This essay looks in to the logistics operational significance during the Korean war,1950-1953. The purpose is to give an orientation about how the logistical functioninfluenced the events during the Korean war. Aiming on the investigation anddescription of the logistical organisation and it’s consistency on operations. To achievethe purpose the author searched the answer to two main questions during the analyse ofthe different texts. These main questions where:• Witch logistical factors influenced the operational design?• How did the logistical organisation develop?The method used in this essay is based upon an empiric study in the form of an perusalof literature. The qualitative content analysis of literature is purely descriptive.The most significant conclusions to be drawn in this essay are as follows:The infrastructure in Korea was one of the most important factors that influenced theoperational design from the logistical point of view.Another important factor was the logistical organisation, witch during the campaign inKorea was built in accordance with the U.S. Army doctrine. This made the organisationinflexible and caused logistical problems. Largely these problems could have beenavoided if the organisation had been more flexible in its form. Finally the lack of plansfor military operations in Korea influenced the operational design on the American side.They were unprepared for the situation that aroused in June 1950. The Americans had tothrow their units in to combat before they where ready both concerning logisticalsupport and combat training. This situation could have been avoided if they should havehad valid plans for such an development of the situation. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02

The sea mine has shown that it is an effective weapon during numerous wars and conflicts over the course of history, including operations against the Japanese Empire during World War II and during the Korean War. Yet, despite its proven potency, the sea mine is often neglected or even forgotten. In order to better comprehend this phenomenon a better understanding of mine warfare is needed. When studying previous research into naval mine warfare, an absence of theoretical perspectives can be identified. The purpose of this study is to contribute to this scientific gap by approaching mine warfare from a theoretical perspective. Raoul Castex’ theories on strategic manoeuvre and offense versus defence, are used to develop an analytical instrument. Two cases are then analysed: the offensive mine laying campaign in Japan 1942-1945 and the defensive mine laying campaign in Korea 1950-1953.  The results show that the theory of strategic manoeuvre has greater explanatory value for the offensive case, while the theory of offense versus defence has an equally high explanatory value for the two cases with their diverse actors. In conclusion, the study demonstrates that a theoretical perspective enables greater scientific understanding of mine warfare and its internal factors.

This paper examines how Speller’s theory of success in amphibious operations can be applied on a successful amphibious operation. The research has been encouraged by the fact that previous research concerning success in amphibious operations appears to be lacking. No previous studies of the theory have been found, which further strengthen the necessity for this study. The theory is examined by a single-case study of the recognised amphibious assault on Inchon during the Korean War. The theory is able to explain the success, otherwise the credence to the theory would be refuted. The result of the analysis discloses that Speller’s theory successfully explains the Inchon success in every analytical aspect but deception. The study shows that the coalition forces did not manage to or intend to deceive the North Korean opponent in relation to how an amphibious landing should take place. This study supports the theory as explanatory and can serve as vital knowledge when planning and executing an amphibious operation; however, to strengthen the study’s result, further studies are necessary.

<p>Per definition så befinner sig Nordkorea och Sydkorea i krig med varandra sedan 25 juni 1950. Den aktiva delen av kriget varade endast i tre år och avlöstes av <em>Armistice </em><em>Agreement </em>27 juli 1953. Avtalet syftade till att möjliggöra för politiska företrädare att enas om ett fredsavtal – något man aldrig lyckades uppnå.</p><p>Denna uppsats analyserar tiden från Kairokonferensen 1943 intill <em>Armistice Day </em>1953 utifrån hur bakomliggande incitament – sett ur realistiska och liberalistiska perspektiv inom ramen för internationella relationer – kan förklara händelseutvecklingen på den koreanska halvön.</p><p>Resultatet visar på hur erfarenheter och efterbörd av VK II, politiska målsättningar, misstro mellan parterna och till FN, successivt bygger upp dagens delade Korea utifrån vad som främst återfinns inom den realistiska teoribildningen.</p> / <p>North Korea and South Korea has been at war with each other since June 25, 1950. The active part of the war lasted only three years, which resulted in the <em>Armistice Agreement </em>July 27, 1953. The main purpose of the agreement was to allow political representatives to open up for diplomatic negotiations and agree on a peace agreement – something they never managed to achieve. </p><p>This paper will analyze the time from the Cairo Conference in 1943 until <em>Armistice Day </em>in 1953, and investigate how realistic and liberalized political forces, in the context of International Relations theory, influenced the developments on the Korean Peninsula.</p><p>The conclusions will show how the post-war reconstructions of WW II, U.S. and Soviet foreign policy objectives and UN intervention gradually shaped a permanent landmark at the 38th parallel based on realistic values.</p>

Per definition så befinner sig Nordkorea och Sydkorea i krig med varandra sedan 25 juni 1950. Den aktiva delen av kriget varade endast i tre år och avlöstes av Armistice Agreement 27 juli 1953. Avtalet syftade till att möjliggöra för politiska företrädare att enas om ett fredsavtal – något man aldrig lyckades uppnå. Denna uppsats analyserar tiden från Kairokonferensen 1943 intill Armistice Day 1953 utifrån hur bakomliggande incitament – sett ur realistiska och liberalistiska perspektiv inom ramen för internationella relationer – kan förklara händelseutvecklingen på den koreanska halvön. Resultatet visar på hur erfarenheter och efterbörd av VK II, politiska målsättningar, misstro mellan parterna och till FN, successivt bygger upp dagens delade Korea utifrån vad som främst återfinns inom den realistiska teoribildningen. / North Korea and South Korea has been at war with each other since June 25, 1950. The active part of the war lasted only three years, which resulted in the Armistice Agreement July 27, 1953. The main purpose of the agreement was to allow political representatives to open up for diplomatic negotiations and agree on a peace agreement – something they never managed to achieve.  This paper will analyze the time from the Cairo Conference in 1943 until Armistice Day in 1953, and investigate how realistic and liberalized political forces, in the context of International Relations theory, influenced the developments on the Korean Peninsula. The conclusions will show how the post-war reconstructions of WW II, U.S. and Soviet foreign policy objectives and UN intervention gradually shaped a permanent landmark at the 38th parallel based on realistic values.