This thesis addresses the historic debate between natural law theorists and positivists. After providing a foundation for the debate by discussing the thirteenth century natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas and the criticisms of it by positivist philosopher John Austin, this thesis turns to the theory of H.L.A. Hart. My primary aim is to outline a defense of the soft positivism of H.L.A. Hart in face of the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin by appealing to two nonexclusive roots of moral principles in the law: justice and criminal law.

This essay is an exploration of the debate between John Finnis and Stephen Macedo on the value of homosexuality. In “Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?” Finnis, a natural law theorist, rejects value-neutralist arguments, stating that the political community can and should make value judgments about its members’ life-choices and that such normative evaluations are compatible with liberalism. Particularly, Finnis argues that homosexuality is in its essence always harmful and degrading, thus unable to participate in the basic human goods it imitates. Furthermore, he argues that the political community in liberal democratic societies is justified in discouraging homosexual conduct as a viable way of life. Macedo, while also rejecting pure value-neutralist liberalism, carefully considers but rejects Finnis’s argument, which rests on an unrealistic description of value and ends of human sexual activity.

Submitted by Felipe Rodrigues Xavier null (felipe_rodrigues@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-29T18:29:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Felipe Rodrigues Xavier.pdf: 1649930 bytes, checksum: ddc407a82e03cbc3947e271a825578d4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Monique Sasaki (sayumi_sasaki@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-29T19:18:52Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 xavier_fr_me_fran.pdf: 1649930 bytes, checksum: ddc407a82e03cbc3947e271a825578d4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-29T19:18:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 xavier_fr_me_fran.pdf: 1649930 bytes, checksum: ddc407a82e03cbc3947e271a825578d4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-27 / O projeto pretende pesquisar as relações entre a reduzida efetividade da Constituição Federal de 1988 e os fundamentos paradigmáticos hermenêuticos sustentadores do modelo jurídico de compreensão e aplicação do Direito em nosso país. A Constituição entendida como instituidora do Estado Democrático de Direito e, no seu conteúdo principiológico e dirigente, tendo o objetivo primordial de resgate e efetivação dos direitos de segunda e terceira gerações (ou dimensões) não completamente realizados durante nosso Estado Social. Nesse passo histórico-político, o Direito passa a ter uma função realizadora, transformadora, intimamente comprometido com os mandamentos e desideratos constitucionais. Porém este mesmo Direito, criado a partir de categorias próprias da formação do direito privado europeu do século XIX, não oferece na mesma magnitude constitucional o devido locus de compreensão e aplicação dos direitos sociais e fundamentais, encontrando assim dificuldades para exercer esta função realizadora exigida pela Constituição. Neste diapasão, cabe pesquisar os fundamentos paradigmáticos hermenêuticos sustentadores deste modelo de Direito, tanto o paradigma objetivista assentado na metafísica clássica como o subjetivista fornecido pela filosofia da consciência, conjugando tais paradigmas com o Estado Democrático de Direito instituído pela Constituição e a correspondente função realizadora do Direito para que se possa verificar os desdobramentos e influências das primeiras, pois de fundamento, causas da reduzida efetividade constitucional ou, em outras palavras, a separação entre o prolixo e exuberante Texto Constitucional e sua pobreza em realizações. / The project intends to investigate the relationship between the reduced effectiveness of the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the paradigmatic hermeneutical foundations supporting the legal model of understanding and application of Law in Brazil. The Constitution is understood as establishing the Democratic State of Law and, in its principological and governing content, having the primary purpose of redemption and enforcement of the rights of second and third generations (or dimensions) not completely realized during our Social State. In this historicalpolitical step, Law happens to have a fulfilling, transforming function, intimately committed to the constitutional commandments and desiderata. However, this same Law, created from categories of the formation of European private law of the nineteenth century, does not offer the same constitutional magnitude the locus of understanding and application of social and fundamental rights, thus encountering difficulties to exercise this fulfilling function required by Constitution. In this context, it is necessary to investigate the paradigmatic hermeneutic foundations of this model of Law, both the objectivist paradigm based on the classical metaphysics and the subjectivist provided by the philosophy of consciousness, combining these paradigms with the Democratic State of Law instituted by the Constitution and the corresponding role of Law to be able to verify the unfolding and influences of the former, as grounded, causes of the reduced constitutional effectiveness or, in other words, the separation between the prolix and exuberant Constitutional Text and its poverty in realizations.

<p>This dissertation explores the way in which different conceptions of human agency have helped to shape the course of jurisprudential thought. The overarching aim is to bring to the surface the deeper commitments of Hartian positivism in its various engagements with rival accounts of the nature of law. In particular, I argue that although contemporary positivists take their account of law to be metaphysically noncommittal, views of what it is to be a human agent continue to motivate, if implicitly, their positions on such enduring jurisprudential questions as the nature and source of law’s normativity, the relationship between law and morality, and so on. In order to better understand these debates, we must therefore understand better the relationship between a theory of law and the conception of human nature that drives it.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Comme la propriété privée, la propriété publique a été confondue avec les biens qui n’en sont que les objets. En droit privé, comme en droit public, il est possible, pourtant, de considérer que la propriété n’est pas un bien. Droit subjectif, la propriété est la puissance que le sujet exerce sur les biens. Formellement, elle est le droit de jouir et de disposer des choses conformément au droit objectif. Matériellement, elle variera en fonction du statut de droit objectif qui habilite le sujet de la propriété, le propriétaire. Les personnes publiques, sujets de l’action publique, sont propriétaires sur le fondement d’une compétence que leur assigne immédiatement l’obligation d’agir dans l’intérêt public. La compétence attribue aux personnes publiques un droit de propriété public, affecté au service du seul intérêt public. Envisager les personnes publiques propriétaires au lieu de la propriété des personnes publiques, aura permis de contribuer à la théorie des ordres juridiques partiels comme représentation de la distinction du droit public et du droit privé. Cela conduit à proposer une définition juridique de l’action publique : l’ensemble d’activités mises en œuvre à partir de l’exercice, par les personnes publiques, de leurs droits subjectifs publics, de puissance et de propriété. / As it is the case for private property, the public property was long time confused with the goods that are its objects. However, in public law as in private law, we should consider that property right is not a good. Being an individual right, the property stands for the power exerted by a subject over goods. Formally, it is the right to enjoy and dispose of goods according to law. Materially, it will vary depending on the applicable law which empowers the owner, subject of the property. Public entities, subjects of public action, are owners based on a competency immediately assigned to them by their duty to act in the public interest. This competency grants to public entities a right to public property only affected to the public interest. Focusing on the public persons as owners instead of considering only their property helps contributing to the theory of partial legal orders (“théorie des ordres juridiques partiels”) as a representation of the distinction between public and private law. This finally leads to suggest a legal definition of the public action as a set of activities implemented by the public persons in the exercise of their subjective rights of property.

A presente tese objetiva analisar o redimensionamento conceitual do Princípio da Igualdade no Direito Internacional Público, assim como a aplicação desse princípio na Organização das Nações Unidas, em especial no órgão judiciário, a Corte Internacional de Justiça, e nas Resoluções da Assembleia Geral da ONU sobre o princípio. A mudança mais relevante da sociedade internacional é a sua expansão horizontal de Estados, que impacta na validade das regras do Direito Internacional. A metodologia da escolha dos casos e das resoluções analisados serão precedidas por um estudo exploratório da doutrina sobre o princípio da igualdade. O novo entendimento sobre o princípio visa garantir uma igualdade material no plano internacional. Admite a possibilidade de buscar a realização da igualdade material com as desigualdades compensatórias ou vantajosas. O tratamento diferenciado ocorre apenas na presença de condições que são desfavoráveis na prática. Num primeiro momento, busca-se articular diversas teorias que explicam o princípio da igualdade na teoria do Direito e no Direito Internacional Público, para, num segundo momento, compreendê-lo a partir de um novo entendimento - uma igualdade solidária e pluralista. / This dissertation aims to analyze the conceptual dimension of the Principle of Equality in Public International Law, as well as its application in the United Nations, particularly in the International Court of Justice, in addition to the UN General Assembly resolutions on thhe principle. The most significant change in international society is its horizontal expansion of States, which impact on the validity of the rules of international law. The methodology for choosing the cases and the analyzed resolutions will be preceded by an exploratory study of the doctrine on the principle of equality. The new understanding of the principle aims to ensure a substantive equality internationally. The principle allows the possibility of seeking the realization of the fulfilment of material equality in counter or advantageous inequality. The differential treatment occurs only in the presence of conditions that are unfavorable in practice. At first, several theories that explain the principle of equality in the theory of law and public international law are articulated in order to develop a new understanding - a plural and a solidarity equality.

O trabalho estuda a evolução da teoria geral dos contratos e os seus reflexos na teoria do risco contratual, tendo como ponto de partida o direito contratual clássico do século XIX e o paradigma da autonomia da vontade. No novo direito contratual do século XX em diante, a análise toma como fio condutor as obras de Emilio Betti e de Karl Larenz, dentro do que se pode considerar o novo paradigma do direito contratual: a regulação e a satisfação de interesses privados mediante critérios de autonomia e heteronomia. O objetivo específico desse estudo é verificar a hipótese de que a teoria atual tenha (ou não) enfrentado o problema econômico dos riscos imprevistos dentro da idéia de "economia interna do contrato", tratando o risco econômico imprevisto como um integrante do conteúdo do contrato com autonomia diante da prestação. O caminho percorrido pelo trabalho identifica que o direito contratual tem sua estrutura teórica construída sobre uma concepção formalista de contrato, segundo a qual essa figura jurídica é uma entidade com existência própria, a qual está centrada na noção jurídica-formal de "obrigação de prestar". Mesmo que, com a evolução do direito contratual, tal estrutura tenha passado a contar com uma função a ser desempenhada na vida real, o trabalho conclui que a teoria continua sem tratar adequadamente o risco econômico imprevisto, porque tal função permanece limitada pela noção jurídico-formal de "obrigação de prestar". / This dissertation studies the evolution of contract law theory and its influences on the legal theory of contractual risk. It begins with the classic theory of the 19th century and the will theory paradigm within it; from the 20th century onwards, the main analysis is based on the works of Emilio Betti and Karl Larenz, alongside with the new paradigm that pursues concrete interests through the combination of private autonomy and private heteronomy. The specific purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the current theory may have (or may have not) dealt with the economic problem of unforeseen risks by utilizing the idea of economic balance of contract, insofar as to consider the unforeseen economic risk as an autonomous factor in the content of contracts. The research identifies that the theoretical structure of contract law is built over a formalist conception of contract, according to which the contract is an entity with selfexistence, one that is exclusively centered on the notion of "duty to pay". Although the evolution of contract law has given a function to this structure to perform in society and between parties to a given contract, the dissertation concludes that the current theory is still limited by the notion of "duty to pay", and that the unforeseen economic risk has not yet been provided with an adequate legal treatment.

O trabalho estuda a evolução da teoria geral dos contratos e os seus reflexos na teoria do risco contratual, tendo como ponto de partida o direito contratual clássico do século XIX e o paradigma da autonomia da vontade. No novo direito contratual do século XX em diante, a análise toma como fio condutor as obras de Emilio Betti e de Karl Larenz, dentro do que se pode considerar o novo paradigma do direito contratual: a regulação e a satisfação de interesses privados mediante critérios de autonomia e heteronomia. O objetivo específico desse estudo é verificar a hipótese de que a teoria atual tenha (ou não) enfrentado o problema econômico dos riscos imprevistos dentro da idéia de "economia interna do contrato", tratando o risco econômico imprevisto como um integrante do conteúdo do contrato com autonomia diante da prestação. O caminho percorrido pelo trabalho identifica que o direito contratual tem sua estrutura teórica construída sobre uma concepção formalista de contrato, segundo a qual essa figura jurídica é uma entidade com existência própria, a qual está centrada na noção jurídica-formal de "obrigação de prestar". Mesmo que, com a evolução do direito contratual, tal estrutura tenha passado a contar com uma função a ser desempenhada na vida real, o trabalho conclui que a teoria continua sem tratar adequadamente o risco econômico imprevisto, porque tal função permanece limitada pela noção jurídico-formal de "obrigação de prestar". / This dissertation studies the evolution of contract law theory and its influences on the legal theory of contractual risk. It begins with the classic theory of the 19th century and the will theory paradigm within it; from the 20th century onwards, the main analysis is based on the works of Emilio Betti and Karl Larenz, alongside with the new paradigm that pursues concrete interests through the combination of private autonomy and private heteronomy. The specific purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the current theory may have (or may have not) dealt with the economic problem of unforeseen risks by utilizing the idea of economic balance of contract, insofar as to consider the unforeseen economic risk as an autonomous factor in the content of contracts. The research identifies that the theoretical structure of contract law is built over a formalist conception of contract, according to which the contract is an entity with selfexistence, one that is exclusively centered on the notion of "duty to pay". Although the evolution of contract law has given a function to this structure to perform in society and between parties to a given contract, the dissertation concludes that the current theory is still limited by the notion of "duty to pay", and that the unforeseen economic risk has not yet been provided with an adequate legal treatment.

O trabalho estuda a evolução da teoria geral dos contratos e os seus reflexos na teoria do risco contratual, tendo como ponto de partida o direito contratual clássico do século XIX e o paradigma da autonomia da vontade. No novo direito contratual do século XX em diante, a análise toma como fio condutor as obras de Emilio Betti e de Karl Larenz, dentro do que se pode considerar o novo paradigma do direito contratual: a regulação e a satisfação de interesses privados mediante critérios de autonomia e heteronomia. O objetivo específico desse estudo é verificar a hipótese de que a teoria atual tenha (ou não) enfrentado o problema econômico dos riscos imprevistos dentro da idéia de "economia interna do contrato", tratando o risco econômico imprevisto como um integrante do conteúdo do contrato com autonomia diante da prestação. O caminho percorrido pelo trabalho identifica que o direito contratual tem sua estrutura teórica construída sobre uma concepção formalista de contrato, segundo a qual essa figura jurídica é uma entidade com existência própria, a qual está centrada na noção jurídica-formal de "obrigação de prestar". Mesmo que, com a evolução do direito contratual, tal estrutura tenha passado a contar com uma função a ser desempenhada na vida real, o trabalho conclui que a teoria continua sem tratar adequadamente o risco econômico imprevisto, porque tal função permanece limitada pela noção jurídico-formal de "obrigação de prestar". / This dissertation studies the evolution of contract law theory and its influences on the legal theory of contractual risk. It begins with the classic theory of the 19th century and the will theory paradigm within it; from the 20th century onwards, the main analysis is based on the works of Emilio Betti and Karl Larenz, alongside with the new paradigm that pursues concrete interests through the combination of private autonomy and private heteronomy. The specific purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the current theory may have (or may have not) dealt with the economic problem of unforeseen risks by utilizing the idea of economic balance of contract, insofar as to consider the unforeseen economic risk as an autonomous factor in the content of contracts. The research identifies that the theoretical structure of contract law is built over a formalist conception of contract, according to which the contract is an entity with selfexistence, one that is exclusively centered on the notion of "duty to pay". Although the evolution of contract law has given a function to this structure to perform in society and between parties to a given contract, the dissertation concludes that the current theory is still limited by the notion of "duty to pay", and that the unforeseen economic risk has not yet been provided with an adequate legal treatment.

Companies in private international law Abstract The purpose of my thesis is to analyze the regulation of companies in private international law with the focus on the possibilities of cross-border movement of companies. In today's globalized society, the mobility of companies affects both economy of the state and lives of the employees, creditors and other parties. It is therefore subject to regulation. State's conflict of laws rules are based on two main methods to determine the status of the company, i.e. the incorporation doctrine and the real seat doctrine. These two doctrines are clashing in many aspects. The thesis is composed of an introduction, followed by five chapters, and a summary. Chapter One is introductory and defines basic terminology used in the thesis: the terms company and private international law. The second chapter explains the concept of status of a company and analyses the incorporation theory, the theory of real seat and the theory of super-addition. It also deals with the cross-border transfer of seat. Chapter Three examines Czech legislation regarding the personal status of a company. It explains the historical background and recent Czech concept of the incorporation theory, addresses the issue of seat in Czech law and investigates the regulation of cross-border transfer of seat....