No description available.

Moraliska bedömningar har länge ansetts komma från rationellt tänkande, men även andra aspekter har setts ha en inverkan på individers moraliska bedömningar: så som socialt samspel med vänner och föräldrar. I arbetet undersöktes det om två till synes likvärdiga situationer bedöms som moraliskt olika, där ena situationen utspelar sig i verkligheten och den andra på Internet. 276 gymnasielever med en medelålder på 17 år användes i analysen, 137 slumpades till betingelsen verklighet. Det framkom att situationen över Internet ansågs som moraliskt värre än situationen i verkligheten. Vissa inomgruppsskillnader observerades, exempelvis att färre diskussioner om moral med vänner, samt det upplevda förtrycket av kritiskt tänkande från lärare, samvarierade med åsikten att individerna agerade moraliskt bättre. Även om det framkom en skillnad i hur Internet och verklighet bedömdes moraliskt, så går det inte att utesluta om mediet Internet har en komplett likvärdighet i jämförelse med verkligheten. Vidare studier behövs för att undersöka detta.

Thesis advisor: Liane Young / Thesis advisor: James Dungan / Moral psychologists disagree over whether descriptively different moral violations represent distinct cognitive domains or are in fact unified by common cognitive mechanisms. The Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt, 2007) offers five different domains of moral transgressions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. Both intentionality and omission bias (e.g. omissions such as letting someone die being judged less harshly than actions such as killing someone) have been shown to impact moral judgments; however, it remains unclear how these rules modulate judgments across moral transgressions of various types. Here, we investigate the role of intentionality and omission bias across different moral violations to determine if the divide between moral domains represent true cognitive, (as opposed to descriptive), differences. We utilized a 2 x 2 x 5 design to create stories across the 5 domains posited by MFT that were intentional/accidental cases of actions/omissions. Importantly, this study also looks at four distinct moral judgments of wrongness, responsibility, blameworthiness, and punishment to assess the role of these rules across judgments. We found that intent and action play different roles across judgments, particularly when comparing wrongness and punishment. Intent seems to matter more for wrongness, whereas action matters more for punishment. Further, these rules also differ across domains. We found that intent matters more for the individualizing foundations of harm and fairness (versus the binding foundations of ingroup, authority, and purity) in judgments of wrongness and punishment. The difference between action and omission is also more important for the individualizing foundations for punishment. These data suggest intentionality and omission bias manifest themselves uniquely across moral judgments and domains and provide evidence that there are meaningful differences between domains. / Thesis (BS) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Psychology Honors Program. / Discipline: Psychology .

According to Joshua Greene’s dual-process theory, our moral judgments are processed in one of two systems in the brain referred to as the emotional (quick, unconscious) and rational (slow, conscious) system. The reason for why people tend to answer differently in the footbridge dilemma compared to the trolley dilemma is because the emotional system is dominating over the rational system. Research has demonstrated that patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage make more utilitarian judgments in moral dilemmas in relation to harmful situations. According to the dual-process theory, this is because the emotional system has been impaired which results in that the only working system is the rational system. The aim of this thesis is to investigate how the dual-process theory tries to explain why our moral judgments tend to differ in some moral dilemmas. This thesis will also look at how the dual-process theory tries to explain why patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage make utilitarian judgments in relation to harmful situations. This thesis will sustain that the dual-process theory have gained strong empirical support, especially from the research that has been made on patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage. This thesis will also argue that some modifications needs to be made on the dual-process theory in order to make it stronger.

The events of the Bunkerville standoff and the Malheur wildlife refuge occupation were both important confrontations with the government by the western land rights movement. Participants in and responders to the events engage in distinct moral judgments and rationales. Utilizing cultural schema analysis and moral foundations theory (MFT), I explored the differences in rationales and judgments made by participants and responders in their explicit, public moral discourses of both events. My analysis indicates that responders and participants defined and utilized the same moral foundations, but in distinct ways. Participants were more diverse in their invocation of moral foundations while responders centralized on judgments/rationales centered on harm/care and authority/subversion. I argue that the insights of content differences in construction/usage of moral foundations are a key contribution to the literature and usage of MFT. I further argue that future research on moral judgments utilizing MFT should endeavor to specify the moral and rational content of how moral foundations are employed, rather than simply documenting their distributions.

No description available.

Orientador: Adrian Oscar Dongo Montoya / Banca: Lívia de Oliveira / Banca: Tânia Stoltz / Banca: Maria Suzana de Stéfano Menin / Banca: Nelson Pedro da Silva / Resumo: O presente estudo teve como objetivo analisar o conhecimento e o juízo moral de crianças e adolescentes sobre questões ambientais, em diferentes contextos escolares. O público alvo consistiu em 240 crianças e adolescentes da terceira à oitava séries do ensino fundamental de oito anos, entre oito e quatorze anos, de escolas com características diversificadas, pública e privada, confessional e não confessional, com e sem proposta pedagógica bem definida e de diferentes níveis socioeconômicos, que participassem de projeto de Educação Ambiental há mais de dois anos. Os instrumentos de investigação utilizados foram observações das crianças e dos adolescentes no ambiente escolar e uma entrevista semiestruturada, contendo questões de conhecimento e de dilemas morais sobre temas ambientais. Os resultados obtidos demonstraram que a maioria das crianças e dos adolescentes investigados apresenta juízo moral de respeito para com temas ambientais, assim como casos de juízo moral de desrespeito ambiental independente da idade. O conhecimento ambiental das crianças e dos adolescentes, de modo geral, é preliminar e intermediário, ou seja, eles não possuem entendimentos sistematizados das inter-relações entre os elementos do sistema ambiental e muitos não apresentam conhecimento da constituição de diferentes tipos de matéria presentes no meio ambiente. O conhecimento ambiental das crianças e dos adolescentes, diferentemente do juízo moral ambiental, apresentou uma tendência moderada de ampliação com a idade, entre oito e quatorze anos. O juízo moral de respeito ambiental não apresentou relação com o conhecimento que as crianças e os adolescentes possuíam dos temas ambientais. No entanto, verificamos na análise e interpretação dos dados que, apesar do conhecimento ambiental e do Juízo Moral sobre questões ambientais... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The present study had as objective to analyze the moral knowledge and judgments of children and teenagers about environmental issues, in different school contexts. The target audience was consisted of 240 children and teenagers from third to eighth grade of elementary education of eight years, between 8 and 14 years, of schools with different characteristics, public and private, confessional and non-confessional, with or without a pedagogical propose, and different socioeconomic levels, who participate in environmental education project for over two years. The research instruments used were observations of children and teenagers in the school environment and a semi-structured interview, with questions of knowledge and moral dilemmas on environmental issues. The results showed that most of the investigated children and teenagers show Moral Judgment of respect for environmental issues, as well as cases of Moral Judgment atmosphere of disrespect for all ages, regardless of age. The environmental knowledge of children and teenagers, in general, is preliminary and intermediate, in other words, they have no systematic understanding about the interrelationships between the elements of the environmental system, and many have no knowledge of the different constitution of various themes present in environment. The environmental knowledge of children and teenagers, unlike the Moral Judgment environmental showed a moderated trend of growth with the age, between 8 and 14 years. The Moral Judgment of respect for the environment didn't show any relation with the knowledge that children and teenagers have about the environmental issues. However, we found in the analysis and interpretation of data, that despite the environmental knowledge and Moral Judgment on environmental issues not being determinant, they are constraints, mainly after 11 years... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Doutor

Sripada and Konrath (forthcoming) use Structural Equation Modeling techniques to provide empirical evidence for the claim that implicit and automatic inferences about people’s dispositions, and not normative judgments, are the driving cause behind the pattern of folk judgments of intentional action in Knobe’s (2003a) chairman case. However, I will argue that their evidence is not as strong as they claim due to the potential of methodological and statistical problems with the way they tested their model. After correcting for these problems, I show that even after accounting for the role of dispositional inferences, normative judgments are still playing a significant role in folk judgments of intentional action.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T14:38:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAO Ariadne.pdf: 1821005 bytes, checksum: ddbdff7dddf66e435194f917f99f51a1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Reflecting on the importance of virtues in moral development, our goal was to investigate the children love concepts. We interviewed 40 students, 6 and 9 years old, in a private school in Vila Velha-ES, according to the clinical method proposed by Piaget. We analyzed the cited examples of love, what would be the most and least important, the judgment about the possibility of loving a child of the opposite sex, of same sex, a friend, an enemy and a stranger. We found that children have an ample concept; including mainly giving love to others‟ and love for (a) particular person/people, which increased with age, and actions with love‟, which showed a decrease. These examples were also considered most important by participants, and love for (a) particular person/people increased with age. On the least important examples of love, mostly students aged 9 said they did not exist, and the 6-years old elected the actions with love‟. Most respondents stated the possibility of loving a child of the opposite sex and same-sex friend. However, a minority has confirmed the relationship of love for an enemy, and still less with a stranger. In general, the justifications referred to the existing ties, the positive consequence for oneself, positive feature of the love object and observation of lived experience, and tended to increase with age. We emphasize the importance of love in development and hope to encourage further discussion on this virtue, contributing to proposals for education in moral values / Refletindo sobre a importância das virtudes no desenvolvimento moral, nosso objetivo foi investigar a concepção de amor em crianças. Entrevistamos 40 escolares, de 6 e 9 anos, em uma escola particular de Vila Velha-ES, de acordo com o método clínico proposto por Piaget. Analisamos os exemplos de amor citados, qual seria o mais e o menos importante, o juízo sobre a possibilidade de amar uma criança do sexo oposto, do mesmo sexo, amigo, inimigo e desconhecido. Verificamos que a concepção de amor que as crianças têm é ampla: incluem principalmente ações de amor para outrem‟ e o amor por determinada(s) pessoa(s)‟, que aumentaram com a idade, e ações com amor‟, que apresentaram um decréscimo. Estes exemplos também foram considerados os mais importantes pelos participantes, sendo que amor por determinada(s) pessoa(s)‟ aumentou com a idade. Quando perguntados sobre os exemplos de amor menos importantes, os escolares de 6 anos elegeram as ações com amor‟, ao passo que os escolares de 9 anos afirmaram não existir exemplo menos relevante. A maioria dos entrevistados afirmou a possibilidade de amar uma criança do sexo oposto, mesmo sexo e amigo. Entretanto, a minoria confirmou a relação de amor para com o inimigo e, menos ainda, para com o desconhecido. De forma geral, as justificativas se referiram aos vínculos existentes, à consequência positiva para si próprio, à característica positiva do objeto de amor, bem como à observação de experiência vivenciada, e tenderam ao aumento com a idade. Ressaltamos a importância do amor no desenvolvimento, e esperamos incentivar outras discussões sobre essa virtude, contribuindo para propostas de educação em valores morais

The topic of the thesis are moral judgments which are articulated in language by claims or speech-acts like, for example, “One ought to keep one’s promises” or “It is good to respect the beauty of nature”. According to the philosophical literature on moral judgments, they have two distinctive features. They are objective and practical: They purport to be correct in an objective sense and they tend to motivate us to act in certain ways. In light of these two features, I discuss the two most prominent accounts in the philosophical literature on moral judgments: cognitivism and noncognitivism. Cognitivism takes moral judgments to be acts of theoretical knowledge with a special normative content. Noncognitivism takes moral judgments to be desire-like acts of the mind. In part I., I argue that cognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality since it spoils the practical character of such judgments. In part II., I argue that noncognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality because it makes the objectivity of moral claims mysterious. In part III. of the thesis, I then aim at developing an alternative to cognitivism and noncognitivism that overcomes their shortcomings but also saves their insights. I call this alternative account 'practical cognitivism'. The core claim of practical cognitivism is that moral judgments are acts of a sui generis power for practical knowledge or cognition. The bulk of part III. is about developing this claim and showing that it allows us to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality. I end the thesis by responding to some objections that might be raised against practical cognitivism.:1. Approaching my topic: moral judgments 1 1.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ................... 5 1.2. The practicality of moral judgments................... 9 1.3. The task, the problem .......................... 11 1.4. Outlook .................................. 16 I. Cognitivism 21 2. Introduction 21 3. Cognitivism: the basics 22 3.1. Ordinary descriptive beliefs ....................... 22 3.2. Moral beliefs................................ 28 3.3. Scanlon’s and Smith’s cognitivism.................... 31 4. Cognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 35 5. Cognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 38 5.1. Attempt#1:Externalism ........................ 40 5.2. Attempt #2: The rationality-based account of practicality . . . . . . 44 5.3. Attempt#3: Volitionalism........................ 55 6. Conclusion 63 II. Noncognitivism 67 7. Introduction 67 8. Noncognitivism: the basics 69 8.1. Nondescriptivism ............................. 69 8.2. Intrinsic practicality ........................... 71 8.3. The desire-like account of intrinsic practicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 8.4. A standard of internal consistency.................... 79 8.5. Expressing vs. reporting ......................... 85 9. Noncognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 88 10.Noncognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 90 10.1. Noncognitivism vs. speakersubjectivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 10.2. Attempt #1: Horgan and Timmons................... 96 10.3. Attempt #2: Blackburn ......................... 99 10.4. Attempt #3: Gibbard ..........................103 11. Conclusion 112 III. Practical Cognitivism 115 12. Introduction 115 12.1. Diagnosis .................................115 12.2. Practical cognitivism ...........................125 13. The generic concept of form 130 13.1. Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 13.2. Applying the generic concept of form to moral judgments . . . . . . . 136 14.The practical character of practical knowledge 138 15.The cognitive character of practical knowledge 145 15.1. Universal validity as a feature of theoretical knowledge . . . . . . . . 146 15.2. Universal validity as a feature of practical knowledge . . . . . . . . . 148 16. The self-conscious character of practical knowledge 153 17. Moral judgments as acts of practical knowledge 160 17.1. Self-conscious practicality ........................161 17.2. Self-conscious validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 1 7.3. Self-conscious practical validity .....................167 18. Excursus: Thompson’s (Neo)Aristotelian practical cognitivism 172 19.The objectivity and intrinsic practicality of moral judgments 179 19.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ...................180 19.2.The intrinsic practicality of moral judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 19.3. Shared willing, public reasons and practical knowledge of the good . . 191 20.Conclusion 196 21.Objections 198 21.1. Moral error and practical irrationality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200 21.2. The formalism objection .........................208 22. Acknowledgement 219 References 220