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Deception has long been of interest to humans, but only recently has the neuroscience of deception started. Similarly, lie-detection, as an applied aspect of the study of deception, has long been studied but only with the advent of imaging techniques and the development of the neuroscience of deception has it become possible to develop techniques based on scanningour brains. Currently, both areas suffer from methodological and philosophical problems. As an applied science fMRI lie-detection has greater issues to deal with, specifically legal and ethical issues. Despite interesting results, implicating frontal regions as the neural correlates of deception, the neuroscience of deception need better designs and more study to be able to draw any general inferences. By its nature fMRI lie-detection suffers greatly from this, and additional problems concerning privacy and legality make it seem too early to implement it incourt or anywhere, as stated by many scientists. On the other hand the technology already exists and is likely to be used.

<b>Introduction</b>: Kinesiology-style manual muscle testing (kMMT) is a non-invasive assessment method used by various types of practitioners to detect a wide range of target conditions. It is distinctly different from the muscle testing performed in orthopaedic/neurological settings and from Applied kinesiology. Despite being estimated to be used by over 1 million people worldwide, the usefulness of kMMT has not yet been established. The aim of this thesis was to assess the validity of kMMT by examining its accuracy and precision. <b>Methods</b>: A series of 5 diagnostic test accuracy studies were undertaken. In the first study, the index test was kMMT, and the target condition was deceit in verbal statements spoken by Test Patients (TPs). The comparator reference standard was a true gold standard: the actual verity of the spoken statement. The outcomes of the muscle tests were interpreted consistently: a weak result indicated a Lie and a strong result indicated a Truth. A secondary index test was included as a comparator: Intuition, where Practitioners used intuition (without using kMMT) to ascertain if a Lie or Truth was spoken. Forty-eight Practitioners were recruited and paired with 48 unique kMMT-naïve TPs. Each Pair performed 60 kMMTs broken up into 6 blocks of 10, which alternated with blocks of 10 Intuitions. For each Pair, an overall percent correct was calculated for both kMMT and Intuition, and their means were compared. Also calculated for both tests were sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value and negative predictive value. The second study was a replication of the first, using a sample size of 20 Pairs and a less complex procedure. In the third study, grip strength dynamometry replaced kMMT as the primary index test. In the fourth study, the reproducibility and repeatability of kMMT were examined. In the final study, TPs were presented with emotionally-arousing stimuli in addition to the affect-neutral stimuli used in previous studies, to assess if stimuli valence impacted kMMT accuracy. <b>Results</b>: Throughout this series of studies, mean kMMT accuracies (95% Confidence Intervals; CIs) ranged from 0.594 (0.541 – 0.647) to 0.659 (0.623 - 0.695) and mean Intuition accuracies, from 0.481 (0.456 - 0.506) to 0.526 (0.488 - 0.564). In all studies, mean kMMT accuracies were found to be significantly different from mean Intuition accuracies (p ≤ 0.01), and from Chance (p < 0.01). On the other hand, no difference was found between grip strength following False statements compared to grip strength following True statements (p = 0.61). In addition, the Practitioner-TP complex accounted for 57% of the variation in kMMT accuracy, with 43% unaccounted for. Also, there was no difference in the mean kMMT accuracy when using emotionally-arousing stimuli compared to when using affect-neutral stimuli (p = 0.35). Mean sensitivities (95% CI) ranged from 0.503 (0.421 - 0.584) to 0.659 (0.612 - 0.706) while mean specificities (95% CI) ranged from 0.638 (0.430 - 0.486) to 0.685 (0.616 - 0.754). Finally, while a number of participant characteristic seemed to influence kMMT accuracy during one study or another, no one specific characteristic was found to influence kMMT accuracy consistently (i.e. across the series of studies). <b>Discussion</b>: This series of studies has shown that kMMT can be investigated using rigorous evidence-based health care methods. Furthermore, for distinguishing lies from truths, kMMT has repeatedly been found to be significantly more accurate than both Intuition and Chance. Practitioners appear to be an integral part of the kMMT dynamic because when replaced by a mechanical device (i.e. a grip strength dynamometer), distinguishing Lies from Truth was not possible. In addition, since specificities seemed to be greater than sensitivities, Truths may have been easier to detect than Lies. A limitation of this series of studies is that I have a potential conflict of interest, in that I am a practitioner of kMMT who gets paid to perform kMMT. Another limitation is these results are not generalisable to other applications of kMMT, such as its use in other paradigms or using muscles other than the deltoid. Also, these results suggest that kMMT may be about 60&percnt; accurate, which is statistically different from Intuition and Chance; however it has not been established if 60&percnt; correct is "good enough" in a clinical context. As such, further research is needed to assess its clinical utility, such as randomised controlled trials investigating the effectiveness of whole kMMT technique systems. Also, future investigators may want to explore what factors, such as specific Practitioner and TP characteristics, influence kMMT accuracy, and to investigate the validity of using kMMT to detect other target conditions, using other reference standards and muscles other than the deltoid. <b>Summary</b>: This series of diagnostic test accuracy studies has found that kMMT can be investigated using rigorous methods, and that kMMT used to distinguish Lies from Truths is significantly more accurate that both Intuition and Chance. Further research is needed to assess kMMT’s clinical utility.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-27T14:21:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nicolau Chaud de Castro Quinta.pdf: 3033027 bytes, checksum: 91e3771d5175ceeb2dcee469694dadce (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-03-26 / As a subdomain in the study of deception, lie detection deals with the investigation of variables that control changes on the behavior of senders while they tell lies (deception cues), and with the conditions under which detectors are capable of correctly identifying such cues. The present study investigated the effect of punishment of lying on deception cues, and assessed the judgment of detectors about these senders speeches. In Study 1, ten undergraduate students took the role of salespeople in a used mobile phone store, and had to convince the clients (confederates) to buy those phones. In some of the trials they had to sell known phones (truth condition) and, at others, unknown phones (lie condition) according to previous training. Punishment was configured by the complaint from a deceived client after the purchase of a phone sold in a lie trial. The categorization of these participants behavior didn t show any significant differences between honest and deceptive messages, and didn t reveal punishment effects. In Study 2, 181 participants made judgments about the messages from Study 1 s senders in one of two detection conditions. In the Direct Detection condition, they made dichotomic judgments rating each message as a truth or a lie. In the Indirect Detection condition, they rated the senders behavior in three scales. Data from Study 2 showed that detectors were able to distinguish truths from lies in both conditions, although they did not differentially judge prepunishment from post-punishment messages. Results were discussed considering methodological issues on the creation of scenarios for the investigation of lying behavior, and the need for configuration adjustments for the punishing event was raised for a clearer establishment of relations between deception cues and aversive contingencies. / Como subdomínio do estudo da mentira, a detecção de mentiras trata da investigação de variáveis que controlam alterações no comportamento de emissores enquanto contam mentiras (sinais de mentira) e das condições sob as quais detectores são capazes de identificar corretamente tais alterações. O presente trabalho investigou o efeito da punição do mentir sobre os sinais de mentira e avaliou o julgamento de detectores a respeito das falas destes emissores. No Estudo 1, dez estudantes universitários assumiram o papel de vendedores em uma simulação de loja de aparelhos celulares usados e deveriam convencer clientes (confederados) a comprar os aparelhos. Em algumas das tentativas, deveriam vender aparelhos conhecidos (condição verdade) e, em outras, aparelhos desconhecidos (condição mentira) de acordo com treinamento anterior. A punição se configurou pela interpelação por um cliente lesado após a compra de um aparelho vendido na condição mentira. A categorização dos comportamentos destes participantes não apontou diferenças significativas entre falas sinceras e mentirosas e não revelou efeitos da punição. No Estudo 2, 181 participantes realizaram julgamentos sobre as falas dos participantes do primeiro estudo em uma dentre duas condições de detecção. Na condição Detecção Direta, fizeram julgamentos dicotômicos avaliando cada fala como verdade ou mentira. Na condição Detecção Indireta, avaliaram o comportamento dos vendedores em três escalas. Os dados do Estudo 2 mostraram que detectores foram capazes de distinguir entre verdades e mentiras nas duas condições, embora não tenham julgado diferencialmente falas anteriores e posteriores à punição. Os resultados foram discutidos considerando-se questões metodológicas na criação de um cenário para investigação do comportamento de mentir, e levantou-se a necessidade de ajustes na configuração do evento punitivo para o estabelecimento mais claro de relações entre contingências aversivas e sinais de mentira.

Controversy continues over the use of polygraph testing to deter and detect potential leakers as critics argue that the technique is based on faulty assumptions. The purpose of this descriptive and exploratory research study was to determine whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced a polygraph examination within the same time period. Paternoster and Simpson's, as well as Vance and Siponen's, rational choice models and Bandura's social learning theory served as the theoretical foundation for this study. Specifically, this study assessed groups' perceptions about adhering to security regulations if a polygraph is required, changes in their behavior and attitude, and beliefs about polygraph deterrent effect. Data were obtained through a 15-minute researcher- created survey with a cluster sample of 326 participants. Data were analyzed with a t test to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between the groups. A factor analysis was also conducted. Results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference (p < .001) between the groups, suggesting that participants perceive a deterrent effect associated with the use of polygraphs as well as a change of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work. The implications for positive social change stemming from this study include recommendations to the nation's national security agencies to continue enforcing the polygraph examinations required of certain security personnel and exploring the possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in order to fortify the national intelligence infrastructure.

There is a rich literature on how people tell lies and detect them in others, but the underlying mechanisms are still poorly understood. The first aim of this thesis was to elucidate key cognitive and neural processes underlying cued (i.e., instructed) and uncued lies. The second aim, based on recent research suggesting a link between dishonesty and creativity, was to determine whether creative cognition contributes to deceptive communication. In a first behavioural study, performance on generating and detecting lies was measured in a socially interactive setting involving cued and uncued lies. Results of a multiple regression analysis showed that creativity predicted lying generation ability: more creative individuals were better liars than less creative people. In contrast, the ability to detect lies showed no association with creativity measures, suggesting that generating and detecting lies are distinct abilities. A second event-related potential (ERP) study investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the generation of uncued lies using a novel bluffing paradigm where participants lied at will. Results showed no stimulus-locked differences between uncued lies and truths, suggesting that decision processes leading to both required comparable cognitive resources. Once the uncued decision has been made, it requires strategic monitoring to keep track of the responses in order to maximize the gains regardless of whether the outcome is a lie or the truth as indexed by no response-locked differences between uncued lies and truths. Finally, parallel functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and ERP studies were conducted to determine the role of creativity in countermeasure use in a concealed information paradigm requiring cued lying. Results showed that countermeasures degraded the neural signatures of deception and more so for more creative individuals. This work advances understanding of the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying deception as well as their dependence on individual differences in creative cognition.

The current study applied classic cognitive capacity models to examine the effect of cognitive load on deception. The study also examined whether the manipulation of cognitive load would result in the magnification of differences between liars and truth-tellers. In the first study, 87 participants engaged in videotaped interviews while being either deceptive or truthful about a target event. Some participants engaged in a concurrent secondary task while being interviewed. Performance on the secondary task was measured. As expected, truth tellers performed better on secondary task items than liars as evidenced by higher accuracy rates. These results confirm the long held assumption that being deceptive is more cognitively demanding than being truthful. In the second part of the study, the videotaped interviews of both liars and truth-tellers were shown to 69 observers. After watching the interviews, observers were asked to make a veracity judgment for each participant. Observers made more accurate veracity judgments when viewing participants who engaged in a concurrent secondary task than when viewing those who did not. Observers also indicated that participants who engaged in a concurrent secondary task appeared to think harder than participants who did not. This study provides evidence that engaging in deception is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth. As hypothesized, having participants engage in a concurrent secondary task led to the magnification of differences between liars and truth tellers. This magnification of differences led to more accurate veracity rates in a second group of observers. The implications for deception detection are discussed.

This dissertation presents two individual-difference measures that could be used to assess the validity of eyewitness identification decisions. We designed a non-forced two-alternative face recognition task (consisting of mini-lineup test pairs, half of which included a studied face and half of which did not). In three studies involving a total of 583 subjects, proclivity to choose on pairs with two unstudied faces weakly predicted mistaken identifications on culprit-absent lineups, with varying correlation coefficients that failed to reach the value r = 0.4 found in Baldassari, Kantner, and Lindsay (under review). The likelihood of choosing correctly on pairs that included a studied face was only weakly predictive of correct identifications in culprit-present lineups (mean r of .2). We discuss ways of improving standardized measures of both proclivity to choose and likelihood to be correct when choosing. The second measure is based on the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT), a lie detection method that utilizes an oddball paradigm to evoke the P300 component when a witness sees the culprit. This GKT-based lineup was intended to postdict identification accuracy regardless of witnesses’ overt responses, thus faces are used as stimuli. Half of participants were instructed to respond as if they knew the culprit and wanted to falsely exonerate him. P300 amplitudes evoked by the culprit were indistinguishable from those evoked by a different learned face but were larger than P3s evoked by unfamiliar faces in both the described lying condition and the group of participants who intentionally told the truth. / Graduate / 2018-12-05

The tactical methods of overcoming the false testimony Abstract The objective of this thesis is to describe and analyse the false testimony at interrogation, its recognition and follow-up overcoming by means of tactical interrogation methods and other techniques. In the introductory part of the thesis, the elemental concepts such as the phenomenon of lie, interrogation and testimony are defined in order to gain some insight, without which it would not be well possible to dedicate to the research of detection of lie and its overcoming. The following part deals with the lie detection in crime investigation in particular, it highlights the importance of correct identification of false testimony and it pursues the lie from perspective of the recipient of lie, whose interest is to reveal the lie. The particularities in this area regarding children are outlined as well. The subsequent part is focused on the false testimony and its detection based on the verbal, nonverbal and paraverbal tokens in conduct of concerned person. I have attempted to capture the differences between intentional communicating of untruthful information, thus lying, and unintentional communicationg of untruthful information caused by natural process of forgetting. In the following part, the overview of tactical interrogation methods applied...

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