Thesis (M.A.). / Written for the Dept. of Art History and Communication Studies. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2008/03/12). Includes bibliographical references.

The focus of this qualitative study was Lebanese-Canadians‟ identity in the context of global media coverage of the July 2006 war in Lebanon. A narrative inquiry method was used to interview five Lebanese-Canadian participants living in Canada. A descriptive narrative was constructed for each participant, and interview data were analyzed for thematic content. Comments, opinions, and observations were related to media portrayals of Lebanese-Canadians, the government‟s response to the July 2006 war, and the political history between Lebanon and Israel. The results demonstrate that despite a shared ethnic heritage, conceptualizing a Lebanese-Canadian identity is an individual and interactive process that extends beyond citizenship or ethnic ancestry. Moreover, historical and contemporary socio-political issues are inextricably linked to how participants view themselves as Lebanese-Canadians and the meaning this identity status holds for them. These findings suggest that notions of identity and identity-related processes are multifaceted and operate within a highly political context. / Graduate

Thesis (M.F.A.)--University of North Texas, Aug., 2007. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis explores Shi’a-Sunni relations in Gulf politics during a period of regional upheaval, starting with the 2003 invasion of Iraq through the Arab revolts of early 2011. It seeks to understand the conditions under which sectarian distinctions become a prominent feature of the Gulf political landscape, focusing on the three Gulf countries that have been affected most by sectarian tensions: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The study analyzes the contagion effect of the civil war in Iraq, the 2006 war in Lebanon, and the Arab Spring on local sectarian dynamics in the three states. Specifically, it explores the role of domestic institutions—parliaments and other quasi-democratic structures, the media, and clerical establishments—in tempering or exacerbating sectarianism. It finds that the maturity and strength of participatory institutions in each state played a determinant role in the level of sectarianism resulting from dramatic shifts in the regional environment since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I conclude, therefore, that the real roots of the so-called “rise of the Shi’a” phenomena lie in the domestic political context of each state, rather than in the regional policies of Iran or the contagion effect of events in Iraq or Lebanon. Although the Gulf Shi’a took a degree of inspiration from the actions of their co-religionists in Iraq, Iran and Lebanon, they ultimately strove for greater rights in a non-sectarian, nationalist framework. The rise of sectarianism in the Gulf has been largely the product of excessive alarm by entrenched Sunni elites or the result of calculated attempts by regimes to discredit Shi’a political actors by portraying them as proxies for Iran, Iraq, or the Lebanese Hizballah. What is qualitatively different about the post-2003 period is not the level of mobilization by the Shi’a, but rather the intensity of threat perception by Gulf regimes and Sunni Islamists.

The present thesis analyses and clarifies the phenomenon of hybrid warfare. While the term has established its place in the political lexicon, current definitions and explanations are inadequate and unhelpful. This thesis addresses that shortfall by providing a concise strategic definition and a unifying theory of hybrid warfare. As a thesis grounded in the Realist tradition, the analysis focuses on the strategic implications with a view to aid in practical policy-making. Following a theoretical examination of the context and the intellectual history of the term, hybrid warfare is defined as a deliberately opaque blend of conventional and unconventional warfare. The rules of the international order and its 'guardian powers' are a key to understanding hybrid warfare and this thesis provides that understanding through the concept of the quinity. Based on the trinity, a concept emanating from Clausewitzian thought, the quinity blends traditional notions of war with the contemporary international order. The unique set of circumstances which such a combination creates is then combined with the proposed definition and operationalised through an examination of the defence policies and doctrines of the leading global powers. Hybrid warfare, whether practiced by state-like actors like Hezbollah, or states like Russia and China, can be said to represent the future of warfare, at least in the near- to mid- term. As a form of warfare which is not limited to any one domain, hybrid warfare is examined in its land, air, and maritime iterations by analysing the cases of the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2014 Ukraine crisis, and the South China Sea disputes. Its combination of opaqueness, effectiveness, impact, and strategic surprise makes it a carefully balanced and finely calibrated tool of international coercion.

Hur ska resultatet av ett krig mätas, på vilket sätt är det möjligt att opartiskt bedöma vem som vunnit eller förlorat. I många fall är resultatet uppenbart, ingen tvivlar t.ex. på att Storbritannien vann Falklandskriget, utfallet på slagfältet motsvarar uppfattning av vem som vann kriget. Men i många moderna krig är situationen en annan, utgången kan vara omtvistad, eller så är det svårt att uppfatta om kriget överhuvudtaget har avslutats. I uppsatsen används score-keeping teorin som är ett sätt att analysera resultatet av ett krig, vilken aktör vann? Fallet som analyseras är Libanonkri-get 2006 som utkämpades mellan Israel och Hizbollah och är intressant då resultatet dels är om-tvistat samt att det skedde mellan en stat och en organisation som är grupperad inom och verkar ifrån en annan stat. Uppsatsens syfte är därför att utifrån score-keeping teorin analysera Libanonkriget 2006. Den vetenskapliga frågan som skall besvaras är: Vilken aktör kan sägas ha vunnit Libanonkriget 2006 utifrån score-keeping teorin. Designen för undersökningen är en teorikonsumerande studie av Libanonkriget 2006 där av teorin givna variabler operationaliseras för att kunna ställas mot ett urval ur empirin. Undersökningens resultat visar att utifrån score-keeping teorin kan Hizbollah anses vara vinnare i Libanonkriget 2006. Vidare visar undersökningen på ett antal utmaningar med att tillämpa score-keeping teorin på Libanonkriget 2006 med hänsyn till den asymmetri som rådde mellan aktörerna. / How can the outcome of a war be measured, in what way is it possible to impartially determine who won or lost. In many cases the result is obvious, as there is no doubt that Great Britain won the Falklands war, the outcome on the battlefield was equivalent of the perception of who won the war. But in many modern wars the situation can be different, the outcome may be disputed, or it is even hard to understand if the war has finished at all. This essay is using score-keeping theory, which is a way to analyze the outcome of a war, who won? The case analyzed in this essay is the Lebanon war in 2006 which was fought between Israel and Hezbollah and is interesting because the result is both much-disputed and it was fought between a government and an organization that was deployed within and acting from another state. The purpose of this essay is therefore to analyze the 2006 Lebanon war by applying the score-keeping theory. The scientific question to be answered is: Which participant can be stated to have won the 2006 Lebanon war on the basis of score-keeping theory. The design of the study is a theory-consuming survey of the 2006 Lebanon war, where the given variables from the theory are operationalized to be set against a selection from the empirics. The survey´s result shows that according to the score-keeping theory Hezbollah is considered to have won in the 2006 Lebanon war. Furthermore, the survey shows a number of challenges in applying the score-keeping theory in the 2006 Lebanon war, given the asymmetry that prevailed between the participants.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-83). Also available via the Internet.

The film starts with another ordinary day, two elderly men playing Backgammon, cars passing by, children playing in the street; scenes anyone anywhere in the world can relate to. Seemingly without warning, as the sun set on that ordinary day, the audience is taken on a perilous journey through war-torn Beirut. Born in Beirut is a thoughtful and poetic examination of war through the eyes of a child who lived through endless conflict in war-torn Beirut. The film examines the futility of war and the price paid in innocent lives.

How do states perceive threats? Why are material forces sometimes more prominent in shaping threat perception, whereas ideational ones are key in other instances? This study aims to move beyond the task of determining whether material or ideational factors offer a more plausible explanation by arguing that threat perception is a function of the interplay between material factors and state identity, the influence of which can run both ways. Based on ‘analytical eclecticism’, I develop a two-layered conception of security as both physical and ontological, in which the interaction of ideational and material forces can be analysed. Ontological security is intimately connected with identity; its pursuit, therefore, requires distinctiveness and differentiation from the ‘Other’ as well as a coherent and consistent identity narrative at the domestic level. Physical security, on the other hand, involves the identification of threats that constitute a danger to the survival of the state. While ontological and physical security spheres have distinct dynamics and processes, they constitute two interrelated layers. Accordingly, I argue that states can suffer from ontological insecurity while their physical security remains intact, and vice versa. In some instances, physical security and its corresponding material forces condition identity narratives while in other instances the causal arrow points in the other direction. To illustrate these processes, I present a ‘structured, focused’ comparison of Syrian and Saudi threat perceptions during three major wars in the region: the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 2006 Lebanon War, and the 2009 Gaza War. While providing novel insights for explaining the dynamics of threat perception in the Middle East, this study contributes to the broader IR literature by proposing a conceptual framework that links the literature on Self/Other relations, ontological security, and realism in IR theory. This study thus demonstrates the potential utility of bringing IR theory and the Middle East as an area study into closer dialogue.