Background/Discussion: Among investors, annual reports are used as a decision-making document to value a company. Many companies therefore use voluntary disclosure as a complement to statutory information in annual reports. Previous studies have examined what the underlying factors for voluntary disclosure are. These have among other things, resulted in factors such as size, country of origin and owner concentration, which has a significant impact on the amount of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, it is interesting to examine if there is a significant difference between the amount of voluntary disclosure in companies with controlled ownership versus management ownership. The selection is based on companies listed on the Swedish stock market Nasdaq Strockholm, Large Cap and Small Cap. Purpose: This comparative study is aiming to investigate differences in the amount of voluntary disclosure between companies with controlled ownership and management ownership. The purpose is to create a deeper understanding and increase awareness of the ownership structure's impact on voluntary information. Method: A quantitative method has been used for the study and empirical data has been collected through observations of annual reports. The collected data has then been assessed according to a valuation index designed for the study. The index has been adapted to both swedish and international regulations. The study has then used scatterplots and a t-test to measure whether or not there is a significant difference in the amount of voluntary disclosure between the two owner concentrations. Result: Based on the study's sample, there is no significant difference in the amount of voluntary disclosure between control-owned and management-controlled companies. Control-owned companies tend to report more information about accidents than managementcontrolled companies. The management-controlled companies in the study tend to report more information on marketing than control-owned companies

Le Capital-Investissement et plus particulièrement les opérations de LBO, occupent une place importante dans l'économie mondiale et française. Ce travail de recherche a pour objet l'analyse de l'impact des leviers organisationnels et de gouvernance sur la performance opérationnelle et la rentabilité des entreprises françaises sous LBO. Nous présentons ainsi, en premier lieu, dans les deux premiers chapitres de cette thèse, une revue complète de la littérature, ainsi que le modèle théorique de l'impact des leviers organisationnels et de gouvernance sur la performance opérationnelle et la rentabilité des entreprises sous LBO en privilégiant une approche actionnariale de la gouvernance.Ensuite, dans le cadre des troisième et quatrième chapitres de cette thèse, nous examinons de façon empirique, d'une part, l'impact de la mise en place des opérations de LBO sur la performance opérationnelle des entreprises françaises, et, d'autre part, les effets des leviers organisationnels et de gouvernance sur la rentabilité des entreprises françaises sous LBO.Nos résultats confirment en partie les résultats anglo-saxons concernant l'impact positif des opérations de LBO sur la performance de la société cible, ils sont obtenus en effectuant une double analyse comparative : la première en comparant l'évolution de la performance avant et après la mise en place du LBO, et la deuxième en effectuant une comparaison par rapport à un groupe de contrôle composé d'entreprises aux caractéristiques comparables mais qui n'ont pas fait l'objet d'un LBO.Enfin, nous proposons un modèle explicatif des effets des leviers organisationnels et de gouvernance sur la rentabilité des entreprises sous LBO. / Private Equity, especially Leverage Buyout activity (LBO), is now an important concern in the world economy and also in France. This kind of investment is an important alternative to capital market.The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the effects of corporate governance and organizational mechanisms on the performance of French firms leveraged buyout.We presented in the first part of this thesis, the first and second chapter of it, the history of the emergence of these investments in the world and especially in France, and an overview of the literature on private equity and leveraged buyouts, focusing on our theoretical framework which is based on corporate governance theories, especially on agency theory and financial performance.Moreover, we discussed the literature about the relation between operating performance, corporate governance and Leverage Buyout. As part of this thesis and in the third and fourth chapters, we proposed an empirical study of the impact of LBO on operating performance.This research also proposes a new approach to the relationship governance-performance by a financial modelling of the relation between corporate governance and performance in the case of leveraged buyout firms in France.This thesis is a contribution to the Leverage Buyout and Private Equity literature from a theoretical and empirical point of view. It also has implications for the managers of private firms.

This is a study on the effect of management and CEO stock ownership on company performance. A regression analysis is performed on panel data consisting of a sample of 30 companies listed on OMX Stockholm Mid Cap. A total of 210 and 2520 observations is considered on a yearly and monthly basis, respectively, for seven years (2010-2016). The Hausman test is applied for determining between the fixed effects and random effects regression models. Results show that management relative stock ownership has a significant positive effect on company net income growth and return on assets. The effect is not significant for CEO stock ownership, which is contrary to what commonly has been shown for large companies in previous research. Moreover, alternative methodology is discussed for the benefit of the future researcher. The authors illustrate how the selection of dummy variables can be vital for final model outcomes, and it is thus an important aspect to consider when performing panel data analysis. / I den här studien undersöks hur aktieinnehav hos ledning och den verkställande direktören i ett företag påverkar företagsutvecklingen. Studien genomförs med regressionsanalys på paneldata som består av 30 företag, samtliga noterade på OMX Stockholm Mid Cap. Totalt samlas 210 och 2520 observationer på årsbasis respektive månadsbasis över sju år (2010-2016). Hausman-testet används för att bestämma vilken av fixed effects-modellen och random effects-modellen som ska användas i regressionen. Resultaten visar att relativt aktieinnehav hos ledningen har en positiv signifikant påverkan på ett företags nettoinkomstutveckling och avkastning på tillgångar. Den verkställande direktörens aktieinnehav visas inte vara signifikant, vilket är motsatt till det som generellt har visats för stora företag i tidigare forskning. Regressionerna genomförs även med alternativa metoder, vilka det resoneras kring i en diskussion som bör vara till gagn för vidare forskning. Författarna illustrerar hur val av dummy-variabler kan ha en avgörande betydelse för regressionsanalysen, och att det således är en viktig aspekt att ta hänsyn till när regressioner genomförs på paneldata.