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Thesis (LLM) --University of Limpopo, 2010

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This thesis examines the possibilities for building a reconciliatory jurisprudence for the protection of indigenous rights under the Australian Constitution. The thesis first examines what could be meant by the term ???reconciliation??? in a legal context and argues that it requires (1) acknowledgement of and atonement for past wrongdoing, (2) the provision of recompense, and (3) the establishment of legal and constitutional structures designed to ensure that similar wrongs are not repeated in the future. The thesis focuses on the last of these three requirements. It is further argued that developing a reconciliatory jurisprudence first requires the courts to free themselves from the dominant paradigm of strict positivism so that they are liberated to pay due regard to questions of morality. Given this framework, the thesis then sets out to examine the purpose and scope of the race power (section 51(xxvi)) of the Australian Constitution, with particular regard to the case of Kartinyeri v Commonwealth in which the High Court directly considered the power. The thesis concludes that the majority of the Court had not, for various reasons, properly considered the nature of the power. An appropriate ruling, it is argued, should find that the power does not enable Parliament to discriminate adversely against racial minorities. The thesis then proceeds to consider whether there are implied terms under the Constitution that protect fundamental rights. It is argued that these rights are indeed protected because the Constitution is based upon the rule of law. In addition constitutional provisions are to be interpreted subject to the presumption that its terms are not to be understood as undermining fundamental rights unless a constitutional provision expressly states otherwise. The thesis also considers whether there is an implied right to equality under the Constitution. The conclusion drawn is that such a right exists and that it is both procedural and substantive in nature.

This thesis looks at the reality of the situation of the Tasmanian Aborigines using the theme of the 19th Century genocide of the Tasmanian Aborigines and the Sacred wound in the context of the law and spirituality. The methodology of the lived experience of the author is drawn upon for a legal and spiritual analysis of cases lived by the author, which provide a backdrop to the handing back of certain Aboriginal lands in Tasmania as well as reflecting on the intersection of Aboriginal lore and the legal system. The meaning of these cases goes beyond a rational legal analysis as the idea that genocide is still continuing is a difficult one for Australians to understand due to compartmentalisation between spirituality and the law in the context of modern Australia. The High Court case of Mabo poses a dilemma for Aborigines as it contains an opportunity to move beyond terra nullius thinking, but at the same time it limits claims in a way that continues dispossession and may in certain circumstances disallow aspects of Aboriginal self determination. Within this apparent standoff lies the possibility for a development of the law that can embrace or incorporate the Aboriginal spiritual attachment to the land, ancestors and artefacts. There is no word in the English language that can describe the multifaceted, inside and outside, perspectives required to carry out the required discussion that could bring the law more into tune with the people, the land and the original inhabitants. The spiritual direction of Australia, however, could be affected by the turning away from a material, logical rational perspective to the embracing of connection as a value in itself: to spiritual values and a personal sense of calling. The Sacred wound is the meditation around which the discussion of all these themes of lived experience, the law and spirituality moves and ultimately rests. / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis argues that native title rights are fundamental to Indigenous citizenship in Australia. It does this by developing a normative conception of citizenship in connection with a model of constitutionalism. Here, citizenship is more than a legal status. It refers to the norms of individual rights coupled with democratic responsibility that are attached to the person in a liberal-democracy. Constitutionalism provides the framework for understanding the manner in which Australian society realizes these norms. This thesis focuses on a society attempting to grapple with issues of postcolonialism. A fundamental question faced in these societies is the legitimacy of group rights based in pre-colonization norms. This thesis argues that these rights can be legitimized when constitutionalism is understood as originating in the deliberations connecting civil society with the state; which deliberations reconcile individual rights with group rights in such a way as to resolve the issue of their competing claims to legitimacy. Civil society is the social space in which politico-legal norms collide with action. The argument constructed here is that native title is built on norms that have the potential (it is a counterfactual argument) to contribute to a postcolonial civil society. This is one in which colonizer and colonized coordinate their action in a mutual search for acceptable solutions to the question 'how do we live together?'. The optimistic analysis is tempered by a consideration of the development of native title law. The jurisprudence of the High Court after the Wik's Case has undermined the potential of native title to play a transformative role. It has undermined Indigenous Australians' place in civil society, and their status as equal individuals and responsible citizens. In seeking to explain this, the thesis turns from jurisprudence to political sociology, and argues that an alternative model of constitutionalism and civil society has supplanted the postcolonial; viz., the neoliberal.

Australian women faced the last two decades of the twentieth century, optimistic in their capacity to contribute positively to social change in the restructuring state. Encouraged by the relative euphoria of the late 1970s and early 1980s, women had a fleeting glimpse of the possibilities of woman-friendly legislation and feminist inspired government policy. What eventuated was the dismantling of supportive welfare structures, under the guise of economic rationalist state action, which undermined and eventually halted women’s economic and social advancement. This research project examines the impact of government policy on the welfare of Victorian women, through a feminist analysis of state and federal decision-making, framed in the context of case studies in the areas of employment, education and health. The promotion of ‘gender-neutral’ policy, by generally conservative bureaucracies, effectively exposes the mythical woman-friendly state. The implications do not auger well for Victorian women in the new millenium.

The topic of this thesis is the prolonged denial and eventual recognition of the rights of the Indigenous peoples of Australia following the British assertion of sovereignty. The analysis considers the manner in which the denial and subsequent recognition of Indigenous rights has affected the system of government of the dominant society (the Commonwealth of Australia) in terms of the establishment and evolution of the constitutional framework and associated processes of institutional change in the principles, structures and procedures of the system of government. The primary jurisdiction in which this topic is explored is the Northern Territory of Australia; the primary contexts are the recognition of Indigenous land rights (defined broadly to include associated natural and cultural heritage and resource rights) and the Indigenous right to self government within ‘the state’ (the internationally constituted and recognised polity of the Commonwealth of Australia). / The thesis draws on analogous developments in Canada and New Zealand to demonstrate that, while significant progress has been made in the recognition of Indigenous rights since the 1960s, many forms of recognition remain conceptually and procedurally limited. In particular, associated regimes have almost invariably been devised and implemented within a fundamentally monocultural context in which Indigenous rights remain subject to unilateral abrogation or extinguishment by Commonwealth governments. In addition, the legal basis of and requirements for recognition of Indigenous rights according to Commonwealth law result in extremely variable levels of recognition in different areas and contexts, and principles and procedures for the mutual recognition and co-existence of Indigenous and Commonwealth law and systems of government are only partially apparent in the Federal and Northern Territory systems of government. In addition to extending and deepening the recognition of Indigenous rights throughout all relevant institutions of the system of government, to address these deficiencies the thesis argues that constitutional recognition and protection of Indigenous rights and the negotiation of treaties are essential if the Indigenous right of self-determination is to be respected and accommodated by the dominant society.