Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3163.pdf: 1370527 bytes, checksum: d0b0191eb4d9d05d62107cc782b08b7c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-19 / In order to understand the concepts of space and matter in the physics of Leibniz we should consider the metaphysical concept of substance. Such is the fundamental hypothesis of our inquiry. The problem is to conciliate the mechanical causality with an universe consisting of immaterial simple substances. Taking into account the principles of Leibniz s cosmology, the dynamic conception of substance, the refutation of the vacuum, the continuum and the infinite, the matter appears to be an aspect of the substance susceptible of infinite divisibility, without thereby invalidating the indestructibility and unity of substance. From this it arises that the space is full and relational. / A hipótese fundamental da nossa investigação é que há uma relação de dependência entre os conceitos de espaço e matéria e a metafísica leibniziana centrada na substância, o que implica a importância dessa metafísica para a compreensão da física de Leibniz. A partir da relação entre esses conceitos entende-se sua posição perante problemas de ordem metafísica e sobretudo física. Do ponto de vista metafísico, vem à tona o tradicional problema da conciliação entre o uno e o múltiplo. Do ponto de visto físico, o problema é aliar a explicação mecanicista dos fenômenos a um universo constituído de substâncias simples imateriais. Para entender como os conceitos de espaço e matéria dependem do conceito de substância foi tomada uma linha de análise específica. Primeiro, era preciso esclarecer os princípios constituintes da cosmologia de Leibniz; em seguida, sua concepção dinâmica de matéria, a refutação do vazio, o continuum e o infinito. A partir daí, a substância define-se sob perspectivas diversas que respondem a problemas diferentes, mas cujas soluções não são incompatíveis. Leibniz busca na dinâmica a determinação física da substância: de sujeito lógico passa a ser concebida como força. Através do dinamismo, a matéria pode ser concebida como um aspecto da substância que admite infinita divisibilidade, sem que isso invalide a indestrutibilidade e unidade das substâncias; em função dessa matéria, há o espaço pleno e relacional.

Notre travail vise à étudier les Max-Phil, textes inédits de Kurt Gödel, dans lesquels il développe sa pensée philosophique. Nous nous intéressons plus spécifiquement à la question du réalisme conceptuel, position déjà défendue dans ses écrits publiés selon laquelle les concepts existent indépendamment de nos définitions et constructions. L’objectif est de montrer qu’une interprétation cohérente de ces textes encore peu connus est possible. Pour ce faire, nous proposons une interprétation de certains passages, interprétation hypothétique mais susceptible d’apporter de nouveaux éléments à des questions laissées sans réponse par les textes publiés, telles celles relatives au réalisme conceptuel. Cette dernière position ne peut être comprise que par un éclairage de la notion de concept chez Gödel. Les concepts sont des entités logiques objectives, au cœur du projet d’une théorie des concepts conçue comme une logique intentionnelle et inspirée de la scientia generalis de Leibniz. L’analyse des Max-Phil souligne que la notion de concept et la primauté du réalisme conceptuel sur le réalisme mathématique ne peuvent se comprendre qu’à la lumière du cadre métaphysique que se donne Gödel, à savoir d’une monadologie d’inspiration leibnizienne. Les Max-Phil offrent ainsi des indices sur la façon dont Gödel reprend et modifie la monadologie de Leibniz, afin, notamment, d’y inscrire les concepts. L’examen de ce cadre métaphysique tend également à éclaircir les rapports entre les concepts objectifs, les concepts subjectifs (tels que nous les connaissons), et les symboles (par lesquels nous exprimons les concepts), mais aussi les rapports entre logique et mathématiques. / Our work aims at studying the unpublished texts of Kurt Gödel, known as the Max-Phil, in which the author develops his philosophical thought. This study follows the specific issue of conceptual realism which is adopted by Gödel in his published texts (during his lifetime or posthumously), and according to which concepts are independent of our definitions and constructions. We want to show that a consistent interpretation of the Max-Phil is possible. To do so, we propose an interpretation of some excerpts, which, even if it is only hypothetical, can give new elements in order to answer open questions of the published texts, e.g. questions about conceptual realism. This last position is not understandable without explaining Gödel’s notion of concept. For him, concepts are logical and objective entities, and they are at the core of a theory of concepts, which is conceived as an intensional logic, following Leibniz’s scientia generalis. The analysis of the Max-Phil underlines that we can understand the notion of concept and the primacy of conceptual realism over mathematical realism only in the light of Gödel’s metaphysical frame, i.e. of a monadology inspired by Leibniz. Thus the Max-Phil shows how Gödel reinvestigates Leibnizian monadology, and offers some clues on the modifications he makes on it in order to include concepts. The examination of this metaphysical frame tends to elucidate the relationships between objective concepts, subjective concepts (as we know them) and symbols (through which we express concepts), and also the relationship between logic and mathematics.

Cette étude propose une exploration des stylèmes récurrents dans les écrits de Leibniz, dédiés aux thèmes de la théodicée. L’analyse répond à une triple exigence : répertorier les stylèmes leibniziens les plus fréquents, en retracer les sources et les modèles pour ainsi identifier leur fonction logique et leur rôle architectonique à l’intérieur des structures textuelles. L’étude est articulée selon trois grands chapitres qui correspondent aux différentes phases génétiques marquant l’évolution de la réflexion leibnizienne sur ces thèmes et, corrélativement, aux trois ordres de phénomènes stylistiques avec lesquels l’analyse textuelle a coutume de se confronter : les champs notionnels et sémantiques ainsi que les figures microstructurales et macrostructurales. Parallèlement, cette recherche entreprend une critique de la littérature dédiée à la tropologie leibnizienne. L’idée centrale de ce travail – qui se détache méthodologiquement de la discipline appelée Literature&Science autant qu’il se détache des présuposés théoriques admis par G.G. Granger dans son Essai d’un philosophie du style – est d’emprunter les techniques analytiques utilisées dans le champs de la stylistique littéraire pour révéler les structures sous-jacentees à l’architecture des textes leibniziens. L’enquête, conduite à partir de ces présuposés, a permis de contribuer à éclaircir certains des problématiques de la philosophie leibnizienne les plus débattues par la critique, notamment la supposée adhésion du jeune Leibniz au volontarisme, l’interprétation de la célèbre image des deux labyrinthes et certaines oscillations théoriques persistantes dans les écrits de théodicée de l’âge mature. / This thesis offers a systematic exploration of the recurring stylemes in Leibniz’ works wich are dedicated to the theodicy topics.The analysis answers to a triple requirement: to catalogue the most frequent stylemes; to track the fonts and patterns out of them and to identify their logical function and architectonic role within the text structures.The study is set up in three main chapters, which correspond to the three different phases in the evolution of Leibniz’s thought, likewise to the three orders of stylistics phenomena which the text analytics usually confronts with: semantic and notion fields and macro-level and micro-level figures. In parallel, the research conducts a critical confront with the literature dedicated to Leibniz tropology,The central idea of this study – which distances itself methodologically from the discipline called Literature&Science as much as from the theoretical presuppositions endorsed by G.G. Granger in his Essai d’une philosophie du style (1968) – is to borrow the analytic techniques used in the literary stylistics field in order to disclose the structures which are subjacent to Leibniz texts’ architecture. The research based on such assumption contributed to clarify some core issues of Leibniz philosophy among the most frequently debated by critics: the supposed adhesion of young Leibniz to voluntarism, the interpretation of two the labyrinths and certain theoretical persistent oscillations in the theodicy writings of maturity period.

Die Erforschung der deutschen Philosophie um 1700 hat in den vergangenen beiden Jahrzehnten starke Impulse erfahren; es wurden bisher unbekannte Diskussionen und Richtungen entdeckt, darunter der Eklektizismus. Der Eklektizismus war in den letzten Jahrzehnten des 17. und den ersten Jahrzehnten des 18. Jahrhunderts Gegenstand einer europaweiten Debatte, besonders unter Deutschlands Universitätsphilosophen. Inhaltlich geht es um eine Neubestimmung der Philosophie im versöhnenden Ausgleich der Ansprüche von Antike und Moderne, von Aristotelismus und Cartesianismus, deren Konflikt die Problemlage der Akademiker um 1700 allgemein charakterisierte. Figuren der Eklektizismus-Debatte sind durch kontextualisierende Forscher wie Horst Dreitzel oder Michael Albrecht ans Tageslicht geholt worden, in deren Arbeiten das doxographische Bild der Philosophie im späten 17. und im frühen 18. Jahrhundert geweitet und gedehnt wird, so daß heute eine breite (nicht nur philosophische) Kultur das historiographische Feld dort belebt, wo traditionell Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz und Christian Wolff die Geschichte der Philosophie fast allein repräsentierten. Ersetzt oder ergänzt der Eklektizismus unser traditionelles Bild der frühmodernen Philosophie?

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The purpose of this dissertation is to search the primitives of Axiomatic Set Theory in Leibnizian Philolosophy, nourishing, roughly, from Platonic idea of universal-particular distinction, Aristotelian syllogistic propositions of Organon-Categoria and Euclidean Methodology in Elements. The main focus of the dissertation intends to examine the analyticity of Leibnizian Metaphysics and the anologies between the subject-predicate relation in The Philosophy of Leibniz and Axiomatic Method in general and Set Theory in particular. In doing this, special emphasis will be ascribed to the notion of sets as to universality and/or nullness of a class, probable causes of paradoxes and in this context a critical analysis of Russell Paradox.

This commentary on article #19 of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics is for the purpose of promoting the understanding of Leibniz on the role of teleology in physics. Understanding Leibniz on final causes is crucial to understanding his overall natural philosophy. If one approaches Leibniz with a bias regarding either final causes or protestant Christian theology, such that they ignore these aspects of Leibniz, such a person is in danger of completly misunderstanding this philosopher. Leibniz is a mix of natural philosophy, mechanical physics, and protestant Christian theology. The rationale behind this study is to cause the student of philosophy to consider a somewhat ignored side of Leibniz which stems from his combination of two politically incorrect words in academics today, "intelligent" and "design". Both of these words are found in #19. Both of these terms are employed in concert with the Christian idea of God, a combination which is highly charged in academics today, and most politically incorrect. To address the political incorrectness of this combination of terms, however, is to engage in the understanding of what it mean to think and argue in seventeenth century Europe. To wrestle with these terms in article #19, therefore, is to wrestle with those positions which caused great tensions in early modern culture. The approach taken for this work is a line by line exposition of the text, unearthing the arguments involved and those philosophers who made them. Once into this particular text, article #19 turns out to be enormous in its scope of Leibnizian thought. Its subject matter mirrors the thinking of Leibniz, and is background material for other projects Leibniz was involved in at the time, such as the laws of motion in optics. The significance of this work to the discipline is that Leibniz, one of the most intellectually gifted men in human history, no less the co-discoverer of the calculus, argues that reality is an intelligent design created by a loving person who only wants to be loved by the creation in return. This puts him at odds with pure mechanists in his day, and it puts him at odds with many in philosophy today. For all those in philosophy who argue that there is no reason for reality existing, at least not as it does, Leibniz provides a very clear counter argument. Leibniz's point in #19 is that there is a place for end purposes in calculating the laws of nature, and that those who dismiss end purposes do so for insufficient reasons.

This thesis explores the ways in which key holistic thinkers over the course of the last three hundred years have articulated unity between the human subject and objective world. I borrow the term “holism” from the philosopher J. C. Smuts, who coined it in his 1936 work Holism and Evolution, and I use it here in an expanded sense that includes all thinkers in the Western tradition who, like Smuts, have been preoccupied with the question of unity. Although the nature of cosmic unity and the individual’s place within it have been questions for philosophical debate since the classical Greeks of the sixth and fifth centuries BC, from the seventeenth century onwards these questions became largely associated with a series of thinkers who sought to overcome the dualistic separation of subject and object introduced by Galileo, Descartes and others in the mechanistic philosophical tradition of Western thought. My consideration of the holistic tradition includes selected writings by Leibniz, Hegel, Whitehead and Arne Naess, cofounder and key communicator of the deep ecology movement. In my discussion of these authors I observe an emerging pattern that has gradually carried holistic thought away from its traditional dependence on an absolute universal Being as the origin of unity in the world, towards an increasing emphasis on Becoming as the origin of Being. This pattern is confirmed by my broad analyses of Renaissance philosophy and of the Counter-Enlightenment thinkers Vico, Hamann and Herder. It is further confirmed by Naess’ vision of the deep ecology movement, which emphasizes plurality and diversity in the struggle to create more ecologically sustainable forms of human living. The pattern is challenged, however, by my discussions of Heraclitus and of the deep ecology movement, which both exhibit features that also contradict the existence of a definite linear progression “from Being to Becoming.” Insofar as the deep ecology movement recognizes the validity of a broad diversity of philosophical views and premises as grounds for ecological action and decision-making, it is part of a larger movement in contemporary societies that is helping create an open space wherein all perspectives are appreciated as valuable in their own right. This movement seeks to challenge all absolute and hegemonic claims to truth (which in the early twentieth century gave rise to fascism and in our present day continue to inform our views of nature and the self), and, as I suggest, is also contributing to the emergence of an apophatic perspective in our own day that is a precondition for change. / Graduate / 0422 / 0585 / jdesser@uvic.ca

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