Montaigne has widely been regarded as one of the most significant sceptics of the XVI Century. Yet, if we consider his Essais as a whole, he turns out to be more a sceptical thinker like Socrates or Saint Augustine rather than a pyrrhonist like Sextus Empiricus. He is closer to the Academic scepticism rather than to the absolute scepticism of Pyrrhonism. This thesis contends that despite most of modern research, Montaigne’s biggest debt to ancient sources is with Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Saint Paul, Saint Augustine and Plutarch rather than with Sextus Empiricus. I argue that Montaigne was familiar with the distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism and his quest for truth meant that he had more affinity with Socrates and St. Augustine than with Sextus Empiricus or Pyrrho. He did not suspend his judgment more pirronico: on the contrary, he exerted it in every occasion. The Christian tradition left a more important mark than it was initially thought in Montaigne’s Essais. This reconsideration of Montaigne’s scepticism leads to a re-evaluation of different aspects of the sceptical tradition since the ancient times. In this thesis I show that Montaigne’s scepticism was partly shaped by the presence of scepticism in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Old Testament and in St. Paul, Lactantius and St. Augustine. Powerful currents of scepticism permeated different traditions during the Middle Ages and although their existence has been acknowledged, their potential debt to Greco-Roman antiquity and their influence in the recovery and transmission of scepticism in the early modern period still need further investigation. I argue that in the sceptical crisis of the early modern period Sextus’ writings may have fuelled this crisis, but they did not initiate it. I claim that Sextus Empiricus revival was more a result rather than a cause of the sceptical crisis. Considering that scepticism is a fundamental part of the Essais as a whole we can say that Montaigne was an important part of the sceptical crisis but his scepticism was not shaped by Sextus. I present in this thesis Montaigne’s originality and the complexity of his thought, and even though sometimes it is difficult to follow, his vision is utterly harmonious and consistent. Montaigne considered the ideas of many who had gone before him, sometimes following them, sometimes taking his own path. Montaigne believed in the possibility of real knowledge, even if, in the tradition of Socrates and Augustine, he despaired of achieving it in one person’s life. Montaigne was a sceptic who believed in the existence of truth and he sought that truth through the medium of the essay.

Texte remanié de : Thèse : Lettres : Paris : 1907. / Contient une table des ouvrages historiques possédés par Montaigne. Notes bibliogr. Index.

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The purpose of the research paper is to study and analyze the criticism expressed by Montaigne on different doxic themes that pervade the social discourse of his time. To do so, we consider two problems connected and coextensive to the second part of the XVI century. / The first one that extends over the first two chapters analyzes the way by which the religious wars of the era have found their justification in God. In the first chapter, we try to analyze the discursive vector of the divine ire whereas in the second chapter, we investigate the relationship between the tide of a battle and the elect sign that is supposed to give to the winner. / The second problem, that deals with various attempts of pacification, forms the third chapter of this paper. It focuses on the efforts undertaken by some "well intentioned" jurists to end "fratricidal" wars by royal by-laws (edits) whose unfortunate results are to stir up hatred among different ideological factions. / The fourth chapter is a reflection on some criticism stated by XVI century thinkers who perceived actual wars as lacking religious foundation, and even as a carnage where nobody really knew why the fighting was going on. / Finally, we put forward some hypotheses on the specificity of the Essais in the sociodiscursive context of this age.

Issued also as thesis, Cologne. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 87-94.

Resumo: Examinamos como Montaigne, no ensaio intitulado Da Arte da Conversação, fornece um instrumento para instaurar uma filosofia moral compatível com o ceticismo pirrônico, tal como apresentado por Sexto Empírico, em suas Hipotiposes Pirronianas. O primeiro capítulo possui caráter introdutório ao tema. Ou seja, nele desenvolvemos uma apresentação geral da filosofia cética e seus principais aspectos que nos conduzem à formulação do problema relativo à instauração de uma moralidade no seio desta filosofia. Assim sendo, apresentaremos a noção geral da filosófica cética, assim como sua relação com outras filosofias antigas que, por sua vez, apresentam caráter moral, como por exemplo, o estoicismo e epicurismo. Como são poucos os dizeres de Sexto Empírico sobre o problema que envolve uma moralidade cética, o que não nos permite resolver o problema com muita clareza, nosso próximo passo, no segundo capítulo, será o exame da filosofia montaigneana, cujo caráter é estritamente moral. Sabe-se que Montaigne não apenas foi leitor assíduo das Hipotiposes Pirronianas, como retomou a filosofia cética. Portanto, examinaremos em que medida sua filosofia moral seria compatível com o ceticismo, oferecendo, por assim dizer, acréscimos a esta filosofia. "Conversação" como um modelo de investigação filosófico, não apenas aperfeiçoa o modelo cético, como também nos auxilia na própria compreensão desta filosofia. Desenvolveremos, portanto, uma discussão sobre a relação entre o ceticismo e a filosofia dos Ensaios. Assim como o modo como será possível conciliar o modo de racionar cético à esfera moral.

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Dans ce mémoire, nous cherchons à comprendre la nature et le mouvement du scepticisme de Montaigne en dégageant la métaphysique et l'anthropologie qui sont à l'œuvre dans les Essais . Premièrement, nous examinons les discours sur le savoir, sur l'être et sur le bien qui se trouvent dans l'"Apologie de Raymond Sebond" et nous montrons qu'ils sont articulés selon une même structure tripartite-dogme, doute et réflexivité-qui constitue une métaphysique sceptique. Secondement, nous examinons, à travers une série d'essais, le rapport de Montaigne à la politique, à la sociabilité et à la peinture de soi et nous signalons que son approche est similaire dans chacun des cas: son attitude à la fois confiante, méfiante et inquisitrice est l'expression d'une anthropologie sceptique. Articulation de sa métaphysique et de son anthropologie, le scepticisme de Montaigne se veut une philosophie qui s'essaie sur le monde et l'homme qui l'habite.