Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1985. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 213-229).

Thesis--University of Wisconsin--Madison. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 174-176).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1982. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-159).

Sudarydami sandorius asmenys siekia tam tikro teisinio rezultato: sukurti naujas, pakeisti ar panaikinti turimas civilines teises ir pareigas. Laisva asmenų valia ir sutikimas su visomis konkretaus sandorio sąlygomis yra esminė kiekvieno sandorio galiojimo prielaida. Tačiau tai yra tik siekiamybė, kadangi praktikoje ne visuomet ir ne visi sandoriai sudaromi esant teisingai išreikštai šalių valiai dėl sandorio objekto, terminų, atlygintinumo, sandorio įvykdymo pobūdžio ar kitų būtinųjų sąlygų. Nors kiekviena demokratinė teisinė valstybė įstatymais ir kitais teisės aktais stengiasi užtikrinti sandorių bei tarp sandorio šalių susiklosčiusių civilinių teisinių santykių stabilumą, ji taip pat privalo nustatyti sąlygas, kuriomis šalis, sandoriu neišreiškusi tikrosios savo valios ar išreiškusi ją klaidingai, įgyja teisę visiškai ar iš dalies atsisakyti ir paties sandorio, ir iš jo kylančių teisių bei pareigų. Tiek civilinės teisės tradicijos valstybėse, tiek ir bendrosios teisės tradicijos valstybėse tarp tokių sandorio pripažinimo negaliojančiu pagrindų kaip apgaulė, prievarta, asmens neveiksnumas, įgaliojimų viršijimas bei kitų yra ir vienos ar abiejų sandorio šalių suklydimas. Kaip ir kitų sandorio pripažinimo negaliojančiu pagrindų atveju, taip ir esant suklydimui, teismo sprendimas priklauso ne tik nuo teisingo faktinių aplinkybių nustatymo ir įvertinimo, bet ir nuo tinkamo aktualių teisės normų išaiškinimo bei pritaikymo. Suklydimo doktriną ir jos sąsają su sandorių... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / When entering into contracts persons expect some kind of legal result: either to create new civil rights and duties, or to change or withdraw those they already have. Free will of the persons and consent towards all provisions set out in a particular contract is the essence of the validity of that contract. However, it can only be considered to be an aim, whereas in practice not each and every contract is concluded having as a pre-condition correctly expressed will with regard to the object, terms, nature of execution or other material provisions of the contract. Even though each democratic judicial state is aiming at securing the stability of contracts, civil rights and duties of persons, it also has to determine rules when and under what conditions persons having mistakenly expressed their will are entitled to fully or partially rescind the contract as well as rights and duties arising out of it. Both, civil law countries and common law countries among such grounds as fraud, duress, incapability, entitling one to make the contract voidable, also have a ground called mistake, whether it be unilateral or mutual. Law with regard to doctrine of mistake is very complex and not always clear. Courts not just have to interpret and apply those unclear laws correctly, they also have to find the balance between two conflicting basic statutory principles: principle stating that “contract is valuable, therefore if there is a possibility not to declare it invalid, it should be left as... [to full text]

Suretyships given in favour of banks are being challenged in the courts on the basis of equitable doctrines of unconscionable conduct, undue influence, or statutory provisions dealing with unfair conduct or unfair contract terms. This thesis is an enquiry into a bank's duties of disclosure or advice to an intending surety. Such an investigation also necessitates a study of the relationship between banker and customer, as the surety is quite often a customer of the bank as well, and, as a surety's obligation to the bank is an accessory obligation, the obligation is dependent on a valid principal obligation between the bank and the principal debtor - the customer. The face of modern banking has, however, changed dramatically and most major banks have become multi-functional. As a result, the banker-customer relationship may often be seen as a fiduciary relationship. A major problem brought about my multi-functioning banks is that of conflicts of interest between the bank and its customer. Furthermore, the banker-customer relationship is providing much more scope for lender liability than in the past. Various factors are currently having an impact on the law of contract, and this is expected to affect the legal policy makers in their assessments of whether a duty of disclosure of material facts exits or not. A surety has long been a favoured debtor in the eyes of the law, and the courts have developed a plethora of technical principles on which a surety can be relieved of his obligation. The escape routes of the surety, especially if he is a consumer as well, on the new grounds of public policy, unconscionability, good faith or unreasonableness, are growing. The results of these trends is the expected demise of suretyship as an acceptable, cheap form of debt security in the banking sector. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

Dans cet exercice, on essayera de produire une véritable théorie locale ou spéciale du précédent judiciaire pour Colombie. Compte tenu de la profonde transformation du rôle de la jurisprudence contentieuse administrative au cours des dernières années, abandonnant son rôle indicatif et assumant une valeur normative de précédent judiciaire, il est nécessaire d'analyser le précédent contentieux administratif d'après la culture des opérateurs juridiques en Colombie, les fondations doctrinales et jurisprudentielles de l'existence du précédent en Colombie et les objectifs du Code de Procédure Administratif.Ce travail a pour but de tester l'hypothèse selon laquelle en Colombie, les juges du contentieux administratifs et les autorités administratives, afin d'identifier et d'appliquer rationnellement le précédent judiciaire contenu dans les arrêts d'unification Jurisprudentielle du Conseil d'Etat pour résoudre les cas qui viennent à leur connaissance, devraient appliquer des critères théoriques et pratiques d'une théorie locale du précédent, jusque-là Inexistante. Pour cela, on souhaite montrer que cette théorie devrait aborder (i) les contributions théoriques à la doctrine transnationale du précédent judiciaire et les flux légaux ayant donné lieu à la figure de précédent en Colombie, (li) la base théorique et constitutionnelle du respect pour le précédent en Colombie ainsi que (iii) les objectifs de la création des « arrêts d’unification jurisprudentielle » dans la loi 1437 de 2011. / This dissertation produces a local or special theory of judicial precedents for Colombia. Public case law in Colombia has departed from its prior persuasive role and has acquired a normative value as judicial precedent. Given the deep transformation of the role of public case law in recent years, it is necessary to analyze the judicial precedents in light of the Colombian legal culture, the doctrinal and jurisprudential foundations of the existence of the precedent in Colombia and the objectives• pursued by the Code of Administrative Procedure. This work aims to test the hypothesis that public authorities and public law judges in Colombia should apply theoretical and practical criteria of a local theory of the precedent, hitherto nonexistent. The latter is necessary for them to identify and rationally apply the judicial precedents contained in the unification rulings of the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) to solve the cases that come to their knowledge. This theory should address (i) the theoretical contributions to the transnational doctrine of the judicial precedent and the legal flows that gave rise to precedents in Colombia, (ii) the theoretical and constitutional basis for respecting precedents in Colombia as well as (iii) the objectives of law 1437 of 2011 when creating unification rulings of the Council of State.

Suretyships given in favour of banks are being challenged in the courts on the basis of equitable doctrines of unconscionable conduct, undue influence, or statutory provisions dealing with unfair conduct or unfair contract terms. This thesis is an enquiry into a bank's duties of disclosure or advice to an intending surety. Such an investigation also necessitates a study of the relationship between banker and customer, as the surety is quite often a customer of the bank as well, and, as a surety's obligation to the bank is an accessory obligation, the obligation is dependent on a valid principal obligation between the bank and the principal debtor - the customer. The face of modern banking has, however, changed dramatically and most major banks have become multi-functional. As a result, the banker-customer relationship may often be seen as a fiduciary relationship. A major problem brought about my multi-functioning banks is that of conflicts of interest between the bank and its customer. Furthermore, the banker-customer relationship is providing much more scope for lender liability than in the past. Various factors are currently having an impact on the law of contract, and this is expected to affect the legal policy makers in their assessments of whether a duty of disclosure of material facts exits or not. A surety has long been a favoured debtor in the eyes of the law, and the courts have developed a plethora of technical principles on which a surety can be relieved of his obligation. The escape routes of the surety, especially if he is a consumer as well, on the new grounds of public policy, unconscionability, good faith or unreasonableness, are growing. The results of these trends is the expected demise of suretyship as an acceptable, cheap form of debt security in the banking sector. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

Summaries in English and Afrikaans / Wanvoorstelling van wesenlike feite deur omiss/o aan 'n versekeraar kan tot gevolg he dat die versekeringskontrak ongeldig verklaar word ingevolge die gemene reg. In Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 (1) SA 419 (A) is beslis dat wesenlikheid bepaal moet word vanuit die oogpunt van die redelike man. In 'n paging om bewys van die wesenlikheid van feite te vermy, het versekeraars vereis dat aansoekers die voorstellings in die kontrak moat waarborg. Dit het tot gevolg gehad dat voorstellings wat in die kontrak gewaarborg is outomaties wesenlik was. Sedert die invoering van artikel 63(3) van die Versekeringswet 27 van 1943 deur die wetgewer gedurende 1969, is die wesenlikheid van voorstellings egter 'n vereiste, selfs waar dit in die kontrak gewaarborg is. Versekeraars sou dus in die toekoms nie agter kontraktuele wanvoorstellings kon skuil nie. Hierdie maatreel het meer beskerming aan die versekerde gebied. In Qilingele v South African Mutual Life Assurance Society 1993 (1) SA 69 (A) is die toets vir wesenlikheid, soos vereis deur artikel 63{3), aangespreek. Dit het die vraag laat ontstaan of daar twee aparte toetse vir wesenlikheid bestaan, naamlik gemeenregtelik en statuter, en of daar een algemene toets bestaan. / Misrepresentation by omissio of material facts to an insurer may lead to an insurance contract being declared invalid in terms of the common law. In Mutual and Federal Insurance v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 (1) SA 419 (A) it was decided to determine materiality in the eyes of the reasonable man. To avoid proving materiality of facts, the insurers required proposers to warrant the representations in the contract. This resulted in the facts automatically being material. In 1969 parliament, .however, enacted section 63(3) of the Insurance Act 27 of 1943 whereby materiality of presentations, even where it was warranted in the contract, became a requirement. Therefore insurers could in future not hide behind contractual misrepresentations. This provided more protection to the insured. Qilingele v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1993 (1) SA 69 (A) addresses the test for materiality as required by section 63(3). This resulted in the question whether two separate tests for materiality in terms of common law and statute, or only one exists. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / In die skripsie word gekyk na die remedies van 'n versekeraar by wanvoorstelling (nie-openbaring) en waarborgbreuk deur 'n versekerde en veral die beperking van die versekeraar se kansellasiereg. Die klem sal egter val op die remedies by waarborgbreuk omdat versekeraars veel meer daarop steun. Die volgende voorstelle word gemaak. 'n Kansellasiereg behoort in die geval van wanvoorstelling (nie-openbaring) nie verleen te word as die versekeraar nogtans, met kennis van die ware feite, sou kontrakteer nie. By verbreking van bevestigende waarborge behoort 'n kansellasiereg toegestaan te word as die waarborgbreuk die betrokke versekeraar se berekening van die risiko redelikerwys geraak het maar nie as die versekeraar nogtans sou kontrakteer nie. By voortdurende waarborge behoort kansellasie beskikbaar te wees as die waarborgbreuk die skade redelikerwys veroorsaak het. 'n Skadevergoedingseis behoort beskikbaar te wees waar 'n versekeraar nie kan of wil kanselleer nie. / The remedies of an insurer, in the event of misrepresentation (non-disclosure) and breach of warranty by an insured are discussed, particularly limiting the insurer's right to cancel. The emphasis is on the remedies applicable to breach of warranty because insurers use these more frequently. The following solutions are suggested. An insurer should not be allowed to cancel in the event of misrepresentation (nondisclosure) if it would still have concluded the contract, knowing the truth. In the event of affirmative warranties a right to cancel should be available if breach of warranty reasonably affected the particular insurer's assessment of the risk, but not if the contract would still have been concluded. In the event of promissory warranties, cancellation should only be available if breach of warranty reasonably caused the loss. A claim for damages should be available if an insurer can not or does not wish to cancel. / Private Law / LL.M.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / In die skripsie word gekyk na die remedies van 'n versekeraar by wanvoorstelling (nie-openbaring) en waarborgbreuk deur 'n versekerde en veral die beperking van die versekeraar se kansellasiereg. Die klem sal egter val op die remedies by waarborgbreuk omdat versekeraars veel meer daarop steun. Die volgende voorstelle word gemaak. 'n Kansellasiereg behoort in die geval van wanvoorstelling (nie-openbaring) nie verleen te word as die versekeraar nogtans, met kennis van die ware feite, sou kontrakteer nie. By verbreking van bevestigende waarborge behoort 'n kansellasiereg toegestaan te word as die waarborgbreuk die betrokke versekeraar se berekening van die risiko redelikerwys geraak het maar nie as die versekeraar nogtans sou kontrakteer nie. By voortdurende waarborge behoort kansellasie beskikbaar te wees as die waarborgbreuk die skade redelikerwys veroorsaak het. 'n Skadevergoedingseis behoort beskikbaar te wees waar 'n versekeraar nie kan of wil kanselleer nie. / The remedies of an insurer, in the event of misrepresentation (non-disclosure) and breach of warranty by an insured are discussed, particularly limiting the insurer's right to cancel. The emphasis is on the remedies applicable to breach of warranty because insurers use these more frequently. The following solutions are suggested. An insurer should not be allowed to cancel in the event of misrepresentation (nondisclosure) if it would still have concluded the contract, knowing the truth. In the event of affirmative warranties a right to cancel should be available if breach of warranty reasonably affected the particular insurer's assessment of the risk, but not if the contract would still have been concluded. In the event of promissory warranties, cancellation should only be available if breach of warranty reasonably caused the loss. A claim for damages should be available if an insurer can not or does not wish to cancel. / Private Law / LL.M.