A literatura empírica de ciclos políticos orçamentários pouco aborda a influência da limitação de mandato na existência do oportunismo fiscal por parte do ocupante do poder executivo nas finanças dos vários entes da federação. Nesse sentido, à luz da Nova Economia Política, o objetivo desta pesquisa foi investigar o impacto dos diferentes incentivos enfrentados no Brasil por prefeitos em primeiro mandato - aqueles que são elegíveis para a reeleição - e em segundo mandato - aqueles que não podem candidatar-se à reeleição - na gestão fiscal dos municípios. Para além da avaliação de todo o mandato eletivo, também foi analisado o impacto da diferenciação dos dois tipos de incumbentes na inscrição de valores em restos a pagar nos anos eleitorais. Os resultados obtidos via painel clássico sugerem uma efetiva diferenciação entre prefeitos em primeiro e segundo mandato em anos não eleitorais, com prefeitos em primeiro mandato inscrevendo maiores valores em restos a pagar processados e total em relação aos prefeitos de segundo mandato. Ademais, seguindo a legislação de responsabilidade fiscal brasileira, prefeitos em segundo mandato reduziram a inscrição de valores nessas rubricas em ano eleitoral, embora prefeitos em primeiro mandato tenham aumentado a inscrição de valores em restos a pagar não processados. / The empirical literature on political budget cycles has not studied all the influences of term limitations in the existence of fiscal opportunism by politicians in the various levels of government. In this sense, regarding the Political Economy, the objective of this research was to investigate the impact of different incentives faced by first-term mayors in Brazil - those who are eligible for re-election - and second-term mayors - those who cannot apply for re-election - in the fiscal management at the local level. Beyond the assessment of the entire mandate, it was also evaluated the impact of differentiation of the two types of incumbents in the management of the unpaid spending obligations in election years. Results obtained via classic panel suggest an effective differentiation between first and second-term mayors in non-election years, as first-term mayors exhibit higher unpaind recognized spending obligations and total unpaid spending obligations values in comparison to second-term mayors. Moreover, following the Brazilian fiscal responsability law, second-term mayors reduced values in these items in election year, although first-term mayors had higher values on average for unpaid and unrecognized spending obligations.

In the last decades, in most of the OECD countries employment relations have been changing and atypical forms of employment have been spreading rapidly. The “standard contract”, permanent and full-time, has lost importance, replaced by “flexible jobs”, such as fixed-term contracts, temporary work agency employment, variable working hours jobs, on call employment. A debate has been rising on whether atypical jobs, especially short-term contracts, might spur the development of a secondary labour market, in which the unemployed might get trapped in a cycle between dead-end jobs and unemployment. On the other hand, disadvantaged groups excluded from employment by too strict regulations might benefit most from the enhanced flexibility. Chapter 1 introduces this debate, Chapters 2 and 3 shed light on it. I analyse the labour market performance of workers who left unemployment through short-term jobs. I infer what counterfactual labour market performance would have been undertaken if the unemployed had rejected these jobs. In this way, it can be established whether short-term jobs may increase or decrease the chances of having a more stable career later in life, i.e. whether they are “stepping stones” or “dead ends”. I find evidence supporting the stepping stone hypothesis both in Italy and in Belgium. In terms of future job stability, even precarious and unsuccessful jobs are to be preferred to longer searches for directly finding better jobs. Chapter 4 is an identification analysis of the econometric models for duration data that encompass competing risks of exits, consecutive spells, and lagged duration dependence. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a new estimation strategy to look at the effect of past labour market experiences on two aspects of the subsequent job quality: wage and tenure on the job. The methodological novelty consists in jointly modelling labour market durations, transitions, and wages by way of a hazard-function based approach.

Using firm-level data of manufacturing sector during the period 1989-2010, this thesis explored the export behavior of firms in Turkey. Up to date, Turkey&rsquo / s export performance has been analyzed from macro perspective extensively. However, far too little attention has been paid to firm-level analysis contrary to ongoing and growing empirical literature. The preliminary analysis revealed the superiority of exporting firms. Both self-selection and learning-by-exporting are found to be valid explanation for the source of this observed export premium. Dynamic discrete choice model results provide supportive evidences for the existence of sunk-costs. Besides, it is observed that sunk-costs varied during the crises. Sunk-costs not only shape export decision but also affect timing decision. The exit and entry dynamics of the firms has been studied using duration analysis. Results showed self-selection of less profitable firms into export markets and importance of non-price competition for the survival of exporters. Impact of crises on export behavior has been examined by regarding extensive and intensive margins of exports separately. The findings implied that for 1994 crisis increase in extensive margins, for the case of 2001 crisis increase in intensive margin and for 2008 crisis decline both in extensive and intensive margins of exports dominated. This thesis makes several noteworthy contributions to the existing literature. First, it contributed to the ongoing and growing empirical literature using Turkish data. Secondly, unlike, existing studies that investigate single feature of the export behavior, in this thesis, using different approaches the issue has been analyzed extensively. Moreover, using advantage of the data set and Turkish economy, the impact of different types of crisis on export behavior has been analyzed and contributed to the literature that studies the impact of shocks on export behavior.

Approaches on transfer of technology to developing countries within the development discourse are discussed in historical perspective and determinants of disembodied technology transfer of Turkish manufacturing industries are analyzed via enterprise-level data and microeconometric methods. While firm size, general skill level, export behaviour, capital intensity have significant effect of technology transfer decision of the firm, foreign ownership does not. Sectoral characteristics&rsquo / effects are also statistically significant.

This doctoral thesis consists of 4 self-contained chapters, bound together by their focus on household behavior and social interaction: Bargaining over Risk: The Impact of Decision Power on Household Portfolios. This paper provides an analysis of the internal financial decision-making process of households, employing a unique panel of household finances of the entire Swedish population. Exploitation of a source of exogenous variation in sex-specific labor demand reveals that the distribution of decision power among spouses is a driving force behind the aggregation of spouses’ preferences on financial decision making. Peer Effects and Academic Achievement: Regression Discontinuity Approach. The estimation of peer effects in schools has received much attention in recent years but convincing estimates are hard to produce due to self-selection. This paper overcomes this problem by employing a regression discontinuity design where student assignment into high-ability classes constitutes the source of identifying information. Domestic Equality and Marital Stability: Does More Equal Sharing of Childcare affect Divorce Risk? There is an unanimity that divorce wreaks havoc upon families in which it occurs and individuals growing up in a one-parent family are more likely to deal with term economic and social difficulties. Identifying means by which divorces can be reduced is therefore an important task from a public policy perspective and this paper investigates whether more equal sharing of childcare is successful in doing so. Do Classroom Peers Matter in an Early Tracking System? The potential for peers to affect educational achievement of students is central to many important policy debates, for instance on the impacts of ability tracking. Whether tracking affects efficiency and equality of opportunities depends on how peers enter the educational production function and this paper provides estimates of this. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2014. Sammanfattning jämte 4 uppsatser</p>

Esta tesis consta de tres ensayos basados en microeconometria, teoria de redes y desarrollo económico. En los primeros dos me focalizo en paises en desarrollo (Tanzania y Nepal respectivamente) por estudiar como los habitantes de zonas rurales forman redes sociales, y cómo la existencia de estos lazos informales afecta su bienestar. El tercer ensayo se centra en el comercio internacional de armas e investiga si la orientación política del gobierno tiene un impacto sobre la politica de exportacion de armamentos. / This thesis contains three essays on microeconometrics, networks and economic development. In the first two essays I focus on developing country settings (Tanzania and Nepal respectively) to study how rural villagers form their social networks, and how the existence of these informal links impacts their welfare. The third essay focuses on the international trade of weapons to investigate whether the political orientation of government in power makes any difference to arms export policy.

A literatura empírica de ciclos políticos orçamentários pouco aborda a influência da limitação de mandato na existência do oportunismo fiscal por parte do ocupante do poder executivo nas finanças dos vários entes da federação. Nesse sentido, à luz da Nova Economia Política, o objetivo desta pesquisa foi investigar o impacto dos diferentes incentivos enfrentados no Brasil por prefeitos em primeiro mandato - aqueles que são elegíveis para a reeleição - e em segundo mandato - aqueles que não podem candidatar-se à reeleição - na gestão fiscal dos municípios. Para além da avaliação de todo o mandato eletivo, também foi analisado o impacto da diferenciação dos dois tipos de incumbentes na inscrição de valores em restos a pagar nos anos eleitorais. Os resultados obtidos via painel clássico sugerem uma efetiva diferenciação entre prefeitos em primeiro e segundo mandato em anos não eleitorais, com prefeitos em primeiro mandato inscrevendo maiores valores em restos a pagar processados e total em relação aos prefeitos de segundo mandato. Ademais, seguindo a legislação de responsabilidade fiscal brasileira, prefeitos em segundo mandato reduziram a inscrição de valores nessas rubricas em ano eleitoral, embora prefeitos em primeiro mandato tenham aumentado a inscrição de valores em restos a pagar não processados. / The empirical literature on political budget cycles has not studied all the influences of term limitations in the existence of fiscal opportunism by politicians in the various levels of government. In this sense, regarding the Political Economy, the objective of this research was to investigate the impact of different incentives faced by first-term mayors in Brazil - those who are eligible for re-election - and second-term mayors - those who cannot apply for re-election - in the fiscal management at the local level. Beyond the assessment of the entire mandate, it was also evaluated the impact of differentiation of the two types of incumbents in the management of the unpaid spending obligations in election years. Results obtained via classic panel suggest an effective differentiation between first and second-term mayors in non-election years, as first-term mayors exhibit higher unpaind recognized spending obligations and total unpaid spending obligations values in comparison to second-term mayors. Moreover, following the Brazilian fiscal responsability law, second-term mayors reduced values in these items in election year, although first-term mayors had higher values on average for unpaid and unrecognized spending obligations.

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京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(農学) / 甲第23241号 / 農博第2448号 / 新制||農||1084(附属図書館) / 学位論文||R3||N5331(農学部図書室) / 京都大学大学院農学研究科生物資源経済学専攻 / (主査)准教授 三谷 羊平, 教授 伊藤 順一, 教授 梅津 千恵子 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Agricultural Science / Kyoto University / DGAM