This thesis examines the Indian system of personal laws (‘the PLS’), under which the state applies a version of religious doctrine to the family matters of citizens whom it identifies as belonging to different religious groups. There has been a lengthy and persistent debate over the PLS, particularly in relation to its discriminatory effects upon women. However, another problem with the PLS has been little commented-upon. Supporters of the PLS emphasise its positive impact on religious freedom to such an extent that there is a pervasive assumption that the PLS is, indeed, good for religious freedom. But there has been surprisingly little critical assessment of the truth of this claim in either academic or political debates. This thesis, a work of applied normative legal theory, attempts to fill this important gap in the literature on the PLS. The thesis addresses the question of how the PLS affects one conception of religious freedom, namely religious autonomy. Its principal findings are that the PLS interferes with the religious autonomy of those subject to it by affecting their religious options (by interfering with their freedom from religion and their freedom to practice religion) and by harming their self-respect (by discriminating on the grounds of sex and religion, and by misrecognising their religious identities). Furthermore, the thesis finds that the PLS cannot be defended in the name of religious autonomy based on the possibility of exit from the system, the advantage of having the ‘option of personal law’, the power it gives people to bind their future selves, the expressive potential of the personal laws, the contribution it makes to membership in a religious community, the contribution it makes to religious group autonomy, or the recognition or validation it provides for religious identities. These conclusions imply that concerns relating to religious autonomy constitute an important set of objections to the PLS. The thesis then considers several reform proposals, including certain modifications of the PLS, a move towards a millet system, ‘internal’ reform of individual personal laws and the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code. It particularly focusses on one reform possibility – religious alternative dispute resolution – which has not been considered closely in the Indian context.

Morocco is oftentimes praised by academics, development workers, and women’s rights activists as a trailblazer for the empowerment of women in the Middle East and North African region. Its reforms in the realm of family legislation and progress made in human development place the country at the helm of liberalising Arab Muslim-majority societies, even more so after the Arab Spring and Morocco’s peaceful transition to a ‘new’ constitutional order. However, a closer look at women’s rights discourses, legal reforms, its texts and implementation, and the public attitudes towards the enhancement of women’s rights reveals a less empowering situation. The purported goals of the Family Code, as the extolled document showcasing Morocco’s attempt at ameliorating (married) women’s rights, of ‘doing justice to women’ while ‘preserving men’s dignity’ mask the reformed law’s reconsolidation of patriarchal family relations. Many legal grey areas within this particular law, as well as clashing principles emanating from other laws such as the Penal Code, allow judges and the ʿaduls (religious notaries) to exercise discretion and apply the law as they see fit and, to a large extent, as it conforms to their and the community’s vision of the ideal moral order. Moreover, because ‘doing justice to women’ affects men’s and family’s honour, the project of the enhancement of women’s rights has had as a result retraditionalisation of family relations and hierarchical gender structures. Nowhere is this more poignant than in the status of educated single adult girls from provincial areas. They may be poster girls for the development community, but they are pitied by their own communities because they fail to become complete women––married (non-employed) mothers. The story of Morocco’s professed progress is a story of empowering its citizens, but one which does so on paper only. It is also a story which hides the salient details of poorly written reformed laws, obstructed access to justice, continuing widespread misogyny, material poverty and social marginalisation, and cohesive socio-economic programmes, which are rarely followed through.

This thesis explores the constitutionality of compulsory electoral quotas for women imposed by law. The central question this thesis attempts to answer is what makes these quotas constitutional or unconstitutional in a given jurisdiction. A double methodology was employed to answer this question: theoretical and comparative. From a theoretical perspective, it is proposed that the constitutionality of electoral quotas for women depends on the approach that domestic legal orders adopt to four issues: political representation, equality, affirmative action and political rights. An additional crosscutting factor that influences the constitutionality of these quotas is gender, mainly through its effects on the understanding of political representation and equality. From the comparative law perspective, three jurisdictions were analysed: France, Spain and Mexico. After exploring these systems' approaches to political representation, equality, affirmative action and political rights, the process of adoption of electoral quotas for women is discussed, particularly the constitutional litigation about quota laws. Finally, the relationship between the theory and the practice of assessing the constitutionality of electoral quotas for women is analysed, concluding that although courts use a theoretical framework formed by political representation, equality, affirmative action and political rights, they adopt a somewhat simplistic approach to these issues, using only one of these theoretical factors as the primary determinant, often side-stepping the most controversial issues connected with these factors, and almost completly ignoring the particularities of the target group (women). Additionally, in each jurisdiction the decisions of the courts are also influenced by domestic political and legal factors.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and describe the historical development and current state of children's rights protection under international law. In the first place this text provides an introduction to the issue of the status of children in society and the need for its increased protection. This issue is still actual even if international regulation provides children with complex protection. The ongoing problem is the level of compliance with such obligations, which varies in Member States considerably. The main text of this thesis consists of three main thematic blocks.First one is formed by an excursion into the history of international protection of children rights. This block outlines position of children, which is mirrored in the development of various instruments of international law. It describes a gradual shift from socially almost invisible group, which was not guaranteed any special rights to first general protection by universal human rights instruments and to actual peak of international protection of children rights, which is represented by comprehensive Convention on the Rights of the Child. The second thematic section is dedicated just to Convention on the Rights of the Child where considerable amount of space is devoted to this international treaty. This work deals with related...

The thesis deals with ethical reflection of the right to psychotherapy as a potential natural right, with regard to dispute about psychotherapy outside the health system and its ethical solution. The first part of the thesis clarify the origin and core of the dispute, its parties and their arguments, their conflicting and congruent interests and the impact of the dispute on the situation of the takers of psychotherapy. The second part is devoted to psychotherapy, first of all to the development of psychotherapy in context with political-cultural and historical conditionality, then it reflects the changes in the needs of the recipients of psychotherapy with respect to the transformation of society and finally it defines psychotherapy taking into account domestic and European trends. The third part of the thesis investigate the right to psychotherapy as a potential natural right and consequently also the importance of human rights for resolving the dispute about psychotherapy. First it pays attention to the natural law, to the natural rights and obligations and to the relationship of the natural and positive law; second it reflects the current possibilities of realizing the right to psychotherapy in the Czech Republic with regard to the conclusions of the previous research. The fourth part deals with the realization of the right to psychotherapy due to the principle of subsidiarity and its different concepts. The fifth part contains the discussion and reflection of the current development of the dispute and finally the conclusion of the thesis brings a summary and evaluation of the obtained conclusions.

The liberal conception of the state is marked by an insistence upon the equal civil and political rights of each inhabitant. Recently, though, a number of writers have argued that this emphasis on uniform rights ignores the fact that the populations of most states are culturally diverse, and that their inhabitants have significant interests qua members of particular cultures. They argue that liberals should recognize special, group-based cultural rights as a necessary part of a theory of justice in multicultural societies. In this thesis I examine the idea of special cultural rights. In the first part (Chapters 1 to 4), I begin by setting out some of the different conceptions of culture and multiculturalism that are involved in the debate over cultural rights. I then discuss three claims made by supporters of special cultural rights: (1) that having culture is an essential part of individual autonomy; (2) that people have morally significant interests qua members of particular cultures; and (3) that these interests are inadequately protected by existing liberal conceptions of human rights. Although I conclude that (1) is correct, I argue that both (2) and (3) are mistaken. Among other things, I suggest that the version of culture relied upon by supporters of special cultural rights is an implausible one and I outline what I take to be a more plausible, cosmopolitan conception of culture. In the second part (Chapters 5 to 9), I begin by looking at specific instances of cultural rights-claims, and analyzing the concept of cultural rights qua rights. I consider the practical and conceptual difficulties with special cultural rights at great length. But the core of my thesis is that our interest in culture lies in its contribution of worthwhile goals and options, and that this interest lies in culture generally rather than in particular cultures. Hence, adopting a special or group-based distribution of any right to culture would seem to be inconsistent with liberal egalitarian principles. If there are such things as cultural rights, I argue, they are general rather than special rights. I conclude by offering a very preliminary account of what a cosmopolitan conception of cultural rights might involve in the case of the right to free association and language rights.

Univ., Diss.--Fribourg, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. XVII - LXXXVIII.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Frankfurt, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references and register.

[pt] O presente trabalho realizou análise acerca do conceito de Grave e Genera-lizada Violação de Direitos Humanos (GGVDH), a fim de investigar quais são as fundações da definição ampliada de refugiado e como se deu a sua construção no Brasil. Através de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, os dados usados nesta Dissertação de Mestrado foram coletados das seguintes fontes: teses, dissertações, livros e artigos; relatórios do governo, de organizações internacionais e não go-vernamentais; tratados, declarações e legislações. Esta dissertação buscou apre-sentar a arquitetura protetiva internacional da pessoa humana, investigando as conexões com os diversos mecanismos do Direito Internacional dos Direitos Hu-manos, suas complementaridades, seus regimes e aplicações regionais e nacionais para, então, explorar a trajetória do refúgio no Brasil não somente até a construção do conceito de GGVDH pelo governo, mas também no seu reconhecimento. Em um primeiro momento, deu-se a apresentação do arcabouço jurídico internacional, sua interdependência e relevância para a proteção humana, culminando na Decla-ração de Cartagena (1984) e seus processos revisionais. Posteriormente, desen-volveu-se o histórico brasileiro em matéria de refúgio, chegando ao período de redemocratização e incorporação do conceito de GGVDH pela Lei n° 9.474/1997. Por fim, passou-se à breve análise do reconhecimento de refúgio no Brasil por GGVDH, no intento de mapear o posicionamento do governo frente a essa defini-ção, sua aplicação e limitações, apontando algumas nuances e conclusões. / [en] The present study undertook an analysis about the concept of Gross and Generalized Violation of Human Rights (GGVDH), in an attempt to understand what the foundations of the extended definition of refugee are and how it has been constructed in Brazil. Through a bibliographic and documental research, the data used in this Master s Thesis was collected from the following sources: theses, dissertations, books and articles; reports from government, international and non-governmental organizations; treaties, declarations and legislation. This thesis sought to present the international protective architecture of the human person, investigating its connections with the various mechanisms of International Human Rights Law, their complementariness, regimes, regional and national applications to then, explore the refuge trajectory in Brazil, not only until the construction of the GGVDH concept by the government, but also its recognition. Initially, the international legal framework was presented, their interdependence and relevance to the human protection, culminating in the Cartagena Declaration (1984) and its revision processes. Subsequently, it demonstrated the Brazilian history in terms of refuge, up until the period of re-democratization and incorporation of the GGVDH concept by the Law n 9.474/1997. Finally, it presented a brief analysis of the refugee status recognition under GGVDH in Brazil, in an attempt to map the gov-ernment’s position in relation to this definition, its application and limitations, pointing out some nuances and conclusions.

This thesis inquires into the meaning of the right to security of person. This right is found in many international, regional and domestic human rights instruments. However, academic discourse reveals disagreement about the meaning of the right. The thesis first considers case law from the European Convention on Human Rights, the South African Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. The analysis shows that courts too disagree about the meaning of the right to security of person. The thesis then takes a theoretical approach to understanding the meaning of the right. It is argued that the concept of ‘security’ establishes that the right imposes both positive and negative duties but that ‘security’ does not determine which interests are protected by the right. For this, we need consider the meaning of the ‘person’. The notion of personhood as understood in the ‘capabilities approach’ of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum is then introduced. It is suggested that this theory could be used to identify the interests protected by the right. Next, the theoretical developments are applied to the legal context in order to illustrate the variety of interests the right to security of person would protect and the type of duties it would impose. As a result, it is argued that the idea of ‘security of person’ is too broad to form the subject matter of an individual legal right. This raises a question over the relationship between security of person and human rights law. It is proposed that instead of recognising an individual legal right to security of person, human rights law as a whole could be seen as a mechanism to secure the person, the capabilities approach determining what it takes to fulfil a right and thereby secure the person.