In contrast to his rationalist predecessors, Kant insists that feeling has a pos- itive role to play in moral life. But the exact nature of this role is far from clear. As much as Kant insists that moral action must proceed from a feeling of respect, he maintains with equal insistence that the objective basis of acting from duty must come from practical reason alone, and that when we act from duty we must exclude sensibility from the determining grounds of choice. In what way, then, is respect for the law a feeling? And what place does this feeling have—if any—in Kant’s ethics? The aim of my dissertation is to answer these questions, in part through a close engagement with Kant’s second Critique. I provide a close reading of his claim that our recognition of the moral law must effect both painful and pleasurable feelings in us, and I argue that these feelings, for Kant, are meant to explain how the moral law can figure into the basis of a maxim. By showing why our recognition of the law must be painful from the perspective of self-love, but pleasurable from the perspective of practical reason, Kant is able to show how our desires can acquire normative direction. On my reading, then, the theory of moral sensibility we find in the second Critique addresses a rather troubling form of skepticism: skepticism about moral motivation.In the course of defending this claim, I provide an alternative reading of the development of Kant’s project of moral justification from Groundwork III to the second Critique. Against a wide-spread view in the literature, I suggest that what changes between these texts is not a direction of argument (from freedom to morality, or morality to freedom), but a methodological shift toward the concept of human sensibility. In the later work, I argue, Kant develops a novel approach to moral feeling from the perspective of the deliberating agent; and this in turn clears room in Kant’s ethics for a new kind of a priori knowledge—namely, knowledge of what the activity of practical reason must feel like. The broader aim of my dissertation is thus to put Kant’s work on meta-ethics and moral psychology in closer proximity.

In contrast to his rationalist predecessors, Kant insists that feeling has a pos- itive role to play in moral life. But the exact nature of this role is far from clear. As much as Kant insists that moral action must proceed from a feeling of respect, he maintains with equal insistence that the objective basis of acting from duty must come from practical reason alone, and that when we act from duty we must exclude sensibility from the determining grounds of choice. In what way, then, is respect for the law a feeling? And what place does this feeling have—if any—in Kant’s ethics? The aim of my dissertation is to answer these questions, in part through a close engagement with Kant’s second Critique. I provide a close reading of his claim that our recognition of the moral law must effect both painful and pleasurable feelings in us, and I argue that these feelings, for Kant, are meant to explain how the moral law can figure into the basis of a maxim. By showing why our recognition of the law must be painful from the perspective of self-love, but pleasurable from the perspective of practical reason, Kant is able to show how our desires can acquire normative direction. On my reading, then, the theory of moral sensibility we find in the second Critique addresses a rather troubling form of skepticism: skepticism about moral motivation.In the course of defending this claim, I provide an alternative reading of the development of Kant’s project of moral justification from Groundwork III to the second Critique. Against a wide-spread view in the literature, I suggest that what changes between these texts is not a direction of argument (from freedom to morality, or morality to freedom), but a methodological shift toward the concept of human sensibility. In the later work, I argue, Kant develops a novel approach to moral feeling from the perspective of the deliberating agent; and this in turn clears room in Kant’s ethics for a new kind of a priori knowledge—namely, knowledge of what the activity of practical reason must feel like. The broader aim of my dissertation is thus to put Kant’s work on meta-ethics and moral psychology in closer proximity.

It is a serious problem for some well-known accounts of moral motivation, that is, accounts of what ought to motivate us, that what is supposed to provide motivation to act well instead provides motivation to self-deceive. I term this the Self-Deception Problem. Any theorist who offers an account of moral motivation that has the Self-Deception Problem has reason for concern with our tendency to self-deceive. In this dissertation, I create a taxonomy of accounts of moral motivation, which provides a structural explanation for which accounts of moral motivation are liable to the Self-Deception Problem. Using this taxonomy, I am able explain why Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, and Joseph Butler are concerned with self-deception as a moral problem in a way that Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Francis Hutcheson are not. But the application of my taxonomy is not limited to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I also show how it fits the work of the contemporary psychologist Augusto Blasi and the contemporary philosopher Christine Korsgaard. Neither Blasi nor Korsgaard discusses self-deception in any thoroughgoing way but, as I argue, since both their accounts have the Self-Deception Problem, both of them have reason to do so. The most interesting theorist of moral motivation and self-deception, though, is Joseph Butler. Through a close reading of his arguments for the authority of conscience, I show how his account gives rise to the Self-Deception Problem, and how his sermons on self-deception serve as explanations of and responses to that problem. But the link is even tighter than that: on my novel interpretation of Butler's arguments in favor of the authority of conscience, what he is in fact arguing for is an appropriate degree of self-trust. His discussion of self-deception can accordingly be understood as seeking a proper degree of self-suspicion. On Butler's view, moral agency is not just a matter of recognizing our divinely set proper ends. Nor is it just a matter of acting as a self-legislating agent. It is primarily a matter of correctly modulating self-trust and self-suspicion.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This dissertation aims to explain and discuss the Kantian proposal regarding the grounds of moral action from the pure practical reason, and the relationship between these grounds and the "moral sense", i.e., the feeling of "respect". Thus, it is presented the reconstruction of the Kantian argumentation concerning the problem of objective validity of the moral law as a determinant of human will, as well as an analysis of the respective sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, which present the Kant's arguments concerning the relation between the moral law and the feeling of respect, as a central figure to the practice of this law. In order to do so, the first chapter deals with a terminological analysis of the concept of feeling of Respect, distinguishing it from the conception of moral sense and the feeling of happiness. In the second chapter it is intended to show how the moral law can be realized in the hearts of a finite rational human being like a man, in view of the issue of moral motivation and the systematic link between the feeling of respect and the moral law. Finally, in the third chapter, the dissertation addresses the relationship between the feeling of respect and the fact of reason. / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo principal explicitar e discutir a proposta kantiana quanto à fundamentação do agir moral a partir da razão prática pura, e a relação desta fundamentação com o chamado sentimento moral , i.e., o sentimento do respeito . Nessa medida, apresenta-se a reconstrução da argumentação kantiana acerca do problema da validade objetiva da lei moral como determinante da vontade humana, bem como uma análise dos respectivos trechos da Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes e da Crítica da Razão Prática, que apresentam os argumentos de Kant referentes à relação da lei moral com o sentimento do respeito, como figura central para a prática desta lei. Para isso, no primeiro capítulo, faz-se uma análise terminológica do conceito do sentimento do respeito, distinguindo-o da concepção de senso moral e do sentimento de felicidade. No segundo capítulo busca-se mostrar como a lei moral pode ser efetivada no ânimo de um ser racional finito como o homem, tendo em vista a questão da motivação moral e a ligação sistemática entre o sentimento do respeito e a lei moral. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, a dissertação aborda a questão da relação entre o sentimento do respeito e o facto da razão. A presente dissertação tem como objetivo principal explicitar e discutir a proposta kantiana quanto à fundamentação do agir moral a partir da razão prática pura, e a relação desta fundamentação com o chamado sentimento moral , i.e., o sentimento do respeito . Nessa medida, apresenta-se a reconstrução da argumentação kantiana acerca do problema da validade objetiva da lei moral como determinante da vontade humana, bem como uma análise dos respectivos trechos da Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes e da Crítica da Razão Prática, que apresentam os argumentos de Kant referentes à relação da lei moral com o sentimento do respeito, como figura central para a prática desta lei. Para isso, no primeiro capítulo, faz-se uma análise terminológica do conceito do sentimento do respeito, distinguindo-o da concepção de senso moral e do sentimento de felicidade. No segundo capítulo busca-se mostrar como a lei moral pode ser efetivada no ânimo de um ser racional finito como o homem, tendo em vista a questão da motivação moral e a ligação sistemática entre o sentimento do respeito e a lei moral. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, a dissertação aborda a questão da relação entre o sentimento do respeito e o facto da razão.

With this dissertation I developed a new theory and measure of ethical work climate (EWC). Currently, there exists one dominant theory and measure of EWC developed by Victor and Cullen (1988, 1987). Even though researchers have identified problems with this theory, such as inconsistencies with regard to its limited theoretical scope and troubling psychometric properties, it is the most widely utilized framework for conceptualizing and testing EWC. Therefore, I propose to develop an improved theory and measure of EWC, one capable of addressing some of the principle shortcomings of earlier efforts. Building on Rest's (1986, 1979) "Four-Component" model of individual-level ethical decision-making and behavior, I specify four dimensions of EWC necessary for the emergence of ethical behavior: collective moral sensitivity, collective moral judgment, collective moral motivation, and collective moral character. I developed a multidimensional instrument capable of capturing each of these dimensions at the climate level. I anticipate that this theory and instrument will allow researchers to understand EWCs and their impact on attitudes and behaviors more effectively than previous approaches. Chapter 1 reviews the organizational climate and culture literatures, so as to gain a comprehensive understanding of the organizational climate construct in general and how it differs from organizational culture in particular. Chapter 2 includes a review and evaluation the EWC literature. This helped to identify opportunities and suggestions for a new theory and measure of EWC. Chapter 3 describes the development of the new theory of EWCs, the Psychological Process Model, with propositions for future research. Chapter 4 informs about the development of the Ethical Climate Index, the measure used to assess the new theory of EWCs. It describes 3 studies that were used to construct the Ethical Climate Index to measure the ethical work climate dimensions of collective moral sensitivity (12-items), collective moral judgment (10-items), collective moral motivation (8-items), and collective moral character (6-items). Study 1 and 2 resulted in parsimonious and reliable scales for each one of the four dimensions. Results of the 3rd study support convergent and discriminant validity for each one of the scales and suggest that the ECI is a valid and reliable predictor of ethical and unethical behavior. Implications and suggestions for the use of this measure in future research is discussed.

No description available.

Deontic reasoning is a domain of reasoning concerning permissions, obligations, and prohibitions founded on conditional logic (Wason,1968). The inclusion of a social valence to deontic rules leads to increased rule violation identification in both adults (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) and children (Harris & Nunez, 1996), suggesting an evolutionary advantage for a specific class of reasoning known as “cheater-detection” (Fiddick, 2004). The current investigation is the first attempt to understand the cognitive and social variables that account for children’s logical reasoning advantage in social violation situations. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015 / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Text in English / With the start of democracy in South Africa and the end of the legal Apartheid rule, it became apparent to those who identified the church with the liberation struggle that Christian communities had lost their significance in society today. This feeling, although not popular among theologians, became widely held by those who thought that we had arrived politically. This feeling was also supported by views which felt that democracy was the ultimate human form of governance. In this light, it is conceivable for churches to abandon the struggle because of the irrelevance of agitating a form of government that is affirmed and celebrated globally. Also, it became justified to abandon the struggle, if indeed the struggle was against Apartheid, because the enemy had been defeated. Consequently, this meant a withdrawal from siding with those whose rights were marginalised. Such an abrupt withdrawal from championing the rights of those who are marginalised (especially as displayed by the church during the Apartheid era) also raises many concerns pertaining to the role that the churches ought to be playing in the current democratic dispensation. It is also conceivable that the initiative to struggle against Apartheid was motivated only by the fact that the Apartheid regime was unjust and that it discriminated against certain groups of South African citizens. The attainment of liberation in South Africa has plunged churches into an illusion that democratic states are capable of good governance and that when such a government exists, churches can safely concern themselves with their primary ecclesiastical duties—of preaching the Word of God and administering the sacraments and leave the socio-economic and political affairs to those who are governing. It seems that this view is especially prevalent among the constituency of the church that brought forward a theological confession against the theological legitimacy granted to the Apartheid ideology. To unapologetically declare its association with those on the margins, and to defy Apartheid for the evil that it was, this church brought about the Belhar Confession as proof of its allegiance to those on the margins. This study shall confine itself to the realm of the Christian community. It will look to the historicity of the URCSA precisely because it has been bold enough to pen a confession that chastised Apartheid. / Philosophy & Systematic Theology / D. Th. (Theological ethics)

Text in English / With the start of democracy in South Africa and the end of the legal Apartheid rule, it became apparent to those who identified the church with the liberation struggle that Christian communities had lost their significance in society today. This feeling, although not popular among theologians, became widely held by those who thought that we had arrived politically. This feeling was also supported by views which felt that democracy was the ultimate human form of governance. In this light, it is conceivable for churches to abandon the struggle because of the irrelevance of agitating a form of government that is affirmed and celebrated globally. Also, it became justified to abandon the struggle, if indeed the struggle was against Apartheid, because the enemy had been defeated. Consequently, this meant a withdrawal from siding with those whose rights were marginalised. Such an abrupt withdrawal from championing the rights of those who are marginalised (especially as displayed by the church during the Apartheid era) also raises many concerns pertaining to the role that the churches ought to be playing in the current democratic dispensation. It is also conceivable that the initiative to struggle against Apartheid was motivated only by the fact that the Apartheid regime was unjust and that it discriminated against certain groups of South African citizens. The attainment of liberation in South Africa has plunged churches into an illusion that democratic states are capable of good governance and that when such a government exists, churches can safely concern themselves with their primary ecclesiastical duties—of preaching the Word of God and administering the sacraments and leave the socio-economic and political affairs to those who are governing. It seems that this view is especially prevalent among the constituency of the church that brought forward a theological confession against the theological legitimacy granted to the Apartheid ideology. To unapologetically declare its association with those on the margins, and to defy Apartheid for the evil that it was, this church brought about the Belhar Confession as proof of its allegiance to those on the margins. This study shall confine itself to the realm of the Christian community. It will look to the historicity of the URCSA precisely because it has been bold enough to pen a confession that chastised Apartheid. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / D. Th. (Theological ethics)

Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel. / One of the burning questions among metaethical realists is whether moral facts and properties are natural or non-natural. In this thesis, I argue that we should treat a family of arguments for non-naturalism with considerable scepticism: the Open Question Argument, the Normative Intuition, and the argument from the Is-Ought Gap. Moore’s famous Open Question Argument only supports moral non-naturalism if it begs the question against the modest (non-reductionist) naturalist. As for the Normative Intuition, it either commits the fallacy of inferring on the basis of a thing’s specific difference that it does not belong to the genus it putatively belongs to, or it underestimates the breadth of natural properties that possess the features which non-naturalists allege are distinctive of moral and normative properties. The argument from the Is-Ought Gap, for its part, underestimates the ubiquity of the logical and conceptual gap that allegedly marks a deep metaphysical discontinuity between the normative and natural domains.