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Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-17T15:25:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2015-03-02. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2015-09-17T15:48:42Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000846216.pdf: 3579467 bytes, checksum: 0b8621401bd0759772dcabb0fa312dd9 (MD5) / Durante sua vida, Leibniz persegue o objetivo de criar uma Linguagem universal que comunique perfeitamente o pensamento e assim permita o conhecimento de todas as coisas. Segundo ele, a viabilidade da construção de tal linguagem deriva da convicção de que todo o conhecimento tem por base um número finito de conceitos básicos ou ideias simples que podem ser identificadas e estruturadas hierarquicamente. Em sua concepção para a elaboração de tal linguagem, é necessário: chegar às ideias simples; estipular um sistema adequado de signos -o que ele denomina Característica universal; e estabelecer as regras lógicas para compor ideias complexas -o que ele denomina Gramática racional. Delineamos então como objetivo central deste trabalho apresentar uma pesquisa sobreLinguagem universal e, em especial, sobre a Característica universal e investigar os caminhos percorridos por Leibniz nesta busca. Deste propósito decorrem como objetivos complementares: verificar de que forma Leibniz desenvolve suas pesquisas na Aritmética binária, uma materialização da Característica universal; e expor brevemente seus estudos relativos à Gramática racional. Para dar suporte... / During his life, Leibniz pursues the goal to create a universal language that perfectly communicates the thought and thus allows the knowledge of allthings. According to him, the viability to the construction of a universal language accrues from the fact that all the knowledge sustains itself on a finite number of basic concepts or simple ideas which can be identified and hierarchically structured. Inhis conceiving for the preparation of such language is necessary: defining the simple ideas; setting a proper system of signs -what he calls universal characteristic; and establishing the logical rules in order to compose complex ideas -or, as he's defined, rational grammar. We have defined the main goal of this paper as to present a survey on a universal language, in particular about theuniversal characteristicand to investigate the paths taken by Leibniz in this pursuit. From this purpose it courses the following secondary objectives: to verify how Leibniz develops his research in Binary Arithmetic, that consists on materialization of the universal characteristic; and briefly to present his rational grammar. To support our goal, we introduce some....

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Submitted by Isaac Francisco de Souza Dias (isaac.souzadias@ufpe.br) on 2016-06-13T18:06:38Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO Arthur Leandro da Silva Marinho.pdf: 705635 bytes, checksum: d4f308f2bad2a3bce0dd50efa5156947 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-13T18:06:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO Arthur Leandro da Silva Marinho.pdf: 705635 bytes, checksum: d4f308f2bad2a3bce0dd50efa5156947 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-21 / Apontando o inicio do ciclo de comemorações dos 300 anos de falecimento de Leibniz, surge a nossa pesquisa como um lastro do grandioso sistema metafísico leibziano. Propomos-nos a interpretar um dos principais princípios deste sistema: trata-se do Princípio da identidade dos indiscerníveis (PII). Com este intuito, debruçamo-nos sobre os escritos de Leibniz de 1676 até 1716 (ano da sua morte). A nossa tese é que Leibniz considera o PII como um princípio verdadeiro. Contudo, o que seria o Princípio da identidade dos indiscerníveis? Este é o princípio metafísico-lógico que individualiza e distingue uma substância das demais. E, de fato, um indivíduo na natureza não poderia ser completamente semelhante a qualquer outro. Além disso, um dos resultados importantes desta pesquisa é a descoberta de trinta e seis passagens que, expostas ao longo da dissertação, apresentam Leibniz fazendo referência ao PII direta ou indiretamente. Substâncias indiscerníveis seriam apenas noções incompletas. Como resultado, quando existem noções incompletas das características de um objeto, então estes objetos podem ser considerados coisas perfeitamente semelhantes, ou idênticos. Todavia, esse tipo de substância seria algo impensável ao intelecto divino. Por conseguinte, o argumento do PII servirá como base de contestação para o espaço vazio e átomos indiscerníveis, uma vez que o filósofo não admite a homogeneidade da matéria. Além do que, o intelecto infinito jamais criaria substâncias idênticas, porque contestar-ser-ia um dos princípios fundamentais divinos, que é o Princípio da razão suficiente. O destaque é que este PII nunca foi formulado desta forma por nenhum outro filosofo. Além disso, Leibniz poderia formular outros tipos de argumentos que não fosse o PII contra seus adversários. O que observamos é que em muitos textos ele prefere usar o PII, podendo usar muitos outros argumentos. Por esta razão, o PII merece o destaque e atenção, dada a ênfase feita por Leibniz. / Pointing the beginning of the cycle of celebrations of 300 years of the death of Leibniz, arises our research as a ballast grand metaphysical system Leibnizian. We propose us to interpret one of the main principles of this system, it is the principle of identity of indiscernibles (PII). With this order, we are discussing in the writings of Leibniz of 1676 until 1716 (year of death). Our thesis is that Leibniz considers the PII as a true principle. However, what would be the principle of the identity of indiscernible? This is the metaphysical-logical principle which differentiates and distinguishes a substance from the others. And indeed, an individual in nature could not be completely similar to any other. Furthermore, one of the important findings of this research is the discovery of thirty-six passages, exposed along the dissertation Leibniz noted with reference to directly or indirectly PII. Indiscernible substances would only incomplete notions. As a result, when there are incomplete notions of the characteristics of an object, then these objects can be considered perfectly like, or identical. However, such substances would be impossible to divine intellect. Therefore, the PII of the argument will serve as the basis for contesting empty space and indiscernible atoms because the philosopher does not admit the homogeneity of matter. Besides, the infinite intellect never create identical substances assay office because one of God's fundamental principles is the Principle of sufficient reason. The highlight is that this PII was never formulated this way for no other philosopher. Moreover, Leibniz could make other arguments that were not the PII against their opponents. What we observe is that in many texts he prefers to use the PII and can use many other arguments. For this reason the PII deserves emphasis and attention given to the emphasis made by Leibniz.

The identity of indiscernibles is the ontological principle which prescribes that there can be no separate objects which have all the properties in common. This means that, for example, there cannot be two chairs which are perfectly similar. The principle is today assumed to have few supporters, and this is believed to be largely due to easily accessible counterexamples which have been constructed by the opponents of the principle. At a closer examination of these counterexamples, it is possible to find inherent contradictions and shortcomings which have not been considered by the opponent and which in turn have the capacity to lead to absurdities. What makes the principle particularly interesting is that it has the potential to affect one's entire ontology and view of survival, depending on whether one adheres to the principle or not. The fact that there is not yet a preliminary or acceptable answer to whether the principle should be considered valid or invalid does not make the matter any less interesting. This work aims to visualize the arguments for and against the principle that are present in the discourse and to come up with an argument which argues in the direction of the principle's validity. Which will be described later in this essay, it can be argued that an adherence to the principle is compatible with a naturalistic view of reality, but that the opposite is not. / Principen om oskiljaktiga storheters identitet, vilket på engelska benämns som the identity of indiscernibles är den ontologiska princip vilken föreskriver att det inte kan finnas åtskilda objekt vilka har alla egenskaper gemensamt. Detta betyder att det till exempel inte kan finnas två stolar vilka är fullständigt likadana. Principen antas idag ha få anhängare och detta torde till stor del bero på lättillgängliga motexempel vilka har konstruerats av opponenterna till principen. Vid en närmare granskning av dessa motexempel går det dock att finna motsägelser och brister vilka inte har tagits hänsyn till av opponenten och vilka i sin tur har kapacitet att leda till absurditeter. Vilket gör principen särskilt intressant är att den har potential att påverka hela ens ontologi och syn på överlevnad beroende på om man försanthåller principen eller ej. Att det heller inte än existerar ett premilnärt eller godtagbart svar på huruvida principen bör ses som giltig eller ogiltig gör inte ärendet mindre intressant. Detta arbete syftar till att synliggöra de för och emot argument vilka finns närvarande i diskursen rörande principen samt att återge en argumentation vilken talar i riktning för principens giltighet. Vilket senare kommer att redogöras för i uppsatsen går det att argumentera för att ett försanthållande av principen är förenlig med en naturalistisk verklighetssyn men att det motsatta förhållandet inte är det.

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yes / This paper discusses Leibniz’s view and defence of heliocentrism, which was one of the main achievements of the Scientific Revolution (1543-1687). As Leibniz was a defender of a strictly mechanistic worldview, it seems natural to assume that he accepted Copernican heliocentrism and its completion by figures like Kepler, Descartes and Newton without reservation. However, the fact that Leibniz speaks of the Copernican theory as a hypothesis (or plausible assumption) suggests that he had several reservations regarding heliocentrism. On a first approach Leibniz employed two of his most cherished principles to defend the Copernican hypothesis against the proponents of geocentrism: these were the principle of the relativity of motion and the principle of the equivalence of hypotheses. A closer analysis reveals, however, that Leibniz also appeals to dynamic causes of planetary motions, and these constitute a much stronger support for heliocentrism than his two philosophical principles alone.

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Cette thèse vise à bien faire ressortir la profonde originalité, par rapport à la tradition logique antérieure, de la logique de Leibniz et, à travers elle, de toute la logique de type mathématique ou symbolique inaugurée par les Modernes. La comparaison des enseignements de Leibniz avec ceux des logiciens de tradition aristotélicienne â propos des thèmes en apparence les plus traditionnels (syllogisme, démonstration, définition, énonciation, mot en logique) révèle de façon détaillée à quel point Leibniz s'écarte d'Aristote et avec quelle merveilleuse audace il engage la logique sur des voies nouvelles. Les innovations introduites par Leibniz n'acquièrent cependant leur pleine intelligibilité qu'une fois connus les motifs qui les ont suscitées. Aussi avons-nous fait précéder la comparaison de l'ancien et du moderne d'une investigation des différentes origines de la logique leibnizienne. Parmi les éléments extérieurs au système leibnizien comme tel, les développements dans les mathématiques ou les arts du calcul survenus à cette époque ont exercé une influence prépondérante. On observe chez Leibniz un mathématisme qui l'oriente vers un nouvel idéal de rigueur scientifique inspiré des déductions telles qu'on les retrouve dans le calcul algébrique et ses divers prolongements. La mathématisation de la physique, amorcée depuis peu, propose un nouveau modèle de la connaissance scientifique et suggère la recherche d'un nouvel organon logique. Cette recherche du nouveau est d'ailleurs fortement encouragée par la mentalité générale des premiers philosophes modernes. La logique leibnizienne tire également ses origines d'éléments intrinsèques au système leibnizien. Les enseignements de Leibniz sur le déroulement des opérations de l'esprit ainsi que sur la nature de la vérité et de l'être et son unité ne relèvent pas nécessairement de la logique comme telle, mais constituent des présupposés aux enseignements les plus proprement logiques du philosophe de Hanovre. Non pas bien sûr que Leibniz lui-même n'ait souvent développé ses opinions sur ces sujets sous l'influence d'idées qu'il avait déjà antérieurement sur la logique, mais il fallait de toutes façons révéler la cohérence logico-métaphysique du système leibnizien. Ainsi par exemple, ce n'est qu'une fois conçue à la fois comme correspondance de la chose et de l'intelligence, comme non contradiction et possibilité et comme identité que la vérité sur des êtres conçus comme complexes de monades pourra se dévoiler à l'intelligence logico-mathématisée.