One of the most heavily researched topics of cognitive development concerns children's growing understanding of people's behaviors as reflecting mental states such as beliefs, desires and intentions. Anthropomorphism is the overextension of this conceptual framework, referred to as "theory of mind", to nonhuman animals and inanimate objects. In this dissertation, I investigate the development and correlates of anthropomorphism building on and extending past research with children and adults. In Study 1, I investigated the relation between anthropomorphism, social understanding, and social behaviors that are known to correlate with theory of mind, such as empathy, and prosocial attitudes in a college sample (N = 919). Contrary to my predictions, results showed that anthropomorphism is only weakly related to the measures of social understanding. There was, however, some evidence for a link between anthropomorphism and imaginary companions; individuals who had a history of imaginary companions scored higher on anthropomorphism. In Study 2, I examined the link between theory of mind and anthropomorphism in preschool children. In addition, I investigated the developmental trajectory of anthropomorphism from age 4 to 6 and the relation between anthropomorphism and role play and social preferences. Seventy-four children (36 girls; Mage = 5 years, 5 months; SD = 9 months) took part in this study. In order to assess anthropomorphism in this age group, I used two methods: interview and movie narrative measures. Results revealed no age-related changes in anthropomorphism scores of the children. As in Study 1, I did not find a strong relationship between the theory of mind measures and anthropomorphism. There was, however, more evidence for a link between the interview measure of anthropomorphism and role play, and social preferences of children. Overall, in both studies, theory of mind, the most obvious candidate as a correlate of anthropomorphism, was, at best, not a strong predictor of the anthropomorphism, suggesting the need to rethink how developing knowledge about people is related to the overextension of this knowledge to nonhuman entities. It is possible that a rudimentary understanding of humans is necessary to be able to overextend it, but whether you overextend it might be linked to other factors.

A critical explication and comparison of the notion of judgment in the epistemologies of Immanuel Kant and Bernard J. F. Lonergan is developed with a view to exploring the nature and limits of human knowing. The study reveals that Kant is forced to ground his epistemology in immediate intuition and rigid, a priori concepts because he fails to distinguish between mere animal extroversion and rational inquiry, and because he overlooks the role of the virtually unconditioned. He therefore relegates to judgment a merely mechanical function limited in its scope exclusively to empirical employment. He is furthermore forced (because of his oversights) to the drastic distinction between phenomena and noumena, with all knowledge being restricted to phenomena. In contrast to Kant, Lonergan's epistemology is found to be far more promising. His explication of the virtually unconditioned as the sole grounds for judgment gives full rein to our desire to know and his critical distinction between mere extroversion and rational inquiry enables us to maintain a significant meaning to the notion of objectivity. Loneraan's account imposes no restrictive limits to the range of our knowing while yet being able to account for all its various dynamics and departments.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 198-205).

Thesis (M.S.)--Central Connecticut State University, 2003. / Thesis advisor: Jane Fried. " ... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Student Development in Higher Education." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-83). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Quicklooks provide an initial examination of commercialization potential of a technology. This thesis examines the Quicklook methodology in support of technology commercialization. The paper uses a Mind Map to create a visual representation of the methodology in a single image. Each component of the Mind Map is constructed individually and described in detail. The Mind Map allows the relationship between the many components of the Quicklook to be understood more rapidly. An example of a Quicklook report follows. The results of a Quicklook analysis support improved decisions regarding continued commercialization efforts while outlining the steps needed to get the product or service to market. The technology, its intellectual property, the market, and the competition are included in the analysis. Commercialization specific aspects, such as economic sustainability and business models, are then considered along with the value proposition. The final step in the Quicklook methodology is to recommend whether or not commercialization efforts should continue. / text

published_or_final_version / Psychiatry / Master / Master of Philosophy

This paper examines Zen Master Dogen's philosophy of shinjin datsuraku, dropping off body and mind, through his dialectical standpoint on sunyata. In our efforts, we shall learn of the philosophical affinities Dogen shares with early Mahayana thinkers, particularly Nagarjuna and his philosophy of emptiness. A demonstration of this connection will in turn open up a new conceptual window for viewing and interpreting various themes and passages within Dogen's writings. Some ideas we will explore in order to frame out a dialectical discussion of shinjin datsuraku are the mind-body problem and its relationship to the problem of time, as well as his philosophy and practice of zazen, seated meditation. / Following from this examination, we will then probe Dogen's dialectical standpoint on shinjin datsuraku. In our attempt to unfold the philosophical layers of meaning that encapsulate this teaching, we will provide a novel reading of his philosophy of Buddha-nature, a philosophy that is free from all traces of essentialism.

The current study examined whether there is a curvilinear association between differential parenting and children’s Theory of Mind (ToM) and two similar abilities we defined as “ToM- in-Action”. These were, use of perspective taking language and cognitive sensitivity (providing tailored verbal or non-verbal guidance) while completing a challenging task with a younger sibling. A community sample of 372 children (52% were males, average age=5.6), their younger siblings (average age=3.14) and their mothers were observed in their homes. Findings showed a linear association rather than a curvilinear effect, where favored older siblings had significantly poorer cognitive sensitivity and perspective taking when interacting with their younger sibling in a challenging task. This relationship remained significant when other variables such as age and SES were controlled. The relationship between differential parenting and ToM was non-significant. Results demonstrate the specific and complex impact of differential parenting on children’s social cognition.

Vulnerability to major depressive disorder (MDD) is characterized by extensive interpersonal dysfunction. A framework that has been used to understand this impairment is theory of mind, or the ability to decode and reason about others’ mental states. Previous research has identified a mental state decoding advantage in individuals with a past history of MDD, which has been explained in terms of an enhanced social orientation in those with depression vulnerability. Although social phobia is highly comorbid with MDD, there is no research investigating theory of mind abilities in individuals with social phobia, nor has there been research examining how social anxiety may better account for the relation of depression to heightened theory of mind ability. Furthermore, there is a paucity of research investigating whether evidence of such a relation extends to the more complex task of reasoning about others’ mental states. Thus, the goals of the current investigation were to examine whether heightened ToM accuracy in those with a history of MDD is better accounted for by social phobia, and whether superior ToM skills in those with past MDD are seen across tasks that tap the domains of decoding and reasoning. Participants (N = 109) were assigned to one of four groups based on a structured diagnostic interview: (a) past MDD only (n = 36); (b) social anxiety disorder only (n = 9); (c) comorbid past MDD and social anxiety disorder (n = 23); and (d) no psychiatric history (n = 41). Results show that having a history of MDD is associated with heightened mental state reasoning abilities only in the presence of current social phobia. However, theory of mind decoding was not elevated in this condition. This suggests that social phobia differentially influences the relation of past MDD and theory of mind ability for decoding and reasoning abilities. Furthermore, social phobia without a history of depression was associated with poor theory of mind decoding and reasoning. This reduced ability in individuals with social phobia may be the result of self-focused attention or avoidance of potential negative evaluation, but future research is required to specifically address these possibilities. / Thesis (Master, Psychology) -- Queen's University, 2012-08-28 10:30:44.686

This paper is an analysis of aspects of Daniel Dennett's theory of human consciousness. For Dennett, the reasons why human consciousness is so unique among earthly creatures, and so manifestly powerful, are not to be found in the differences between our brains and those of other higher mammals, but rather in the ways in which the plasticity of our brains is harnessed by language and culture. According to Dennett, the best way to understand the enhancements and augmentations that result from enculturation is as a von Neumannesque virtual machine implemented in the parallel-distributed processing brain. This paper examines two questions that arise from the latter hypothesis: (1) If nonsymbolic, parallel-distributed networks accomplish all the representation and computation of the brain, what kind of explanation of the functionality of that brain, can legitimately maintain descriptions of procedures that are symbolic, serial, and real? (2) What kind of structural design, training, and resultant processing dynamics could enable a (human) brain to develop a competency for symbolic, serial procedures? Through addressing these questions, I argue that Dennett's theory of consciousness is broadly correct, investigate some other theorist's ideas that are highly compatible with Dennett's work, and consider some criticisms that have been levelled against it. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2003.