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Mao Tse-tung and the hundred flowers campaign, 1956-7Wong, Sing-wah. January 1980 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1980. / Also available in print.
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毛澤東的建國理論. v.1 / Mao Zedong de jian guo li lun. v.1January 1975 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Manuscript. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / Chapter 第一章 --- 導論 --- p.1 / Chapter (一) --- 問題的提出 --- p.1 / Chapter (二) --- 研究的中心 --- p.5 / Chapter (三) --- 研究的範圍及方法 --- p.7 / Chapter (四) --- 研究的局限 --- p.9 / Chapter (五) --- 全文的結構 --- p.13 / Chapter 第二章 --- 建國 Nation Building 的理論 --- p.17 / Chapter 第一節 --- 卡爾⁾ة代卓 Karl Deutsch 等人的建國理論。 --- p.18 / Chapter 第二節 --- 建國理論的檢討 --- p.82 / Chapter 第三章 --- 馬克思主義傳統中的民族國家问題 --- p.106 / Chapter 第一節 --- 民族̐£國家̐£民族國家的定義 --- p.108 / Chapter 第二節 --- 民族運動及民族國家的歷史發展過程 --- p.133 / Chapter 第三節 --- 馬克思主義的民族问題及民族綱領 --- p.149 / Chapter (一) --- 一八四八年民族運動´ؤ´ؤ馬克思 的民族運動綱領。 --- p.152 / Chapter (二) --- 二十世紀帝國主義階段的民族问題──列寧的民族運動綱領。 --- p.167 / Chapter 第四節 --- 建國理論的綜合 --- p.182 / Chapter 第四章 --- 民族解放革命理論(一)──毛澤東一九二四年至一九三七年著作分析 --- p.131 / Chapter 第一節 --- 一九二四年至一九二七年第一次國內革命戰爭時期。 / Chapter 第二節 --- 一九二七年至一九三七年:第二次國內革命戰爭時期。 / Chapter 第三節 --- 一九二四年至一九三六年著作的歸納 / Chapter 第五章 --- 民族解放革命理論(二)──毛澤東一九三七至一九四五年著作分析 --- p.488 / Chapter 第一節 --- 一九三七年至一九四五年中國社會̐£歷史實況 --- p.498 / Chapter 第二節 --- 毛澤東著作內容分析 --- p.534 / Chapter (一) --- 抗日民族統一戰綫問題 --- p.541 / Chapter (二) --- 抗日民族戰爭的戰略問題 --- p.580 / Chapter (三) --- 抗日戰爭中中國共產黨的黨,軍,政問題。 --- p.608 / Chapter (四) --- 中國革命的方向´ؤ´ؤ新民主主義 --- p.643 / Chapter 第三節 --- 一九二四年至一九四五年著作的總結及引伸 --- p.668 / Chapter 第六章 --- 毛澤東的建國理論 --- p.679 / Chapter 第一節 --- 毛澤東的建國理論 --- p.680 / Chapter (一) --- 為甚麼建國? --- p.685 / Chapter (二) --- 誰人去建立屬於誰人的國家? --- p.688 / Chapter (三) --- 怎樣建國? --- p.694 / Chapter (四) --- 建立怎麼樣的民族國家? --- p.704 / Chapter 第二節 --- 毛澤東的建國理論與西方社會科學家(卡爾⁾ة代卓等人)的對比 --- p.710 / Chapter 第三節 --- 毛澤東的建國理論與馬克思主義的建國理論的比對 --- p.732 / ´ؤ´ؤ結語´ؤ´ؤ --- p.742
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Olof Lagercrantz har varit i KinaTobias, Romare January 2013 (has links)
This thesis aims to examine how the renowned swedish writer and critic Olof Lagercrantz wrote about communist China under Mao Zedong's leadership in the years 1970–1971. Lagercrantz served as editor-in-chef and as cultural director on one of Sweden's major daily newspapers, Dagens Nyheter, between 1951 and 1975. He travelled to China in 1970 as one of the first European reporters to get admission after the cultural revolution. This series of articles about China also changed the image of Lagercrantz, afterwards he was referred to as Maoist. The Swedish daily press referred to him as an "operetta Chinese" and "ching-tjopp chinaman" and the myth that he came back from China to the DN-office wearing a Mao suit, is still in circulation. The paper concerns the problem of trying to understand a culture on its own terms. In the survey, I give a picture of how Lagercrantz wrote about China, and explore some of the contexts of the texts produced. It's easy to judge in hindsight, but my ambition has been to try to find some kind of understanding of, or insight into what was communicated. Making a representation of a country and its people involves many issues and problems and in the paper I examine these through a postcolonial perspective inspired by Edward Said's book Orientalism (1978). Furthermore, I will examine the contexts that may have been important for Lagercrantz's work, and what might have influenced the image Lagercrantz gave of China and what authoritative position he occupies in his articles.
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毛澤東的政治思想-權力與策略 / The Political Thought of Mao Zedong - Power and St- rategy.李嵩明, Lee, Soong Ming Unknown Date (has links)
毛澤東是中共革命及建政中最具影響力的領導人物,他的政治思想在某種程度上改變了中共的發展路線。誠如斯圖爾特.施拉姆(Stuart.R.Schram)所說:「思想發源於歷史,思想也塑造歷史」,毛澤東的政治思想有其受中國歷史傳統影響的一面。但是,就身為一位革命者而言,毛的政治思想在開創歷史方面,更值得去研究與探討。
就中共的歷史來看,中共黨內歷次的鬥爭,所包含的意義除了領導者之間的權力鬥爭之外,它的深刻意含尚包括一套政治權力與策略的建立。從陳獨秀的「右傾」,瞿秋白、李立三的「盲動」,到王明國際派的倒台及毛澤東取得中共黨內的領導權,這一連串歷史過程不僅改變了中共的革命,也建立了毛澤東的政治思想與實踐,這就如同葛蘭西(Antonio Gra- msci)所稱的「建立領導階級同創造世界觀有同等的價值」,而「實現了的領導權意味著對哲學的實在評論,意味著它的實在的辯證法」,身為一位革命者,毛澤東既反傳統又從傳統文化吸取精華,他的革命改變了歷史,卻也造就出他獨特的政治思想,一種具體的社會實踐及辯證的政治思想。
傅柯(Michel Foucault)認為「當代哲學完全是政治的和歷史的。它是內在於歷史的政治,同政治不可分隔的歷史」,毛的政治思想,如同傅柯所言是「內在於歷史的政治」,毛熟讀中國歷史,懂得歷史的政治過程,他更瞭解歷史政治的權力與策略。當毛澤東以「中國人民站起來了」,總結中共革命及建政的時代意義時,這場革命似乎只關注道德及正義,革命所具有的權力爭奪被有意的忽略。如今是重新探討這場革命的權力與策略研究的時候了。
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Dialectics of Globalization and Localization on the Chinese Communist Party's IdeologyHuang, Ching-hsien 26 July 2007 (has links)
The foundation of the Chinese Communist Party was originated from the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the May Forth movement in 1919. Of the two events, the former inherited the ideological characteristics of ¡§globalization¡¨ on Marxism, while the latter embodied the ideological features of ¡§localization¡¨ on nationalism. Up to now, the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party has still been involving the dialectics of ¡§globalization¡¨ and ¡§localization¡¨.
This doctoral dissertation first elaborates on the research motivation, purpose, method, documents, framework and so forth. It then continues to expound on the definitions of ideology, dialectics, globalization and localization. The third chapter discusses Marxism and Leninism which are the origins of the Chinese Communist Party¡¦s ideology. Chapter four analyzes how Mao Zedong conducted the dialectics of ideology and helped the Chinese Communist Party to seize power. Chapter five explores why Mao Zedong led the dialectics of the Chinese Communist Party¡¦s ideology to advance the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
The sixth chapter studies how Deng Xiaoping guided the dialectics of ideology and promoted the Chinese Communist Party to transform a political movement into an economic reform. Chapter seven investigates why and how Jiang Zemin, and later, Hu Jintao carry on the dialectics of the Chinese Communist Party¡¦s ideology and construct the important thought of Three Represents, harmonious society of socialism, etc. Chapter eight concludes the achievements and discoveries of this research.
Be it Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, or, as a matter of fact, regardless of whoever was or is in charge, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party invariably conducts the dialectics of ideology on the ¡§globalization¡¨ of Marxism-Leninism and the ¡§localization¡¨ of the Chinese Communist Party in power. Based on the successful experience of ¡§localization¡¨ of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communist Party expects to achieve the goal of ¡§globalization¡¨ of the Marxism-Leninism.
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Toward strategic alignment : Sino-American relations from rapprochement to normalizationMinami, Kazushi 20 January 2015 (has links)
Richard Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972 marked a diplomatic breakthrough for Sino-American relations after two decades of mutual animosity since the Korean War. Nevertheless, the bilateral relations underwent a long stalemate in the mid-1970s, before the United States and China finally reached normalization of relations in December 1978. The scholarship on Sino-American relations in the 1970s tends to focus on Nixon’s visit or normalization of relations, without paying adequate attention to how Washington and Beijing dealt with the mid-decade deadlock. My report addresses this gap in the literature by analyzing the changing dynamism of Sino-American relations, determined first by Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong, and later by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deng Xiaoping. Kissinger sought to establish a triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and China, where the United States could manipulate the Sino-Soviet antagonism to improve its relations with both communist giants. With the failure of his initial idea of creating an anti-Soviet united front with Washington, Mao, through his Three World theory, championed the Third World struggle against both superpowers in competition for global hegemony in the disguise of détente. With Kissinger clinging to superpower détente and Mao determined to maintain a revolutionary China, their strategies were doomed to a stalemate. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski tried to create a bilateral structure, where the United States cooperated with China to confront the Soviet Union, which expanded its influence globally despite ongoing détente. Unlike Mao, Deng sought to replace revolution with development as China’s national agenda, by emphasizing modernization, instead of the Three World theory, in Chinese foreign policy. Their global strategies necessitated mutual cooperation, creating momentum for normalization negotiations, especially after Brzezinski’s trip to China in May 1978. The shifting dynamism in Sino-American relations from the Kissinger-Mao years to Brzezinski-Deng years, therefore, precipitated normalization of relations in the late 1970s. / text
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An annotated translation of Mao Tse-tung t'ung chih ti ch'u-ch'i ke-ming huo-tung: Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang (The early revolutionary activities of comrade Mao Tse-tung: The founding of the chinese communist Party)Onate, Andres D., 1940- January 1968 (has links)
No description available.
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Pooling the strength of the masses : Mao Tse-Tung and Pol Pot, with emphasis on mass media and personal influence /Tong, Po-shan. January 1996 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 83-92).
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Pooling the strength of the masses Mao Tse-Tung and Pol Pot, with emphasis on mass media and personal influence /Tong, Po-shan. January 1996 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 83-92). Also available in print.
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Provisions for leadership succession in the P.R.C.Campbell, David Nathan January 1988 (has links)
Most analysts study leadership succession in communist states as a "crisis" which ensues after the death of a dominant leader. This study takes an alternative approach. It is a survey of provisions for leadership succession in the People's Republic, of China. This involves a comparison of the strategies and motivations of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in providing for their own succession.
Deng Xiaoping's more extensive provisions for leadership succession during the CCP's transition towards a more institutionalized one-party bureaucratic rule are likely to be more durable than Mao's provisions in the earlier period. Nevertheless, guarantees of smooth and regularized succession, especially of protégés promoted on the basis of personal ties within the leadership core, may be impossible to obtain.
Mao's provisions were aimed largely at what he saw as a probable, but deplorable, bureaucratic future of the PRC. Deng, on the other hand, perceives an element of opportunity in the succession process. He has tried to provide leadership that will, in his estimation, be better able to bring about China's modernization. In both leaders' provisions for succession, the elevation to the status of "heir apparent" of individuals has been a political liability to those individuals, especially when their promotion is perceived to be based largely on personal ties to the dominant leader. This liability becomes more pronounced in a period of bureaucratic, collective leadership.
Because of his shifting policy preferences, his status as charismatic leader, and the ambitious nature of his protégés, Mao Zedong was unsuccessful in providing for his own succession. Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, has been successful in cultivating a reserve of young, well-educated cadres. These provisions, because they are extensive and exist in a more subdued, consensus-oriented political environment, may well be Deng's most enduring legacy. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate
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