Includes bibliography. / What I have coined as 'politics' occur at two levels, namely at the level of the differing political perceptions of Muslims and at the level of how they interact with the modern-state. This study approaches the subject from two angles. The first deals with a community's self-perception in relation to its religious symbols and values. The second involves an understanding of the human reality we experience. Law, ideology, economics and a host of other forces dictate the destinies of people. It is against the backdrop of the above two levels that the implications of the implementation of MPL [Muslim Personal Law] is examined in this thesis. It must be said at the outset that MPL has as yet not been applied in South Africa. The debate regarding its implementation has only begun. This thesis thus looks into the dynamics of this experience. Some aspects of the debate is also based on projections and comparative studies.

Text in Afrikaans / Artikel 217 is van toepassing op Jn bekentenis, synde Jn ondubbelsinnige erkenning van skuld, wat indien dit in Jn hof gemaak sou word, sou neerkom op Jn pleit van skuldig. Om toelaatbaar te wees, moes die verklaarder die bekentenis vrywillig en ongedwonge, by sy volle positiewe sender onbehoorlike beinvloeding afgele het aan Jn landdros of vrederegter. Waar die bekentenis in Jn dokument vervat is, is dit, mits daar aan die toelaatbaarheidsvereistes voldoen is, toelaatbaar teen die verklaarder daarvan. Artikel 209 vind toepassing mits die bekentenis Jn volle bekentenis is en die vereistes van artikel 217 nagekom is. Volgens die beslissing in S V SHEEHAMA 1991 2 SA 860(A) is Jn aanwysing Jn erkenning. As sulks moet dit voldoen aan die vereistes van artikel 219A en moes derhalwe vrywillig en ongedwonge gemaak wees. Jn Gedwonge aanwysing is dus ontoelaatbaar, tensy nuwe feite ontdek word as gevolg daarvan. / Section 217 is applicable to a confession, being an unequivocal acknowledgment of guilt, the equivalent of a plea of guilty before a court of law. To be admissible, the declarant must have made the confession to a magistrate or justice freely and voluntarily in his sound and sober senses without having been unduly influenced thereto. Section 209 is applicable provided that the confession is a full confession and the requirements of section 217 are complied with. According to the judgment in S V SHEEHAMA 1991 2 SA 860(A) a pointing out is an admission. As such it must comply with the requirements of section 219A and must therefore be made voluntarily and freely. An involuntary pointing out is thus inadmissible, except if new facts are discovered because of it. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.

Quantification of damages for loss of amenities of life is a difficult task because there is no connection between enjoyment of life and money. The court however has to compensate the plaintiff with money because that is the only way of restitution. In compensating the plaintiff the court will award a conservative amount which is fair to both parties. The court will take into account previous awards in comparable cases but the personal circumstances of the plaintiff will form the background of the assessment. The intensity and duration of the loss of amenities of life, the plaintiff's contributory negligence, his obligation to mitigate his loss, his ability to cope with his loss and patrimonial damages tending to minimize the loss of amenities of life are all factors to be taken into account in the quantification process. / Die kwantifisering van die vergoeding vir die verlies aan lewensgenietinge is 'n moeilike taak aangesien daar geen verband tussen lewensgeluk and geld is nie. Die hof moet egter die eiser vergoed met 'n som geld aangesien dit die enigste manier van restitusie is. By kwantifisering word die doel van die vergoedingsbedrag asook billikheid en regverdigheid in gedagte gehou. Die hof sal eerder konserwatief as wispelturig te werk gaan by kwantifisering. Verder sal daar na vorige toekennings in vergelykbare gevalle gekyk word, maar uiteindelik sal die omvang van die vergoedingsbedrag bepaal word deur die persoonlike omstandighede van die eiser wat die agtergrond van die kwantifiseringsproses sal vorm. Die tydsduur en intensiteit van die verlies aan lewensgenietinge, die eiser se bydraende nalatigheid, sy verpligting om skade te beperk, sy vermoe om sy verlies te verwerk asook toekennings van 'n vermoensregtelike aard is relevant by kwantifisering. / Mercantile Law / LL.M.

Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.

Thesis (LL M )--Stellenbosch University, 1990. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: According to Rumpf£ CJ in the Nduli decision, Roman-Dutch law is the fons et origo of the statement that customary international law is part of South African law. His sources, Fran~ois and Huber, are open to criticism because they are not Roman-Dutch authorities on this specific question, but the decisions in Ncumata v Matwa (1881-2), Du Toit v Kruger (1905), and Rex v Lionda (1944) emphasise that the reception of customary international law in South African law has taken place through Roman law. Various court decisions emphasise that the term Roman-Dutch law should not be interpreted narrowly, as it includes the common law of the whole of Western Europe and not only of the province Holland. If this quotation is interpreted in an ius commune context, it is clear why Rumpf£ CJ did not cite specific sources to prove his point: he accepted it as a given fact- as the jurists did in the middle ages. Roman-Dutch law serves only as a frame of reference out of which international law has developed. The courts therefore apply international law as international law and not as, for example, common law. Two important implications follow: firstly it means that customary international law need not to be transformed before the courts can apply the relevant rule and secondly that new rules of customary international law automatically form part of the law of South Africa. From the eighty South African court decisions discussed, it is clear that the courts do take judicial notice of customary international law. This justifies the statement that the judiciary regards customary international law as part of the law of South Africa since 1879. The influence of English law on this section of South African law must, according to Rumpf£ CJ, also be taken into account. The reason is that English law is the common law of the South African constitutional law which influences the application of international law by the courts. This can extend the courts' frame of reference. Only a fifth of the cases discussed refer to Roman-Dutch writers, and then only in a comparative sense. The South African courts rely mainly on Anglo-American decisions and tendencies. The South African courts follow their English counterparts by accepting the same qualifications on the general rule that customary international law forms part of the law of the land. The willingness of the courts to apply customary international law has diminished over the years especially in cases where state security features. It seems that politically contentious questions play an inhibiting role on the readiness of the courts to apply customary international law where conflict, real or imaginary, between customary international law and municipal law appears. Acts of state constitute the most important obstacle in the application of customary international law, because they could lead to the court abandoning its independent judicial function in favour of the executive. Because the South African courts follow the English law in this area also, it is assumed that safety measures developed there would be adopted by the South African courts to prevent their jurisdiction from being limited too easily. It is recommended that more attention should be given to the existence and application of customary international law principles and that a conscious effort must be made by the judiciary to resolve conflict between customary international law and municipal law and to do it in such a manner that due account is taken of the fact that in South Africa customary international law is part of the law of the land. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Volgens Rumpff HR se uitspraak in die Ndu/i-beslissing, is Romeins-Hollandse reg die fons et origo van die stelling dat volkeregtelike gewoontereg dee! van Suid-Afrikaanse reg is. Sy bronne, Fran<;ois and Huber, is vatbaar vir kritiek omdat hulle nie Romeins-Hollandse gesag op hierdie spesifieke vraag is nie. Die beslissings in Ncumata v Matwa (1881-2), Du Toit v Kruger (1905), en Rex v Lionda (1944) beklemtoon egter dat die gelding van volkeregtelike gewoontereg in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg we/ deur die Romeinse reg plaasgevind het. Verskeie hofbeslissings beklemtoon verder dat die term Romeins-Hollandse reg nie eng gei"nterpreteer moet word nie, aangesien dit die gemenereg van die hele Wes-Europa omvat, en nie net die van die provinsie Holland nie. Indien hierdie aanhaling in 'n ius commune konteks gei"nterpreteer word, is dit duidelik waarom Rumpff HR nie spesifieke bronne aangehaal het om sy punt te bewys nie: hy het dit as 'n gegewe feit aanvaar - soos ook die juriste in die middeleeue. Romeins-Hollandse reg geld dus slegs as 'n verwysingsraamwerk waaruit die volkereg ontwikkel het. Die howe pas dus volkereg toe as volkereg en nie as, byvoorbeeld, gemenereg nie. Twee belangrike implikasies volg hieruit: eerstens beteken dit dat volkeregtelike gewoontereg nie getransformeer hoefte word voordat die howe die relevante reel toepas nie, en tweedens dat nuwe volkeregtelike gewoonteregreels outomaties dee! vorm van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Uit die tagtig Suid-Afrikaanse hofbeslissings wat bespreek is, is dit duidelik dat die howe wei geregtelik kennis neem van volkeregtelike gewoontereg. Dit regverdig dus die stelling dat die reg bank volkeregtelike gewoontereg reeds sedert 1879 as dee! van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg beskou. Die invloed van die Engelse reg op hierdie dee! van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg behoort volgens Rumpff HR ook in ag geneem te word. Die rede hiervoor is dat die Engelse reg die gemenereg van die Suid-Afrikaanse staatsreg vorm. Dit bei"nvloed die toepassing van die volkereg deur die howe- gevolglik kan dit die howe se verwysingsraamwerk uitbrei. Slegs 'n vyfde van die beslissings verwys na Romeins-Hollandse skrywers, en dan slegs in 'n vergelykende sin. Die Suid-Afrikaanse howe steun hoofsaaklik op Anglo-Amerikaanse beslissings en tendense. Die Suid-Afrikaanse howe volg hulle Engelse ewekniee deur dieselfde beperkinge op die algemene reel dat volkeregtelike gewoontereg dee! vorm van die reg van die land, te aanvaar. Die bereidwilligheid van die howe om volkeregtelike gewoontereg toe te pas het deur die jare afgeneerri, vera) waar staatsveiligheid ter sprake is. Dit blyk dat polities-kontensieuse vrae 'n striemende faktor is by die toepassing van volkeregtelike gewoontereg deur die howe, vera) waar daar 'n botsing tussen volkeregtelike gewoontereg en munisipale reg voorkom. Staatshandelinge is die verna.amste struikelblok by die toepassing van vol-keregtelike gewoontereg, aangesien dit daartoe kan lei dat die howe afstand kan doen van hul onafhanklike regsfunksie ten gunste van die uitvoerende gesag. Omdat die Suid-Afrikaanse howe die Engelse reg ook in hierdie gebied navolg, kan dit aanvaar word dat die veiligheidsma.atreels wat reeds daar ontstaan bet, deur die Suid-Afrikaanse howe gevolg sal word om te verhoed dat hul jurisdiksie ligtelik beperk sou kon word. Dit word dus aanbeveel dat aanda.g gegee word aan die bestaan en toepassing van volkeregtelike gewoonteregbeginsels en dat 'n daadwerklike poging deur die regbank gemaak moet word om botsings tussen volkeregtelike gewoontereg en munisipale reg te vermy, en om dit op so 'n wyse te doen dat in ag gehou word dat volkeregtelike gewoontereg in Suid-Afrika deel is van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg.

LL.M. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Text in Afrikaans / Artikel 217 is van toepassing op Jn bekentenis, synde Jn ondubbelsinnige erkenning van skuld, wat indien dit in Jn hof gemaak sou word, sou neerkom op Jn pleit van skuldig. Om toelaatbaar te wees, moes die verklaarder die bekentenis vrywillig en ongedwonge, by sy volle positiewe sender onbehoorlike beinvloeding afgele het aan Jn landdros of vrederegter. Waar die bekentenis in Jn dokument vervat is, is dit, mits daar aan die toelaatbaarheidsvereistes voldoen is, toelaatbaar teen die verklaarder daarvan. Artikel 209 vind toepassing mits die bekentenis Jn volle bekentenis is en die vereistes van artikel 217 nagekom is. Volgens die beslissing in S V SHEEHAMA 1991 2 SA 860(A) is Jn aanwysing Jn erkenning. As sulks moet dit voldoen aan die vereistes van artikel 219A en moes derhalwe vrywillig en ongedwonge gemaak wees. Jn Gedwonge aanwysing is dus ontoelaatbaar, tensy nuwe feite ontdek word as gevolg daarvan. / Section 217 is applicable to a confession, being an unequivocal acknowledgment of guilt, the equivalent of a plea of guilty before a court of law. To be admissible, the declarant must have made the confession to a magistrate or justice freely and voluntarily in his sound and sober senses without having been unduly influenced thereto. Section 209 is applicable provided that the confession is a full confession and the requirements of section 217 are complied with. According to the judgment in S V SHEEHAMA 1991 2 SA 860(A) a pointing out is an admission. As such it must comply with the requirements of section 219A and must therefore be made voluntarily and freely. An involuntary pointing out is thus inadmissible, except if new facts are discovered because of it. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.

Quantification of damages for loss of amenities of life is a difficult task because there is no connection between enjoyment of life and money. The court however has to compensate the plaintiff with money because that is the only way of restitution. In compensating the plaintiff the court will award a conservative amount which is fair to both parties. The court will take into account previous awards in comparable cases but the personal circumstances of the plaintiff will form the background of the assessment. The intensity and duration of the loss of amenities of life, the plaintiff's contributory negligence, his obligation to mitigate his loss, his ability to cope with his loss and patrimonial damages tending to minimize the loss of amenities of life are all factors to be taken into account in the quantification process. / Die kwantifisering van die vergoeding vir die verlies aan lewensgenietinge is 'n moeilike taak aangesien daar geen verband tussen lewensgeluk and geld is nie. Die hof moet egter die eiser vergoed met 'n som geld aangesien dit die enigste manier van restitusie is. By kwantifisering word die doel van die vergoedingsbedrag asook billikheid en regverdigheid in gedagte gehou. Die hof sal eerder konserwatief as wispelturig te werk gaan by kwantifisering. Verder sal daar na vorige toekennings in vergelykbare gevalle gekyk word, maar uiteindelik sal die omvang van die vergoedingsbedrag bepaal word deur die persoonlike omstandighede van die eiser wat die agtergrond van die kwantifiseringsproses sal vorm. Die tydsduur en intensiteit van die verlies aan lewensgenietinge, die eiser se bydraende nalatigheid, sy verpligting om skade te beperk, sy vermoe om sy verlies te verwerk asook toekennings van 'n vermoensregtelike aard is relevant by kwantifisering. / Mercantile Law / LL.M.

Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.

This thesis analyses the doctrine of duress and its application in the law of contract and unjustified enrichment in South Africa. Following an initial examination of the historical development of the doctrine from its roots in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, the study focuses on the current legal position in the two areas of law under review, identifies the substantive and formal deficiencies in the current approach, and suggests, using comparative authorities, how the law might be developed. As far as the law of contract is concerned, after exposing the difficulties inherent in the current approach, and placing the doctrine in its proper context in the South African law of contract generally, it is argued that the duress doctrine finds its juridical basis in the principle of good faith. A more modern and coherent test for duress is then proposed: one that concentrates on the question whether an illegitimate threat was made, which induced a contract in that it left the other person no reasonable choice but to succumb to the proposal. Additionally, the need for South African contract law to recognise and deal with cases of economic duress is emphasised. The study then shifts to an examination of the position in situations where non-contractual performances have occurred under duress: cases that are decided in terms of the principles of the law of unjustified enrichment. The current position is reviewed, and it is shown that the approach to duress cases is substantially different to the approach that applies in contract. An attempt is made to reconcile this problem. From a structural perspective, the nature and application of the relevant enrichment action where a non-contractual performance is made under duress (the condictio indebiti) is also investigated, in the light of approaches to enrichment adopted in both Germany and England, in an attempt to make better sense of this enrichment action in the South African context. The study closes with an analysis of the various contractual, delictual and enrichment remedies that are available once a case of duress has been proved.