Which uses of the power to criminalise are misuses of that power? When, in other words, is an exercise of the power to create a criminal offence an exercise of that power which cannot be morally justified? This thesis seeks to provide one part of the answer, by addressing an aspect of the question little discussed by criminal law theorists. Thus it seeks not classes of conduct which it is impermissible to criminalise, nor classes of objective which offence-creators cannot permissibly pursue. Rather the thesis addresses the distinct issue of means – of how criminal offences (are set up to) bring about their creators’ objectives. It asks which means of achieving objectives it is impermissible to employ or make available, and how the power to criminalise must be used to avoid their employment or availability. In answering these questions the thesis distinguishes a number of types of criminal offence, by reference to the means by which the tokens of each (are set up to) achieve objectives. The argument is that to create tokens of these types is often to misuse power, because it is often to employ, or make available, impermissible means. This judgment of impermissibility is a function of a number of principles of political morality, some of which are developed at length in the course of the thesis. No single principle (or set of principles) is presented as an absolute limit on the power to criminalise; but each is part of a complete picture of how that power can permissibly be used, and contributes to vindicating the thesis defended within these pages. That thesis, to repeat, is that some uses of criminalisation are no better than misuses, on account of the means by which the resulting offences (are set up to) achieve their creators’ ends.

Investiga se o neoconstitucionalismo, teoria jurídica advinda do constitucionalismo do pós segunda guerra, cujo marco filosófico é o pós positivismo, enquadra-se no conceito restrito de ideologia, desde a perspectiva de Karl Marx e Gyorgy Lukács. Para tanto, parte do entendimento da categoria ideologia sob um prisma ontológico, ou seja, a ideologia estará alicerçada na realidade material da sociedade, logo as inversões ideológicas, necessariamente corresponderão as inversões materiais da sociedade, como ocorre no capitalismo. Neste sentido, a pesquisa pretende primeiramente expor e analisar o conceito de ideologia trazido por Karl Marx e Gyorgy Lukács. Em um segundo momento, buscará a análise dos aspectos doutrinários referentes ao neoconstitucionalismo, desde o sentido de seu marco histórico e teórico, mas também ressaltando os paradigmas filosóficos e políticos. Finalmente, propõe-se a analisar o neoconstitucionalismo enquanto ideologia, desde a análise ontológica do direito. / Investigates if Neoconstitutionalism, the legal theory originated from Post Second World War Constitutionalism whose philosophical framework is the post positivism, falls within the restricted concept of ideology from the perspective of Karl Marx and Gyorgy Lukacs. The perspective of analysis parts from the understanding of ideology in an ontological perspective, therefore considering it as rooted in material reality of society, as consequence of what ideological inversions will be interpreted as necessarily corresponding to material inversions in society, in the way it occurs in capitalism. In this sense, the research aims first to expose and analyze the concept of ideology brought by Karl Marx and Gyorgy Lukacs. The second effort will be directed to the analysis of doctrinal aspects of Neoconstitutionalism mainly in its historical and theoretical framework, but also emphasizing its philosophical and political paradigms. Finally, the ontological critic of law will be employed to analyze Neoconstitutionalism as ideology.

This dissertation argues that the novels of Henry James offer a conception of personhood and of human freedom better able to explain and unify private law than the conceptions currently dominant in private law theory. I begin by laying out the two conceptual frameworks that now dominate private law theory: Kantian right and the feminist ethic of care. I argue that Kantian right‟s exclusive focus on respect for freedom of choice makes it unable to explain private law doctrines founded upon concern for human well-being, including unjust enrichment, unconscionability, and liability for negligence. However, feminism‟s ethic of care, which can be understood as a response to the Kantian abstraction from considerations of well-being and need, is also incomplete, because its understanding of the person as essentially connected to others fails to respect human separateness. I then offer readings of James‟ novels—The Portrait of a Lady, What Maisie Knew, and The Ambassadors—that show how vindicating individual worth requires both respect for abstract agency‟s separateness and freedom to choose, on the one hand, and concern for the dependent individual‟s well-being and autonomous flourishing, on the other. I argue that these two ideas are complementary parts of a complete understanding of human dignity and freedom. Finally, I argue that this understanding illuminates doctrines of private law that remain mysterious on the Kantian account while avoiding feminism‟s tendency to immerse private law in public law.

This dissertation argues that the novels of Henry James offer a conception of personhood and of human freedom better able to explain and unify private law than the conceptions currently dominant in private law theory. I begin by laying out the two conceptual frameworks that now dominate private law theory: Kantian right and the feminist ethic of care. I argue that Kantian right‟s exclusive focus on respect for freedom of choice makes it unable to explain private law doctrines founded upon concern for human well-being, including unjust enrichment, unconscionability, and liability for negligence. However, feminism‟s ethic of care, which can be understood as a response to the Kantian abstraction from considerations of well-being and need, is also incomplete, because its understanding of the person as essentially connected to others fails to respect human separateness. I then offer readings of James‟ novels—The Portrait of a Lady, What Maisie Knew, and The Ambassadors—that show how vindicating individual worth requires both respect for abstract agency‟s separateness and freedom to choose, on the one hand, and concern for the dependent individual‟s well-being and autonomous flourishing, on the other. I argue that these two ideas are complementary parts of a complete understanding of human dignity and freedom. Finally, I argue that this understanding illuminates doctrines of private law that remain mysterious on the Kantian account while avoiding feminism‟s tendency to immerse private law in public law.

[pt] A tese tem como hipótese a importância do realismo jurídico norteamericano para o desenvolvimento do ensino jurídico e das escolas de direito norte-americanas. Para isto três autores serão abordados: Wesley N. Hohfeld, Walter W. Cook e Karl N. Llewellyn. O primeiro capítulo trará uma introdução sobre as questões metodológicas do trabalho. O segundo capítulo fará uma digressão histórica no direito norte-americano para podermos compreender o contexto de surgimento do realismo jurídico. O terceiro capítulo abordará Wesley N. Hohfeld, sua importância para o surgimento do movimento realista e também sua contribuição para a evolução do ensino jurídico norte-americano. O quarto capítulo tratará de Walter W. Cook, sua teoria e sua experiência fracassada no Instituto para o Estudo de Direito de Johns Hopkins. O quinto capítulo tratará especificamente do surgimento do realismo jurídico através dos escritos de Karl N. Llewellyn e também de sua teoria das funções do direito. A crítica de Llewellyn ao ensino jurídico da época será ponto central do capítulo. O sexto capítulo demonstrará o porquê de o movimento realista ter sucumbido tão rápido, bem como abordará o seu legado. Finalmente a conclusão demonstrará as limitações do trabalho e suas principais contribuições. / [en] The thesis has as its main hypothesis the importance of American legal realism to the development of American Law Schools and legal education. In order to accomplish that, three authors will be faced: Wesley N. Hohfeld, Walter W. Cook e Karl N. Llewellyn. The first chapter will bring an introduction about the methodological issues of the present work. The second chapter will make a historical digression on the American law so that the reader can understand in which context American legal realism appeared. The third chapter will be about Wesley N. Hohfeld and his importance to the appearance of American legal realism and also his contribution to legal education. The fourth chapter will treat Walter W. Cook’s theory and his failure in the John’s Hopkins Institute. The fifth chapter will treat specifically about the appearance of the legal realism movement through Karl N. Llewellyn articles and his law-jobs theory. Also, his criticism about legal education at the time will be the core of this chapter. The sixth chapter will demonstrate why American legal realism was not successful in its attempt and why it didn’t last long. It also will demonstrate the important legacy left by the movement. Finally, the conclusion will demonstrate the thesis’s limitations and its main contributions.

Added value of this thesis is to order principles of taxes and fees into a system, which allows its easier application in context of tax law and law of fees. This system then uncurtain joint relations among these principles and enable its further analysis. The result is a system (tree) of principles within which principles are divided according to different criteria. They can be sorted into three groups, namely the principle of regulatory intent (there are mostly the principles of the other disciplines; these principles determine intent, reason and purpose of the regulation), the principles of regulatory instrument (it is created by the principle of legal state; these principles represents legal dogmatic) and the principles of efficient regulation (here everything follows from the principle of economy). Thesis target on material side of problem which it differs from the other thesis on this topic. An essential partial step toward revealing the system of principles is also a definition of tax and definition of fee and also analysis what is the principle.

This PhD thesis seeks to establish a multi-layered definition of the principle of loyal cooperation in EU law in its current form. It focuses on four fundamental ways of describing this principle. The first one is a linguistic analysis of the term "principle of loyal cooperation" itself. The thesis looks at its equivalents in all official languages of the EU and applies various linguistic (etymology) and non-linguistic research tools and findings from the study of history, social psychology and philosophy to understand and delimit the principle of loyal cooperation in EU law. In a second step, the principle is examined at three separate levels. At the first level the situation and significance of the actors bound by loyalty is explored. At the second level the paper focuses on the differences between the principle of loyal cooperation, the way commitments are met in international public law, and the mechanisms of ensuring loyalty in countries with a federal structure. Lastly, the third level of analysis looks into the ways the principle of loyal cooperation and its operation vary according to the area of competence. Keywords: principle of sincere cooperation, European Union law, theory of federalism, European studies

[pt] A dissertação tem por objetivo analisar e expor a teoria de Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, sendo assim, trata-se de um corte metodológico e de uma análise puramente autoral. Nesse sentido, a primeira parte do trabalho traz uma biografia do autor para assim situar o leitor no contexto em que sua teoria foi elaborada. O segundo capítulo adentra no cerne de sua teoria, ou seja, nos conceitos fundamentais do Direito, sua principal contribuição para a teoria geral do Direito. A terceira parte do trabalho visa diferenciar, através da aplicação dos conceitos fundamentais do Direito, direitos in rem e direitos in personam, termos que sempre geraram confusão para os juristas. O quarto capítulo, por sua vez, trará críticas que alguns autores fizeram à teoria do autor. A conclusão tentará demonstrar os pontos positivos e negativos da teoria de Hohfeld dando fechamento ao trabalho. / [en] The present work has as its main purpose to analyze and expose Wesley`s Newcomb Hohfeld theory, so the methodology used is purely authorial. Thus, the first part of the research brings the author`s biography in order to situate the reader in the theory`s elaboration context. The second chapter is about Hohfeld`s fundamental legal conceptions, his main contribution to the general law theory. The third part seeks to distinguish, applying the fundamental legal conceptions presented afore, the concepts of right in rem and right in personam, phrases that have always been confusing to jurists. Moreover, the fourth chapter will bring some critics made by important authors to Hohfeld`s theory. Furthermore, in the conclusion there will be made an attempt to expose the positive and negative topics in Hohfeld`s theory as a closure to the research.

Submitted by PPG Direito (ppgdir@pucrs.br) on 2018-04-17T19:20:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 EDUARDO_LUIS_KRONBAUER_DIS.pdf: 1792721 bytes, checksum: 3b5e5a4d3bcf3f2bc31c2673af2e659e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2018-05-04T17:49:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 EDUARDO_LUIS_KRONBAUER_DIS.pdf: 1792721 bytes, checksum: 3b5e5a4d3bcf3f2bc31c2673af2e659e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-04T18:09:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EDUARDO_LUIS_KRONBAUER_DIS.pdf: 1792721 bytes, checksum: 3b5e5a4d3bcf3f2bc31c2673af2e659e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-21 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / This study aims to develop a reasoning of tax rules with simulative function under the point of view of the natural law, indicating the natural law theory perspective as the best alternative against to the other existent legal theories standpoint. First, the study presents, in a critical view, the philosophical preconditions of the two doctrines that predominate the actual paradigm: legal positivism and ?neoconstitucionalism?. It demonstrates that these theories are in the opposite extremes and follow incommunicable ways, and both show insufficiencies in its justifications. Therefore, this present research sustains that the preconditions capable of revealing a more efficient and complete reasoning of the inducing tax rules can be find in the theory of natural law. Thereby, the justification presented in this paper stablishes the idea of natural law, basic goods, justice, finalities. Legitimacy and form of law as the elements capable of justify the taxation with simulative function. / O presente trabalho versa sobre a fundamenta??o das normas extrafiscais sob o prisma do direito natural, apontando a perspectiva jusnaturalista como a melhor alternativa em rela??o ?s demais correntes jusfilos?ficas existentes. Na primeira parte, s?o apresentados, de forma cr?tica, os pressupostos das duas correntes que predominam as fundamenta??es presentes no paradigma atual: positivismo jur?dico e neoconstitucionalismo. Demonstra-se que estas teorias caminham em extremos e n?o se comunicam entre si, sendo que ambas apresentam insufici?ncias em suas fundamenta??es. Dessa forma, sustenta-se que os pressupostos capazes de apresentar uma fundamenta??o mais eficiente e completa das normas extrafiscais est?o na teoria do direito natural. A fundamenta??o trazida no trabalho estabelece que os elementos capazes de justificar a tributa??o com finalidade de indu??o de comportamento dos contribuintes, com maior razoabilidade, est?o presentes na ideia de lei natural, bens b?sicos, justi?a, finalidades, legitimidade e forma.

En retraçant la trajectoire de l’évolution du concept de SIEG vers la notion juridique de SIEG,notre recherche met l’accent sur l’évolution d’un concept juridique aux contours flous et à laportée incertaine, notamment pour les juristes français, dans sa perception initiale, vers unenotion juridique porteuse d’un idéal social ; le modèle social Union européen. Ainsi, cettethèse aboutit-elle, premièrement, à redessiner les contours de la notion de SIEG en prenant encompte sa capacité à faire peau neuve de la notion d’intérêt général, familière au droit publicfrançais, progressivement devenue « intérêt économique général — ou intérêt généraléconomique » dans le cadre strict du concept qui nous retient ; intérêt économique généraladossé par ailleurs aux idéologies et principes juridiques européens de la concurrence (article106-2 TFUE) et de régulation économique (article 106-3 TFUE) (Partie 1).En second lieu, la recherche explore ce que l’on pourrait dénommer les « vertus » du régimejuridique des SIEG longtemps passées sous silence par la doctrine : protections juridiquesofferte aux acteurs et consommateurs des prestations de SIEG et position axiologique dumodèle social Union européenne des SIEG consacrée par les articles 14 TFUE et le Protocolenuméro 26 sur les services d’intérêt général qui nous semble contenu dans la notion même deSIEG ou pour le moins en découler fonctionnellement (Partie 2). / Retracing the evolutionary trajectory of the Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI)concept concept to the legal notion of SGEI, my research focuses on the evolution of a legalconcept with uncertain outlines as initially perceived, particularly with reference to the Frenchpublic law theory, towards a juridical notion which carries a social ideal: the European Unionsocial model. The thesis thus leads, first, to the redrawing of the concept of SGEI taking intoaccount its ability to revamp the notion of general interest, a notion familiar to French publiclaw, gradually becoming "economic interest" generally or "general interest economicallyspeaking" within the strict framework of the principles of EU Law relating to competition(Article 106 (2) TFEU) and economic regulation (Article 106-3 TFEU) (Part 1).Secondly, my research explores what might be called the "virtues" of the legal regime ofSGEIs that have long been ignored by the doctrine: legal protection offered to actors andconsumers of SGEI services and the axiological position of the European Union social modelof SGEI enshrined in Articles 14 TFEU and Protocol 26 on services of general interest, whichseems to us contained in the concept of SGEI or at least functional (Part 2)