Minority government is defined by the relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government in parliamentary democracies; it means single-party cabinet or coalition cabinet, which are not supported by a parliamentary majority in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential countries. For instance, in Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian won the Presidential Election in 2000, but he just garnered 39.3¢Mof the popular vote, so he was a minority president. After election, the president Chen Shui-bian appointed Chang Chun-hsiung as Premier (Executive Yuan); therefore, ¡§Chen Shui-bian government¡¨ indeed was a minority government. Because the ¡§regime turnover¡¨ happened in Taiwan is the first time, as a ruling party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) didn¡¦t deal with very well in cabinet portfolios, policy concession or policy implementation. On the other hand, the political disturbance has been existed in the executive-legislative relations since 2000. Under this context, to understand why minority governments form and how they operate become an important issue. As we noted, there is not rich literature on minority governments, so this is why the study focus on initially exploring minority government. This essay includes two research subjects: The first point is to analyze theory of minority government. By following the documents of the scholars¡¦ comparison and research, I try to explain why a minority government form from the part of the institution and strategy; I also introduce the operation and performance of minority government briefly. The second point is to do the studies of cases of minority government and performance in Norway and Fourth Republic France: From the two empirical cases, I expect to find a suitable solution for the constitutional deadlock at present in Taiwan.

Le 18 mars 2000, Chen Shui-bian, représentant le Parti Démocrate-Progressiste (Minjindang) succédait à Lee Teng-hui, appartenant au Parti Nationaliste (Kuomintang), premier président élu au suffrage universel à Taïwan. Cependant, le Yuan législatif a connu à partir des années 2000, et jusqu'au terme du second mandat de Chen Shui-bian en 2008, de nombreux blocages, résultant du fait que le KMT et ses alliés du camp pan-bleu aient réussi à conserver à toutes les élections législatives le contrôle du parlement. Le point de départ de notre thèse est de comprendre comment ces blocages sont advenus, et la manière dont les différentes branches du gouvernement et du parlement ont négocié en vue de les résoudre. A ce titre, nous nous intéressons en particulier au rôle des Grands Juges du Yuan judiciaire (Sifa yuan Dafaguan) dans la résolution de ces différends institutionnels. Nous nous demandons si ces derniers ont été un recours dont les différentes branches se sont servies pour résoudre ces différends ou bien sont-ils restés en retrait, préférant ne pas s'impliquer dans les problèmes politiques ? Les Grands Juges ont eu pour constante l'affirmation de leur indépendance en tant que cour constitutionnelle. Plutôt que de trancher les litiges, ils ont préféré les recours aux solutions négociées entre les acteurs, donnant un cadre aux institutions pour résoudre les conflits. En matière de libertés fondamentales et de droits de l'Homme, les Grands Juges ont statué en faveur de la garantie ou de l'extension des droits déjà inscrits dans la Constitution de 1947. Cette institution agit ainsi dans la continuité de son rôle historique dans la transition démocratique. / On March 18th, 2000, Chen Shui-bian, representing the Democratic-Progressive Party (Minjindang), succeeded Lee Teng-hui, member of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and first Taiwan president elected by popular vote. However, starting in 2000, and until the end of Chen Shui-bian's second term in 2008, a number of political standoffs occurred in the Legislative Yuan, as a result of the KMT and its allies of the so-called pan-blue camp securing control of the parliament's majority in every legislative election. Our thesis aims to understand how these deadlocks happened, and the way in which each branch of the government negotiated to find agreements. We particularly focus on the role played by the Great Justices of the Judicial Yuan (Sifayuan Dafaguan). Were the Great Justices called upon by the different branches of the government to end the stalemates, or did they stay away from political matters? The Great Justices have consistently asserted their independence as a constitutional court. Instead of deciding in favour of one party or another, they have privileged procedural solutions, providing thus an institutional framework for conflict resolution. In matters of civic liberties and human rights, the Great Justices have ruled in favour of protecting and extending the rights already enshrined in the 1947 Constitution. The Great Justices therefore appear more as defenders of rights, i.e. ombudsmen, rather than as a constitutional mechanism to work disputes out. This institution thus acts in keeping with its historical role during the democratic transition.

Le 18 mars 2000, Chen Shui-bian, représentant le Parti Démocrate-Progressiste (Minjindang) succédait à Lee Teng-hui, appartenant au Parti Nationaliste (Kuomintang), premier président élu au suffrage universel à Taïwan. Cependant, le Yuan législatif a connu à partir des années 2000, et jusqu'au terme du second mandat de Chen Shui-bian en 2008, de nombreux blocages, résultant du fait que le KMT et ses alliés du camp pan-bleu aient réussi à conserver à toutes les élections législatives le contrôle du parlement. Le point de départ de notre thèse est de comprendre comment ces blocages sont advenus, et la manière dont les différentes branches du gouvernement et du parlement ont négocié en vue de les résoudre. A ce titre, nous nous intéressons en particulier au rôle des Grands Juges du Yuan judiciaire (Sifa yuan Dafaguan) dans la résolution de ces différends institutionnels. Nous nous demandons si ces derniers ont été un recours dont les différentes branches se sont servies pour résoudre ces différends ou bien sont-ils restés en retrait, préférant ne pas s'impliquer dans les problèmes politiques ? Les Grands Juges ont eu pour constante l'affirmation de leur indépendance en tant que cour constitutionnelle. Plutôt que de trancher les litiges, ils ont préféré les recours aux solutions négociées entre les acteurs, donnant un cadre aux institutions pour résoudre les conflits. En matière de libertés fondamentales et de droits de l'Homme, les Grands Juges ont statué en faveur de la garantie ou de l'extension des droits déjà inscrits dans la Constitution de 1947. Cette institution agit ainsi dans la continuité de son rôle historique dans la transition démocratique. / On March 18th, 2000, Chen Shui-bian, representing the Democratic-Progressive Party (Minjindang), succeeded Lee Teng-hui, member of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and first Taiwan president elected by popular vote. However, starting in 2000, and until the end of Chen Shui-bian's second term in 2008, a number of political standoffs occurred in the Legislative Yuan, as a result of the KMT and its allies of the so-called pan-blue camp securing control of the parliament's majority in every legislative election. Our thesis aims to understand how these deadlocks happened, and the way in which each branch of the government negotiated to find agreements. We particularly focus on the role played by the Great Justices of the Judicial Yuan (Sifayuan Dafaguan). Were the Great Justices called upon by the different branches of the government to end the stalemates, or did they stay away from political matters? The Great Justices have consistently asserted their independence as a constitutional court. Instead of deciding in favour of one party or another, they have privileged procedural solutions, providing thus an institutional framework for conflict resolution. In matters of civic liberties and human rights, the Great Justices have ruled in favour of protecting and extending the rights already enshrined in the 1947 Constitution. The Great Justices therefore appear more as defenders of rights, i.e. ombudsmen, rather than as a constitutional mechanism to work disputes out. This institution thus acts in keeping with its historical role during the democratic transition.

In this paper, the ¡§divided government¡¨ is defined as a situation in which the president and the parliament are controlled by different parties respectively. The formation of a ¡§divided government¡¨ depends on whether the president is able to control an absolutely majority of seats in the parliament through election or not. Some literature think that a divided government is easy to lead to policy gridlock or inefficiency and even causes stalemate in the legislative and executive branches. However, many scholars feel that a divided government may lead to policy gridlock or inefficiency, but it is in agreement with the principle of checks and balances in the constitutional system and is able to meet the expectation of majority voters. The eras of the Third and Fourth Republic in France had the same political situation as today¡¦s Taiwan, i.e., deadlock legislation, impeded policy implementation, unsteady political situation, and frequent changes of premiers. During the period of the Fifth Republic, the political situation became steady gradually after France went through three times of ¡§La Cohabitation¡¨ commencing from 1986. It formed a ¡§constitutional convention¡¨ and set a good model for constitutional governments in the world. The constitutional system of Taiwan has been similar to the ¡§semi-presidential system¡¨ of France during the era of the Fifth Republic since the constitution of the Republic of China was amended in 1997.However, in the opinion of Chen Shui-bian, he thought a president is elected by the people directly, and the prime premier may be nominated by the president directly without the consent of the President of Legislative Yuan, so the constitutional system of Taiwan should be ¡§presidential system¡¨ instead of the ¡§semi-presidential system.¡¨ Therefore, after Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000, he ignored the fact that Kuomingtan held a majority seats in the parliament, which constituted a ¡§divided government¡¨, and refused to hand over the right of forming a cabinet to Kuomingtan, the majority party in the parliamen, or endow the power to a majority alliance.Consequently, the regime changed from a ¡§government for all people¡¨ led by Chen Shui-bian and Tang Fei to a ¡§minority government¡¨ controlled by Chen Shui-bian and Su Chen-chang in the past 6 years. Till now, there have been five presidents of Executive Yuan changed.Owning to the long-term conflict and stalemate between the executive and legislative branches, the politics of Taiwan is in a state of chaos, leading to today¡¦s constitutional crisis. In view of the situations mentioned above, this article investigates into the system factors contributing to the formation of ¡§divided government¡¨ in Taiwan and the political operation and political influences of individual actors from the viewpoint of historical institutionalism. Also, the in-depth researches and studies were conducted to find out the reasons why the political situation of Taiwan became unsteady and the country fell into the constitutional crisis in the past 6 years after President Chen Shui-bian held the reins of government and discuss how to solve those problems. The author also compared and analyzed the ¡§minority government¡¨ of Taiwan, the alternating mechanism of the ¡§La Cohabitation¡¨ in France, and the formation of ¡§coalition cabinet¡¨ in order to draw lessons from their experiences and establish a good interaction among the president, the cabinet and the parliament.

Le 18 mars 2000, Chen Shui-bian, représentant le Parti Démocrate-Progressiste (Minjindang) succédait à Lee Teng-hui, appartenant au Parti Nationaliste (Kuomintang), premier président élu au suffrage universel à Taïwan. Cependant, le Yuan législatif a connu à partir des années 2000, et jusqu'au terme du second mandat de Chen Shui-bian en 2008, de nombreux blocages, résultant du fait que le KMT et ses alliés du camp pan-bleu aient réussi à conserver à toutes les élections législatives le contrôle du parlement. Le point de départ de notre thèse est de comprendre comment ces blocages sont advenus, et la manière dont les différentes branches du gouvernement et du parlement ont négocié en vue de les résoudre. A ce titre, nous nous intéressons en particulier au rôle des Grands Juges du Yuan judiciaire (Sifa yuan Dafaguan) dans la résolution de ces différends institutionnels. Nous nous demandons si ces derniers ont été un recours dont les différentes branches se sont servies pour résoudre ces différends ou bien sont-ils restés en retrait, préférant ne pas s'impliquer dans les problèmes politiques ? Les Grands Juges ont eu pour constante l'affirmation de leur indépendance en tant que cour constitutionnelle. Plutôt que de trancher les litiges, ils ont préféré les recours aux solutions négociées entre les acteurs, donnant un cadre aux institutions pour résoudre les conflits. En matière de libertés fondamentales et de droits de l'Homme, les Grands Juges ont statué en faveur de la garantie ou de l'extension des droits déjà inscrits dans la Constitution de 1947. Cette institution agit ainsi dans la continuité de son rôle historique dans la transition démocratique. / On March 18th, 2000, Chen Shui-bian, representing the Democratic-Progressive Party (Minjindang), succeeded Lee Teng-hui, member of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and first Taiwan president elected by popular vote. However, starting in 2000, and until the end of Chen Shui-bian's second term in 2008, a number of political standoffs occurred in the Legislative Yuan, as a result of the KMT and its allies of the so-called pan-blue camp securing control of the parliament's majority in every legislative election. Our thesis aims to understand how these deadlocks happened, and the way in which each branch of the government negotiated to find agreements. We particularly focus on the role played by the Great Justices of the Judicial Yuan (Sifayuan Dafaguan). Were the Great Justices called upon by the different branches of the government to end the stalemates, or did they stay away from political matters? The Great Justices have consistently asserted their independence as a constitutional court. Instead of deciding in favour of one party or another, they have privileged procedural solutions, providing thus an institutional framework for conflict resolution. In matters of civic liberties and human rights, the Great Justices have ruled in favour of protecting and extending the rights already enshrined in the 1947 Constitution. The Great Justices therefore appear more as defenders of rights, i.e. ombudsmen, rather than as a constitutional mechanism to work disputes out. This institution thus acts in keeping with its historical role during the democratic transition.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo discutir a viabilidade de governos minoritários no presidencialismo brasileiro. Seu objeto de estudo é a formação do governo Collor, momento em que se compôs um gabinete minoritário, e hipótese aqui advogada é a de que o presidente agiu racionalmente ao realizar a opção minoritária. Essa noção é contra-intuitiva porque vai de encontro à tradicional concepção de presidencialismo de coalizão que informa a literatura política nacional. Todavia, uma breve apreciação do estado-da-arte sobre o sistema político brasileiro evidencia uma dinâmica específica das relações Executivo-Legislativo que não impede a existência e viabilidade de governos minoritários. A partir dessa percepção, constrói-se um modelo analítico cujas variáveis nos permitem desvendar o cálculo presidencial que levou Fernando Collor de Mello a constituir seu governo com ministérios apartidários. Por fim, retomam-se as relações entre aquele governo e o PMDB, na votação do Plano Collor, para demonstrar que governos sem base nominal majoritária conseguem lograr êxito parlamentar, dada a conjuntura anteriormente exposta. / This paper aims at discussing the survival of minority governments under Brazilian presidentialism, with its focus on the formation of the Collor government, when a minority cabinet was assembled. The hypothesis put forth in this study is that the president acted rationally in picking the minority option, however counter-intuitive it might seem, given that it is not supported by the traditional concept of coalition presidentialism around which most of our political literature was built. We thus need to shed light on the state-of-the-art of the Brazilian political system, which evidences some specific dynamics of Executive-Legislative relations permissible to the existence and viability of minority coalition governments. Following this notion, we built an analytical model whose variables allow us to unveil the presidential calculus that led President Collor de Mello into forming his cabinet with nonpartisan portfolio-holders. In the end, the relationship between that government and the PMDB during the voting of the Collor Plan is brought to light, in order to demonstrate that governments lacking nominal majoritarian support are able to enjoy legislative success, given a particular juncture.

Magister Legum - LLM (Public Law and Jurisprudence) / In any democratic society, elections are a significant mechanism for citizens to communicate with their representatives. As a result, elections provide a window of opportunity to every voter to hire or fire any political party or independent representative. As an aggregated measure of popular preference, elections constitute an important means to affirm that people in any society should be free to choose their own government based on the parties political beliefs and policies that appeal to the needs of the electorates. Powell sums up this perspective in two points; first, the voter must be able to identify the prospective future governors and have some idea of what they will do if elected. Secondly, the outcome of the elections should bring into office a coherent government whose inherent powers are clearly defined and limited. However, elections sometimes do not produce a single party with an absolute majority to form a government. In such an instance, a coalition or minority government becomes inevitable. It has been argued that coalitions are formed for two different yet interrelated reasons; first to pursue common goals among coalition partners. Secondly, to enable the coalition partners to share the benefits related with being in power. No matter what the intentions are for forming a coalition by the political parties, coalition governments are bound to encounter challenges. One of the challenges is the need to consult and reach consensus among coalition partners, which may not only result in government decision-making being slower but also more complex. Secondly, conflicts within a ruling coalition can make a government unstable and weak due to conflicting ideologies.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo discutir a viabilidade de governos minoritários no presidencialismo brasileiro. Seu objeto de estudo é a formação do governo Collor, momento em que se compôs um gabinete minoritário, e hipótese aqui advogada é a de que o presidente agiu racionalmente ao realizar a opção minoritária. Essa noção é contra-intuitiva porque vai de encontro à tradicional concepção de presidencialismo de coalizão que informa a literatura política nacional. Todavia, uma breve apreciação do estado-da-arte sobre o sistema político brasileiro evidencia uma dinâmica específica das relações Executivo-Legislativo que não impede a existência e viabilidade de governos minoritários. A partir dessa percepção, constrói-se um modelo analítico cujas variáveis nos permitem desvendar o cálculo presidencial que levou Fernando Collor de Mello a constituir seu governo com ministérios apartidários. Por fim, retomam-se as relações entre aquele governo e o PMDB, na votação do Plano Collor, para demonstrar que governos sem base nominal majoritária conseguem lograr êxito parlamentar, dada a conjuntura anteriormente exposta. / This paper aims at discussing the survival of minority governments under Brazilian presidentialism, with its focus on the formation of the Collor government, when a minority cabinet was assembled. The hypothesis put forth in this study is that the president acted rationally in picking the minority option, however counter-intuitive it might seem, given that it is not supported by the traditional concept of coalition presidentialism around which most of our political literature was built. We thus need to shed light on the state-of-the-art of the Brazilian political system, which evidences some specific dynamics of Executive-Legislative relations permissible to the existence and viability of minority coalition governments. Following this notion, we built an analytical model whose variables allow us to unveil the presidential calculus that led President Collor de Mello into forming his cabinet with nonpartisan portfolio-holders. In the end, the relationship between that government and the PMDB during the voting of the Collor Plan is brought to light, in order to demonstrate that governments lacking nominal majoritarian support are able to enjoy legislative success, given a particular juncture.

The purpose of this essay is to study the political horse-trading in 1933 have laid the foundation for political bloc solutions and have become a common occurrence in Swedish politics. Both the political horse-trading in 1933 and the bloc agreement in 1992 where solutions to help the nation out of severe economic crises, reduce unemployment and avoid extra election.  The high unemployment in the 1990s affected a generation who now had something in common with their grandparents who lived through the 1930s.  This essay describes the selected newspapers reporting on both the political horse-trading in 1933 and the bloc agreement in 1992 in Kalmar. This essay also describes the selected parties view of the two agreements in Kalmar.

This research aims to contribute to the knowledge gap about opposition and support parties’ competitive behaviour in minority situations where no party have a majority in the parliament. Two Swedish parties - the Centre Party and the Left Party - will be examined to answer the two overarching research questions. Namely, 1) how does the competitive behaviour of parties vary in relation to a party’s role as a support party or opposition party? And 2) does the result support the cartel party thesis or the model of classic opposition? The competitive behaviour was measured in regards to counter proposals, standpoints and reservations on the governmental propositions. This was done through a quantitative content analysis of committee reports during four terms of office. The results indicate that both parties were more competitive during their time in opposition compared to in support status. This supports the model of classic opposition and rejects the cartel party thesis.