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The purpose of this paper is to exam the philosophical development of Emanuel Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence and to note some of the more important parallels between Swedenborg's doctrine and the three contemporary most debated theories concerning the mind-body problem. These three theories was pre-established harmony, its opponent physical influx and finally occasionalism. Especially occasionalism has close connections to Descartes' dualism, but neither pre-established harmony or physical influxus, which in some ways can be dated before Descartes, would have looked the same, if it were not for the Cartesian way of thinking. Also Swedenborg initially inherited major influences from Descartes and that is the first approach in this paper. From there on the paper follows the development of the doctrine of correspondence and the parallels according Swedenborg's more contemporary philosophical writers, until Swedenborg gets to a point where he underwent a profound spiritual crisis and turned his focus on an all together theological approach.

<p> </p><p> </p><p>The purpose of this paper is to exam the philosophical development of Emanuel Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence and to note some of the more important parallels between Swedenborg's doctrine and the three contemporary most debated theories concerning the mind-body problem. These three theories was pre-established harmony, its opponent physical influx and finally occasionalism. Especially occasionalism has close connections to Descartes' dualism, but neither pre-established harmony or physical influxus, which in some ways can be dated before Descartes, would have looked the same, if it were not for the Cartesian way of thinking. Also Swedenborg initially inherited major influences from Descartes and that is the first approach in this paper. From there on the paper follows the development of the doctrine of correspondence and the parallels according Swedenborg's more contemporary philosophical writers, until Swedenborg gets to a point where he underwent a profound spiritual crisis and turned his focus on an all together theological approach.</p><p> </p>

Thesis advisor: Ronald K. Tacelli / Aquinas’ hylomorphism faces a mind–body problem, similar to that faced by Cartesianism. This claim runs contrary to virtually all contemporary Thomism, according to which Aquinas’ view on the relation between soul and body completely sidesteps any mind–body problem, by having a conceptual frame that is non-mechanistic and non-Cartesian, and by emphasizing the oneness of the human being. Typically, these arguments for Thomas’ hylomorphism omit his view that the human soul is not only the substantial form of the body, but also an efficient cause of bodily motion. In this dissertation, I argue that the human soul’s role as efficient cause is integral to Aquinas’ philosophy of nature and his ethics, so that it should not be omitted by Thomists, and that it cannot be denied without undermining Thomism fatally. Because Thomism must treat the human soul as an efficient cause, it does face a mind–body problem, however. Aquinas, I argue, was aware that his psychology raises such a difficulty, and provides some possible solutions to it, grounded on his doctrine of instrumental causality. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Dans la posture émergentiste classique et sa réinterprétation par les premières sciences cognitives, la notion d'émergence ne fait que traduire un consensus anti-réductionniste et n'a aucune véritable pertinence explicative. Pourtant aujourd'hui, les systèmes multi-agents en informatique et la théorie des systèmes dynamiques non linéaires en physique et en biologie, permettent d'ouvrir la «boîte noire» de l'émergence.Il devient possible de définir l'émergence non plus comme la survenance magique de propriétés ontologiquement irréductibles, mais comme la bifurcation dynamique d'un système vers une organisation macroscopique robuste computationnellement et fonctionnellement irréductible, c'est-à-dire non interprétable en termes des propriétés micro-causales du niveau de base. Les propriétés émergentes n'existent qu'en tant qu'elles sont fonctionnelles pour un détecteur de haut niveau.Si des systèmes physiques peuvent instancier des propriétés fonctionnellement irréductibles et relatives à un certain niveau de détection, alors l'irréductibilité fonctionnelle n'est par un argument contre le physicalisme, etil n'est plus possible d'affirmer qu'une propriété n'est pas fonctionnelle simplement parce que l'on ne parvient pas à la fonctionnaliser, puisque son impossible fonctionnalisation peut signifier que l'on ne se situe pas au bonniveau de détection. L'irréductibilité fonctionnelle des propriétés phénoménales ne serait donc pas un argument suffisant pour les exclure du domaine physique. La notion d'émergence ne permet pas de résoudre le problème corps-esprit, mais elle permet d'envisager qu'un tel « problème difficile » puisse survenir dans cadrephysicaliste. / In the classical emergentist position and its re-interpretation within the early cognitive sciences, the notion of emergence transposes only an anti-reductionist consensus and does not contain any pertinent explicative value. Yet today, as a consequence of the multi-agent systems in informatics along with dynamic non-linear theories in both physics and biology, the formerly dubious notion of emergence has become a relevant and informative concept.Emergence was defined as magic supervenience of ontologically irreducible properties. Today in contrast, one views the notion of emergence in terms of dynamic bifurcations to a robust macroscopic organization computationally and functionally irreducible, that is to say it can not be analyzed in terms of their micro-causal components. Emergent properties exist if and only if they are functional for a higher level of detection.This means that functional irreducibility is not an argument against physicalism, nor is it possible to state that a certain property is not functional simply because we are unable to give it a functional interpretation, for itmight signify that one is not situated within the correct level for its detection. The functional irreducibility of some phenomenal properties will not therefor be a sufficient argument to exclude them from the physical realm. The notion of emergence does not resolve the mind-body problem but it does permit considering that such a problem can occur within the physical world.

Thesis advisor: Marilee Ogren / The suggestion of a mind-brain duality that emerges out of Descartes’ cogito argument is assessed in the context of twenty-first century neuroscience. The Cartesian texts are explored in order to qualify the extent to which the cogito necessitates such dualism and the functions that Descartes attributes to a non-corporeal soul are precisely defined. The relationship between the mind and brain is explored in the context of a number neuroscientific phenomena, including sensory perception, blindsight, amusia, phantom limb syndrome, frontal lobe lesions, and the neurodevelopmental disorder Williams syndrome, with an attempt to illuminate the physiological basis for each. Juxtaposing the two perspectives, the author concludes that Descartes hypothesis of a disembodied soul is no longer necessary and that a purely physiological understanding of the human mind is now possible, and that there is an underlying affinity between this assertion and Descartes theory of mind. / Thesis (BS) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Psychology.

One common element of Kripke’s and Chalmers’ reactions to physicalist theories of mind is their reliance upon the intuition that concepts about conscious experiences are essentially identified by the “immediate phenomenal quality” of the conscious experience, how the experience feels from the subjective point of view. I examine how Kripke’s and Chalmers’ critiques require that concepts about conscious experiences be identified by their subjective feel and then move on to provide some ways in which this intuition about concepts of conscious experience could be wrong. Specifically, the intuition is not consistent with our intuitions about unusual cases reported by pain researchers and does not take such cases to be genuine cases of pain. These inconsistencies weaken the intuition, making it problematic for any critique of identity theory or physicalism to rely heavily upon it.

In this dissertation, I argue for the philosophical consistency of Aquinas’ hybrid view of human souls - that is, the idea that human souls, and only human souls, are at once substantial forms and subsistent things. I contend that the best way to understand the ontological status of human souls according to Aquinas is by means of the concept of ‘subsistent parts’. Since Aquinas characterizes souls as parts of substances, I propose a mereological analysis of the different types of part in Aquinas, and I conclude that souls should be seen as metaphysical parts of substances. An influential contemporary view holds that Aquinas’ doctrine is inconsistent on the grounds that nothing could be an abstract (form) and a concrete (subsistent) at the same time. I respond to this view by denying the widespread notion that substantial forms are purely abstract entities. I hold that the best way to make sense of Aquinas’ twofold approach to human souls is by saying that substantial forms possess an element of concreteness which is accounted for by the fundamental relationship between form and being. Finally, I address the question of taxonomy: how can we classify Aquinas’ view of the soul-body relation in light of the concepts that are currently used in philosophy of mind. I argue that the notion of a subsistent part entails the concept of ‘part-dualism’, which I present as standing midway between substance-dualism and nonreductive materialism, and also as being ontologically richer than property-dualism. I conclude this dissertation with a refutation of the idea championed by some prominent scholars that the existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of the person.

Contemporary philosopher, Joseph Levine, has argued that human phenomenological experience cannot be explained solely through the resources of neuroscience, and that a significant ‘explanatory gap’ exists between the rich features of human experience and scientific explanations of the mind. This thesis examines Guiseppina D’Oro’s novel suggestion that the gap exists, but that it is a semantic rather than an empirical problem. D’Oro argues that the ‘gap’ is a persistent philosophical problem because of its semantic nature, and that advances in neuroscience will fail to resolve the gap because its source is a conceptual distinction that is not marked by empirical difference. In the thesis I will discuss some virtues and difficulties with D’Oro’s thesis, and the implications her claim has more broadly for philosophers of mind. / Graduate / 0422

Bergson's Matter and Memory presents original conception of perception which is developed on the grounds of dualistic ontology. So, Bergson's solution to mind-body problem is not an attempt to explain it as an isolated phenomenon, it is rather ambitious project which puts perception into world where the order of perception and the order of mathematical science coexist. In this dissertation, I will try to determine methods which govern solutions to problems of Matter and Memory. I will also deal with Time and Free Will in outline.