Este trabalho avalia os efeitos do aumento da proporção de alunos de 1ª a 4ª série matriculados em escolas municipais, sobretudo no que concerne à transferência de gestão de algumas escolas estaduais para a administração municipal. Tal processo ocorreu concomitantemente a perda de autonomia fiscal quanto ao direcionamento dos recursos da educação, devido às regras de alocação impostas pelo FUNDEF. Nesse sentido, ainda que a gestão escolar estivesse mais próxima da população, a destinação da maior parte dos recursos ao pagamento de professores em exercício poderia ser contrária às preferências locais. Primeiramente, existem evidências de que o processo de municipalização implicou piora nos indicadores de rendimento, enquanto que as externalidades positivas associadas à alocação de recursos do FUNDEF parecem ter contrabalanceado a perda de autonomia local. Em segundo lugar, existem indicativos de que um componente específico do processo de expansão da gestão municipal, a descentralização das escolas estaduais, esteja associado à queda das taxas de reprovação, após um período de acomodação. Contudo, os resultados sugerem aumento da desigualdade dos resultados educacionais, uma vez que os efeitos positivos concentram-se em municípios com maiores níveis de renda per capita. / This work evaluates the effects of increasing the proportion of students from 1st to 4th grade enrolled in municipal schools, especially regarding the transfer of management of some state schools to the municipalities. This process occurred concurrently with the loss of fiscal autonomy for direction of education resources due to allocation rules imposed by FUNDEF. In this case, even if the school management was closer to the population, the allocation of most resources to pay teachers in practice could be contrary to local preferences. First, there is evidence that increasing the proportion of students from 1st to 4th grade in municipal schools resulted in worsening performance indicators, while positive externalities associated with FUNDEF\'s resources allocation appear to have counterbalanced the loss of local autonomy. Secondly, there are indications that a specific component of the ongoing expansion of municipal management, decentralization of state schools, is associated with the decrease of failure rates after a period of accommodation. However, the results suggest an increase in inequality of educational outcomes, since the positive effects are concentrated in municipalities with higher levels of income per capita.

<p>This study is a response to the dilemma of poor service delivery or the lack thereof. In this regard, this study posits the professionalisation of local government as part of the solution. The focus is on the administrative arm of local government, which is the major conduit for service delivery. Professionalisation of local government is a broader theme. For the present purposes, focus will be devoted to the competency component which entails attracting qualified personnel competent to discharge local government responsibilities. However, it is not limited to attracting already competent and professional staff. It also entails developing the skills of existing staff. This definition, in essence, relates to qualification through training, learning and specialisation.11 In essence, professionalisation of local government ensures that all employees act and behave in a professional way. In this regard, this study seeks to identify the competency standards set by the legislative framework and then explore the legal avenues for enforcing compliance, by the municipal administration, with such standards. This requires one to look at and answer the following questions: What constitutes municipal staff? / What is the content of the competency framework in question? / What are the enforcement mechanisms currently in place? / Whose role is it to enforce compliance with the competency framework? / Broadly speaking, enforcement can take two forms: hard enforcement and soft enforcement. The hard form of enforcement relates to giving incentives for compliance with the competency framework and dismissal for non-compliance. Softer enforcement, in turn, relates to correction and monitoring.</p>

<p>Instability in the administration of municipalities is a particularly serious problem in the Western Cape because of its large number of coalition councils. Coalitions have led to<br /> frequent changes in local governance and to constant changes in political and administrative leadership. Due to the fluidity in local government, the politics of the day have become synonymous with back-stabbing, secret agreements and arrangements between politicians and political parties wishing to align themselves in such a way as to gain control of the councils.1 A municipality is required by the Constitution2 to structure and manage its administration and budgets, budgeting and planning processes so as to give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the community.3 Legislation further prescribes that &ldquo / a municipality must within its administrative and financial capacity establish and organize its administration in a manner that would enable the municipality to establish clear relationships, facilitate coordination, cooperation and communication between (i) its political structures and political office bearers and its administration / (ii) its political structures, political office bearers and administration and the local community&rdquo / .4 It may therefore be argued that a municipality subscribing to the abovementioned prescripts should be functioning effectively. However, in practice continuous administrative and political instability adversely impacts on a municipality‟s capacity to provide service delivery to the community. The 2006 local government elections resulted in only four out of 30 municipalities in the Western Cape having a single party with more than 50% of the seats (outright majority). The remaining 26 municipalities were governed by coalitions of two or more parties. In 2001, Parliament introduced floor-crossing legislation which allowed Members of Parliament, Members of Provincial Legislatures and local government councillors to change their political party (or form a new party) and retains their seats when they did so.5 As a result of the 2007 floor-crossing legislation, the number of municipalities with an outright majority increased to 7. Power changes continued to occur even after the 2007 floor-crossing as a result of by-election outcomes or new internal coalition arrangements. Coalition government in the Western Cape remains a reality following the 18 May 2011 local government elections: the Democratic Alliance won 12 municipalities outright, the African National Congress won 1, and in 12 municipalities there was no outright winner. Of the 12 last-mentioned municipalities, 7 municipalities produced hung municipalities, i.e. Bitou, Witzenberg, Laingsburg, Hessequa, Theewaterskloof, Matzikama and Prince Albert.</p>

<p>This study is a response to the dilemma of poor service delivery or the lack thereof. In this regard, this study posits the professionalisation of local government as part of the solution. The focus is on the administrative arm of local government, which is the major conduit for service delivery. Professionalisation of local government is a broader theme. For the present purposes, focus will be devoted to the competency component which entails attracting qualified personnel competent to discharge local government responsibilities. However, it is not limited to attracting already competent and professional staff. It also entails developing the skills of existing staff. This definition, in essence, relates to qualification through training, learning and specialisation.11 In essence, professionalisation of local government ensures that all employees act and behave in a professional way. In this regard, this study seeks to identify the competency standards set by the legislative framework and then explore the legal avenues for enforcing compliance, by the municipal administration, with such standards. This requires one to look at and answer the following questions: What constitutes municipal staff? / What is the content of the competency framework in question? / What are the enforcement mechanisms currently in place? / Whose role is it to enforce compliance with the competency framework? / Broadly speaking, enforcement can take two forms: hard enforcement and soft enforcement. The hard form of enforcement relates to giving incentives for compliance with the competency framework and dismissal for non-compliance. Softer enforcement, in turn, relates to correction and monitoring.</p>

<p>Instability in the administration of municipalities is a particularly serious problem in the Western Cape because of its large number of coalition councils. Coalitions have led to<br /> frequent changes in local governance and to constant changes in political and administrative leadership. Due to the fluidity in local government, the politics of the day have become synonymous with back-stabbing, secret agreements and arrangements between politicians and political parties wishing to align themselves in such a way as to gain control of the councils.1 A municipality is required by the Constitution2 to structure and manage its administration and budgets, budgeting and planning processes so as to give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the community.3 Legislation further prescribes that &ldquo / a municipality must within its administrative and financial capacity establish and organize its administration in a manner that would enable the municipality to establish clear relationships, facilitate coordination, cooperation and communication between (i) its political structures and political office bearers and its administration / (ii) its political structures, political office bearers and administration and the local community&rdquo / .4 It may therefore be argued that a municipality subscribing to the abovementioned prescripts should be functioning effectively. However, in practice continuous administrative and political instability adversely impacts on a municipality‟s capacity to provide service delivery to the community. The 2006 local government elections resulted in only four out of 30 municipalities in the Western Cape having a single party with more than 50% of the seats (outright majority). The remaining 26 municipalities were governed by coalitions of two or more parties. In 2001, Parliament introduced floor-crossing legislation which allowed Members of Parliament, Members of Provincial Legislatures and local government councillors to change their political party (or form a new party) and retains their seats when they did so.5 As a result of the 2007 floor-crossing legislation, the number of municipalities with an outright majority increased to 7. Power changes continued to occur even after the 2007 floor-crossing as a result of by-election outcomes or new internal coalition arrangements. Coalition government in the Western Cape remains a reality following the 18 May 2011 local government elections: the Democratic Alliance won 12 municipalities outright, the African National Congress won 1, and in 12 municipalities there was no outright winner. Of the 12 last-mentioned municipalities, 7 municipalities produced hung municipalities, i.e. Bitou, Witzenberg, Laingsburg, Hessequa, Theewaterskloof, Matzikama and Prince Albert.</p>

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