This thesis examines how the modern weaponry shaped the American soldiers’ use of weaponry and the change of tactics during World War I. The American experience was unique as Britain, France, and Germany grew accustomed to the advancements in weaponry over time, while the American Expeditionary Force encountered this type of warfare for the first time. The American Army served mainly as a constabulary, fighting guerilla forces before the war, and had to be trained to fight a conventional war in Europe. The common soldiers would modify official doctrine to fit the realities of the battlefield in which they found themselves.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / After the Second World War, the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) worked to inform those in the service that they had a duty to help the American people understand what the Army was doing to provide security for the nation. Their goal was for the public to have, at a minimum, the same amount of understanding of the Army as it had during World War II. To achieve this goal they believed that the officer corps had to be convinced that explaining to the public what the service was doing was in the best interest of the Army. The effort of the leaders to convince the officer corps was conducted by two primary means. First, the leaders made many public statements announcing that the Army would continue to inform the American people. Second, they added a requirement for those setting the curricula at the senior two schools of the service to provide instruction about the program that the Army had, which had three sub-programs, to update the American public. Between AY 1947 and 1989, the leaders continued to talk about the importance of informing the public. However, those approving the curricula at the two Colleges of the Army placed decreasing emphasis on educating students about what public affairs was and how to conduct it. This assertion is based on three primary findings. First, there is a clear decrease in the number of hours allocated to teaching about public affairs. Second, over the course of this period students were provided with fewer chances to apply what they were learning. Third, the coverage of the instruction went from covering at least two of the components of the Army’s program to at best only one. In the end a gap is clearly visible between what the leaders of the Army were saying regarding the importance of educating officers about public affairs and what was included in the curricula of these two schools: deeds did not match words.

<p>This dissertation examines the history of the military institutions of the Hellenistic kingdoms. The kingdoms emerged after years of war-fighting, and the capacity to wage war remained central to state formation in the Hellenistic Age (323-31 B.C.). The creation of institutions and recruitment of populations sufficient to field large armies took a great deal more time and continual effort than has generally been imagined. By bringing documentary evidence into contact with the meta-narratives of the Hellenistic period, and by addressing each of the major powers of the Hellenistic world, this project demonstrates the contingencies and complexities within the kingdoms and their armies. In so doing, it offers both a fresh perspective on the peoples and polities that inhabited the Hellenistic world after Alexander and a much-revised narrative of the process by which Alexander's successors built kingdoms and waged war. Inheritors of extensive political and military traditions, they were forced to reshape them in their new and volatile context, eventually establishing large and powerful kingdoms and armies that dominated the eastern Mediterranean and Near East for over one hundred years. </p><p>The early model of Hellenistic kingship was based on military successes and martial valor. It found a complement in the burgeoning mercenary market of the early Hellenistic period, which allowed Alexander's generals to field massive armies without relying on complex military institutions for recruitment and mobilization. As years of continual warfare stressed populations and war chests, several new kings, crowned in the era of war, sought to end their reliance on mercenaries by developing core territories, settling soldiers, and constructing powerful military institutions. These institutions did not develop seamlessly or quickly, and often functioned awkwardly in many of the locales that had recently come under Macedonian rule, whether in the cities of Syria or along the Nile valley in Egypt. My project involves several detailed studies of military mobilization during the Hellenistic period, as a way to analyze the structures and evaluate the successes of the kingdoms' respective military institutions. </p><p>I employ methodologies from both history and classical studies, moving between technical work with papyrological, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence, close reading of ancient texts, and comparative analysis of narrative and documentary texts, while drawing upon the large historiographies of each of the largest kingdoms. One of this dissertation's contributions is in making comparisons between these spaces and across time, when much of Hellenistic history has trended toward ever-greater partition. The papyrological material, in particular, permits the greatest access into both the social activities of individuals and the particular elements of human, legal, and customary infrastructure within a Hellenistic state, though it has rarely been used outside of particularly Ptolemaic histories. My dissertation argues against Egyptian exceptionalism, and offers a Hellenistic history drawn from the full array of available sources. Part of the narrative of Egyptian exceptionalism developed from the perception that it was in some sense less traditionally Macedonian than the other two kingdoms. A careful reading of the evidence indicates instead that in the violent and multi-polar world of the Hellenistic age, military identity was very flexible, and had been since the time of Alexander. Additionally, the strict adherence of the other kingdoms to the Macedonian way of war ended in defeat at the hands of the Romans, while the Ptolemies in Egypt innovated counterinsurgent activities that preserved their power in the wealthiest region of the Mediterranean.</p> / Dissertation

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Hierarchies within organizations like the military have often contributed to feelings of subordination and have contributed to lower employee autonomy and a decrease in job satisfaction, motivation, and performance. Other constructs, such as those relating to personality, have been eluded to explain the variance in the poor outcomes. However, despite the research on dominance, autonomy, and personality constructs, there has been little investigation to bridge together the structure and dynamics of personality and autonomy. By applying interpersonal, boundary, control, and contingency theories, this quantitative study bridged the gap between hierarchical levels of military rank, the personality construct of relative dominance, and perceived autonomy in a convenience sample of United States Air Force pararescuemen ( N = 72). Based on a multiple linear regression and post hoc logistic regressions, results indicated that relative dominance and military rank equally and significantly explained the variance in total perceived autonomy for pararescuemen. These findings question the current rank-centric military hierarchy and highlight the importance of personality and qualitative factors that influence perceived autonomy in pararescue, a critical variable throughout organizational psychology. These findings have positive social change implications by encouraging a paradigm shift from a rank-centric to position-centric structure for pararescuemen, a shift that may improve personnel/resource management; reduce organizational costs for military personnel; and increase overall job satisfaction, motivation, performance, recruitment, and retention.

This thesis will examine the significance of the defense system that was a result of the Libyan wars against the Romans, Byzantines, and the Vandals. For economic and strategic reasons these nations were involved in long and bitter wars which lasted over six centuries. The policy of the long distance military expeditions, which was the main instrument of the Romans in subduing the natives in the early Empire, had failed to achieve its goals. Thus, the alternative was to erect a network of roads and forts in strategic spots such as water points, commanding hills, along the caravan routes and on the edges of fertile wadis. In fact, neither the roads, which were very well fortified, nor the massive front forts had solved the frontier problems, thus the Romans had no choice other than to leave the frontiers to be guarded by the natives themselves. To this end several civilian settlements (fortified farms) were established on the fertile wadis. "While a mixture of people coexisted in these fortified farms, the archaeological remains show that the prevailing culture belonged to the Libyan natives.

Alois Dwenger, writing from the front in May of 1942, complained that people forgot "the actions of simple soldiers.I believe that true heroism lies in bearing this dreadful everyday life." In exploring the reality of the Landser, the average German soldier in World War II, through letters, diaries, memoirs, and oral histories, Stephen G. Fritz provides the definitive account of the everyday war of the German front soldier. The personal documents of these soldiers, most from the Russian front, where the majority of German infantrymen saw service, paint a richly textured portrait of the Landser that illustrates the complexity and paradox of his daily life. Although clinging to a self-image as a decent fellow, the German soldier nonetheless committed terrible crimes in the name of National Socialism. When the war was finally over, and his country lay in ruins, the Landser faced a bitter truth: all his exertions and sacrifices had been in the name of a deplorable regime that had committed unprecedented crimes. With chapters on training, images of combat, living conditions, combat stress, the personal sensations of war, the bonds of comradeship, and ideology and motivation, Fritz offers a sense of immediacy and intimacy, revealing war through the eyes of these self-styled "little men." A fascinating look at the day-to-day life of German soldiers, this is a book not about war but about men. It will be vitally important for anyone interested in World War II, German history, or the experiences of common soldiers throughout the world. / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1287/thumbnail.jpg

At the end of World War II, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, fearing that retreating Germans would consolidate large numbers of troops in an Alpine stronghold and from there conduct a protracted guerilla war, turned U.S. forces toward the heart of Franconia, ordering them to cut off and destroy German units before they could reach the Alps. Opposing this advance was a conglomeration of German forces headed by SS-Gruppenführer Max Simon, a committed National Socialist who advocated merciless resistance. Under the direction of officers schooled in harsh combat in Russia, the Germans succeeded in bringing the American advance to a grinding halt. Caught in the middle were the people of Franconia. Historians have accorded little mention to this period of violence and terror, but it provides insight into the chaotic nature of life while the Nazi regime was crumbling. Neither German civilians nor foreign refugees acted simply as passive victims caught between two fronts. Throughout the region people pressured local authorities to end the senseless resistance and sought revenge for their tribulations in the "liberation" that followed. Stephen G. Fritz examines the predicament and outlook of American GI's, German soldiers and officials, and the civilian population caught in the arduous fighting during the waning days of World War II. Endkampf is a gripping portrait of the collapse of a society and how it affected those involved, whether they were soldiers or civilians, victors or vanquished, perpetrators or victims. / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1288/thumbnail.jpg

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