Cognitive abilities have been invoked to do much work in externalist epistemology. An ability condition (sometimes in conjunction with a separate, anti-luck condition) is seen to be key in satisfying direction-of-fit and modal stability intuitions which attach to the accrual of positive epistemic status to doxastic attitudes. While the notion of ability has been given some extensive treatment in the literature (especially John Greco, Alan Millar and Ernest Sosa), the implications for these abilities being particularly cognitive ones has been given less attention. To rectify this oversight, I examine the debate over the nature of cognition from philosophy of cognitive science, paying particular attention to the debate between defenders of internalist theories (Fred Adams, Kenneth Aizawa and Rob Rupert) and externalist theories (so-called “extended mind” positions). Armed with substantive accounts of cognition, I argue that the epistemological externalist’s obligation to repudiate epistemological internalism forces her to adopt some sort of externalist account of cognition.

The primary purpose of this explorative study was to develop a therapeutically relevant theory of emotional well-being. The developed theory focuses on coping skills because they are observable, measurable, and teachable. The secondary purpose of this study was to begin researching other important aspects of human nature that may impact emotional well-being. As a foundation to this study, stress and coping theories were reviewed. Contemporary theories concerning coping styles were applied to current conceptions of emotional well-being. The author developed the Well-Being Pilot Test (WBPT) to serve two functions. The WBPT was devised to obtain a useful understanding of the composition of emotional well-being in terms of coping skill divisions. The second function of the WBPT was to begin exploring spiritual, physical, and intellectual health and how they relate to emotional well-being. The WBPT consists of 273 items and was given to 370 people in the United States. The results of this explorative study yielded five coping skill divisions associated with emotional well-being: interpersonal, intrapersonal, stress regulation, emotional stabilization, and problem solving skills. Results of this study are discussed in terms of their usefulness in the therapy session for both, the psychotherapist and the client. The results also indicated that all three of the chosen aspects of human nature (i.e., spiritual, physical, and intellectual health) were significantly related to emotional well-being. Intellectual health was most strongly related to emotional well-being, followed by physical health, and finally, spiritual health. This explorative study, thus, provides pertinent information for the psychotherapist regarding therapeutically relevant conceptualizations of emotional well-being. The information gained from this study will help the psychologist move away from the focus of decreasing emotional sickness to one of encouraging coping skills designed to enhance emotional wellness. Key Words: Emotional well-being, coping skills, stress, wellness, depression, interpersonal, intrapersonal, problem solving, emotional stabilization. / Graduate

In Mind and World John McDowell argues that our attempts to understand how it is that our thoughts are rationally answerable to the world are in vain. Whether one takes Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology or Phenomenology to be capable of answering this question, such attempts are, he claims, merely a consequence of failing to see that they are already gripped by a picture of the world which precludes the possibility of such answers. In particular, he suggests that if we render Nature as that which is circumscribed by the intelligibility of the natural sciences, we leave no room for rationality conceived of in terms of the spontaneity and freedom that Kant associated with it. While McDowell claims to be a `quietist' who is not putting forward his own theory of mind, he is, at the very least, suggesting a theory of nature, one which he dubs `liberal' insofar as it suggests that we widen the scope of nature so that it can be hospitable to the normative features of thought. This thesis will propose a theory of mind which attempts to show how the causal, normative, and phenomenological can be seen as continuous features of the natural world. It demonstrates that a careful appraisal of causal or scientific accounts of intentionality can be made compatible with McDowell's commitment to the normativity of thought. By revealing that a biological account of the mind, suitably expanded to include an account of history as a Dynamic Ecological Milieu, generates biological interrogatives for the human organism, we can show that the normative manifests as an emergent property of the nomological. This allows second nature to retain its sui generis status while being continuous with the causal descriptions of first nature. This thesis will also draw from the Phenomenological tradition, as a means of critiquing McDowell's account of “the Myth of the Given" and his rejection of pre-conceptual content. In particular, it will follow Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus in affirming that we should view experience, not in terms of that which provides epistemic foundations, but as the domain of pre-reflective embodiment. This is essential to showing how the biological sciences can inform us about the causal background which makes embodied coping so unreflectively natural. Furthermore, phenomenology has provided a means of engaging with the biological sciences in a non-reductive way, as is evidenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behavior and the more recent neurophenomenological tradition which is largely inspired by his work. Finally, by drawing on these resources, the desideratum of this thesis is a scientifically informed understanding of what McDowell calls “second nature" and “the space of reasons" in terms of what I have called “biological interrogatives" and the “phenomenology of epistemic agency".

Thesis advisor: Paul Kline / This three paper dissertation considers whether yoga--a popular mind-body practice combining physical postures and movement, mindfulness, and breath exercises--may be a useful component of treatment for adult trauma survivors. The first paper involves a systematic review and meta-analyses of the current evidence base for yoga in the treatment of anxiety, depression, and PTSD among trauma survivors. The second and third papers are grounded in a single, mixed-methods multi-wave data source aimed at examining yoga's contribution to recovery for adult women who have complex trauma histories (i.e., sustained and/or multiple traumatic experiences such as recurring physical or sexual abuse). The second paper is a quantitative study employing hierarchical linear and logistic regression to examine associations between yoga practice and reductions in traumatic symptomology over time. The third paper is a hermeneutic phenomenological study exploring how women with complex trauma histories experience practicing yoga and its potential role in their coping and healing processes over time. Taken together, these three papers offer insights into the complex healing needs of adult survivors suffering from the effects of traumatization, and the promising role of yoga within their recovery processes. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Social Work. / Discipline: Social Work.

This thesis is about common-sense psychology and its role in cognitive science. Put simply, the argument is that common-sense psychology is important because it offers clues to some complex problems in cognitive science, and because common-sense psychology has significant effects on our intuitions, both in science and on an everyday level. The thesis develops a theory of anthropomorphism in common-sense psychology. Anthropomorphism, the natural human tendency to ascribe human characteristics (and especially human mental characteristics) to things that aren't human, is an important theme in the thesis. Anthropomorphism reveals an endemic anthropocentricity that deeply influences our thinking about other minds. The thesis then constructs a descriptive model of anthropomorphism in common-sense psychology, and uses it to analyse two studies of the ascription of mental states. The first, Baron- Cohen et al. 's (1985) false belief test, shows how cognitive modelling can be used to compare different theories of common-sense psychology. The second study, Searle's (1980) `Chinese Room', shows 'that this same model can reproduce the patterns of scientific intuitions taken to systems which pass the Turing test (Turing, 1950), suggesting that it is best seen as a common-sense test for a mind, not a scientific one. Finally, the thesis argues that scientific theories involving the ascription of mentality through a model or a metaphor are partly dependent on each individual scientist's common-sense psychology. To conclude, this thesis develops an interdisciplinary study of common-sense psychology and shows that its effects are more wide ranging than is commonly thought. This means that it affects science more than might be expected, but that careful study can help us to become mindful of these effects. Within this new framework, a proper understanding of common-sense psychology could lay important new foundations for the future of cognitive science.

Theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states to others and to predict their behaviour based on inferences about their mental states, for example their perception, desires, or beliefs. Forty years ago, research on theory of mind originated from the question of whether or not chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have a theory of mind, a question that – after all this time – is still debated. In the present thesis, I investigate theory of mind and its precursors in birds of the crow family, specifically Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius), California scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica), and carrion crows (Corvus corone corone). Corvids have been reported to possess theory of mind-like abilities. This qualification reflects the fact that most research on theory of mind in these birds has revolved around the ability to respond to perceptual and desire states of conspecifics, and so far has not produced evidence for or against an ability to also respond to others’ beliefs. Further, it is unclear which mechanisms could be the basis of corvids’ abilities. Thus, there are two open questions in regard to corvid theory of mind my thesis aims to address. To address these questions, first, I investigated the ability of Eurasian jays to respond to the false belief of a conspecific in a caching paradigm, where the knowledge of a conspecific observer about the accessibility of two caching sites was manipulated (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3 I explore which behavioural cues might present the basis of the jays’ ability to respond to the desire of a conspecific in a caching context. In Chapter 4, I report a study on biological motion perception in scrub-jays, a phenomenon suggested to be crucial for the detection of social agents. In Chapter 5, I assess scrub-jays’ sensitivity to gaze of a human and a conspecific. Finally, in Chapter 6, I report a study investigating the face inversion effect in carrion crows, an effect that is indicative of a ‘special’ relevance of faces. I conclude by discussing how the presented studies could help us inform our understanding of corvid theory of mind-like abilities.

Voice is an inconstant yet constantly performative material; it is our internally-housed, liminal technology. ‘Processes of voice’ is the term I develop throughout the text of this thesis to articulate materialities of voice and methods of address within processes of practice in artists’ moving image that ‘give voice’ to material and non-material forms. I interrogate this in relation to key concepts in Philosophy of Mind to address the complex ways in which bodily skills and action inform perception and thought to explore an account of perception and process in relation to voice. I examine the liminal, inconstant, and uncertain in subjective experience, and the ways in which this is extended into the social through a politics of embodied practice harnessed in moving images. I make a case for the uncertain I-voice, which engages the fully embodied and openly subjective, to challenge established narratives and conventions of address, and the power and knowledge dynamics that structure them. I come to focus on the uncertain acousmatic I-voice in moving image, which through its presentness, intimacy and acknowledgement of uncertainty relinquishes the acousmêtre’s threat of control to share a liminal territory of destabilized authority with the viewer. This is also explored in and through my own moving image work, A Desire For Organic Order (2015), a single screen video, which contributes to the overall thesis.

This dissertation explores the habits of thought that inform how music analysts conceptualize the music they study and how this conceptualization affects the kinds of claims they make and the discursive practices adopted to express them. I aim to clarify these issues in music-theoretical conceptualization with an eye toward mediating analytical disagreements by tracing the influence of two types of concepts used in contemporary music analysis. I differentiate what I call theoretical concepts, which refer to abstract, theoretical objects, from phenomenal concepts, which refer to elements of felt, musical experience. Drawing on theories of concepts from philosophy of mind, I argue that these concepts have a complex structure, featuring both a reference and mode of presentation. The musical concept Dominant, for instance, might be used as a phenomenal concept, referring to the conscious experience of hearing a dominant, or it might be used as a theoretical concept, referring to a kind of abstract object, presented as either the triad the leads to the tonic or the triad built on scale degree five. In analysis, the kinds of concepts that analysts use will determine the scope of their analyses as well as define what sorts of critiques are best deployed against them. I explore four different ways that these conceptual types are used. These case studies include conceptually simple theories that attempt to foreground one type of concept or another (from the formalized model proffered by Eugene Narmour, to the drawing-analyses of Elaine Barkin) as well as more common analytical strategies that rely on both kinds of concept in concert, such as Schenkerian analysis and transformational and neo-Riemannian theory. I enrich my study of analytical approaches with insights drawn from my own analytical practice, including a wide range of styles and composers (though foregrounding the complexity of tonal analysis especially) and close readings of various authors in different analytical traditions. In general, I am concerned less with testing the soundness of any given approach than with understanding what ways of conceptualizing music underlie them and how analysts coordinate these concepts in practice. I find that while most approaches rely on both types of concept in some combination, their differences come in the roles these concepts play in analytical methodology and the degree to which each type of engagement is foregrounded in practice.

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo o estudo da aplicabilidade e dos eventuais benefícios do Mind Map na gestão de projetos em áreas de consultoria, desenvolvimento de negócios e produtos. Como objetivos secundários, este estudo apresenta aplicações práticas do Mind Map, no ambiente empresarial, além de trazê-lo ao ambiente acadêmico brasileiro. O referencial teórico, dividido em duas partes, introduz, primeiramente, a gestão de projetos, a partir da visão de seus principais autores acadêmicos. A segunda parte traz, com maior profundidade, uma revisão bibliográfica do Mind Map, apresentando sua definição, princípios, leis, benefícios, aplicações e quatro casos de sucesso no mercado corporativo. A metodologia de pesquisa adotada nesta dissertação foi estudo de caso múltiplo, com cinco gestores, de quatro organizações atuantes no setor de serviços, que utilizam o Mind Map como ferramenta de gestão de projetos de consultoria, desenvolvimento de negócios e produtos. Como instrumento de coleta de dados, foram feitas entrevistas roteirizadas individuais com cada um dos gestores, realizadas pelo próprio pesquisador, além da coleta de dados secundários de domínio público. As conclusões, apresentadas neste trabalho, revelam que o Mind Map potencializa várias das habilidades necessárias a um bom gestor de projetos, permitindo uma melhor qualidade da sua prática de gerenciamento, principalmente no que tange ao planejamento e acompanhamento do escopo do projeto. Entretanto, ficou evidente a necessidade de um software de Mind Map, muitas vezes apoiado por outros programas clássicos normalmente utilizados em gestão de projetos, para que os objetivos fossem atingidos mesmo diante da complexidade dos casos analisados.

An ontological exploration of consciousness and how it is related to the body and other aspects of physical reality. Framed by David Chalmers' conception of "The Hard Problem", we begin from a physicalist perspective to discuss the problem of mental causation, which is the inquiry of how the mind communicates and interacts with the body. From here we examine the employment of identity reduction to functionalize and therefore physically explain mentality. We find that reductionist methods, the backbone of scientific investigation, do not work to explain conscious experience, because conscious experience is not quantifiable--it is qualitative. Thus we are left with looking for alternatives to our physicalist world-view in order to explain consciousness's place in reality. Perhaps a major conceptual revolution of how we see and understand the world is on the horizon that will allow us to finally explain consciousness.