This research focuses on the desirability and feasibility of allowing individuals to access the International Court of Justice when their rights under international human rights treaties have been violated. International law now recognizes individuals as its subjects and that from such recognition flows a right of access to international courts. Using the Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights as models, it is examined whether the right of individual access supersedes the will of states, the arguments for and against a global human rights court and how the ICJ’s statute and rules could be changed to allow individuals a) to participate in the court’s proceedings and b) gain direct access to the court as parties. Individuals could have both locus standi before the ICJ if the Court modifies its procedural rules and jus standi, which requires not only procedural changes, but the modification of the U.N. Charter.

Les relations internationales attestent d’un nombre sans cesse croissant d’entités les animant. Cette situation conduit à favoriser le chevauchement entre sphère publique et privée, et dès lors, la confusion observée quant aux différents protagonistes pouvant intervenir dans celles-ci. Ce faisant, il devient de plus en plus difficile de différencier un simple acteur du droit, d’un authentique sujet de droit, au sein de bien des domaines d’activité et ce, même dans les matières traditionnellement régaliennes. Dans cette perspective, on l’aura compris, les critères de distinction classiquement entendus jusqu’alors semblent se révéler de moins en moins pertinents, si ce n’est parfois en contradiction avec l’évolution de la société contemporaine. Dans cette optique, il semble résulter de la « logique uniformisante » induite par le « cadre mondial globalisé », que certaines différences de nature ne constituent plus que de simples altérités de degré. En ce sens, les catégories que l’on imaginait les plus stables, comme par exemple la classification des États selon leur nature supposée, peuvent subitement se retrouver soumises à discussion. A ce titre, le cas singulier d’un État français présenté théoriquement comme « unitaire décentralisé » - alors qu’il se révèle pourtant « autonomique », si ce n’est même « quasi-fédéral », lorsqu’il est appréhendé à l’aune de ses rapports avec ses entités infra-étatiques ultra-marines - constituera un formidable support d’analyse de l’évolution statutaire des échelons locaux, dans un monde dont l’ordonnancement est lui-même en pleine métamorphose.Cette observation s’inscrit dans un cheminement plus vaste, celui de la remise en cause de la prééminence de la logique « stato-centrée ». L’échelon local nous renseigne sur ce bouleversement, notamment au regard des actions qu’il mène en dehors de la figure étatique, et des enseignements qu’il convient d’en tirer. La présente étude se conçoit dès lors comme une invitation visant à dépasser bien des ambivalences à l’endroit de la « puissance territoriale ». Notamment cette considération théorique selon laquelle les collectivités infra-étatiques ne constitueraient que de simples prolongements organiques des États, dès lors qu’elles sont appréhendées en dehors du cadre normatif national pour mener l’analyse. La pratique observée dans bien des espaces du monde tend en effet à déboucher sur une toute autre conclusion: sous un angle fonctionnel, les entités infra-étatiques apparaissent davantage comme des sujets de droit - ce qu’elles constituent d’ailleurs déjà pleinement au sein de leur ordre juridique interne - plutôt que des objets de celui-ci. / This research is part of a broad process of questioning the pre-eminence of "stato-centered" logic. The local level informs us about this upheaval, in particular with regard to the actions it carries out outside the state figure, and the lessons to be drawn from it. The present study is therefore seen as an invitation to overcome many ambivalences towards "territorial power". In particular, this theoretical consideration that sub-state communities are merely organic extensions of states, when they are apprehended outside the national normative framework to carry out the analysis. The practice observed in many parts of the world is gradually turning into a different conclusion. From a functional point of view, sub-state entities appear more like subjects of law - which they already constitute fully within their internal legal order - rather than the objects of law.

Esta dissertação tem como tema central a disciplina dispensada pelo Código Civil entre os arts. 986 a 990 à sociedade sem personalidade jurídica chamada de sociedade em comum. O legislador do Código Civil, confessadamente, pretendeu redefinir o tratamento jurídico das sociedades sem atos constitutivos levados ao órgão registrador, colocando fim às discussões de natureza teórica e empírica existentes desde o antigo Código Comercial, no qual estavam presentes as chamadas sociedades de fato ou irregulares. Nesse sentido, a abordagem acerca da disciplina da sociedade em comum prender-se-á ao propósito de deixar evidente o caráter inovador das soluções legislativas. Para tanto, o recurso utilizado foi a exposição dos principais problemas presentes na doutrina e na jurisprudência anteriores à promulgação do Código Civil, na primeira parte do trabalho, passando-se às soluções instituídas pela codificação de 2002, na segunda parte; viabilizando o exame realizado na última etapa acerca do modo como foram efetivamente interpretadas as disposições acerca da sociedade em comum pela doutrina e pela jurisprudência brasileiras, especialmente no sentido de saber se são aplicáveis a todas as sociedades sem personalidade jurídica, em razão da falta de inscrição no órgão registrador, ou se, ao lado do regime da sociedade em comum, podem ser aplicados os modelos jurídicos e dogmáticos construídos anteriormente à promulgação do Código Civil de 2002. / This essay is focused on the rules of the Civil Code between the articles 986 and 990 regarding the partnership without legal personality which is called sociedade em comum. The legislator of the Civil Code, admittedly, intended to redefine the legal treatment of partnerships with no constitutive acts taken to the competent board of trade, giving end to theoretical and empirical discussions of since the old Commercial Code, in which were existent the called sociedades de fato or irregulares. In this sense, the approach of the discipline of the sociedade em comum will be developed aiming to let evident the innovative features of the legislative solutions. Thus, the method used was the exposure of the main problems present in doctrine and jurisprudence prior to the promulgation of the Civil Code in the first part of the essay, by passing the solutions imposed by the referred codification in 2002 in the second part, enabling the survey, in the last part, of how the legislative solutions have been effectively interpreted by the brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence, especially in the sense of whether they are applicable to all partnerships without legal personality due to lack of registration or if, beside of the rules created to regulate the sociedade em comum, is possible apply legal and dogmatic models built prior to the enactment of the Civil Code of 2002.

Esta dissertação tem como tema central a disciplina dispensada pelo Código Civil entre os arts. 986 a 990 à sociedade sem personalidade jurídica chamada de sociedade em comum. O legislador do Código Civil, confessadamente, pretendeu redefinir o tratamento jurídico das sociedades sem atos constitutivos levados ao órgão registrador, colocando fim às discussões de natureza teórica e empírica existentes desde o antigo Código Comercial, no qual estavam presentes as chamadas sociedades de fato ou irregulares. Nesse sentido, a abordagem acerca da disciplina da sociedade em comum prender-se-á ao propósito de deixar evidente o caráter inovador das soluções legislativas. Para tanto, o recurso utilizado foi a exposição dos principais problemas presentes na doutrina e na jurisprudência anteriores à promulgação do Código Civil, na primeira parte do trabalho, passando-se às soluções instituídas pela codificação de 2002, na segunda parte; viabilizando o exame realizado na última etapa acerca do modo como foram efetivamente interpretadas as disposições acerca da sociedade em comum pela doutrina e pela jurisprudência brasileiras, especialmente no sentido de saber se são aplicáveis a todas as sociedades sem personalidade jurídica, em razão da falta de inscrição no órgão registrador, ou se, ao lado do regime da sociedade em comum, podem ser aplicados os modelos jurídicos e dogmáticos construídos anteriormente à promulgação do Código Civil de 2002. / This essay is focused on the rules of the Civil Code between the articles 986 and 990 regarding the partnership without legal personality which is called sociedade em comum. The legislator of the Civil Code, admittedly, intended to redefine the legal treatment of partnerships with no constitutive acts taken to the competent board of trade, giving end to theoretical and empirical discussions of since the old Commercial Code, in which were existent the called sociedades de fato or irregulares. In this sense, the approach of the discipline of the sociedade em comum will be developed aiming to let evident the innovative features of the legislative solutions. Thus, the method used was the exposure of the main problems present in doctrine and jurisprudence prior to the promulgation of the Civil Code in the first part of the essay, by passing the solutions imposed by the referred codification in 2002 in the second part, enabling the survey, in the last part, of how the legislative solutions have been effectively interpreted by the brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence, especially in the sense of whether they are applicable to all partnerships without legal personality due to lack of registration or if, beside of the rules created to regulate the sociedade em comum, is possible apply legal and dogmatic models built prior to the enactment of the Civil Code of 2002.

Esta dissertação tem como tema central a disciplina dispensada pelo Código Civil entre os arts. 986 a 990 à sociedade sem personalidade jurídica chamada de sociedade em comum. O legislador do Código Civil, confessadamente, pretendeu redefinir o tratamento jurídico das sociedades sem atos constitutivos levados ao órgão registrador, colocando fim às discussões de natureza teórica e empírica existentes desde o antigo Código Comercial, no qual estavam presentes as chamadas sociedades de fato ou irregulares. Nesse sentido, a abordagem acerca da disciplina da sociedade em comum prender-se-á ao propósito de deixar evidente o caráter inovador das soluções legislativas. Para tanto, o recurso utilizado foi a exposição dos principais problemas presentes na doutrina e na jurisprudência anteriores à promulgação do Código Civil, na primeira parte do trabalho, passando-se às soluções instituídas pela codificação de 2002, na segunda parte; viabilizando o exame realizado na última etapa acerca do modo como foram efetivamente interpretadas as disposições acerca da sociedade em comum pela doutrina e pela jurisprudência brasileiras, especialmente no sentido de saber se são aplicáveis a todas as sociedades sem personalidade jurídica, em razão da falta de inscrição no órgão registrador, ou se, ao lado do regime da sociedade em comum, podem ser aplicados os modelos jurídicos e dogmáticos construídos anteriormente à promulgação do Código Civil de 2002. / This essay is focused on the rules of the Civil Code between the articles 986 and 990 regarding the partnership without legal personality which is called sociedade em comum. The legislator of the Civil Code, admittedly, intended to redefine the legal treatment of partnerships with no constitutive acts taken to the competent board of trade, giving end to theoretical and empirical discussions of since the old Commercial Code, in which were existent the called sociedades de fato or irregulares. In this sense, the approach of the discipline of the sociedade em comum will be developed aiming to let evident the innovative features of the legislative solutions. Thus, the method used was the exposure of the main problems present in doctrine and jurisprudence prior to the promulgation of the Civil Code in the first part of the essay, by passing the solutions imposed by the referred codification in 2002 in the second part, enabling the survey, in the last part, of how the legislative solutions have been effectively interpreted by the brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence, especially in the sense of whether they are applicable to all partnerships without legal personality due to lack of registration or if, beside of the rules created to regulate the sociedade em comum, is possible apply legal and dogmatic models built prior to the enactment of the Civil Code of 2002.

Considering the recent corporate scandals over the past couple years – VBS Mutual Bank, McKinsey & Trillian, Steinhoff, EOH and possibly Tongaat Hulett to name but a few – many shareholders may seek to hold the directors and management of such entities personally liable for their involvement or negligence. Especially where their actions were tantamount to fraud, they benefited in some way and or as a result the company, and possibly the shareholders, suffered damages. This is especially true when a company as consequence is liquidated and cannot institute action on its behalf. It is submitted that directors are rarely held personally liable for failing to fulfill their duties, let alone liable to the shareholders. The risk of failing to monitor internal controls or business risks, and to hold those acting on behalf of the company responsible and accountable for their actions, is dangerous due to the significant effect that such failure could have on the economy, for example the economic collapse with respect to the recent Steinhoff debacle. Whereas the earlier Companies Act 61 of 1973 did not necessarily ‘spell out’ directors’ duties in detail, the Companies 71 of 2008 comprehensibly records their statutory and common law duties. To this extent the board is held accountable and can ensure proper governance in the company’s internal affairs. Shareholders expect management to maximise the value of a company for the benefit of the shareholders and to act in their best interest. In achieving this, directors are required to act in the best interests of the company. However, directors may use their elevated position for their own personal gain and self-interests. Thus, in which circumstances will courts pierce the corporate veil, stepping aside from a company’s unique legal personality, to impute liability to the wrongdoers lurking behind? The relationship between directors, a company and its shareholders is a fiduciary one which imposes certain duties upon directors. However, it is well established in law that directors’ duties are owed to the company itself. Thus, considering common and statutory law, on what legal basis would shareholders be able to bring a claim against directors for the loss or damage they suffered due to an act of the directors? Considering the above, this paper seeks to explore directors’ liability to shareholders within South Africa’s common and statutory law, bearing in mind entrenched legal principles, such as the argument that fiduciary duties are duties owed to the company and not to individual shareholders; and that as a result only the company can impose liability on its directors. / Mini Dissertation (LLM (Corporate Law))--University of Pretoria, 2019. / Mercantile Law / LLM (Corporate Law) / Unrestricted

Název disertační práce v anglickém jazyce, abstrakt v anglickém jazyce a tři klíčová slova v anglickém jazyce Title: Legal aspects of state property management Abstract: When acting in the field of private law, State has the quality of a legal entity. However, State is a legal entity of its own kind. It has an immanent double nature and consequently it doesn't cease to stand on the border of private and public law. The principle of legality doesn't apply to State as a private law actor, which means that it can do even what is not explicitly permitted by the law. On the other hand, State cannot fully exploit autonomy of its will because its legal actions are rigorously predestined by the rules setting clear limits to it. Those limits in form of restrictive dispositions are addressed directly to organizational units of the state and state organizations and their purpose is to ensure efficient and economical management of state property as it is in the public interest. This dissertation aims to analyse the individual elements of property relations of the State. The most important subject in those relations is State itself. Nevertheless State cannot be regarded as one compact and confluent unity. On the contrary, its internal structure is crucial. The effects of internal structure of the State on the property...

O presente trabalho sustenta que as pessoas jurídicas de direito público são titulares de direitos da personalidade, inclusive a honra subjetiva, naqueles aspectos ou manifestações concretas compatíveis com o modo transindividual com que representam o ser humano. / This study sustains that legal entities of public law are entitled to personality rights, including subjective honor, in those aspects or concrete manifestations that are compatible with the transindividual manner by which they represent natural persons.

O presente trabalho sustenta que as pessoas jurídicas de direito público são titulares de direitos da personalidade, inclusive a honra subjetiva, naqueles aspectos ou manifestações concretas compatíveis com o modo transindividual com que representam o ser humano. / This study sustains that legal entities of public law are entitled to personality rights, including subjective honor, in those aspects or concrete manifestations that are compatible with the transindividual manner by which they represent natural persons.

Nesta pesquisa, argumentamos que os escravos brasileiros, pelo menos a partir da década de 1860, tinham personalidade jurídica. Essa personalidade jurídica era limitada e precária. No primeiro capítulo, analisamos o conceito de personalidade jurídica na civilística brasileira e portuguesa. Já no segundo capítulo, nosso foco é o direito de ação. Por meio da análise da documentação selecionada, discorremos sobre diferentes aspectos desse direito: a) possibilidade dos escravos figurarem como partes em processos judiciais; b) imposição do requisito da vênia; c) necessidade de representação por curador; d) atuação do Procurador da Coroa em ações de definição de estatuto jurídico; e) diversos tipos de procedimentos para discussão de estatuto jurídico; e f) instituto do depósito. No terceiro capítulo, tratamos dos direitos civis dos escravos. Discutimos: a) a concessão de alforrias por mulheres casadas; b) o reconhecimento jurídico da família escrava; c) o direito de propriedade dos escravos e sua capacidade contratual; e d) os direitos sucessórios dos escravos. Por sua vez, no quarto capítulo, discutimos a questão da posse da liberdade e suas relações com o instituto da personalidade jurídica. Essa questão é analisada sob três aspectos: a) prescrição aquisitiva; b) fundamentos jurídicos das ações de manutenção de liberdade; e c) prescrição extintiva. O quinto capítulo tem como objetivo discutir a influência do voluntarismo do direito civil no reconhecimento e na efetivação da personalidade jurídica dos escravos. Por fim, no sexto capítulo, abordamos o tratamento dado à personalidade jurídica dos escravos pelos juristas brasileiros e portugueses da época. Também analisamos dois exemplos de pessoas cujo estatuto jurídico era, marginalmente, abordado pela civilística: os escravos em condomínio e os escravos alforriados condicionalmente. Como fontes desta pesquisa, foram utilizadas 41 ações de definição de estatuto jurídico, que integram os acervos do Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro e do Arquivo Edgard Leuenroth. Também foram utilizados livros e periódicos jurídicos, bem como diversos atos normativos emanados pelo poder público como, por exemplo, alvarás, avisos, decisões e provisões. Ao final, concluímos que os escravos brasileiros, entre 1860 e 1888, eram, juridicamente pessoas, o que não era incompatível com sua condição de objeto de propriedade e, tampouco, amenizava a violência da escravidão brasileira. Ademais, os direitos civis dos escravos eram regulados pelas normas e princípios hermenêuticos que regiam o direito civil em geral: o direito da escravidão não era um direito de exceção, mas compatível com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro da segunda metade do século XIX. / In this research, I argue that Brazilian slaves, at least since the 1860s, had legal personality. This legal personality was limited and precarious. In the first chapter, I analyze the concept of \"legal personality\" in Brazilian and Portuguese legal doctrine. In the second chapter, our focus is slaves right action. Through the analysis of the selected documents, I discuss various aspects of this right: a) slaves standing; b) the requirement of vênia; c) slaves representation by a curator; d) the performance of the Procurador da Coroa in status definition lawsuits; e) the various types of procedures that made possible the discussion of legal status; and f) the deposit. In the third chapter, I discuss slaves rights in Civil Law. More specifically, I analyze: a) the grant of manumission by married women; b) the legal recognition of the slave family; c) the right of ownership of slaves and their contractual capacity; and d) slaves rights regarding succession. In the fourth chapter, I discuss the issue of possession of freedom and its relationship with legal personality. I focus on three aspects of this issue: a) adverse possession; b) the legal grounds of maintenance of freedom lawsuits; and c) extinctive prescription. In the fifth chapter, I analyze the role of volition in Civil Law and in the recognition of slaves legal status. Finally, in the sixth chapter, I discuss slaves legal personality in Portuguese and Brazilian legal doctrine. I also analyze two examples of people whose legal status was seldom addressed by jurists: slaves in condominium and conditionally freed slaves. As sources of this research, I use 41 status determination lawsuits, which integrate the collections of the National Archives of Rio de Janeiro and of Edgard Leuenroth Archives. I also use legal books and legal periodicals, as well as various normative acts issued by state authorities. At the end, I conclude that Brazilian slaves, between 1860 and 1888, were legal persons, a status that compatible with their status as object of property. In addition, their juridical personality did not softened the violence of Brazilian slavery. Moreover, slaves legal status was regulated by the rules and hermeneutical principles that governed the Civil Law in general: the law of slavery was not a law of exception, but it was compatible with the Brazilian legal system of the second half of the nineteenth century