No description available.

No description available.

Proponents of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) argue that the mind literally extends into the world because mental states literally extend into the world. But the arguments presented in favour of these claims are compatible with a much weaker conclusion, expressed as the Extended Machinery of Mind Thesis (EMMT) that secures only the extension of the enablers of mental states. What is required is a mark of the mental that can settle the constitutive versus enabling issue. Both sides of the debate accept non-derived content as a necessary condition on a state‘s being mental but this cannot settle the constitution versus enabling issue, meaning the debate has stagnated because there are no decisive moves left to make. Thus, the strongest move for the EM theorist to make is to reject non-derived content as the mark of the mental and seek an alternative. Because enactivism rejects the representational view of mind then if it can be made to work as an account of mentality it offers promise with regard to the formation of a new mark of the mental on which a genuinely interesting EMT can be based.

abstract: Previous literature was reviewed in an effort to further investigate the link between notification levels of a cell phone and their effects on driver distraction. Mind-wandering has been suggested as an explanation for distraction and has been previously operationalized with oculomotor movement. Mind-wandering’s definition is debated, but in this research it was defined as off task thoughts that occur due to the task not requiring full cognitive capacity. Drivers were asked to operate a driving simulator and follow audio turn by turn directions while experiencing each of three cell phone notification levels: Control (no texts), Airplane (texts with no notifications), and Ringer (audio notifications). Measures of Brake Reaction Time, Headway Variability, and Average Speed were used to operationalize driver distraction. Drivers experienced higher Brake Reaction Time and Headway Variability with a lower Average Speed in both experimental conditions when compared to the Control Condition. This is consistent with previous research in the field of implying a distracted state. Oculomotor movement was measured as the percent time the participant was looking at the road. There was no significant difference between the conditions in this measure. The results of this research indicate that not, while not interacting with a cell phone, no audio notification is required to induce a state of distraction. This phenomenon was unable to be linked to mind-wandering. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Human Systems Engineering 2019

The reductionist tenets of the biomedical model of mental illness generate research methods and clinical practices that neglect significant cultural elements of mental illness. The biomedical model is reductionist because it assumes a view of the mind that lends itself to biological reductionism. Developing a more holistic model of mental illness requires replacing the accepted view of mind with a new one. In this paper, research demonstrating the significance of culture to mental illness will be reviewed in order to illuminate the flaws of the biomedical model. The extended mind theory will be analyzed and discussed as a potential basis for the development of a new paradigm within psychiatry, one which transcends the reductionist tendencies of the biomedical model.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 95-97). Also available via the World Wide Web.

No description available.

No description available.

Doctor of Philosophy / This study defines Theory-of-Mind as the ability to experience one’s own mind and understand the minds of others to the extent necessary to make sense of human behaviour and the world. Since the concept of Theory-of-Mind was first applied to people with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), lack of Theory-of-Mind has been used to explain their cognitive difficulties (National Research Council, 2003), along with social, communicative and imaginative impairments (Frith, Happé & Siddons, 1994). Previous studies have tended to think of Theory-of-Mind in terms of a simple binary of deficit or credit; to exclude the voices of people with ASD; to emphasise the cognitive aspects of Theory-of-Mind over its affective aspects; and to emphasise understanding the minds of others over experiencing one’s own mind. This study aims to address these issues by investigating Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced by students with ASD and objectively understood by their teachers. It is the first attempt in the study of Theory-of-Mind to include the voices of individuals with ASD along with the professional views of their teachers. This study takes an interdisciplinary approach, supported by philosophy of mind and special education. A grounded theory approach and a mixed methods research design combine to build and strengthen a theory of Theory-of-Mind. For Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced, 20 senior secondary and post secondary school students with ASD from Republic of Korea were interviewed and student-produced documents were reviewed to draw out their inner experiences. The Korean Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and the Korean Vineland Social Maturity Scale were employed to assess IQ and social competence. For Theory-of-Mind as objectively understood, their teachers’ beliefs regarding their students with ASD were sought through in-depth interviews, a review of teacher-produced documents and administration of a newly developed Teacher Questionnaire. This study reports differences between Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced and objectively observed, and variations within the components of Theory-of-Mind. The role of imagination in Theory-of-Mind and the relationships between Theory-of-Mind components, IQ and social competence are discussed. As a result, a Theory-of-Mind continuum model and Theory-of-Mind Typology is proposed.

Doctor of Philosophy / This study defines Theory-of-Mind as the ability to experience one’s own mind and understand the minds of others to the extent necessary to make sense of human behaviour and the world. Since the concept of Theory-of-Mind was first applied to people with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), lack of Theory-of-Mind has been used to explain their cognitive difficulties (National Research Council, 2003), along with social, communicative and imaginative impairments (Frith, Happé & Siddons, 1994). Previous studies have tended to think of Theory-of-Mind in terms of a simple binary of deficit or credit; to exclude the voices of people with ASD; to emphasise the cognitive aspects of Theory-of-Mind over its affective aspects; and to emphasise understanding the minds of others over experiencing one’s own mind. This study aims to address these issues by investigating Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced by students with ASD and objectively understood by their teachers. It is the first attempt in the study of Theory-of-Mind to include the voices of individuals with ASD along with the professional views of their teachers. This study takes an interdisciplinary approach, supported by philosophy of mind and special education. A grounded theory approach and a mixed methods research design combine to build and strengthen a theory of Theory-of-Mind. For Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced, 20 senior secondary and post secondary school students with ASD from Republic of Korea were interviewed and student-produced documents were reviewed to draw out their inner experiences. The Korean Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and the Korean Vineland Social Maturity Scale were employed to assess IQ and social competence. For Theory-of-Mind as objectively understood, their teachers’ beliefs regarding their students with ASD were sought through in-depth interviews, a review of teacher-produced documents and administration of a newly developed Teacher Questionnaire. This study reports differences between Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced and objectively observed, and variations within the components of Theory-of-Mind. The role of imagination in Theory-of-Mind and the relationships between Theory-of-Mind components, IQ and social competence are discussed. As a result, a Theory-of-Mind continuum model and Theory-of-Mind Typology is proposed.