This thesis is about the ontology of living beings as natural systems, their behavior, and the way in which said behavior, under special conditions of social coupling, may give rise to mental phenomena. The guiding questions of the thesis are: 1) What kinds of systems are living beings such that they behave the way they do? 2) How, through what kinds of mechanisms and processes, do living beings generate their behavior? 3) How do mental phenomena appear in the life of certain living beings? 4) What are the natural conditions under which certain living beings exhibit mental phenomena? To answer these questions the thesis first assumes, then justifies and defends, a Strict Naturalistic (SN) stance with respect to living beings. SN is a metaphysical and epistemological framework that, recognizing the organizational, dynamic and structural complexity and peculiarity of living beings, views and treats them as metaphysically ordinary natural systems; that is, as systems that, from the metaphysical point of view, are not different in kind from rivers or stars. SN holds that if in natural sciences rivers and stars are not conceived as semantic, intentional, teleological, agential or normative systems, then living beings should not be so conceived either. Having assumed SN, and building mainly on the second-order cybernetic theories of Ross Ashby and Humberto Maturana, the thesis answers question 1) by saying that living beings are (i) adaptive dynamic systems, (ii) deterministic machines of closed transitions, (iii) multistable dissipative systems, and (iv) organizationally closed systems with respect to their sensorimotor and autopoietic dynamics. Based on this ontological characterization, the thesis answers question 2) by showing that living beings’ behavior corresponds to the combined product of (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). Points (i) and (ii) support the idea that living beings are strictly deterministic systems, and that, consequently, notions such as information, control, agency or teleology—usually invoked to explain living beings’ behavior—do not have operational reality but are rather descriptive projections introduced by the observer. Point (iii) helps to understand why, despite their deterministic nature, living beings behave in ways that, to the observer, appear to be teleological, agential or “intelligent”. Point (iv) suggests that living beings’ sensorimotor dynamics are closed circuits without inputs or outputs, where the distinction between external and internal medium is, again, an ascription of the observer rather than a functional property of the system itself. Having addressed the basic principles of living beings’ behavior, the thesis explores the possible origin of (truly) mental phenomena in the particular domain of social behavior. Complementing Maturana’s recursive theory of language with Vygotsky’s dialectic approach the thesis advances, though in a still quite exploratory way, a sociolinguistic hypothesis of mind. This hypothesis answers questions 3) and 4) by claiming that the essential properties of mental phenomena (intentionality, representational content) appear with language, and that mind, as a private experiential domain, emerges as a dialectic transformation of language.

This thesis addresses the question of divine action in the mind: Is human consciousness a uniquely nonphysical causal joint wherein divine intentions meet natural realities without contravening lawlike physical processes? It is argued that consciousness is not uniquely spiritual but wholly natural (and possibly physical). However, this need not lead to the conclusion that divine action in the mind does not occur. Rather, this thesis argues that noninterventionist causal joint programs (such as those privileging the mind as uniquely open to divine action) are both scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient, resting on questionable metaphysical presuppositions that are not necessitated by either theology or the natural sciences. By discarding the God-nature model implied by contemporary noninterventionist divine action theories, one is freed up to explore theological and metaphysical alternatives for understanding divine action in the mind (and elsewhere). It is argued that a theologically robust theistic naturalism offers a more compelling vision of divine action in the mind than that offered by standard causal joint theories. By affirming that to be fully natural is to be involved with God’s active presence, one is then free to affirm divine action not only in the human mind, but throughout the natural world. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part One engages with the scientific and philosophical literature surrounding human consciousness, and uses debates about the nature of the mind to offer a sustained analysis and critique of what is termed the “standard model” of divine action. It is argued that the noninterventionist, incompatibilist model of divine action that has spurred the development of various causal joint theories is scientifically and theologically insufficient, and that this is seen particularly clearly in recent theories locating (and constraining) divine action in the emergent human mind. Chapter 2 analyses the contemporary divine action scene, arguing that the standard model presumes noninterventionism, incompatibilism, and a high view of the laws of nature. However, the God-world relationship implied by this model is theologically insufficient. Chapter 3 examines Philip Clayton’s divine action theory, which locates divine action in the emergent human mind and is the latest manifestation of the causal joint model described in Chapter 2. After using emergence theory itself to critique Clayton’s approach, the thesis then examines the philosophy and science of consciousness, in Chapters 4 and 5. It is suggested that a physicalist understanding of the mind is a well-supported position. Part Two of the thesis reframes divine action in the mind within an explicitly theological framework. The thesis does this by analysing what is termed the “theological turn” in divine action debates – the recent tendency to react against standard causal joint theories by rejecting the idea that science can say anything about how and whether divine action occurs. Proponents of the theological turn instead understand divine action from explicitly theological perspectives, affirming compatibilist models in which God is seen to work in, through, and with natural processes – precisely because God is never absent from nature in the first place. Such an approach allows theologians to accept physicalist explanations of the mind, precisely because all the natural world is necessarily involved with God. Chapter 6 introduces this theological turn by exploring various versions of naturalism, ultimately suggesting that neither philosophy nor science mandates the sort of metaphysical naturalism assumed not only by those who deny divine action, but (ironically) noninterventionist divine action theorists as well. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 then introduce, compare, and contrast three different versions of strong theistic naturalism: Thomism, panentheistic naturalism, and pneumatological naturalism. While each of these explicitly theological frameworks is distinctive, they share an affirmation of the intimate relationship between God’s immanent, active presence in the natural world, and suggest the naturalised mind as a relatively intense locus of divine action, as human minds actively participate in and with God. It is concluded that the participatory ontology supported by these theistic naturalisms does, after all, suggest the mind as a locus of intensified divine action – but for very different reasons than those motivating causal joint theorists.

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This dissertation investigates the requirements and design of a Mind Development Centre in the Pretoria Central Business District. The investigation touches upon the research done into the human mind and brain and the ways in which it can be improved and supported. Environmental factors that influence thinking and meta-thinking is investigated and applied in the design of a centre where research of the mind can be conducted and where knowledge gained can be disseminated. Historical paradigms about thinking play an important part in understanding the way one thinks about thinking. These are briefly discussed and the examination arrives at a contemporary and more appropriate theory of thinking and mind. Fields touched upon in this investigation include popular psychology, environmental psychology, education, health and fitness, neurology, sustainability issues and social reconstruction. The history and context of the site is examined in order to design a building that not only responds to its environment, but serves to project the principles it embodies its direct surrounding area. The normative position throughout the investigation is that thinking is a skill that can be taught and developed. It is accessible to all, but, like physical prowess, some might display a greater proficiency or natural aptitude. It is considered to be in the best interest of individuals and society alike that thinking skills be raised among as broad a base as possible. Through its influence on thinking, the built environment and appropriate design can contribute to this task. / Dissertation (MArch (Prof))--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Architecture / unrestricted

I defend physicalism about phenomenal consciousness against recent epistemic arguments for dualism. First I argue (as against Kripke) that psychophysical identities can be a posteriori (and apparently contingent, and conceivably false). Their epistemic status is due to the analytic independence of phenomenal and physical-functional terms. Unlike Kripke's own explanation of a posteriori necessity, analytic independence is consistent with - indeed explained by - the direct reference of phenomenal terms, so Kripke's argument against psychophysical identities fails. I then argue (as against White and Chalmers) that direct reference does not itself make identities a priori. Next I endorse the 'a priori entailment thesis': if physicalism is true, phenomenal truths follow a priori from a complete statement of the facts of physics. I argue that physicalists must accept a priori entailment if we are to avoid brute or 'strong' a posteriori necessities. I show that a priori entailment is consistent with analytic independence, and so make room for what Chalmers calls 'type-C' physicalism. Jackson's 'Mary', who knows all the physical facts, would be able to deduce the physical-functional reference of phenomenal terms, and so the truth of psychophysical identities, without appealing to analytic connections. The 'knowledge' argument for dualism therefore fails. The lack of such connections does, however, help explain why Mary's deduction seems intuitively impossible. A priori entailment makes zombie scenarios inconceivable, so Chalmers's 'conceivability' argument fails. It also closes Levine's 'explanatory gap' between physical and phenomenal truths. Though it may not satisfy all demands for explanation, any remainder poses no threat to physicalism. I then defend type-C physicalism against some recent objections to the 'phenomenal-concept strategy'. I close by observing that while the view I defend can rebut epistemic arguments for dualism, it leaves the question of whether consciousness has a physical basis as a matter for empirical investigation.

The relationship between life stress and working memory capacity (WMC) has been documented in college students and older adults. It has been proposed that intrusive thoughts about life stress are the mechanism responsible for the impairments seen in WMC. To examine the mechanism responsible for these impairments the current study attempted to induce intrusive thoughts about personal events. The current study allowed for a test of predictions made by two theories of mind wandering regarding the impact of these intrusive thoughts on WMC task performance. One hundred fifty undergraduates were assigned to a control group, positive event group, or negative event group. Participants in the positive and negative event groups completed a short emotional disclosure about an imagined future positive or negative event, respectively, to induce positive or negative intrusive thoughts. WMC measures were completed prior to and following the emotional writing. Results indicated a significant relationship between WMC and mind wandering, however the writing manipulation did not result in any consistent changes in intrusive thoughts or WMC. The results suggest a causal relationship between WMC and mind wandering. The emotional valence of the intrusive thought altered the impact on WMC. No relationship was seen between the measures of stress and WMC. The results of the current study suggest that negative intrusive thoughts result in impaired WMC task performance but other types of off-task thoughts may not result in similar impairments.

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the Degree of Masters in the subject of Psychology, Faculty of Arts at the University of Zululand, 2007. / This study identifies a new paradigm for working with body, mind and spirit that facilitates psychotherapeutic processes. It uses both the verbal and non¬verbal components of human experience. It transforms life's challenges into an empowering, transformational and healing process, allowing opportunities for unfolding our true potential. Philophonetics is a modality of counselling, psychotherapy and coaching. It is a phenomenological approach to human experiences that facilitate the client in a process of active exploration, self discovery and empowerment to become more conscious in their own knowing and way of being in the world. It accepts awareness through the living body as a way of knowing through sensation, movement and gesture, visualization of internal dynamics and the resonance of sound therapy. The skills learnt in the sessions can be practiced and integrated by the client and used for self-management and self-care between sessions and after therapy is completed. The present study has shown how effective philophonetics can be and it is evident that this modality cuts across cultures. The findings of the present study are in keeping with international literature which confirms that philophonetics unlike other therapeutic modalities, it does not rely heavily on the verbal mode but employs about 80% of the nonverbal phase.

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The current thesis intersects cognition and education to study the mental experience of mind wandering and its consequences. This research examines attention and memory using materials, methodologies, and research questions drawn from authentic classroom environments. The overarching question driving this thesis centres on when and why students mind wander during lectures, and how we can reduce its negative impact on learning. The hypothesis underpinning all the presented research proposes that stronger motivation reduces mind wandering, thus improving learning outcomes. The current thesis examines how three different motivational manipulations affect reports of intentional mind wandering—when participants deliberately choose to redirect their attention away from the lecture—and unintentional mind wandering—when participants find their attention to be off-task despite their best efforts to stay focused. Quizzing, monetary rewards, and time-based rewards affected mind wandering reports, particularly reports of intentional mind wandering. Although, throughout this thesis, there was no direct impact on learning, there was consistent evidence of a negative correlation between mind wandering reports and learning. Based on these findings, this thesis discusses implications for the enterprise of mind wandering research, principles of motivation to leverage in education, and pedagogies to improve the classroom learning experience. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Our minds wander multiple times a day—during work, school, leisure time, meals, and countless other activities. When mind wandering occurs during lectures, it negatively impacts our ability to learn information. If we are motivated, we are likely to learn more, and some researchers have suggested that this happens because we are better able to pay attention while learning. The research presented in this thesis used three reward types in an attempt to reduce two types of mind wandering (intentional vs. spontaneous) and, therefore, produce better learning. This thesis demonstrated that outside rewards can increase motivation, and that these changes in motivation appear to affect intentional mind wandering more than spontaneous mind wandering. Reducing mind wandering by properly motivating our students should promote better learning; as educators, effective lectures must play that role for students.

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