Nesta pesquisa, argumentamos que os escravos brasileiros, pelo menos a partir da década de 1860, tinham personalidade jurídica. Essa personalidade jurídica era limitada e precária. No primeiro capítulo, analisamos o conceito de personalidade jurídica na civilística brasileira e portuguesa. Já no segundo capítulo, nosso foco é o direito de ação. Por meio da análise da documentação selecionada, discorremos sobre diferentes aspectos desse direito: a) possibilidade dos escravos figurarem como partes em processos judiciais; b) imposição do requisito da vênia; c) necessidade de representação por curador; d) atuação do Procurador da Coroa em ações de definição de estatuto jurídico; e) diversos tipos de procedimentos para discussão de estatuto jurídico; e f) instituto do depósito. No terceiro capítulo, tratamos dos direitos civis dos escravos. Discutimos: a) a concessão de alforrias por mulheres casadas; b) o reconhecimento jurídico da família escrava; c) o direito de propriedade dos escravos e sua capacidade contratual; e d) os direitos sucessórios dos escravos. Por sua vez, no quarto capítulo, discutimos a questão da posse da liberdade e suas relações com o instituto da personalidade jurídica. Essa questão é analisada sob três aspectos: a) prescrição aquisitiva; b) fundamentos jurídicos das ações de manutenção de liberdade; e c) prescrição extintiva. O quinto capítulo tem como objetivo discutir a influência do voluntarismo do direito civil no reconhecimento e na efetivação da personalidade jurídica dos escravos. Por fim, no sexto capítulo, abordamos o tratamento dado à personalidade jurídica dos escravos pelos juristas brasileiros e portugueses da época. Também analisamos dois exemplos de pessoas cujo estatuto jurídico era, marginalmente, abordado pela civilística: os escravos em condomínio e os escravos alforriados condicionalmente. Como fontes desta pesquisa, foram utilizadas 41 ações de definição de estatuto jurídico, que integram os acervos do Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro e do Arquivo Edgard Leuenroth. Também foram utilizados livros e periódicos jurídicos, bem como diversos atos normativos emanados pelo poder público como, por exemplo, alvarás, avisos, decisões e provisões. Ao final, concluímos que os escravos brasileiros, entre 1860 e 1888, eram, juridicamente pessoas, o que não era incompatível com sua condição de objeto de propriedade e, tampouco, amenizava a violência da escravidão brasileira. Ademais, os direitos civis dos escravos eram regulados pelas normas e princípios hermenêuticos que regiam o direito civil em geral: o direito da escravidão não era um direito de exceção, mas compatível com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro da segunda metade do século XIX. / In this research, I argue that Brazilian slaves, at least since the 1860s, had legal personality. This legal personality was limited and precarious. In the first chapter, I analyze the concept of \"legal personality\" in Brazilian and Portuguese legal doctrine. In the second chapter, our focus is slaves right action. Through the analysis of the selected documents, I discuss various aspects of this right: a) slaves standing; b) the requirement of vênia; c) slaves representation by a curator; d) the performance of the Procurador da Coroa in status definition lawsuits; e) the various types of procedures that made possible the discussion of legal status; and f) the deposit. In the third chapter, I discuss slaves rights in Civil Law. More specifically, I analyze: a) the grant of manumission by married women; b) the legal recognition of the slave family; c) the right of ownership of slaves and their contractual capacity; and d) slaves rights regarding succession. In the fourth chapter, I discuss the issue of possession of freedom and its relationship with legal personality. I focus on three aspects of this issue: a) adverse possession; b) the legal grounds of maintenance of freedom lawsuits; and c) extinctive prescription. In the fifth chapter, I analyze the role of volition in Civil Law and in the recognition of slaves legal status. Finally, in the sixth chapter, I discuss slaves legal personality in Portuguese and Brazilian legal doctrine. I also analyze two examples of people whose legal status was seldom addressed by jurists: slaves in condominium and conditionally freed slaves. As sources of this research, I use 41 status determination lawsuits, which integrate the collections of the National Archives of Rio de Janeiro and of Edgard Leuenroth Archives. I also use legal books and legal periodicals, as well as various normative acts issued by state authorities. At the end, I conclude that Brazilian slaves, between 1860 and 1888, were legal persons, a status that compatible with their status as object of property. In addition, their juridical personality did not softened the violence of Brazilian slavery. Moreover, slaves legal status was regulated by the rules and hermeneutical principles that governed the Civil Law in general: the law of slavery was not a law of exception, but it was compatible with the Brazilian legal system of the second half of the nineteenth century

La personnalité juridique internationale se définit comme la capacité à être titulaire de droits et à se voir imposer des obligations. La théorie classique ne reconnaît la qualité de sujet du droit international qu’aux États et pardérivation aux organisations intergouvernementales. D’autres acteurs, privés, les organisa-tions non gouvernementales, les entreprises, les individus ou encore des groupes armés non étatiques sont aujourd’hui de plus en plus présents sur la scène internationale. Nombre d’instruments convention-nels ont ainsi été développés pour tenir compte de leurs spécificités. C’est essentiellement avec le déve-loppement du droit international pénal, institutionnalisé avec la création de juridictions pénales interna-tionales, que la capacité de certains de ces acteurs à être titulaires de droits et débiteurs d’obligations internationales s’est accrue. Si le statut international des individus, des ONG ou des entreprises soulève moins de difficultés, les contours de celui des organisations armées (au sens large) demeurent encore flous. Leurs activités militaires sont potentiellement génératrices de crimes internationaux; des crimes « belliqueux»d’une part (crimes de guerre, crimes d’agression), d’autres crimes d’autre part (génocides, crimes contre l’humanité). Si le droit des conflits armés reconnaît l’existence de droits et d’obligations à des acteurs privés, il convient de s’interroger sur la relation entre le droit international pénal et la reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique internationale à des organisations armées. La Cour pénale internationale étant à la croisée des différentes branches du droit international, sa possible contribution à une subjectivisation internationale des organisations armées questionne,tant du point de vue de leur rôle dans la commission des crimes, que de leur capacité à en répondre. / International legal personality is defined as the capacity to be a holder of rights and to have obligations imposed on it. Classical theory recognizes only to States as international law subjects and by derivation to intergovernmental organizations. Other private actors, such as non-governmental organizations, com-panies, individuals and non-state armed groups, are nowincreasingly present on the international scene. Many conventional instruments have beendeveloped to consider their specificities. It is mainly with the development of international criminal law, institutionalized with the creation of international criminal courts, that the capacity of some of these actors to be rights holders and duty bearers has increased. While the international statusof individuals, NGOs or companies raises fewer difficulties, the scope of the international status of armed organizations (broadly speaking) remains unclear. Their military activ-ities potentially generate international crimes; « belligerent»crimes on the one hand (war crimes, ag-gression crimes), othercrimes on the other hand (genocides, crimes against humanity). While the law of armed conflict recognizes the existence of rights and obligations of private actors, the link between international criminal law and the recognition of the international legalpersonality to armed organiza-tions must be examined. As the International Criminal Court is at the crossroads of the various fields of international law, its potential contribution to the international subjectification of armed organizations raises questions, both in terms of their role in the commission of crimes and theirability to respond to them.

A desconsideração inversa da personalidade jurídica goza, hoje, de previsão expressa no Código de Processo Civil (artigo 133, §2º), embora já fosse anteriormente estudada pela doutrina e aplicada pela jurisprudência brasileira. Da mesma forma, é recente a inserção, no ordenamento jurídico pátrio, da figura da Empresa Individual de Responsabilidade Limitada (EIRELI), inaugurada pela Lei nº 12.441/2011. A maior novidade trazida por este diploma foi a possibilidade de um único indivíduo constituir uma pessoa jurídica com a celebrada vantagem da separação entre o seu patrimônio e o da empresa que erigiu. Tal particularidade permite, por sua vez, que a desconsideração inversa da personalidade jurídica também atinja as EIRELIs, sendo justamente este o foco da presente pesquisa, a qual se pautou pela análise de acórdãos que se debruçaram sobre o tema, oriundos dos cinco maiores tribunais de justiça no país. Uma vez que as EIRELIs são comumente erigidas sob a forma de micro e pequenas empresas (Lei Complementar nº 123/2006), se sujeitam ao tratamento diferenciado e favorecido dispensado a esta categoria tanto pela Constituição Federal quanto por leis hierarquicamente inferiores. Não obstante, tal atenção especial costuma se restringir à teoria e aos textos legais, sendo raramente constatada na prática jurídica. Por isso, o foco deste trabalho foi o exame crítico de decisões datadas de 2012 a 2017, no bojo das quais foram encontrados equívocos e inconsistências que não condizem com o aludido tratamento, o que, devido à notória relevância das pequenas empresas no cenário econômico-social, prejudica consideravelmente o desenvolvimento nacional. / The inverse disregard of legal personality is now expressly provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure (article 133, §2), although it was previously studied by the doctrine and applied by the Brazilian jurisprudence. In the same way, the insertion in the legal order of the figure of the Individual Company for Limited Liability (EIRELI), inaugurated by Law 12,441/2011, is recent. The greatest novelty brought by this law was the possibility of a single individual to constitute a legal entity with the well-known advantage of the separation between its assets and the one of the company that he/she erected. This particularity allows, in turn, that the inverse disregard of the legal personality also affects the EIRELIs, being precisely this the focus of the present research, which was based on the analysis of judgments that dealt with the subject, coming from the five major courts of justice in the country. Since EIRELIs are commonly erected in the form of micro and small enterprises (Complementary Law 123/2006), they are subject to the differentiated and favored treatment granted to this category both by the Federal Constitution and by lower hierarchical laws. Nevertheless, such special attention is usually confined to theory and legal texts, and is rarely found in legal practice. Therefore, the focus of this work was the critical examination of decisions dating from 2012 to 2017, in which were found misunderstandings and inconsistencies that do not fit the aforementioned treatment, which, due to the notorious relevance of small companies in the economic- development, considerably undermines national development.

This thesis deals with the conditions of influence to the establishment and operation of amusement centers in our country and abroad. It focuses to cooperation of centers and tourism. The goal is to compare the default conditions, which affect the future functioning. The first part deals with the legal conditions that influence the establishment of the company. Next is about the possibilities of financing. The second part deals with tourism. It describes the types of tourism, its development and bringing positive and negative effects. The third part deals to amusement parks. It is an analysis of selected areas, local supply and analysis of selected amusement center. Thesis includes research part, which survey the view of potential clients. Default motive was to find out whether people are interested in similar parks, what they expect and what their experience is. In case of analysis of individual centers is the goal to describe the structure of prosperous companies.

Indivisaires, concubins, membres d'une même famille, copropriétaires siégeant à une même assemblée, sociétés d'un même groupe, adhérents à un même parti politique, salariés d'une même unité économique et sociale, couple d'époux ou de partenaires, personnels de direction d'une même clinique... aucun lien ne semble rapprocher ces situations. Pourtant, toutes ont pu être qualifiées de "communautés d'intérêts". Hasard du langage ou, à l'inverse, signe de l'émergence d'une véritable notion ? Quels enseignements peuvent être tirés de l'emploi récurrent de l'expression "communauté d'intérêts" en droit positif ? Approfondissement minutieusement l'état de notre droit, cet essai s'applique à démontrer l'existence de la nation de communauté d'intérêts, ses spécificités et tout l'intérêt de sa consécration. Appréhendant la communauté d'intérêts comme un ensemble de personnes unies par des liens particuliers, l'étude menée ici s'avère audacieuse. Elle met à la disposition du juge et du législateur des outils de protection adaptés aux particularités de cette entité juridique et requise par celle-ci. D'une utilité pratique indéniable, l'étude répond également à une nécessité théorique. Elle propose de combler un vide juridique, celui qui existe au sein des groupements de personnes, et situe ainsi les diverses communautés d'intérêts entre les ensembles dépourvus de toute cohésion et ceux qui sont dotés de la personnalité morale ou qui en sont privés pour des raisons formelles. / Interest owners, cohabitees, members of a same family, co-owners at a same general assembly, subsidiairies of a same company, members of a same political party, employees of a same economic and social entity, spouses or life partners, management staff of a same clinic... these appear as unrelated and dissimilar simulations. Yet, all qualify as "communities of interests". Is this a mere vocabulary coincidence or the indication that a genuine concept is emerging ? What lessons can we learn from the recurring use of the term "communities of interest" in positive law ? Thoroughly researching the state of our law, this essay demonstrates the concept of "community of interest", its specificities and why it should be legally anchored. Apprehending the community of interest as a group of people united by special ties, the study undertaken here appears bold. It provides the judge and the legislator with protection tools adapted to the particularities of this legal entity and required by it. The study answers a theoretical necessity, and demonstrates its undeniable practical use. It proposes to fill a legal vacuum that exists within groups of people, and thus places the different communities of interest between the entities without any cohesion at all and those with legal personality or who are deprived of legal personality for formal reasons.

L’objectif de cette thèse est de vérifier si les publicains sous la République romaine étaient organisés sous une forme semblable à celle de la compagnie moderne. Après l’introduction, le second chapitre introduit la compagnie, les autres structures utilisées pour organiser une entreprise et la personnalité juridique en droit moderne. Il réfute trois idées préconçues ayant influencé les historiens et les juristes. Le troisième chapitre présente les publicains et leurs activités. En effet, les historiens et les juristes y font abondamment référence dans leur argumentation concernant l’organisation juridique des publicains; il faut donc se familiariser avec elles. Une revue critique de la littérature historique est effectuée. Le quatrième chapitre procède à l’analyse critique de la position des historiens et des juristes sur l’organisation juridique des publicains. D’abord, il explique la notion de société ordinaire de droit romain; ensuite, il discute de l’évolution du concept de la personnalité juridique distincte; enfin, il étudie le cas particulier des sociétés de publicains. Ces dernières seraient différentes des sociétés ordinaires, parce qu’elles détiendraient une personnalité juridique distincte et auraient une organisation interne à trois paliers (actionnaires, administrateurs et dirigeants). Toutefois, ce point de vue est fondé sur des sources datant de plusieurs siècles après la fin de la République. Il faut donc examiner les sources contemporaines afin de vérifier si elles nous mènent aux mêmes conclusions. Le cinquième chapitre contient une analyse originale de la documentation républicaine. De nouveaux éléments de preuve sont repérés. Il confirme que les sociétés de publicains ont détenu un embryon de personnalité juridique distincte durant le dernier siècle de la République; par contre, c’était aussi le cas des sociétés ordinaires. Les sociétés de publicains n’avaient pas une organisation interne à trois paliers; en outre, celle des sociétés ordinaires incluait des magistri comme la leur. Les sociétés des publicains s’apparentaient à des sociétés en commandite et non à des compagnies. La conclusion souligne les éléments nouveaux contribués au savoir par chaque chapitre du doctorat. / The purpose of this thesis is to verify whether at the time of the Roman Republic, the publicans were organized in a structure similar to the modern corporation. After the introduction, the second chapter introduces the corporation, the other legal structures used to organize a business and legal personality in modern law. It refutes three preconceived ideas which have influenced historians and jurists. The third chapter presents the publicans and their activities, since historians and jurists abundantly refer to those in their argumentation regarding the legal organization of publicans. It is therefore necessary to familiarize ourselves with them. A critical review of historical literature is conducted. The fourth chapter proceeds to a critical analysis of the position of the historians and the jurists on the legal organization of publicans. It starts with an explanation of the ordinary partnership in Roman law, it then discusses the evolution of legal personality in Roman law and finally, it presents the special case of the partnerships of publicans. These were apparently been different from ordinary partnerships, because they had legal personality and had a three-levels internal organization (shareholders, directors and officers). However, this point of view is based on sources which post-date the Republic by several centuries. We should therefore examine contemporary sources to verify if they lead us to the same conclusions. The fifth chapter contains an original analysis of the republican documentation. New pieces of evidence are identified. It confirms that publican partnerships had an embryo of legal personality during the last century of the Republic; however, it was also the case of ordinary partnerships. Publican partnerships did not have a three levels internal organisation; in addition; that of the ordinary partnerships included magistri like their own. The publican partnerships were similar to limited partnerships, not to corporations. The conclusion identifies the new elements contributed to knowledge by each chapter of the thesis.

Au début des années 1880, la théorie du ministre-juge entretient encore la fragmentation des actes unilatéraux de l’administration. La méthode d’exposition du droit administratif alimente également la dispersion de ces actes et nourrit le morcellement de leurs règles. Près d’une cinquantaine d’années sera nécessaire pour ordonner cette diversité, pour forger une conception générale de l’acte administratif unilatéral obéissant à un régime unifié. Afin de se représenter le processus d’élaboration de l’acte administratif unilatéral, la doctrine et le juge puisent conjointement dans le fonds conceptuel subjectif. Instruments traditionnels de la science juridique, à l’efficacité éprouvée, la volonté et la personnalité juridique révèlent, à partir de la fin du XIXe siècle, l’essence logique de l’acte administratif unilatéral. L’émergence d’une conception unifiée de l’acte n’est cependant pas le fruit de l’utilisation servile des matériaux hérités de la science juridique classique. Alors que cet outillage a été pensé pour un sujet libre et agissant ordinairement pour son propre compte, les administrativistes doivent systématiser l’activité juridique d’hommes agissant pour le compte d’êtres collectifs, privés de volonté propre. Les spécificités de l’acte administratif unilatéral requièrent donc un imposant travail d’adaptation. A la tradition, succède l’innovation lors de la conceptualisation du résultat de l’opération décisionnelle. A l’inverse du juge administratif, la doctrine repousse le legs des civilistes pour penser l’effet de droit et imagine un concept, la situation juridique, reflétant l’épanouissement de l’objectivisme. Son ambition de contenir le subjectivisme l’incite également à rompre avec ses premiers inspirateurs, les théoriciens allemands du droit public. La théorie de l’hétérolimitation de l’Etat, qui remplace celle de l’autolimitation, influe alors sur la conception de l’autorité des actes administratifs unilatéraux. / At the begining of the 1880’s, the theory of the « Minister-Judge » continues to maintain the partition of the unilateral administrative acts. The methodology of the Doctrine then in use, contributes to scatter the Administration’s decisions and feeds the fragmentation of the rules. It will take about fifty years to overcome this divesity and to forge a general conception of the unilateral administrative act governed by a unified legal system. In order to picture the elaborating process of the unilateral adminstrative act, the Doctrine and the Judge jointly draw in the subjective conceptual collection. Starting from the end of the 19th century onwards, the logical essence of the unilateral administrative act has been revealed by the traditionnal and proven tools of legal science, ie the Will and the Legal Body. However, the emergence of a unified conception of the Act is not the outcome of a servile use of the materials supplied by the classical legal science. While this tool set has been elaborated for a free subject, acting - in most cases - for its own behalf, the administrativists think over the legal activities of men, acting on behalf of collective bodies, without personal will. The specifics of the unilateral administrative act, then require a significant adaptation work. Innovation succeeds tradition in the conceptualisation of the result of the decision process. Contrary to the Judge, the Doctrine, through objectivism development, pushes back the heritage of the civilists and imagines the effect of the unilateral administrative act through an innovative concept : the legal situation. The Doctrine’s ambition to contain subjectivism also leads to the break up with the german theorists of public law who were the first inspiring masters. The theory of heterolimitation of the State, which replaces the doctrine of self limitation, influences over the conception of the authority of unilateral administrative acts.

La subsidiarité qui constitue un principe directeur du droit européen a aussi sa place en droit privé. C’est une notion fonctionnelle qui ne peut être appréhendée que d’après ses applications ; la recherche de la place qu’elle occupe en droit privé passe par l’analyse des différentes fonctions qu’elle remplit. C’est une notion autonome qui doit être distinguée de situations voisines où il existe un concept qui s’élabore par rapport à un autre dit principal ou premier. Il faut donc la distinguer notamment des rapports qui régissent le principal et l’accessoire, de la supplétivité et de l’équivalence. Révélée et connue comme étant une caractéristique de l’action de l’enrichissement sans cause, elle s’étend à diverses matières du droit privé. La subsidiarité y remplit deux fonctions : la première, c’est celle de préserver la primauté du principal, la deuxième, c’est celle d’assurer la suppléance du principal. Sa première fonction est illustrée par l’obligation de la caution, l’obligation des associés au passif social dans les sociétés civiles et les groupements assimilés, ainsi que la subsidiarité des voies d’exécution, plus précisément, celle de la saisie-vente. A côté de ces illustrations relatives au droit substantiel, la subsidiarité est également illustrée dans le droit processuel ; c’est celle qui se concrétise dans la marche du procès. Sa deuxième fonction est illustrée par l’action en enrichissement sans cause, en tant que voie de droit subsidiaire, par les recours-nullité, en tant que voies de recours subsidiaires, ainsi que par la vocation subsidiaire du droit commun, illustrée par le droit commun de la responsabilité civile. La subsidiarité est employée pour éviter toute subversion de l’ordre juridique. Elle contribue à combler les lacunes du Droit et à garantir l’efficacité du système juridique. / Subsidiarity which constitutes a leading principle of European Union law has also its place in private law. It is a functional notion that can only be comprehended through its applications, the search of the place that it occupies in private law passes through analyzing the various functions which it has. It is an autonomous notion which has to be distinguished from close situations where there’s a concept that is elaborated according to another one said to be principal or primary. It has to be for instance distinguished from the links existing between the principal and the accessory, from suppletivity and from equivalence. Revealed and known as a characteristic of the legal action of enrichment without just cause, it has spread to various topics of private law. In private law subsidiarity performs two functions: the first one aims to preserve the primacy of the principal, and the second one, aims to assure the substitute of the principal. Its first function is illustrated by the obligation of the guarantor, by the obligation of the partners for the liability of debts in civil companies and other assimilated societies, and also by the subsidiarity of the enforcement proceedings, more precisely, the one related to the seizure of goods. In addition to these illustrations related to substantive law, subsidiarity is also illustrated in civil procedure; it is the one which is revealed to the course of the process. Its second function is illustrated by the legal action of enrichment without just cause, as of a subsidiary legal action, and by the nullity recourses, as of subsidiary remedies at law, and also by the subsidiary vocation of the common law, illustrated by the common rules of civil liability. Subsidiarity is employed to avoid any subversion of the legal order. It contributes to fill the gaps of Law and to make the legal system more efficient.

La présente contribution a pour objet d'effectuer une analyse critique de la société unipersonnelle. Une approche conceptuelle démontre qu'une théorie unitaire et cohérente de la notion de société suppose de réserver celle-ci à l'idée d'association entre deux ou plusieurs personnes. De même, en mettant l'accent sur l'utilité de la personnalité morale, celle-ci devrait être réservée aux groupements dotés d'un intérêt collectif. Dans la réalité, la société unipersonnelle n'est qu'une appellation légale consistant à introduire le patrimoine d'affectation d'une seule personne et cela sans fournir des justifications juridiques ou économiques validant sa responsabilité limitée. En outre, la société unipersonnelle n'est pas dépourvue de certaines conséquences négatives pour celui que l'on entend protéger, l'associé unique, alors qu'elle se révèle généralement peu efficace. La société unipersonnelle doit surtout être dénoncée comme une institution entraînant un divorce entre le droit et les faits. / The present contribution is to carry out a critical study of single-member limited liability Company (Sole Proprietorship Company). A conceptual approach shows that a unitarian and coherent theory of the notion of société [company] suggests to reserve it to the idea of association between two or several persons. Also, focusing on the usefulness of the legal personality, it should be reserved for groups endowed with a collective interest. In the reality, the SMC (single-member Company) is a legal denomination consisting in introducing a special purpose patrimony (autonomous patrimony by appropriation) for a single person while the legal and economics bases of limited liability are not satisfied. Moreover, the SMC is not without certain negative consequences for the one that we intend to protect, the only partner (the sole owner), while it is generally proves irrelevant. Especially, the SMC must be denounced as an institution entailing a divorce between law and practice.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-11-26T10:54:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciane Pimentel de Lima.pdf: 1434579 bytes, checksum: f28dcaab06138d81b730f217e7971e80 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-26T10:54:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciane Pimentel de Lima.pdf: 1434579 bytes, checksum: f28dcaab06138d81b730f217e7971e80 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-10-05 / This paper’s purpose is to analyze the disregard of legal personality institute, provided for in article 50 of the Civil Code (CC) and that of tax liability, especially that provided for in 135, III, of the National Tax Code (CTN). It will be also studied the possibility of applying the Incident of Disregard of Legal Personality (IDPJ), innovation of the new Civil Procedure Code (Law nº 13.105/2015), regarding the tax foreclosure procedures / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo a análise dos institutos da desconsideração da personalidade jurídica, prevista no artigo 50 do Código Civil, e da responsabilidade tributária, principalmente no art. 135, III, do Código Tributário Nacional, de modo a verificar se a responsabilidade tributária pode ser considerada uma forma particularizada de desconsideração ou se são institutos totalmente diversos. Além disso, será examinada a possibilidade da aplicação do Incidente de Desconsideração da Personalidade Jurídica, procedimento trazido pelo novo Código de Processo Civil (Lei nº 13.105/2015), na seara tributária, principalmente nas execuções fiscais