforms in various areas. Nevertheless, he remains a convinced communist who tries this way to give a new start to the soviet ideological adventure. The denunciation of the crimes of Stalin during the XXth Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party (SUCP) opens path to some intellectual and artistic pluralism often called « unfreezing ». Furthermore, the wills of the first secretary will lead to a policy of unexpected and unbalancing politic and economic reforms. But in fact the destalinization times will also be times of disappointments, especially for the Ukrainians. Indeed Ukraine will have a special place in the antireligious campaign, as one of the healthiest strongholds of the religious life of the Soviet Union. Since the western regions had not suffered the repression of the thirties, they were a singular phenomenon in the Soviet Union with their vivid religious life and their refusal to become uniformly orthodox. Thus the antireligious campaign of Khrushchev is one of the poorly known sides of the policy of Stalin’s successor. The behaviour of the new first secretary as regards the religions will be indeed even harsher than the one of Stalin (the former were-be priest). Stalin had made concessions to the churches after 1943; but as soon as 1958, few years after Khrushchev’s rise to power, the antireligious propaganda becomes strong and efficient again.