El presente texto busca desarrollar y explicitar el concepto de filosofía que Martin Heidegger tenía desde la segunda mitad de la década de 1920, es decir, en los años que giran en torno a Ser y tiempo. Se toman como ejes los cursos dictados en esos años en la Universidad de Marburgo. La distinción entre ciencias positivas y ciencia crítica, así como la distinción entre filosofía científica y filosofía como concepción del mundo, tendrán por objetivo precisar qué es lo propio del quehacer filosófico: la diferencia ontológica. Tematizar el ser es lo propio de la filosofía para Heidegger, lo cual implica considerar que la filosofía en sentido pleno y eminente es ontología. Su relación con el ente no es positiva, pues se da en función al problema del sentido del ser. Todo ello nos permitirá tener una mejor comprensión de lo que Heidegger entendía por quehacer filosófico (ontología fenomenológica) y poder, así, estar en una mejor posición para comprender aspectos fundamentales del proyecto de la ontología fundamental desarrollado por Heidegger en Ser y tiempo.

A crítica da razão é tão antiga quanto ela mesma, pois a razão não passa disso: a capacidade de pôr as coisas em suspenso, subtrair-lhes a obviedade, exigir-lhes fundamento, como se exige de um proprietário o seu título de propriedade. Em torno da metade do século XX, esta crítica parece ter esgotado as possibilidades de serenovar, o que estimulou pensadores como Jürgen Habermas à formulação de um conceito ampliado ou enriquecido de razão, que teria essencialmente duas vantagens sobre o modelo ultrapassado. A primeira diz respeito à aptidão desta figura renovada da razão para incluir o outro excluído da razão centrada na subjetividade, a saber, a experiência estética. A segunda incide sobre o modo como esta inclusão é realizada a partir de uma incorporação da razão à linguagem, conseqüentemente através de uma lingüistificação da experiência estética. A presente tese propõe-se a investigar como esta estratégia conceitual, embora justificada, esbarra em limites que, a rigor, não deveriam ser imputados à própria racionalidade. Arazão comunicativa, portanto, não deveria ser passível de uma crítica autofágica, algo assim como uma dialética negativa. Porém, na medida em que ela precisa levar em consideração o potencial cognitivo destes limites impostos pela linguagem que abre o mundo, ela interioriza pressupostos normativos dissonantes consigo mesma. Uma vez que a experiência coma arte oferece o exemplo mais claro deste potencial, sem deixar de levantar uma pretensão racional específica, ela tem a prerrogativa metodológica de permitir uma crítica à razão comunicativa que não se torna auto-referente, mas que se coloca a partir de um problema: o problema da estética._________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT: The critique of reason is as old as herself, because reason is just that: the ability to put things on hold, to snatch away from them the obviousness, and to require them to plea, as required of an owner your title. Around the middle of the twentieth century, this criticism seems to have exhausted the possbilities of renewal, what stimulated thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas to formulate a broadened or enriched concept of reason, which would essentially have two advantages over the outdated model. The first one concerns the aptitude of this renewed figure of reason to include the other of the subject-centered reason, namely the aesthetic experience. The second one focuses on how this inclusion is accomplished by an incorporation of reason into language, therefore through a linguistification of aesthetic experience. The present thesis proposes to investigate how this conceptual strategy, although justified, comes up against limits, which, striclty speaking, should notbe imputed to rationality itself. Communicative reason should therefore not be susceptible to an autophagic critique, something like a negative dialectics. However, insofar asit must take into account the cognitive potential of these limits imposed by a world-disclosing language, it internalizes dissonant normative assumptions. Since the experience with art offersthe clearest example of this potencial, while raising a specific rational claim, it has the methodological prerogative to allow a critique of communicative reason which does not become self-referential, but which has been put from a problem: the problem of aesthetics.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:04:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo858_1.pdf: 416013 bytes, checksum: 89a3c65884546030b3ac0712313b05d4 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Universidade Federal de Pernambuco / A pluralidade é um dos baluartes da teoria política de Hannah Arendt. Perpassa a sua obra quase inteiramente. Faz-se notar desde As origens do totalitarismo, publicada em 1951, livro que deu notoriedade internacional a autora, até A vida do espírito, de 1978, póstuma; mas, é em A condição humana, de 1958, que ganha um lugar imprescindível. Seguindo as indicações desse escrito podemos caracterizar a pluralidade como à condição da ação e do discurso. Esses dois aspectos que lhe são inerentes manifestam a singularidade humana. Isto é, somente na presença de outros com e entre os quais agimos e falamos, que nos são iguais e diferentes, é que podemos ir desvelando o Quem que cada um de nós é. Isso pode significar algumas convergências com a analítica existencial heideggeriana, apesar de não tê-la necessariamente como única fonte de inspiração e de também poder apresentar alguma divergência. O Dasein nunca se dá isoladamente, ele é sempre ser-com, é co-presença e neste mesmo sentido o mundo é sempre mundo compartilhado, viver é conviver. No pensamento de Heidegger não há lugar para se pensar em um si-mesmo isolado da presença dos outros, visto que até na decisão resoluta do Dasein de assumir o peso de sua finitude, seu modo de ser mais próprio, isso se dá simultaneamente a todos os outros modos de ser. Não há como separar o ser-para-morte do ser-no-mundo e do ser-com-os-outros. Aceitando essa interpretação podemos perceber que o Dasein mesmo em seu modo de ser mais próprio, na singularização permitida pela angústia fundamental, manifesta e não nega a pluralidade que lhe é inerente. Arendt insinua essa compreensão de Heidegger a partir dos anos cinquenta. Dessa forma, pode-se assumir como possibilidade, a partir dessa reinterpretação da analítica existencial, que a noção de mundo e de Dasein como ser-nomundo e ser-com tem um papel importante para a noção de pluralidade como a paradoxal pluralidade de seres singulares , desenvolvida em A condição humana. O presente texto versa sobre essa possível aproximação entre os autores. Procuramos resgatar o legado heideggeriano sobre uma autora e um tema que cada vez mais são estudados com recorrência na contemporaneidade. A pluralidade é uma das categorias atuais mais visitadas em diversas áreas do saber, isso por causa do seu potencial de fazer refletir sobre a igualdade e o respeito às diferenças

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:36:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo8060_1.pdf: 445850 bytes, checksum: 12b06c1bc4f234be9b6600a2bd6416a0 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2002 / Dar a conhecer a poesia da argentina Alejandra Pizarnik é nosso principal objetivo, e, também, um desafio. Traçamos, não um percurso bio/gráfico, mas a trajetória po/ética, em que vida e literatura vibram uníssonas. Divisor de águas da poética pizarnikiana, Árbol de Diana (1962), quarto livro de poemas, escrito e lançado, enquanto residia em Paris (1960-1964), constitui-se nosso cuidado. Ao dispormo-nos a escutar e perscrutar os mistérios das palavras dizentes, aproximamo-nos deste instrumento natural de visión , segundo Octavio Paz, amparados por Martin Heidegger. O pensador da Floresta Negra, em seu segundo momento, será nosso condutor rumo à elucidação desta árvore incomum (Árbol de Diana), a partir de suas reflexões acerca da linguagem e da poesia de G. Trakl, Rilke, Stefan George e Hölderlin. Como poetisa e pensador habitam em montanhas separadas, ousamos coliga-los via ponte, a fim de acedermos a morada do ser, na condição de pastor

[EN] This work has both a theoretical and practical approach. It is an attempt to approximate the thought of Martin Heidegger, mainly existential analysis developed in Being and Time, to the field of art therapy. So, on the one hand, some facts and aspects are presented and analysed, which are needed to apprehend with solvency the dialogue that took place in the 1960s between the heideggerian approach and the foundations of verbal psychotherapy. On the other hand, it purports to be an exposition of the potential that this conceptual and philosophical framework has for practice in art therapy and, specifically, in the field of mental health. The first section focuses on the rationale of Heidegger's existential phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis as two poles of tension that can potentially lead to some type of therapeutic practice. In this regard, the Zollikon Seminars will be particularly relevant: a series of meetings in Switzerland that had the active participation of Heidegger, extending over a decade (1959-1969), during which his conceptual project was measured with relevant Central European psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. In order to delve into the heart of the matter, the first chapter discusses some fundamental aspects concerning the work Being and Time, which will be relevant both to enter into the transdisciplinary exchange condensed in the seminars, and to lay the foundations of what in the second section will be extrapolated into the practice in art therapy. The second chapter covers the pillars of Freudian psychoanalysis, both the metapsychology proyect and the basis for psychoanalytic practice, in which the principles and the tradition of modern psychotherapy and art therapy are based. The third chapter retrieves some of the key issues discussed during the Zollikon Seminars and the findings of Freudian praxis that can be interpreted in the light of this therapeutic approach, as well as the criticism of its theoretical foundations. Furthermore, it is also point out perhaps the most important result after the dialogue between such diverse disciplines: a form of analytical procedure called Daseinsanalysis and an orientation that, even without creating a homogeneous body, is covered by the British School of Existential Therapy. Finally, the foundations of group analysis are presented as they were raised by SH Foulkes. His reflections on the organization and formal understanding of group therapy were examined by Hans W. Cohn to advance a hypothesis about the potential of the phenomenological existential theory in this therapeutic format. This working model has guided my work as an art therapist. The second section contains a personal experience working with an art therapy group located in a mental health intensive care unit for short and medium stays. After describing the material conditions and characteristics of the centre where this group is located, two sessions and three individual cases or processes of group members group are presented. The second chapter aims to pass some of the tenets of Heidegger's existential phenomenology into the field of art therapy. The intention is to illustrate the potential of this approach, especially focusing on the artistic and visual work while the specificity of art therapy. Thus, some of the practice situations described in the preceding chapter will be recovered, in order to maintain a continuous dialogue between the most significant conceptual issues and the practice. In the third chapter, the three cases presented above are analysed, with the aim of addressing from close proximity the possibilities that this conceptual framework involves, both for effective work in the sessions and subsequently for reflection upon them. Finally, by way of summing up, conditions, praxis and the theoretical arguments for understanding the therapeutic work as a hermeneutics of facticity are synthesized. / [ES] Este trabajo tiene un carácter teórico-práctico. Constituye una tentativa de aproximar el pensamiento de Martin Heidegger, principalmente la analítica existencial desarrollada en Ser y tiempo, al ámbito del arteterapia. Así, por un lado, se presentan y analizan algunos hechos y aspectos necesarios para aprehender con solvencia el diálogo que tuvo lugar en la década de los años sesenta del siglo pasado entre el planteamiento heideggeriano y los fundamentos de la psicoterapia verbal. Por otro lado, se trata de dar cuenta del potencial que este marco conceptual y filosófico tiene para la praxis en arteterapia y, de manera específica, en un grupo ubicado en el ámbito de la salud mental. La primera sección se centra en la exposición razonada de la fenomenología existencial de Heidegger y el psicoanálisis freudiano en tanto que dos polos de tensión que pueden potencialmente dar lugar a un cierto tipo de praxis terapéutica. Cobrarán, en este sentido, especial relevancia los Seminarios de Zollikon: una serie de encuentros en Suiza que contaron con la activa participación de Heidegger, prolongados a lo largo de una década (1959-1969) y durante la cual su proyecto conceptual se midió con relevantes psiquiatras y psicoanalistas centroeuropeos. El primer capítulo analiza algunos aspectos fundamentales que conciernen a la obra Ser y tiempo y que resultarán relevantes tanto para adentrarse en ese intercambio transdisciplinario condensado en los Seminarios, como para asentar las bases de aquello que en la segunda sección será extrapolado a la praxis en arteterapia. El segundo capítulo recoge los pilares del psicoanálisis freudiano, tanto el proyecto de metapsicología como las bases para la praxis psicoanalítica, en cuyos principios se asienta la tradición de la psicoterapia moderna y el arteterapia. El tercer capítulo rescata algunos de los aspectos claves tratados durante los Seminarios de Zollikon y los hallazgos de la praxis freudiana susceptibles de ser interpretados a la luz de esta orientación terapéutica, así como la crítica de sus fundamentos teóricos. Se señala asimismo el resultado y proyección quizá más relevante tras ese dialogo entre disciplinas tan dispares: una forma de intervención analítica denominada Daseinsanalysis y una orientación que, aún sin constituir un cuerpo homogéneo, resulta amparada por la British School of Existential Therapy. En último lugar se presentan los fundamentos del grupo-análisis tal y como fue planteado por S. H. Foulkes. Sus reflexiones en torno a la organización y comprensión formal de la terapia grupal fueron examinadas por Hans W. Cohn para adelantar una hipótesis sobre el potencial de la teoría de corte fenomenológico-existencial en este formato terapéutico. Este modelo de trabajo ha guiado mi labor como arteterapeuta. La segunda sección recoge una experiencia personal de trabajo con un grupo de arteterapia ubicado en una unidad de salud mental de atención en crisis, de corta y media estancia. Tras describir las condiciones materiales y las características del centro en que se localiza este grupo, se presentan dos sesiones y tres casos o procesos individuales de miembros de este grupo. El segundo capítulo tiene como objetivo desplazar al ámbito del arteterapia algunos de los presupuestos de la fenomenología existencial de Heidegger. Para ello, serán recuperadas algunas situaciones de la praxis recogidas en el capítulo anterior con el fin de mantener un diálogo continuo entre los aspectos conceptuales más significativos y la práctica. El tercer capítulo, para atender desde la cercanía a las posibilidades que este marco conceptual comporta tanto para el trabajo efectivo en las sesiones como posteriormente para la reflexión en torno a las mismas, se analizarán los tres casos presentados con anterioridad. Por último, y a modo de recapitulación, se sintetizan las condiciones, la praxis y los argumentos teóricos que permiten en / [CAT] Este treball té un caràcter teoricopràctic. Constituïx una temptativa d'aproximar el pensament de Martin Heidegger, principalment l'analítica existencial desenvollupada en Ser i temps a l'àmbit de l'arteterapia. Així, d'una banda, es presenten i analitzen alguns fets i aspectes necessaris per a agarrar amb solvència el diàleg que va tindre lloc en la dècada dels anys seixanta del segle passat entre el plantejament heideggerià i els fonaments de la psicoteràpia verbal. D'altra banda, es tracta de donar compte del potencial que este marc conceptual i filosòfic té per a la praxi en arteterapia i, de manera específica, en un grup ubicat en l'àmbit de la salut mental. La primera secció es centra en l'exposició raonada de la fenomenologia existencial de Heidegger i la psicoanàlisi freudiana en tant que dos pols de tensió que poden potencialment donar lloc a un cert tipus de praxi terapèutica. Cobraran, en este sentit, especial rellevància els Seminaris de Zollikon: una sèrie de trobades a Suïssa que van comptar amb l'activa participació de Heidegger, prolongats al llarg d'una dècada (1959-1969) i durant els quals el seu projecte conceptual es va mesurar amb rellevants psiquiatres i psicoanalistes centreeuropeus. A fi d'aprofundir en el nucli de la qüestió, el primer capítol analitza alguns aspectes fonamentals que concernixen l'obra Ser i temps i que resultaran rellevants tant per a endinsar-se en eixe intercanvi transdisciplinari condensat en els Seminaris, com per a assentar les bases d'allò que en la segona secció serà extrapolat a la praxi en arteterapia. El segon capítol arreplega els pilars de la psicoanàlisi freudiana, tant el projecte de metapsicología com les bases per a la praxi psicoanalítica, en els principis del qual s'assenta la tradició de la psicoteràpia moderna i l'arteterapia. El tercer capítol rescata alguns dels aspectes claus tractats durant els Seminaris de Zollikon i les troballes de la praxi freudiana susceptibles de ser interpretats a la llum d'esta orientació terapèutica, així com la crítica dels seus fonaments teòrics. S'assenyala així mateix el resultat i projecció -potser més rellevant- després d'eixe dialogue entre disciplines tan dispars: una forma d'intervenció analítica denominada Daseinanalysis i una orientació que, encara sense constituir un cos homogeni, resulta emparada per la British School of Existential Therapy. En últim lloc es presenten els fonaments del grup-anàlisi tal com va ser plantejat per S. H. Foulkes. Les seues reflexions entorn de l'organització i comprensió formal de la teràpia grupal van ser examinades per Hans W. Cohn per a avançar una hipòtesi sobre el potencial de la teoria de tall fenomenologicoexistencial en este format terapèutic. Este model de treball ha guiat la meua labor com arteterapeuta. La segona secció arreplega una experiència personal de treball en grup d'arteterapia ubicat en una unitat de salut mental d'atenció en crisi, de curta i mitja estada. Després de descriure les condicions materials i les característiques del centre en què es localitza este grup, es presenten dos sessions i tres casos o processos individuals de membres d'este grup. El segon capítol té com a objectiu desplaçar a l'àmbit de l'arteterapia alguns dels pressupostos de la fenomenologia existencial de Heidegger. Per això, seran recuperades algunes situacions de la praxi arreplegades en el capitul anterior a fi de mantindre un diàleg continu entre els aspectes conceptuals més significatius i la pràctica. El tercer capitul, per a atendre des de la proximitat a les possibilitats que este marc conceptual comporta tant per al treball efectiu en les sessions com posteriorment per a la reflexió entorn de les mateixes, s'analitzaran els tres casos presentats amb anterioritat. Finalment, i a manera de recapitulació, es sintetitzen les condicions, la praxi i els arguments teòrics que permeten entendre el treball terapèutic / Takkal Fernández, A. (2016). HERMENÉUTICA DE LA FACTICIDAD, [PSICO]TERAPIA Y ARTE. UN ESTUDIO TEÓRICO-PRÁCTICO PARA LA INTERVENCIÓN EN GRUPOS DE SALUD MENTAL [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/63267 / TESIS

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / Martin Heidegger’s work centers on the task of retrieving the traditional problem of ontology, metaphysics, and first philosophy: the problem of Being. There has been a tendency in the scholarship to take Heidegger’s formulation and solution to the problem together as a whole. In contrast, I propose to differentiate between the two, and to engage Heidegger’s formulation of the problem as such, which takes shape as phenomenological ontology in the second half of the 1920s. I claim that the subject matter of phenomenological ontology, the problem of Being, is in fact the unitary articulation of four problems: the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being, the possible modifications of Being, and the truth-character of Being. My analysis shows that these four problems are Heidegger’s problematization (following Brentano) of the four main senses of Being, traditionally associated with Aristotle and Aristotelianism: the difference between the incidental and the in itself; the articulation of being-at-work, potency, and being-at-work-staying-itself; Being in the sense of the categories; and Being in the sense of truth. Concerning its method, I claim that phenomenological ontology reformulates the problem of Being in three moments: reduction, construction, and destruction. My analysis shows that, with these three moments, Heidegger problematizes (following Husserl) the movement of ascent and descent traditionally associated with Plato and Platonism. Although Heidegger never makes it fully explicit, the problem of the phenomenologically reductive, constructive, and destructive unitary whole of the four basic problems of Being is in fact his problematization of a (the) perennial locus philosophiae—the unity of the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent. Moreover, I claim that phenomenological ontology has a transcendental-architectonic character, in a Kantian sense. The problem of Being is formulated in three differentiated moments: the reductive fundamental ontology asks and answers the question of the sense of Dasein’s Being; the constructive transcendental science of Being asks and answers the question of the sense of Being as such; and the destructive groundwork of metaphysics asks and answers the question of the (historical) whole [καθ'ὅλου] of the Being of entities. Heidegger considers that his own architectonic is the historical outcome of the ontotheological orientation of the problem since Antiquity (Aristotle’s Metaphysics), during the Middle Ages (Suárez’s Disputationes), and throughout Modernity (Kant’s Critiques.) Because my interest lies in the problem itself, my aim is to problematize Heidegger’s ontotheological interpretation of the locus philosophiae. The first task in this direction is to clarify Heidegger’s incomplete construction of a unitary phenomenological ontology during the mid-late 1920s. The present text begins this clarification by outlining the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being, and on the basis of the indicated locus. The reconstruction is a clarification in that it exhibits the simplest moments of the inner structure of phenomenological ontology. The dissertation is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I analyze the basic concepts of phenomenological ontology. I exhibit first the basic concepts of fundamental ontology (Chapter 1), and then the basic concepts of the science of Being (Chapter 2.) Through these first two chapters I show the correspondence between the concepts of fundamental ontology and the science of Being based on the projection of the former onto the latter. It is here that I argue that fundamental ontology and the science of Being are two stages in Heidegger’s architectonic reformulation of the problem of Being. I also argue that each of these stages reflects the whole problem from its own standpoint. In the second part, I begin the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being. I claim that the analytic of Dasein is to be understood as the reduction of Dasein. The reduction of Dasein is articulated in two distinct moments that I call ‘ontological’ and ‘existential.’ I first characterize the reduction of Dasein as a whole (Chapter 3) and then its first moment—the ontological reduction (Chapter 4.) The text ends with an Appendix where I clarify Heidegger’s lexicon of Being. Here, I anticipate fundamental aspects of the existential reduction, and point toward the connection between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s accounts of the reduction. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Destruction Loops uses the guiding phenomenon of self-destruction to begin to develop an ontology that would not be ontosoteriological—that is, it would not cast being itself in a saving role for human being. Beginning with Martin Heidegger’s thought (both early and late), but also relinquishing his ontosoteriology, Destruction Loops seeks to explain how people can self-destruct because of their insight into the character of being, time, reality, and the world. A pre-theoretical understanding that one is self-destructing is often not sufficient for an affective resolve to stop oneself from self-destructing. It is not, because one’s pre-theoretical insight into the character of being can be existentially discouraging and result in an affective demeanor of resignation. In this sense, the correlation with being itself does not save, but rather exacerbates the existential conditions for self-destruction. The human being, understood not as Sorge (care) or as mortal but as desire for a loved one, is fundamentally non-correlated with being itself because it wants more for this other than being can give. An exposure to this insight is painful—and also difficult: for it then leaves the self alone with a task to build for this other against the conditions of being itself. All the while, being can turn the self against itself, by turning the origin of its selfhood (its relationship with a special other) against this endeavor. Instead of building, one can then fall into a destruction loop, where the meaning of the past overcomplicates the need for building the conditions of meaning and love in life. In the following pages, expressionistic phenomenology—a phenomenology that seeks to express the formal inadequacy of being itself—is expressed through the pseudonymous, intellectual memoir called Generation Loss, written by Dylan Errington in the wake of the disappearance of his ex-girlfriend, Christina “Chris” Weston. Dylan’s book iterates, and formally reflects, the need for building and creating works that express desire’s dissatisfaction with being itself. / Graduate / 2023-04-21

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / This thesis turns to Martin Heidegger to develop an interpretive framework to answer the question that has increasingly been thrust to the fore of 21st century society: what is the nature of the relationship between technology and society? And related to this central question is the matter of how society and social being is altered by technology and its modalities of vision? The basic argument that has been advanced to address this question revolves around the fact that in as much as we use technology as a means to serve practical ends, it displaces certain tasks and functions, which would otherwise be necessary, and thus truncates or reduces the scope of social practices in our everyday social routines. However, it does not simply end there as we illustrate that social practices encompass, to varying degrees, a different range and scope of social relationships which are instantiated in their wake. Considered together we found that these relations constitute a nexus of social connections, which we take up as the quality of sociality. The implications for our argument that sociabilities and sociality converge to produce an understanding of social being means that any technological encroachments which displace our social practices and social connectives alters our understanding of social being and thus how we understand ourselves, the world and others. We take up this theme of the displacement of our social being, sociality and sociabilities by considering two outcomes that modern technology seems to open up: equipmentality and curiosity.Firstly, as regards equipmentality we have noted that it connect us to our sociality and sociabilities and thus inures our understanding of social being, however, by contrast Heidegger finds in (idle) curiosity a second outcome that dooms us to the dystopian fate of nihilism. There is thus no fait accompli as regards modern technology’s nihilistic tendencies. This does not mean that we can be complacent about our future. But it does mean, on a positive note, that we human beings do have a responsibility to recognize technology’s efficacious ontological dimension for disclosing our being and the world.By contrast, on the negative task, our responsibility does extend to resisting modern technology’s nihilistic ontological wasteland, which does not admit objects, things or for that matter human beings, but only the flattened insubstantial being of resources as standing reserve for the technological system, bereft of sociality, humanity and an understanding of social be-ing.

The dissertation considers the influence of Jacques Ellul, Martin Heidegger, and Simone Weil on Grant's understanding of technology. Chapters One and Two analyze Ellul's influence on Grant, while Chapter Three examines Heidegger's influence on Grant's understanding of technology. Chapter Four examines the consequences of Grant's ambiguous evaluation of Ellul and Heidegger. Grant's unwillingness to entirely accept either account of technology leads to a tension in which aspects of Ellul 's account of technology are held simultaneously with elements of Heidegger's account. As a way to overcome the tension between these explanations, Grant becomes open to gnostic elements in Weil's theology, which manifest themselves in radical dualism and esoteric wisdom. The purpose of the dissertation is to clarify the significance of Ellul for Grant's thought. Scholars often overlook the extent of Ellul's contribution for Grant's account of technology, particularly in Grant's refinement of concepts such as technological necessity and his critique of liberal ideology. Furthermore, the dissertation seeks to reveal the pliability of Grant's account of technology, which is closely linked to Grant's theological, philosophical, and political judgments. The dissertation suggests that Grant's understanding of technology leads Grant to espouse gnostic elements from Weil's theology (such as radical dualism and esoteric wisdom) as a palliative to the arid technological necessity and moral inarticulacy of technological civilization. The dissertation challenges the scholarly orthodoxy that exists in the interpretation of Grant's work. Through a fresh reading of primary and secondary sources, the dissertation advocates an alternative approach to understanding Grant's thought. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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