Behavior-analytic accounts of rule-adherence behavior suggest that rule-governance is a general class of functional (i.e., instrumental) behavior maintained by social consequences (Baum, 2005; Malott & Suarez, 2004; Jacobs et al., in prep.). Evolutionary Life-History (LH) theory suggests that LH strategy may underlie variation in rule-adherence behavior. Based on an integration of these two theories, a theoretical structural model of rule-governance was developed and tested. The structure of this model was used to develop follow-up experiments to test particularly salient links in the model. Consistent with theory, the structural model indicated that slow LH strategy directly and indirectly (through increased moral emotions and increased executive functioning) contributed to strength of rule-governance. Two experiments failed to replicate previously demonstrated effects of executive function depletion or moral identity priming (on moral behavioral outcome measures). Further, self-report measures of slow LH strategy, executive functioning, and rule-governance did not predict prosocial (donating) or rule-defiance (cheating) behavior in laboratory tasks. The limitations of relying solely on either self-report or behavioral tasks of unknown external validity are discussed.

Anyone who has ever had the opportunity to observe small children when playing or learning something new or telling something and anyone who has ever had the op- portunity to talk to them must have noticed the children sometimes treat the reality around them in a strange way. These are the funny moments when one is surprised what children think and how they treat logic. As though small children lived in an odd world where the rules of logic are completely different. The famous Swiss psy- chologist noticed this peculiar children's thinking and described the intellectual egocentrism in children of preschool and early school age. Egocentrism does not affect only the children's logical thinking but also other aspects of children's think- ing and experience. This special "setting" of children's minds can be observed when the children are playing, in children's communication, in their drawings or in chil- dren's moral judgement. In the field of children's morals Piaget spoke of the moral realism. Under the influence of moral realism children when morally judging the moral situations presented to them do not concentrate on the essential elements of the story but rather on irrelevant circumstances such as material results of an action and other outside matters. According to Piaget it is essential for...

Developmental research on moral psychology has long been driven by the classic studies of Lawrence Kohlberg with an almost exclusive focus on reasoning. The adoption of an evolutionary perspective has opened moral psychology to investigations into the deep roots of morality. From this perspective, it is thought that group living (cooperation), evolved psychological mechanisms, disgust, emotion, and punishment make for the complex building blocks that is morality. Based on this notion, it is quite possible that morality is present early in life and driven by the forces of natural selection. Thus, moral development may be understood by taking a different approach, one that takes into account the tenants of evolution. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of third-party punishment on children’s moral sentiments using a common moral transgression (exclusion from a group). For this cross-sectional study, children in age groups 4-5, 7-8, and 12-13 years heard two short stories describing a perpetrator (matched in gender to the participant) who excludes a victim (also matched in gender to the participant). For each story, children were asked to imagine a different relationship to the victim: kin (i.e., brother or sister) or non-kin (i.e., friend/stranger). After each story, children were asked to rate the intensity of the moral transgression, choose a possible punishment for the perpetrator, identify an emotion associated with the transgression, and then offer a justification for the emotion. A total of 109 children were interviewed for the study. Results were mixed. Relationship (kin vs. non-kin) made a difference in some cases, while not in others. Overall, all children rated the treatment of the victim as wrong, deemed punishment as necessary, and reported neutral emotions. The children in the 12 to 13 age group were different on measures of wrongness and emotional responses. There is some evidence that relationship may influence moral sentiments, which is in line with an evolutionary hypothesis. Moral sentiments seem to be present early, and common moral transgressions are perceived as wrong early and consistently across age groups. This study provides some insight into the evolutionary roots of morality. Additional research is necessary to gain a greater understanding of other factors contributing to the evolutionary roots of morality. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2019. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Short-term service-learning experiences such as alternative breaks are increasing in popularity due to the focus on service in higher education and the institution’s responsibility to ensure students are graduating with the skills needed to succeed in an increasingly competitive, global economy and contribute to a democratic society as citizens who address societal needs. To meet this demand, colleges and universities continue to explore ways to increase civic engagement in the form of curricular and co-curricular programs. Additionally, faculty and administrators in higher education are intensely seeking a revitalization of the public purposes of higher education, which include educating for moral and civic development (Colby, 2000). One specific need identified in the research literature includes developing a better understanding of the relationship between service-learning and moral competence. There are strong indications that service-learning experiences support psychosocial development in areas such as appreciation of diversity, empathy, concern for social justice, a greater sense of personal efficacy, and problem solving (Bernacki & Jaeger, 2008; Einfeld & Collins, 2008; Marichal, 2010). While this limited research is hopeful, little to no research has been conducted to date to explore the relationship between a co-curricular service-learning experience and moral competence. An exploratory, mixed methods study was conducted with participants of a short-term service-learning experience known as a Bulls Service Break at the University of South Florida. A pre-post analysis was conducted on participants to determine if there was a relationship between moral competence and the service-learning experience through use of the Moral Competence Test. Additionally, a questionnaire was administered to participants upon completion of their service experience to explore the relationship between service-learning and Rest’s Four Component Model of Moral Behavior. The questions focused on moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral character. These data were analyzed using a combination of statistical analysis through SPSS for the quantitative research question, and through thematic coding for the qualitative questionnaire responses. Results indicated that students experienced an increase in their moral competence as evidenced pre-post comparison of C-scores. Additionally, for the research questions pertaining to Rest’s Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, relationships between moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation and moral character were confirmed via the themes generated from the qualitative data analysis. Participants experienced increased self-awareness and social awareness with relation to moral sensitivity. When exploring the data pertaining to moral judgment, participants expressed a realization of social injustice in our communities. This awareness then prompted participants to be morally motivated to combat social injustices by helping others and giving back to my community and by treating others equally and with respect. And finally, the participants’ moral character was tested when they experienced situations that made them uncomfortable during their service but they persisted toward combating social injustices and helping the communities they served. Based on the findings of the study, suggestions for future research and practical implications are offered.

Cognitive and emotional processes both seem to contribute in the production of moral judgments, but how they interact is still under investigation. Greene’s dual-process model suggests that these processes constitute dissociable systems in the brain, which are hypothesized to give rise to two qualitatively different ways of moral thinking characterized by two normative moral theories, consequentialism and deontology. Greene indicates that this research undermine deontology as a normative theory. The empirical investigation of moral judgments implies that the dual-process model only seems to accurately predict and explain moral judgments in moral dilemmas involving physical harmful intentions. Regardless of the models empirical support, the empirical findings in the study of moral judgments could have normative and metaethical implications.

Research in moral psychology has focused on understanding what factors assist in the development of moral action and decision making. Examples of these research factors include educational experiences (Rest et al, 1986), intelligence (Rest, 1979), and social networking (Derryberry & Thoma, 2000). Personality factors facilitating moral judgment have also receive attention in recent years with Damon and Hart (1988) exploring self-understanding as a possible factor in moral judgment and Baumeister and Exline (1999) proposing that exercising self-control is often characteristic of those who often employ prosocial behavior. Pizarro (2000) suggested that those who fail to utilize empathy may think about moral issues just as those who do employ empathy but find them easier to ignore. This study attempted to explore this research from a different angle by examining the relationships between antisocial personality traits as opposed to prosocial personality traits. To measure these traits, data were collected from two samples comprised of 120 college students and 24 prisoners from a state-inmate facility. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was used to measure moral judgment and the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) was used to measure the desired personality factors. The results indicated that antisocial personality characteristics do not inhibit moral judgment development. However, the results showed that individuals with antisocial personality characteristics were more likely to endorse self-serving decisions in situations that call for moral decision-making.

Traditionally, it has been the cognitive-developmental approach that has dominated moral judgment research. Specifically, it has been Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (1969, 1986) that has provided the theoretical framework for much of the research in the field. According to the Kohlbergian perspective, individuals are rational agents who engage in conscious deliberation in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. In contrast to this, the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007) proposes that it is the individual’s immediate affective reactions to events are the overriding cause of moral judgment. In addition to this, the model proposes that the social context is an equally important determinant of moral judgment. Emergent group norms are said to directly shape the moral judgments of the individual, with the moral judgments of friends, allies and acquaintances having a direct bearing on the moral judgments one makes, even those made and held privately. In the current thesis, the impact of social persuasion - group norms, audience, and social identity - on moral judgment was investigated, using the methods and meta-theoretical framework of the social identity approach. In Studies 1 (N = 98) and 2 (N = 60) the influence of group norms and level of identification with the reference group on participants’ moral evaluations was assessed. The results of these studies revealed that participants’ evaluation of the target issue (the sex selection of children) was not influenced by the group norms to which they were exposed. In both studies, the interaction between norm and identification was also found to be non-significant. Under investigation in Studies 3, 4, and 5 was the impact of normative influence on participants’ moral evaluations. In Study 3 (N = 186) the impact of group norms, level of identification, and audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluations of morally-tinged scenarios and issues were assessed. Those exposed to a norm portraying the reference group as judgmental tended to be harsher in their evaluations than those exposed to a non-judgmental norm, but the effect was weak and inconsistent. Contrary to expectation, identification and audience were not found to interact with the norm manipulation. Study 4 (N = 93) focused exclusively on the impact of audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluation. Participants evaluated a number of morally-tinged scenarios either alone, under the expectation that their responses would be visible to an audience (with either the opportunity to justify their evaluations, or not), or under the pretext of being connected to a lie-detector. Contrary to expectation, no significant difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found across the four audience conditions. To discount the possibility that the lack of normative influence on moral evaluation obtained in Study 4 was due to methodological limitation (i.e., the audience category was too broad), the selection of participants and the choice of audience were modified for Study 5 (N = 54). In Study 5, Christian students were required to make their moral evaluations under the expectation that their responses would be made visible to either a Christian or student audience. Contrary to expectation, only a subtle effect of audience was found in relation to both the morally tinged issues and the morally tinged scenarios. Participants in the Christian audience condition were found to evaluate only a small number of the issues (3 of 10), and only one of the four scenarios more negatively than those in the student audience condition. In Studies 6 and 7 the impact of social identity factors on participants’ moral evaluations was investigated. In Study 6 (N = 45), the extent to which participants’ moral evaluation were influenced by their social identity was assessed. In this study, participants had either their Christian identity or their student identity made salient when making their evaluations. No difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found between the Christian identity and student identity salience conditions. In Study 7 (N = 68), the extent to which participants’ political identity influenced their moral evaluation of government policy was assessed. Participants (who were either Australian Labor Party supporters or Australian Liberal Party supporters) were led to believe that the policies had been proposed by either the Australian Labor Party or the Australian Liberal Party. It was found that participants’ political affiliation contributed to their moral evaluation of the presented policies. Overall, the current program of studies provides a first step toward understanding the impact that group norms, audience, and social identity factors have on the evaluation component of moral judgment. It suggests that morality is complex, and that moral judgments may be amenable to social influence, albeit weakly. Theoretical and practical implications for this research are discussed with reference to social identity theory and the broader literature on moral psychology.

Traditionally, it has been the cognitive-developmental approach that has dominated moral judgment research. Specifically, it has been Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (1969, 1986) that has provided the theoretical framework for much of the research in the field. According to the Kohlbergian perspective, individuals are rational agents who engage in conscious deliberation in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. In contrast to this, the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007) proposes that it is the individual’s immediate affective reactions to events are the overriding cause of moral judgment. In addition to this, the model proposes that the social context is an equally important determinant of moral judgment. Emergent group norms are said to directly shape the moral judgments of the individual, with the moral judgments of friends, allies and acquaintances having a direct bearing on the moral judgments one makes, even those made and held privately. In the current thesis, the impact of social persuasion - group norms, audience, and social identity - on moral judgment was investigated, using the methods and meta-theoretical framework of the social identity approach. In Studies 1 (N = 98) and 2 (N = 60) the influence of group norms and level of identification with the reference group on participants’ moral evaluations was assessed. The results of these studies revealed that participants’ evaluation of the target issue (the sex selection of children) was not influenced by the group norms to which they were exposed. In both studies, the interaction between norm and identification was also found to be non-significant. Under investigation in Studies 3, 4, and 5 was the impact of normative influence on participants’ moral evaluations. In Study 3 (N = 186) the impact of group norms, level of identification, and audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluations of morally-tinged scenarios and issues were assessed. Those exposed to a norm portraying the reference group as judgmental tended to be harsher in their evaluations than those exposed to a non-judgmental norm, but the effect was weak and inconsistent. Contrary to expectation, identification and audience were not found to interact with the norm manipulation. Study 4 (N = 93) focused exclusively on the impact of audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluation. Participants evaluated a number of morally-tinged scenarios either alone, under the expectation that their responses would be visible to an audience (with either the opportunity to justify their evaluations, or not), or under the pretext of being connected to a lie-detector. Contrary to expectation, no significant difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found across the four audience conditions. To discount the possibility that the lack of normative influence on moral evaluation obtained in Study 4 was due to methodological limitation (i.e., the audience category was too broad), the selection of participants and the choice of audience were modified for Study 5 (N = 54). In Study 5, Christian students were required to make their moral evaluations under the expectation that their responses would be made visible to either a Christian or student audience. Contrary to expectation, only a subtle effect of audience was found in relation to both the morally tinged issues and the morally tinged scenarios. Participants in the Christian audience condition were found to evaluate only a small number of the issues (3 of 10), and only one of the four scenarios more negatively than those in the student audience condition. In Studies 6 and 7 the impact of social identity factors on participants’ moral evaluations was investigated. In Study 6 (N = 45), the extent to which participants’ moral evaluation were influenced by their social identity was assessed. In this study, participants had either their Christian identity or their student identity made salient when making their evaluations. No difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found between the Christian identity and student identity salience conditions. In Study 7 (N = 68), the extent to which participants’ political identity influenced their moral evaluation of government policy was assessed. Participants (who were either Australian Labor Party supporters or Australian Liberal Party supporters) were led to believe that the policies had been proposed by either the Australian Labor Party or the Australian Liberal Party. It was found that participants’ political affiliation contributed to their moral evaluation of the presented policies. Overall, the current program of studies provides a first step toward understanding the impact that group norms, audience, and social identity factors have on the evaluation component of moral judgment. It suggests that morality is complex, and that moral judgments may be amenable to social influence, albeit weakly. Theoretical and practical implications for this research are discussed with reference to social identity theory and the broader literature on moral psychology.

Traditionally, it has been the cognitive-developmental approach that has dominated moral judgment research. Specifically, it has been Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (1969, 1986) that has provided the theoretical framework for much of the research in the field. According to the Kohlbergian perspective, individuals are rational agents who engage in conscious deliberation in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. In contrast to this, the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007) proposes that it is the individual’s immediate affective reactions to events are the overriding cause of moral judgment. In addition to this, the model proposes that the social context is an equally important determinant of moral judgment. Emergent group norms are said to directly shape the moral judgments of the individual, with the moral judgments of friends, allies and acquaintances having a direct bearing on the moral judgments one makes, even those made and held privately. In the current thesis, the impact of social persuasion - group norms, audience, and social identity - on moral judgment was investigated, using the methods and meta-theoretical framework of the social identity approach. In Studies 1 (N = 98) and 2 (N = 60) the influence of group norms and level of identification with the reference group on participants’ moral evaluations was assessed. The results of these studies revealed that participants’ evaluation of the target issue (the sex selection of children) was not influenced by the group norms to which they were exposed. In both studies, the interaction between norm and identification was also found to be non-significant. Under investigation in Studies 3, 4, and 5 was the impact of normative influence on participants’ moral evaluations. In Study 3 (N = 186) the impact of group norms, level of identification, and audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluations of morally-tinged scenarios and issues were assessed. Those exposed to a norm portraying the reference group as judgmental tended to be harsher in their evaluations than those exposed to a non-judgmental norm, but the effect was weak and inconsistent. Contrary to expectation, identification and audience were not found to interact with the norm manipulation. Study 4 (N = 93) focused exclusively on the impact of audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluation. Participants evaluated a number of morally-tinged scenarios either alone, under the expectation that their responses would be visible to an audience (with either the opportunity to justify their evaluations, or not), or under the pretext of being connected to a lie-detector. Contrary to expectation, no significant difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found across the four audience conditions. To discount the possibility that the lack of normative influence on moral evaluation obtained in Study 4 was due to methodological limitation (i.e., the audience category was too broad), the selection of participants and the choice of audience were modified for Study 5 (N = 54). In Study 5, Christian students were required to make their moral evaluations under the expectation that their responses would be made visible to either a Christian or student audience. Contrary to expectation, only a subtle effect of audience was found in relation to both the morally tinged issues and the morally tinged scenarios. Participants in the Christian audience condition were found to evaluate only a small number of the issues (3 of 10), and only one of the four scenarios more negatively than those in the student audience condition. In Studies 6 and 7 the impact of social identity factors on participants’ moral evaluations was investigated. In Study 6 (N = 45), the extent to which participants’ moral evaluation were influenced by their social identity was assessed. In this study, participants had either their Christian identity or their student identity made salient when making their evaluations. No difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found between the Christian identity and student identity salience conditions. In Study 7 (N = 68), the extent to which participants’ political identity influenced their moral evaluation of government policy was assessed. Participants (who were either Australian Labor Party supporters or Australian Liberal Party supporters) were led to believe that the policies had been proposed by either the Australian Labor Party or the Australian Liberal Party. It was found that participants’ political affiliation contributed to their moral evaluation of the presented policies. Overall, the current program of studies provides a first step toward understanding the impact that group norms, audience, and social identity factors have on the evaluation component of moral judgment. It suggests that morality is complex, and that moral judgments may be amenable to social influence, albeit weakly. Theoretical and practical implications for this research are discussed with reference to social identity theory and the broader literature on moral psychology.

Traditionally, it has been the cognitive-developmental approach that has dominated moral judgment research. Specifically, it has been Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (1969, 1986) that has provided the theoretical framework for much of the research in the field. According to the Kohlbergian perspective, individuals are rational agents who engage in conscious deliberation in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. In contrast to this, the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007) proposes that it is the individual’s immediate affective reactions to events are the overriding cause of moral judgment. In addition to this, the model proposes that the social context is an equally important determinant of moral judgment. Emergent group norms are said to directly shape the moral judgments of the individual, with the moral judgments of friends, allies and acquaintances having a direct bearing on the moral judgments one makes, even those made and held privately. In the current thesis, the impact of social persuasion - group norms, audience, and social identity - on moral judgment was investigated, using the methods and meta-theoretical framework of the social identity approach. In Studies 1 (N = 98) and 2 (N = 60) the influence of group norms and level of identification with the reference group on participants’ moral evaluations was assessed. The results of these studies revealed that participants’ evaluation of the target issue (the sex selection of children) was not influenced by the group norms to which they were exposed. In both studies, the interaction between norm and identification was also found to be non-significant. Under investigation in Studies 3, 4, and 5 was the impact of normative influence on participants’ moral evaluations. In Study 3 (N = 186) the impact of group norms, level of identification, and audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluations of morally-tinged scenarios and issues were assessed. Those exposed to a norm portraying the reference group as judgmental tended to be harsher in their evaluations than those exposed to a non-judgmental norm, but the effect was weak and inconsistent. Contrary to expectation, identification and audience were not found to interact with the norm manipulation. Study 4 (N = 93) focused exclusively on the impact of audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluation. Participants evaluated a number of morally-tinged scenarios either alone, under the expectation that their responses would be visible to an audience (with either the opportunity to justify their evaluations, or not), or under the pretext of being connected to a lie-detector. Contrary to expectation, no significant difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found across the four audience conditions. To discount the possibility that the lack of normative influence on moral evaluation obtained in Study 4 was due to methodological limitation (i.e., the audience category was too broad), the selection of participants and the choice of audience were modified for Study 5 (N = 54). In Study 5, Christian students were required to make their moral evaluations under the expectation that their responses would be made visible to either a Christian or student audience. Contrary to expectation, only a subtle effect of audience was found in relation to both the morally tinged issues and the morally tinged scenarios. Participants in the Christian audience condition were found to evaluate only a small number of the issues (3 of 10), and only one of the four scenarios more negatively than those in the student audience condition. In Studies 6 and 7 the impact of social identity factors on participants’ moral evaluations was investigated. In Study 6 (N = 45), the extent to which participants’ moral evaluation were influenced by their social identity was assessed. In this study, participants had either their Christian identity or their student identity made salient when making their evaluations. No difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found between the Christian identity and student identity salience conditions. In Study 7 (N = 68), the extent to which participants’ political identity influenced their moral evaluation of government policy was assessed. Participants (who were either Australian Labor Party supporters or Australian Liberal Party supporters) were led to believe that the policies had been proposed by either the Australian Labor Party or the Australian Liberal Party. It was found that participants’ political affiliation contributed to their moral evaluation of the presented policies. Overall, the current program of studies provides a first step toward understanding the impact that group norms, audience, and social identity factors have on the evaluation component of moral judgment. It suggests that morality is complex, and that moral judgments may be amenable to social influence, albeit weakly. Theoretical and practical implications for this research are discussed with reference to social identity theory and the broader literature on moral psychology.