Despite a renewed interest in scholarship about archaic warfare, hoplites, Homeric society, and several other related areas, archery in Archaic Greece has managed to escape comprehensive study for half a century. Scholarship on the subject stands in urgent need of update and revision. Certain erroneous beliefs about archery have become canonical and are dangerous impediments to academic progress in those areas of study that require an accurate and nuanced understanding of archers or archery. I conclude that, contrary to popular opinion, there was no point in Greek history when the bow was not used. Rather, it was used in a variety of ways to support, supplement, and complement heavily armed infantrymen. Although archery could be effective, especially against horses and light-armed men, the bow was not as effective against heavily armed infantrymen for the simple reason that arrows would not often have been able to penetrate Greek armor. This factor did not, however, mean that the bow was impotent or "the feeble weapon of a worthless man." My study of wounds, their treatment, infection, and the potential use of arrow toxins adds a fruitful and previously unexplored perspective on the risks involved with facing an archer and some of the psychological considerations of doing so. In a form of warfare wherein armies were so heavily dependent upon morale and so easily compromised by fear, an arrow was a weapon of terror. Moreover, dying six days after a battle of tetanus did not accord with the hoplites' ideal of a `beautiful death' - one of the prospects that fortified a warrior as he girded himself for what was surely a horrifying ordeal. I also argue that the identity of archers changed over time. Early on, warriors might use a variety of weapons and the bow might have been used by just about anyone. Later, with the advent of the hoplite phalanx, archers became light-armed specialists. While convention holds that these archers were Scythian or Cretan mercenaries, I prove that there is no compelling reason to believe that this was so. The archers were Greek and likely derived from the lower classes of citizens. Moreover, despite its ideological demotion among the elite, the bow did not carry an actively negative association until the Persian Wars in the early 5th century B.C.E. In sum, the treatment of archery in the Archaic period is considerably more nuanced than many scholars have allowed.

The United States commands the most powerful conventional military in the world. This extraordinary advantage in conventional power should enable the United States to coerce target states without having to fire a single shot. Yet, over the past two decades, leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed U.S. threats and invited military clashes with the world's sole superpower. What explains the United States' inability to coerce many of the world's weakest targets with compellent military threats? I argue that the United States' compellent threats fail more frequently in the post-Cold War period because they are costly neither to issue nor to execute. That is, because it is not risky for the United States to issue compellent threats, and because it is relatively cheap for the United States to use military force, the threat of force does not signal to target states that the United States is highly motivated to defeat them. For this reason, a target will resist a U.S. threat that is immediately credible in the belief that the United States will apply limited force, but will not apply decisive force if the target continues to resist after the United States executes its threat. The costly compellence theory asserts that only threats that are costly for the unipole to issue and to execute will be effective in compelling target states to yield before the application of force. To illustrate this logic, I present a basic formal model of a unipole that issues a compellent threat against a weak target state. The model suggests that both unipoles that are highly motivated to prevail over targets and those that are not will behave identically in the early stages of a crisis, i.e., they are both willing to execute military threats in many equilibria. The model suggests that, under many conditions, the target cannot infer from the willingness to issue and to execute a compellent threat that the United States is highly motivated to defeat it, and consequently, it is likely to resist. I then argue that the United States has developed a model of warfare that dramatically limits the human, political, and financial costs of employing force. As the unipole, it is not costly for the United States to issue compellent threats in the post-Cold War period. The United States has also pursued many strategies that limit the costs of force: it relies on an all-volunteer military increasingly supplemented by private contractors; it has developed a force structure based on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) thesis that relies increasingly on airpower and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); it employs force in conjunction with allies who contribute money and troops to U.S. coercive campaigns; it employs deficit spending to pay for its military operations; and, it actively limits collateral damage inflicted on target states. In combination, these strategies both lower the costs of employing force and undermine the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats. To evaluate the logic of the costly compellence theory, I present a new dataset on the United States' use of compellent threats 1945-2007. I demonstrate that the United States has employed compellent threats more frequently since the end of the Cold War, and that these threats have been less effective on average in the post-Cold War period. These observations are consistent with the logic of the costly compellence theory. I also evaluate four cases in which the United States issued compellent threats against weak opponents. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 2011 threat against Libya constitute "most-likely" cases for the costly compellence theory. The theory accurately predicts that the Soviets would concede in 1962 and that Qaddafi would resist the United States' demands in 2011. I also compare the United States' 1991 and 2003 threats against Saddam Hussein. Saddam's resistance in 1991 is consistent with the logic of costly compellence. I evaluate sources captured after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to evaluate why Saddam Hussein chose to resist the more costly threat in 2003. Finally, I argue that the United States is likely to continue its efforts to minimize the costs of employing force and to emphasize the use of technology over ground troops. My study suggests that these strategies will both enhance the ease with which the United States can employ force and decrease the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats, because they suggest to potential targets that the United States lacks the motivation to defeat them.

Chan, Tze Wai. / "August 2011." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / List of Illustrations --- p.iv / Note on Abbreviation --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1: --- Prologue --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- Homeric War and the Greek Military Culture --- p.12 / Homeric Age and the Study of Greek Warfare --- p.12 / Metallurgy --- p.18 / The Inception of the Greek Way of War --- p.30 / The Idea of Warfare --- p.44 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- The Emergence of the Greek Way --- p.52 / The Hoplite Warfare and the Greek Essences --- p.52 / Homeric Tradition and Hoplite Warfare --- p.59 / Encountering Foreigners --- p.73 / The Greek Way of War --- p.87 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- The Transformation of Greek Warfare --- p.92 / The Legacy of the Persian Wars --- p.92 / The Introduction of New Elements --- p.98 / Response of the Hoplite Tradition --- p.113 / Militarization of the Greek Way --- p.121 / Chapter Chapter 5: --- Epilogue --- p.130 / Bibliography --- p.133

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The purpose of my thesis research was to transcribe a collection of letters to John H. Crawford about the formation and actions of the Sixtieth Tennessee Infantry (Confederate) in Jonesboro during the Civil War, annotate them, and provide an introduction that details the events and people described in the letters. These letters are important because they describe first-hand the process of formation of this Confederate infantry unit in an area of East Tennessee that predominately supported the Union. The letters themselves can be found in the Archives of Appalachia at East Tennessee State University’s Charles C. Sherrod Library.

The Nauvoo Legion takes its name from the city in Illinois which was the center of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the early 1840's, when the Mormon militia was organized. When the Mormons were driven to the Rocky Mountains they revived the militia, in 1849, under its original title.The legislative organization of the Utah Nauvoo Legion was carried out through enactments of three lawmaking bodies, the High Council of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Legislature of the State of Deseret, and the Legislature of the Territory of Utah.

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