Wong, Wai Kin. / "November 2011." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-116). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1: --- The problem of mental causation for physicalism --- p.7 / Chapter 1.1 --- Mental causation´ؤintroduction to the problem --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2 --- The problem of mental causation for physicalism --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- "A brief introduction to physicalism´ؤlayered model, supervenience, and physical closure" --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- What is the mind from a physicalist perspective? --- p.12 / Chapter 1.3 --- Non-reductive physicalism stated --- p.14 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Commitments and generally accepted claim of physicalism --- p.14 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- The non-reductive physicalist's view on mental causation --- p.19 / Chapter 1.4. --- What is next? --- p.20 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- Kim's supervienience/exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism --- p.21 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2 --- Supervenience argument --- p.22 / Chapter 2.3 --- Exclusion argument --- p.25 / Chapter 2.4 --- Implications of the supervenierice/exclusion argument --- p.28 / Chapter 2.5 --- Objections to the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.29 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- Kim on the principle of causal/explanatory exclusion --- p.33 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.33 / Chapter 3.2 --- Kim's realist commitment --- p.35 / Chapter 3.3 --- Kim's argument for explanatory exclusion --- p.36 / Chapter 3.4 --- From the principle of explanatory exclusion to the principle of causal exclusion --- p.38 / Chapter 3.5 --- Kim's view on non-standard overdetermination and how the gap between EEP and CEP is bridged --- p.39 / Chapter 3.6 --- Kim's view on causation --- p.43 / Chapter 3.7 --- Further implications of production causation for the exclusion argument --- p.47 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- Two concepts of causation and the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.53 / Chapter 4.1 --- The counterfactual analyses of causation´ؤa general overview --- p.55 / Chapter 4.2 --- How the dependence conception of causation helps non-reductive physicalists to avoid the causal exclusion principle --- p.59 / Chapter 4.3 --- Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between Kim and Loewer (I) --- p.62 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Loewer's objections to the use of production conception in the formulation of the supervenience/exclusion argument --- p.63 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- The first reason put forward by Loewer --- p.63 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Loewer's argument for (2) --- p.68 / Chapter 4.4 --- Production conception vs. dependence conception? The debate between Kim and Loewer (II) --- p.73 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Can a non-reductive physicalist distinguish epiphenomena from a genuine causal process by the dependence conception of causation? --- p.74 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Does agency require production? --- p.78 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Kim's third objection on omissions --- p.79 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- Loewer's responses to Kim's second and third objections --- p.82 / Chapter 4.4.5. --- Further discussion on Kim's second and third objections --- p.84 / Chapter 4.5 --- Conclusion --- p.87 / Chapter Chapter 5: --- Does Yablo's determination proposal help to solve the exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalism? --- p.88 / Chapter 5.1. --- Yablo's idea elaborated --- p.89 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Yablo's argument for the determination proposal --- p.91 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- The primacy of the causal status of mental events --- p.94 / Chapter 5.2 --- Evaluating Yablo's idea --- p.96 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Are mental properties determinables of physical properties? --- p.97 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The story is not ended. The crux of the issue is not whether the determination proposal is literally true --- p.100 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Why is proportionality constraint not the solution? --- p.102 / Chapter 5.3 --- What about the causal exclusion principle? --- p.107 / Chapter 5.4 --- Conclusion --- p.108 / Chapter Chapter 6: --- The final conclusion´ؤthe exclusion problem remains unsolved --- p.110 / Responses to the external review --- p.Error! Bookmark not defined. / Bibliography --- p.113

A versão infantil do Teste de Ler a Mente nos Olhos (Reading the Mind in Eyes Test - Child Version ) de Simon Baron-Cohen, é composto por 28 fotografias da região dos olhos de indivíduos com diferentes expressões e tem como objetivo uma quantificação da habilidade do indivíduo em inferir estados mentais a partir de expressões faciais, sendo usualmente utilizado como um instrumento para avaliação de Teoria da Mente. Neste trabalho foi feito um estudo de validade de uma versão em português do teste, visando maiores esclarecimentos acerca de suas propriedades psicométricas. O teste foi aplicado em uma amostra controle de 434 crianças de dois estados brasileiros, São Paulo e Santa Catarina, cursando o ensino fundamental e em uma amostra clínica de 20 crianças diagnosticadas com Transtornos do Espectro do Autismo. Foram encontrados um índice de consistência interna (alfa de Cronbach) de 0,718 e variância estatisticamente significativa de acordo com o ano escolar. Não foram encontradas diferenças significativas com relação ao sexo e Estado. Não houve diferença estatisticamente significativa nos escores dos grupos controle e clínico. Os resultados foram, portanto, parcialmente favoráveis para validade de construto, mas não foram encontradas evidências de validade critério / The \"Reading the Mind in Eyes Test - Child Version\" by Simon Baron-Cohen, consists of 28 photographs of the eye region of people with different expressions and aim a quantification of the individual\'s ability to infer mental states from facial expressions, and is usually used as an instrument for assessing Theory of Mind. This paper is a study of validity of a Portuguese version of the test, seeking further clarification about its psychometric properties. The test was applied to a control group of 434 children from two Brazilian states, Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina, in elementary school and a clinical group of 20 children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders. We found an index of internal consistency (Cronbach\'s alpha) of 0.718 and statistically significant variance in accordance with the school year. There were no significant differences with regard to gender and state. There was no statistically significant difference in the scores of clinical and control groups. The results were therefore partially favorable to construct validity, but there was no evidence of criterion validity

This thesis adopts a cognitive-phenomenological approach to Apollonius’ presentation of psychological imagery, thus eschewing the cultural-determinist assumptions that have tended to dominate Classical scholarship. To achieve this, I analyse relevant theories and results from the cognitive sciences (Theory of Mind, agency, gesture, conceptual metaphor), as well as perceived socio-literary influences from the post-Homeric tradition and the various advances (for example, medical) from contemporary Alexandria. This interdisciplinary methodology is then applied to the Argonautica in three large case studies: Medea and the simile of the sunbeam (3.755-60), Heracles and the simile of the gadfly (1.1286-72), and, finally, the poem’s overall psychological portrayal of Jason. In so doing, I show that Apollonius conforms to cognitive universal patterns of psychological expression, while also deploying and deepening his specific culture’s poetic, folk, and scientific models.

Lin, Kwan Ting Maggie. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 190-195). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction / Literature Review --- p.17 / "Theories of the Body, Class and Social Status" --- p.21 / Theories of Globalization --- p.28 / Why Yoga in Hong Kong --- p.32 / Defining Social Class in Hong Kong --- p.32 / Methodology --- p.39 / Personal Statement --- p.42 / Structure of the Thesis --- p.44 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Yoga in Hong Kong and its Historical Development / The 1950s Indian Wave --- p.48 / The 1980s-90s Western Wave --- p.52 / The Commercial Yoga Boom --- p.54 / Characteristics of Yoga in Hong Kong --- p.58 / My Fieldsites --- p.61 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Yoga Studios: The Construction of Difference and Distinction / Features of Yoga Studios in Hong Kong --- p.65 / Studio Space for Leisure --- p.68 / Liminality and Yogic Ambience --- p.70 / "“Playing Yoga""" --- p.74 / Conspicuous Leisure --- p.75 / Discipline vs. Leisure --- p.81 / Membership as a Status Symbol --- p.87 / Conclusion --- p.90 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Practitioners and Teachers: Ethnicity and Respect / Verbs for Describing Degree of Engagement in Yoga --- p.92 / “Doing Yoga´ح --- p.93 / “Practicing Yoga´ح --- p.93 / "Ethnicity, Respect, and Relationships" --- p.95 / "Yoga, Ethnicity，and Status" --- p.103 / Ethnicity and Social Class --- p.112 / Beyond Ethnicity? Internationalism --- p.117 / Conclusion --- p.118 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Yoga and the Fetishism of the Body / Marketing and Advertising of Yoga and the Ideal Female Body --- p.122 / Yoga and the Slim Body Ideal in Hong Kong --- p.124 / Different Slimming Rhetorics --- p.125 / Mirrors and Discipline --- p.127 / Studios as Panopticon --- p.129 / The Slimming Myth --- p.131 / Yoga and the Fetishism of the Body in Hong Kong --- p.133 / Body as Capital --- p.134 / Body as Class Signifier --- p.135 / Conclusion --- p.139 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Beyond the Body? Spirituality and Distinction / Yoga and Spirituality --- p.143 / Yoga and Mysticism --- p.147 / Beyond the Body? --- p.150 / "Yoga, Spirituality and Progression" --- p.154 / Body vs. Spirituality --- p.156 / Disciplining the Body --- p.162 / Distinction and Class Analysis --- p.172 / Conclusion --- p.175 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Conclusion: The Significance of Yoga as Distinction in Hong Kong Limitation --- p.178 / Summary of Chapters --- p.179 / Leisure and Discipline in Hong Kong --- p.181 / Globalization and Yoga in Hong Kong --- p.182 / Capital Transference in the Capitalist Society --- p.183 / "Yoga, Class，and Status Evolution" --- p.184 / Reflections from the Failure of the Hong Kong Yoga Journal --- p.186 / "A New ""Yogic"" Hong Kong?" --- p.187 / Bibliographies --- p.191 / Appendix --- p.198

Levando em conta as possibilidades de abordagem do pensamento de Bergson a partir de Matière et Mémoire - Essai sur la relation du corps à l´esprit, nos propomos, ao percorrer a análise da percepção e de suas conseqüências metafísicas, a tratar da relação entre o método bergsoniano e a ontologia dele resultante, o que implica uma crítica aos pressupostos do intelectualismo e, nesse sentido, uma nova concepção de Ser e de conhecimento. / Considering the possibilities of approache of Bergson\'s philosophy from Matière et Mémoire - Essai sur la Relation du Corp à L\'esprit, we intend to treat of the relation between his method and the onthology that arises from it, as we peruse his analysis of perception and it\'s metaphysical consequences. That implies a certain critic of the presuppositions of the intellectualism and, in this sense, a new conception, of Being and knowledge.

In the always connected and fast-paced modern world we live in, questions about who we are, what our values are, and how to act are more pertinent than ever. What better way to reconcile these questions than turning to a seemingly out of touch 19th century German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche? Interestingly enough, Nietzsche lamented that his contemporaries would never understand his work; similarly, he thought of his own work as directed towards ‘philosophers of the future.’ As any present moment passes and as history progresses, we, in a sense, run away from ourselves. This projecting of oneself into the future is unavoidable. Could one ever strictly pin down oneself in such a way to eliminate this problem of time? Of course not! This is an absurd question. What we should really be asking is can we at least exist in a way that is at one with the movement of time and the immediacy of modern technology? The purpose of this paper is to illuminate what would be involved in the task of figuring out how to authentically be-alongside-oneself in this way, qua Nietzsche. However, once we, if successful, are able to achieve a mode of being-alongside- ourselves, it is fruitless, in a sense; we are always being thrown into the future and are therefore no longer alongside-ourselves as such. This is why we shall pivot at the end of this paper in order to suggest how it is possible to orient our being- thrown-into-the-future in the most useful and timely way.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore a thought-provoking consequence of the functionalist theory of mind. Given the current organizational structure of Earth and field theories of consciousness in neuroscience, Earth is probably conscious. The argument is explored through an examination of the current organizational structure of Earth and field theories of consciousness in neuroscience, which leads to the conclusion that Earth is conscious. Various theories of mind have been proposed by neuroscientists and philosophers alike in an attempt to qualify what consciousness is and what provides the basis for consciousness to occur. Support, in the form of data and information, for this thesis was found through reviews of philosophic and neuroscientific literature. Using a functionalist argument and field theories of consciousness, I argue for the possibility of Earth’s consciousness due to its organization. Based on the likelihood of human consciousness being spatially distributed, I illustrate how Earth’s organization is sufficiently similar. However, there is controversy surrounding functionalist theories of mind. This is detailed with Ned Block’s (1978) objection to functionalism, the Chinese Nation thought experiment. I place this objection in conversation with Paul and Patricia Churchland’s (1981) work on inverted qualia, absent qualia, and the method to identify systems with and without qualia. A further objection to my conclusion is explored with Kammerer’s (2015) Sophisticated Anti-Nesting Principle is addressed. Finally, this thesis draws some inspiration from Eric Schwitzgebel’s (2014) paper “If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious,” but the conclusion is projected to a larger scale, resulting in implications for morality, politics, and theories of mind.

A mental model of the another person’s state of mind including their thoughts, feelings, and beliefs, otherwise known as Theory of Mind (ToM), can be created to better predict their behavior and optimize our own decisions. These representations can be explicitly modeled during both the development and presence of stable cooperation via communication outcomes, allowing us to understand the sophistication or depth of mental coordination, involved in an individual’s social perception and reasoning. Almost all current scientific studies of ToM take a spectatorial approach, relying on observation followed by evaluation (e.g., the Sally-Anne Task). However given evidence that social cognition fundamentally shifts during valuationally significant social encounters with others, this study adopts a second-person approach. Each participant’s actions under dynamic uncertainty influence the joint reward probabilities of both, favoring cooperation and coordination. Only Teachers have knowledge of the correct action-reward contingencies, while Learners must ascertain the Teacher’s directive and correctly adjust their actions to obtain the optimal reward. The complexity of cooperative behaviors cannot be captured with simple reinforcement learning models, however a similarity in valuation exists, probing further investigation.

There is no consensus on the relationship between working memory resources and mind wandering. The purpose of the current study is to investigate whether mind wandering requires working memory resources to be sustained. The resource-demanding view is that mind wandering requires working memory resources to sustain an internal train of thought (Smallwood, 2010). The resource-free view is that mind wandering is a result of executive control failures and this internal train of thought proceeds in a resource-free manner (McVay & Kane, 2010). Participants were presented with thought probes while they performed a Simon task in single and dual task conditions. From the resource-demanding view, individuals with high WMC should experience more Task unrelated thought (TUT) in single and dual task conditions compared to those with low WMC. From the resource-free view, individuals with high WMC should experience fewer TUT compared to low WMC individuals. Results indicated that, WML eliminated the Simon effect for high WMC and reduced it for low WMC group. Mind wandering was decreased in dual task conditions however there was no effect of working memory capacity on mind wandering. Also, mind wandering correlated with task performance measures for the low WMC but not high WMC group. The results of the current study do not provide strong support for either a resource-demanding or resource-free view and are discussed in terms of a context dependent relationship between WMC and mind wandering

Defenders of the Knowledge Argument contend that physicalism is false because knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient to know all the truths about the world. In particular, proponents of the Knowledge Argument claim that physicalism is false because the truths about the character of conscious experience are not knowable from the complete set of physical truths. This dissertation is a defense of the Knowledge Argument. Chapter one characterizes what physicalism is and provides support for the claim that if knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient to know all the truths about the world, then physicalism is false. In chapter two, I defend the claim that knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient for knowing all the truths about the world. In addition to mounting a prima facie case for the knowledge intuition, I present and defend an epistemology grounded in direct acquaintance to provide a more substantive argument to accept it. Chapters three through five address the physicalist objections to the Knowledge Argument. The first set of objections advocates that knowing all the physical truths is, in fact, sufficient for knowing all the truths about the world. The next set of objections admits that there is some sense in which knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient for knowing all the truths about the world. However, these objections maintain that the kind of knowledge that is absent from the complete set of physical truths is know-how or knowledge by acquaintance, and not factual or propositional knowledge. The final set of objections maintain that the kind of propositional knowledge that is left out of the complete set of physical truths is compatible with physicalism. My response to these objections is part of advancing my prima facie case for the Knowledge Argument. The final chapter addresses a structural question that pertains to the Knowledge Argument. Some philosophers have maintained that the structure of the Knowledge Argument invites a kind of self-refutation of any systematic account of reality. The concern is that the Knowledge Argument proves too much, and that the dualist who uses the argument to refute physicalism risks the argument defeating his own position. I will argue that the Knowledge Argument does not refute dualism.