This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the feasibility of voluntary moral bioenhancement through an ethico-legal exploration of three motivators: money (and financial incentives in general), health, and duty. These motivators are explored in turn over the course of three papers and it is concluded that while none offer a motivator that could encourage broad participation in voluntary programmes of moral bioenhancement, they do provide insight into things that will be important to note in advance of the advent of such an intervention and (especially) of attempts to promote it. In addition, this thesis identifies and explores areas of discussion not previously addressed in the literature, including issues such as: taboo trade-offs in the use of financial incentives to promote participation in programmes of moral bioenhancement, the use of medical definitions in order to classify moral bioenhancement interventions as medically indicated, and the question as to whether there could be a duty to undergo moral bioenhancement interventions. Moral bioenhancement, though currently a hypothetical notion, is considered by many to be a desirable endeavour due to its potential to bring about good consequences and to avoid instances of significant and even ultimate harm. However, unlike other enhancements, moral bioenhancement is something that does not seem to directly benefit the enhanced individual and so there are concerns that people would be disinclined to undergo the intervention. Some writers have proposed that this therefore demonstrates a need for compulsory approaches to the endeavour, but in the introductory chapters of this thesis I demonstrate that such an approach would be ethically and legally problematic and, therefore, a voluntary approach would be required. If moral bioenhancement is considered as something that is good to have (and it seems that such a case can be made, certainly on a societal level), then a method of encouraging participation in programmes of the endeavour will be required. This thesis aims to identify that method by exploring the three possible motivators already mentioned and, in doing so, to analyse the feasibility of voluntary moral bioenhancement in a broader sense.

Recent developments in social neuroscience have stirred up increased interest within the bioethical debate (for a review see: Specker et al. 2014). Moral enhancement is a concept that directly embodies the idea of making brain science work for the social and moral good. In recent ethical discussions about biomedical means of moral enhancement, scholars have focused on so called ‘direct means of moral enhancement,’ discussing the ethical permissibility of modifying the emotional underpinnings of moral behaviour (Douglas, 2008; 2013; Persson and Savulescu, 2008; Savulescu and Persson, 2012). However, critics have argued that such modification only seems like moral enhancement, that behavioural modification is not ‘true’ moral enhancement, for the reason that it changes behaviours without making agents better moral agents. Critics have also noted that it can undermine freedom (e.g. Harris, 2011; see also: Douglas, 2014). This thesis addresses the ethical issues relating to enhancement. In the first part of this work I consider conceptual issues surrounding the concept of moral enhancement and argue that moral enhancement is plausible if we adjust our expectations to match those we have of cognitive enhancement. I examine the difference between pro-sociality and morality, and argue that an increase in empathy and reduction in anger cannot be seen as straightforward moral enhancements. The second part examines the objections related to moral disagreement, medicalization and narrative identity. The third part of this work focuses of the issues related to freedom and agency. I argue that voluntary direct emotion modulation, if embedded in appropriate reflection, is a prima facie desirable way of moral enhancement.

At first glance, the project of moral enhancement (making people more moral) may appear uncontroversial and obviously worth supporting; surely it is a good idea to make people better. However, as the recent literature on moral enhancement demonstrates, the situation is not so simple – there is significant disagreement over the content of moral norms as well as appropriate means by which to manipulate them. This disagreement seriously threatens many proposals to improve society via moral enhancement. In my dissertation, I develop an understanding of how, exactly, disagreement poses problems for moral enhancement. However, I also argue that there is a way forward. It is possible to bring about moral improvement without commitment to particular and controversial moral norms, but instead relying on relatively uncontroversial ideas concerning morally reliable processes. The upshot is that, while attempting to directly manipulate people’s moral ideas is objectionable, it is relatively unproblematic to focus on helping people reason better and avoid akrasia, with the justified expectation that this will generally lead to moral improvement. We should, therefore, focus not on how to bring people in line with what we take to be the right ideas, motives or behaviors. Rather, we should look to helping people determine for themselves what being moral consists in, as well as help ensure that they act on those judgments. Traditional, non-moral education, it turns out, is actually one of the best moral enhancers we have. In fact, the tools of philosophy (which is, in many aspects, concerned with proper reasoning) are central to the project of indirect moral enhancement. Ultimately, one of the best ways to make people morally better may well be to make them better philosophers.

Essay I explores brain machine interface (BMI) technologies. These make direct communication between the brain and a machine possible by means of electrical stimuli. This essay reviews the existing and emerging technologies in this field and offers a systematic inquiry into the relevant ethical problems that are likely to emerge in the following decades. Essay II, co-written with professor Sven-Ove Hansson, presents a novel procedure to engage the public in ethical deliberations on the potential impacts of brain machine interface technology. We call this procedure a Convergence seminar, a form of scenario-based group discussion that is founded on the idea of hypothetical retrospection. The theoretical background of this procedure and the results of the five seminars are presented here. Essay III discusses moral enhancement, an instance of human enhancement that alters a person’s dispositions, emotions or behavior in order to make that person more moral. Moral enhancement could be carried out in three different ways. The first strategy is behavioral enhancement. The second strategy, favored by prominent defenders of moral enhancement, is emotional enhancement. The third strategy is the enhancement of moral dispositions, such as empathy and inequity aversion. I argue that we ought to implement a combination of the second and third strategies. / <p>QC 20121206</p>

Yes / In this chapter we will review experimental evidence related to pharmacological moral enhancement. Firstly, we will present our recent study in which we found that a drug called propranolol could change moral judgements. Further research, which also investigated this, found similar results. Secondly, we will discuss the limitations of such approaches, when it comes to the idea of general “human enhancement”. Whilst promising effects on certain moral concepts might be beneficial to the development of theoretical moral psychology, enhancement of human moral behaviour in general – to our current understanding – has more side-effects than intended effects, making it potentially harmful. We give an overview of misconceptions when taking experimental findings beyond the laboratory and discuss the problems and solutions associated with the psychological assessment of moral behaviour. Indeed, how is morality “measured” in psychology, and are those measures reliable?

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Inom en snar framtid kan effektiva behandlingsmetoder mot antisocial personlighetsstörning komma att bli tillgängliga för användning. I denna uppsats driver jag en tes om hur vi på ett etiskt försvarbart sätt skulle kunna använda dessa metoder. Tesen begränsar sig till (1) tvångsbehandling (2) av våldsamma återfallsbrottslingar (3) som diagnostiserats med antisocial personlighetsstörning och psykopati, samt till (4) behandlingsmetoder som klassificeras som kapacitetsförbättringar riktade mot moralisk kompetens. Jag argumenterar för att vi har starka skäl att godta tesen, främst med hänseende på fördelarna det skulle innebära för patienten, potentiella brottsoffer, och samhället i stort. Jag diskuterar också de två allvarligaste invändningarna mot min tes – att behandlingen hotar patientens autonomi, respektive personliga identitet – men konstaterar slutligen att de inte tycks kunna falsifiera tesen.

This essay aims to provide an overview of some key theories and frameworks regarding moral cognition and its neural correlates, in order to examine the possibilities of enhancement of moral cognition. Moral cognition arises from the functional integration of several distinct brain regions and networks. These neural systems correspond to different socioaffective abilities, such as empathy and compassion, as well as sociocognitive abilities, such as theory of mind. Due to this neural distinction, these moral abilities, behaviors, and emotions can be targeted and trained separately. Recent research suggests that training sociocognitive and socioaffective abilities increases cortical thickness in corresponding brain regions and networks, hence providing support for adult neural plasticity in relation to moral cognition. Increased cortical thickness also corresponds to enhanced performance in socioaffective and sociocognitive abilities. Training compassion and empathy induce enhanced abilities to pick up emotional cues, as well as strengthen the motivation to alleviate others’ distress. Practicing theory of mind allows for a better understanding of the perspective of others, which has been indicated to reduce biases between individuals or societal groups. Thus, enhanced moral cognition can contribute to an increase in consideration for those affected by our choices and behavior, which may yield more compassionate, just, and safe societies.

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