Most Artificial Intelligence (AI) work can be characterized as either ``high-level'' (e.g., logical, symbolic) or ``low-level'' (e.g., connectionist networks, behavior-based robotics). Each approach suffers from particular drawbacks. High-level AI uses abstractions that often have no relation to the way real, biological brains work. Low-level AI, on the other hand, tends to lack the powerful abstractions that are needed to express complex structures and relationships. I have tried to combine the best features of both approaches, by building a set of programming abstractions defined in terms of simple, biologically plausible components. At the ``ground level'', I define a primitive, perceptron-like computational unit. I then show how more abstract computational units may be implemented in terms of the primitive units, and show the utility of the abstract units in sample networks. The new units make it possible to build networks using concepts such as long-term memories, short-term memories, and frames. As a demonstration of these abstractions, I have implemented a simulator for ``creatures'' controlled by a network of abstract units. The creatures exist in a simple 2D world, and exhibit behaviors such as catching mobile prey and sorting colored blocks into matching boxes. This program demonstrates that it is possible to build systems that can interact effectively with a dynamic physical environment, yet use symbolic representations to control aspects of their behavior.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2006. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (February 28, 2007) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Bakgrund Forskning har visat att personer med autism har svårigheter med "theory of mind", förmågan att sätta sig in i andra personers tankar och känslor. Det leder till en annorlunda förståelse av sociala sammanhang. Tankestilen påverkar samspelet med pedagoger och kräver ett anpassat bemötande. Metod Sju halvstrukturerade intervjuer med pedagoger som arbetar i särskolan och undervisar elever med autism. Flertalet pedagoger undervisar i grundsärskolan. Deltagarna uppmuntrades bland annat att beskriva elever med utmanande beteende och berätta om vad de anser är ett bra bemötande. Intervjuerna kretsade mycket kring olika former av kravsituationer.Resultat Pedagogerna anpassar bemötande och undervisning på en rad sätt för att passa elever med svag "theory of mind". Framför allt anpassas kommunikationen på ett genomtänkt sätt. Pedagogerna skiljer sig i hur de bemöter elever i kravsituationer. Flera pedagoger förespråkar ett bemötande som inte utgår från pedagogens eget sätt att tänka. Studien visar hur pedagogerna trots den utgångspunkten återgår till att förstå utmanande beteende som medvetet och provokativt.Diskussion Studien diskuterar möjliga samband mellan den pedagogiska miljön och hur pedagoger beskriver och tolkar utmanande beteende. Idén att ostrukturerade och/eller stränga miljöer hänger ihop med en förståelse av eleverna som medvetet "testande" och manipulerande förs fram. Studien utmynnar i ett förslag på ny definition av utmanande beteende, som bygger på omgivningens svårighet att förstå och tolka beteendet.

In this thesis I consider the problem of the distinctiveness of knowledge of our own mental states and attitudes. I consider four influential approaches to this problem: the epistemic approach, the "no reasons view," the neo-expressivist approach and the rational agency approach. I argue that all of them face serious problems. I further argue that many of these problems are connected with the lack of fine-grained enough classification of the entities with respect to which we have self-knowledge. I suggest such a classification, distinguishing passive occurrent mental states, mental actions and standing attitudes, and argue that we should treat each of these categories separately for the purpose of explaining self-knowledge of them. I discuss in detail self-knowledge we have with respect to two of these categories: standing attitudes and mental actions. On my account self-knowledge of standing attitudes stands in a derivative relation to self-knowledge of other kinds. In my discussion of self-knowledge of mental actions I establish that we have a distinctive non-observational kind of self-knowledge and show some specific characteristics of this kind of self-knowledge. In the end I attempt to relate self-knowledge of mental actions to practical knowledge in the ordinary sense of skill.

The purpose of this paper is to exam the philosophical development of Emanuel Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence and to note some of the more important parallels between Swedenborg's doctrine and the three contemporary most debated theories concerning the mind-body problem. These three theories was pre-established harmony, its opponent physical influx and finally occasionalism. Especially occasionalism has close connections to Descartes' dualism, but neither pre-established harmony or physical influxus, which in some ways can be dated before Descartes, would have looked the same, if it were not for the Cartesian way of thinking. Also Swedenborg initially inherited major influences from Descartes and that is the first approach in this paper. From there on the paper follows the development of the doctrine of correspondence and the parallels according Swedenborg's more contemporary philosophical writers, until Swedenborg gets to a point where he underwent a profound spiritual crisis and turned his focus on an all together theological approach.

When evaluating a situation that results in harm, it is critical to consider how a person’s prior intention may have been causally responsible for the action that resulted in the harmful outcome. This thesis examined children’s developing understanding of intentional causation in reasoning about harmful outcomes, and the relation between this understanding and mental-state reasoning. Four-, 6-, and 8-year-old children, and adults, were told eight stories in which characters’ actions resulted in harmful outcomes. Story types differed in how the actions that resulted in harm were causally linked to their prior intentions such that: (1) characters wanted to, intended to, and did perform a harmful act; (2) they wanted and intended to perform a harmful act, but instead, accidentally brought about the harmful outcome; (3) they wanted and intended to perform a harmful act, then changed their mind, but accidentally brought about the harmful outcome; (4) they did not want or intend to harm, but accidentally brought about a harmful outcome. Participants were asked to judge the characters’ intentions, make punishment judgments, and justify their responses. Additionally, children were given first- and second-order false-belief tasks, commonly used to assess mental-state reasoning. The results indicated that intention judgment accuracy improved with age. However, all age groups had difficulty evaluating the intention in the deviant causal chain scenario (Searle, 1983), in which the causal link between intention and action was broken but a harmful intention was maintained. Further, the results showed a developmental pattern in children’s punishment judgments based on their understanding of intentional causation, although the adults’ performance did not follow the same pattern. Also, younger children referred to the characters’ intentions less frequently in their justifications of their punishment judgments. The results also revealed a relation between belief-state reasoning and intentional-causation reasoning in scenarios that did not involve, or no longer involved, an intention to harm. Further, reasoning about intentional causation was related to higher-level understanding of mental states. The implications of these findings in clarifying and adding to previous research on the development of understanding of intentional causation and intentions in moral reasoning are discussed.

This thesis explores assumptions regarding the nature of the Self as it relates to the World. The exploration, a hermeneutic investigation initially shaped by the authors interest in the role of the unconscious in thinking, develops through the emergence of questions which move from the role of the unconscious to the conceptualization of self and reality and finally to the role of language. To answer these questions, the author examines ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of the Self and the World by analyzing various boundaries, imposed both (a) as spatial metaphors used to speak of subjective experiences and (b) as notions of locality grounded in the classical physics world view. The assumptions of a locally-grounded, boundaried subject create separations between Self, mind, body and the World, and thus are worthy of exploration. Instead of setting out to provide a definitive answer to pre-set questions, the thesis chronicles the evolution of the authors questions and answers produced through her examination of various texts on metaphor, philosophy of mind, and consciousness studies. Thus, the thesis is written as the authors search to understand how it is possible to move beyond locally grounded boundaried subjects towards a form of knowing that considers simultaneously the distinctiveness of Self, and the unity of Self with the whole of what is. The metaphor of tracking emphasizes the importance of possessing attentiveness to the specific while not losing sight of the larger context or whole. Ultimately, the author suggests an attitude of speculative tentativeness constantly on the verge of reconfiguring the whole The thesis is presented in multiple formats including essay, multi-voiced essay, poetry, dialogue, and story. These formats capture the continuous interplay of various faces of knowing presented as forms of perception, unconscious appreciation, and conceptualization. In this way, the overall format of the thesis reflects the content of the thesis where the author portrays her experience of tracking how her living interactions in the world are forms of awareness uninhibited by boundaries. In her conclusion, the author recognizes her experience as a form of direct realism in which human knowing is symbolic of the emergent nature of reality.

This thesis examines the effects of linguistic input on the development of children’s epistemic concepts. It draws upon two fundamental questions in the field of cognitive development: (a) whether distinctions between automatic and controlled forms of cognitive processing are indicative of underlying conceptual differences, and (b) whether language is critical to the process of concept development. To establish the background of the current research, a summary of how these theoretical questions have been addressed in other fields of cognitive psychology is first provided (Chapter 1). These questions are then re- examined within the specific domain of epistemic concept development (Chapter 2). Changes in false-belief processing that occur between infancy and the early preschool years are discussed in relation to two competing theories of false-belief development. A framework to explain how language promotes children’s transition between automatic and controlled forms of processing is then provided. It is suggested that language facilitates change by both reducing the cognitive demands associated with controlled response tasks as well as assisting with the formation of robust epistemic representations. An empirical study that was designed to examine the effects of epistemic language (i.e., verbs and syntax) on children’s automatic and controlled processing of belief is then described (Chapters 3 to 5). Eighty-four children (Mage = 3;5 years), who initially failed elicited measures of false-belief, were trained with visual contexts of true- and false-belief. The critical manipulation across three conditions was the linguistic input presented in conjunction with these contexts. Children heard narrations that contained either (a) the description of an agent’s actions without an epistemic verb, (b) a familiar epistemic verb (thinks) across both contexts, or (c) the familiar epistemic verb in contexts of true-belief and a novel epistemic verb (gorps) in contexts of false-belief. Results demonstrated a significant advantage for children who were trained with epistemic verbs on spontaneous measures of false-belief (i.e., anticipatory gaze). Significant effects of epistemic verb exposure were also demonstrated in novel contexts of belief induction. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to theories that make distinct predictions about the role of language in epistemic concept development (Chapter 6).

Previous research on mind wandering has used subjective verbal reports as a means to acquire the frequency and rate of its occurrence. I proposed the use of eye movements as an objective measure of mind wandering while participants attempted a reading task. Participants were placed in a self-classified probe-caught mind wandering paradigm while their eye movements were recorded. They were randomly probed every 2-3 minutes and were required to indicate whether their mind had been wandering before they were allowed to continue reading. The overall pattern showed that eye movement behaviour was slower and less frequent when participants reported mind wandering episodes, with duration and frequency of within-word regressions reaching levels of statistical significance. It may be that the cognitive processes that normally guide eye movements during reading exert less control during mind wandering episodes. Other implications and limitations are discussed.