Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1949. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 708-721).

Thesis (M.A.) -- Central Connecticut State University, 2007. / Thesis advisor: Matthew Warshauer. "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History" Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-114). Also available via the World Wide Web.

The diploma thesis discusses the issues of help mainly by the United States under the Lend- Lease Act during the Second World War. The theoretical part deals with the historical context and the economic s and political framework of the rise of the programme with an emphasis on the USA. The following part is focused on the quantification of the whole extent. A great part of the thesis is devoted to the issues of help by the Soviet Union. The emphasis is placed not only on the content, but mainly on the logistic issues. Following the historical context there are also four major transportation corridors discussed and their occupancy at the time, material flow and mode of transport are analysed.

Student Number : 0204752J - MSc research report - School of Construction Economics and Management - Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment / Most governments in developing countries are unable to assist in the ever-growing housing needs of the informal sector, which constitutes the major part of most economies. The two reasons for this state of affairs are (i) the ever-shrinking resource base of countries, which makes the provision of subsidies impractical; and (ii) the fact that this sector is normally characterized by irregular incomes, which makes provision for loans by financial institutions difficult. This situation is particularly true for the Kingdom of Lesotho. Due to their unfortunate predicament, the informal sector has become innovative in addressing their housing needs. Various informal credit methods are widely employed to finance their houses, which are built progressively. This research therefore investigates the possibilities of linking the progressive housing investment to bank housing finance, using Maseru - Lesotho as the research focus. In order to achieve the above aim, a household survey was conducted coupled with structured interviews. The structured interviews were held with the commercial banks as well as the government housing authorities. These interviews were mainly to elicit their views about the option of Microfinance of housing. It was established that the respondents as well as the government authorities were not aware of this option. The banks were equally unaware of it and in addition to this, the perceived risk led to skepticism. As such these made Microfinance of housing impractical in the short-run. However it would be advisable to mobilize the formation of a revolving fund to which the commercial banks could on-lend, as a solution to the lack of housing finance.

No description available.

我國抗戰期間，美國提供援華物資，自一九三八年至一九四二年間，共有三項援助方案：內容摘要如下：[一]中美商業借款：可分成桐油，滇錫，鎢砂，和金屬借款。[二]：中美財政援助方案：美國國會於一九四二年通過同意借我政府五億美元以穩定我國財政。[三]租借法案：美國國會於一九四二年通過租借法案，給予中華民國物資以抵禦日本。在租借法案下美國提供我道路運輸之協助，以及供應軍械與飛機。本論文主要就以上三項方案之債務解決作一討論，因債務涉複雜之問題： 　　1.政府承認問題：美國已於一九七九年與中華民國政府斷交，承認中華人民共和國為代表中國之唯一合法政府，因此美國既不認為中華民國具有國際法人資格，缺乏代表性，中華民國政府是否有償還債務之義務？ 　　2.政府繼承問題：美國政府認為中國只有一個，中華人民共和國是代表中國之新政府。所以依照國際慣例，中華人民共和國應繼承舊政府的權利與義務，負有債務清償責任。 　　3.台灣關係法對中華民國拘束力的問題：美國與中華民國斷交後，美國國會制定了台灣關係法，用以規範美國與台灣的非官方關係，該關係法認為中美斷交以前的若干條約應繼續有效，所以這些債務條約都應繼續有效。惟台灣關係法是美國單方制定之國內法，無法拘束中華民國。本論文主要就以上三問題作一探討，以供國家當局參考。

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles began trying to make military matériel available to Latin America during the latter 1930s. Little progress was made until passage of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 enabled Washington to furnish eighteen Latin American nations with about $493,000,000 worth of military assistance during World War II. This study, based primarily on State Department lend-lease decimal files in the National Archives and documents published in Foreign Relations volumes, views the policy's background, development, and implementation in each recipient nation. The conclusion is that the policy produced mixed results for the United States and Latin America.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt inspired the Allies with memorable speeches in their fight against the Axis Powers during World War II. These speeches resulted from their personalities, preparation, and correspondence; and the speeches directed Allied conduct and challenged Axis aggression. The speeches examined here pertain to Lend-Lease in November, 1940-March, 1941. The author consulted the collections of Churchill's and Roosevelt's speeches and correspondence and drew from memoirs and newspapers. The first two chapters examine Churchill and Roosevelt's rhetorical abilities; the third chapter looks at how their correspondence shaped their speeches; and the fourth chapter looks at the Lend-Lease rhetoric. Roosevelt and Churchill's speeches contributed to the success of the Lend-Lease bill and strengthened the Anglo-American alliance. Their words and actions led to the emergence of America as the leader in the alliance and affected Hitler's perception of the Anglo-American relationship and policy.

Through the U.S. Lend-Lease program, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to keep Joseph Stalin's Red Army fighting Adolf Hitler's forces to prevent a separate peace and Nazi Germany's colonization of Soviet territory and strategic resources during the Second World War. Yet after the Red Army's 1943 counterattacks, Roosevelt unnecessarily increased Soviet Lend-Lease aid, oversupplying Stalin's soldiers with more armament than they required for the Soviet Union's defense and enabling their subsequent conquest of East Central Europe and large parts of East Asia. Roosevelt's underestimation of the Red Army's capabilities, his tendency to readily rely on Soviet-influenced advisers, and his unquestioning acceptance of Stalin's implicit threats to forge a separate peace all contributed to his excessive arming of Moscow from 1943 forward. Expanding on the findings of other scholars, this work identifies and explains the impact of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on Roosevelt's reasoning, the key role of the Arctic convoys in delivering material to the Red Army, and how the unnecessary aid routes through Iran and Alaska resulted in the oversupplying of Stalin's troops. Had Roosevelt not opened these unnecessary routes, the Arctic convoys could have continued to sufficiently supply the Red Army's defensive efforts without empowering it to aggressively spread Communism at gunpoint.

British propaganda, delivered in the United States against immediate self-government for India in 1942, was efficiently and effectively organised. British propaganda was not adventitious. It was deliberate. The chief protagonists were Churchill and Roosevelt. Churchill's success in retaining control of government in India depended on convincing the President that there was no viable alternative. This the Prime Minister did in two ways. Firstly, his propaganda organization targetted pro-British groups in America with access to Roosevelt. Secondly, it discredited Indian nationalist leadership. Churchill's success also depended on Sir Stafford Cripps' loyalty to Whitehall and to the Government of India after his Mission in March 1942 failed to reach agreement with the Indian leaders. Cripps tailored his account of the breakdown of negotiations to fit the British propaganda line. Convincing American public opinion and, through it the President, that colonial government should remain in British hands, also depended on the right mix of censorship and press freedom in India. Britain's need to mount a propaganda campaign in the United States indicated its dual agenda: its war-related determination to maintain and increase American aid, and its longer term aim to retain control of its empire. Despite strong American support for isolationism, given legal status in the 1930s Neutrality Acts, Roosevelt was Britain's supportive friend and its ally. Britain, nonetheless, felt sufficiently threatened by the anti-imperial thrust of the Lend Lease Act and the Atlantic Charter, to develop propaganda to persuade the American public and its President that granting Indian selfgovernment in 1942 was inappropriate. The case for a propaganda campaign was made stronger by Roosevelt's constant pressure on Britaln from mid-1941 to reach a political settlement with India. Pressure was also brought to bear by the Congress Party as the price for its war-related cooperation, by China, and by the Labour Party in Britain. Japan's success in Singapore and Burma made strategists briefly assess that India might be the next target. Stable and cooperative government there was as much in America's interest as Britain's. The idea that Roosevelt might intervene in India to secure a measure of self-government there constantly worried Churchill. In turn this motivated the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Information, the India Office, the Government of India and the British Embassy in Washington to develop propaganda based, firstly, on the official explanation for the failure of the Cripps Mission and, secondly. on the elements of the August 1942 Quit India resolution which could be presented as damaging to allied war aims. The perceived danger to Britain's India-related agenda, however, did not end with substantive threats. The volatility of the American press and the President's susceptibility to it in framing policy were more unpredictable. Britain met both threats by targetting friends with access to Roosevelt, sympathetic broadcasters and pro-British sections of the press. Each had shown support for Britain during the Lend Lease debates. Britain, however, could never assume that it had won the propaganda battle or that Roosevelt would not intervene polltically on nationalist India's behalf. Roosevelt continued during 1942 and beyond to let Indian leaders know of his interest in their struggle, and information received from his Mission in New Delhi and from unofficial informants in India gave him a view of events there which differed markedly from the British account. Just as nationalist India was unsure about America's intentions, so was Britain.