The project that resulted in this work had two main goals. The first was to sort out the most plausible form of the moral error theory, the view made popular by J.L. Mackie in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Second, I aimed to determine the extent of its plausibility. The first three chapters of this dissertation are the result of my attempt to accomplish the first goal, and the last two chapters are a consequence of the second. In the end, I argue that the most plausible version of the error theory (viz., Richard Joyce's development of Mackie's views) is not true. Along the way, I make three additional novel contributions to the meta-ethical literature. First, I provide a close reading of Mackie's work, and I argue that he has been misinterpreted thus far in the literature. Second, I attempt to clarify the linguistic and metaphysical components of the error theory. Third, I explicate a novel view in meta-ethics that isn't a direct descendent of Mackie's views, but which is, in many important respects, similar to his view. I call the view 'moral indecisionism', since its main thesis seems to agree with Hume when he writes, "The chief obstacle ... to our improvement in the moral ... sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms."

Error theory turns on a particular presupposition about the conceptual commitments of moral realism, namely that the moral facts posited by realists need to be categorical. True moral propositions are said to have an absolute authority in their prescriptions in the sense that an agent, regardless of her own ends, needs or desires, is categorically obligated and has reason to act in accordance with their prescriptions. But, nothing in the world has such a queer property as categoricity, and therefore we ought to be suspect of the enterprise of moral discourse. Some philosophers, like Stephen Finlay, have argued that this categoricity is not a necessary feature of moral language, and in so doing hope to have shown that the error theoretic critique is thus refuted. In this article I offer a survey of the literature on this topic and then contribute independent motivations for siding with those who think moral facts need not be categorical (and that a powerful argument for error theory is defused).

Zugl.: Düsseldorf, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Edinburgh, 2001.

This is a novel about the way individuals can and do operate in a world controlled by larger power structures. It is interested in how people can effect change in this world, often in ways they do not plan. It explores the inability of the individual to control the world around them. The novel features a large cast of characters moving through a world that is dying. Earth’s climate is warming at a rate that will make it uninhabitable for humans. The specifics of this catastrophe are never explored. Rather, the novel concerns itself with people who are reacting to it, and how their reactions ultimately do more harm than good.

When an act is right or wrong, there may be an explanation why. Different moral theories recognize different moral facts and offer different explanations of them, but they offer no account of moral explanation itself. What, then, is its nature? This thesis seeks a systematic account of moral explanation within a framework of moral realism. In Chapter 1, I develop a pluralist theory of explanation. I argue that there is a prima facie distinctive normative mode of explanation that is essential to moral theory. In Chapter 2, I characterize normative explanation through its formal properties. I then draw on John Mackie’s claim that moral explanations are queer to develop a powerful form of moral scepticism. In Chapters 3–4, I reject attempts to reduce normative explanation to logical necessity, metaphysical necessity, or conceptual (analytic) necessity. The failure of these accounts is taken to reinforce Mackie’s scepticism. In Chapter 5, I defend a partial analysis of normative explanation in terms of irreducible normative laws. I argue that irreducible normative laws offer a realist, though non-naturalist, answer to Mackie’s scepticism. The existence of irreducible normative laws then is defended as offering the best realist explanation of why rightness and wrongness supervene on descriptive properties. In Appendix A, I discuss the claim the normative explanation has an essential connection to the motivation of virtuous agents. I defend this claim from certain difficulties posed by Jonathan Dancy’s recent work.

This thesis focuses on problematics of DAW controllers for sound production software. In this thesis is analysed Mackie Control protocol, one of used communication protocols. There is also an overview of MIDI messages, because Mackie Control protocol is based on MIDI protocol. The thesis contains two own DAW controller designs. First one is based on Mackie Control protocol, second one is based on Generic Remote which offers better customization.

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This thesis examines how the aesthetic and queer themes in E. W. Hornung’s Raffles stories have been transmediated in the TV-series Raffles. Hornung’s Raffles stories were not only immensely popular in their time, but were also a reflection of the fin-de-siècle and of the cultural role aestheticism played in the late Victorian society. Though a number of adaptations were made in the early 20th century, none of them adapted Hornung’s original stories to the same extent as the 1975-77 Yorkshire TV-series.  In this study, material such as original scripts, notes, and correspondence from screenwriter Philip Mackie’s personal collection are examined from an adaptation theoretical perspective in relation to Hornung’s books and the finished TV-series. At the same time, a queer reading of the screenplays and of the televised series is made and compared to previous academic queer readings of Hornung’s stories. The adaptation is discussed in context with the time period in which it was produced and with the various factors that have formed it, such as financial restraints and medium related conventions.  The study demonstrates that both aesthetic and queer themes that correspond to those found in Hornung’s stories can be found in the TV-series. It argues that the political climate of the 1970s both restrained how Raffles and Bunny’s relationship was portrayed in the series but also allowed for a more faithful adaptation of Hornung’s stories, including their aesthetic and queer themes, than had previously been possible.

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