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Tarifas de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil: aperfeiçoamento da metodologia tarifária a partir de parâmetros de continuidade do serviço, sustentabilidade econômico-financeira e simplicidade regulatória. / Electricity distribution tariffs in Brasil: improving regulatory methods from quality of service and economic-financial sustainability regulation.Brito, Erico Henrique Garcia de 03 February 2017 (has links)
A partir de revisão do histórico da regulação do segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil, da revisão de conceitos de Teoria da Regulação, Distribuição de Energia Elétrica, Estrutura Tarifária, Regulação de Monopólios Naturais, Qualidade do Serviço Prestado, e Sustentabilidade Econômico-Financeira, assim como definições de Direito Administrativo, Teoria Geral de Concessões de Serviços Públicos e política de preço aplicada a monopólios naturais, aprende-se que o regime tarifário chamado de serviço pelo preço (price cap) foi adotado a partir da edição da Lei de Concessões, sendo abandonado o regime do custo do serviço (rate of return), praticado desde a década de 1950. Contudo, a distinção entre os dois regimes de regulação tarifária fica prejudicada devido às práticas do regulador, fato que ocorre não apenas no Brasil. Conforme estabelecem os contratos de concessão, as tarifas deveriam ser preservadas pela equação de equilíbrio inicial \'RPI +/- X\', sendo previstas revisões tarifárias periódicas, observadas as alterações na estrutura de custos e de mercado, os níveis de tarifas observados em empresas similares no contexto nacional e internacional, e estímulos ao ganho de eficiência e à modicidade tarifária. Passadas duas décadas da implantação do price cap, observa-se que o regulador incorporou práticas do rate of return, criando instrumentos de reposicionamento das tarifas de acordo com critérios e trajetórias de custos operacionais eficientes e componentes discricionários de cálculo do ganho de produtividade, dotando o processo de reajuste e revisão das tarifas de excessiva complexidade. Assim, buscando-se maior simplicidade e clareza nos processos tarifários, de modo a incentivar de forma mais adequada o investimento na melhoria da qualidade do serviço e na sustentabilidade da concessão, o presente trabalho propõe aperfeiçoamentos na metodologia tarifária com base em parâmetros de eficiência em relação à qualidade do serviço prestado, discutido no âmbito do Mecanismo de Incentivo à Melhoria da Qualidade (MIQ) por meio do componente \'Q\' do Fator X, e de eficiência em relação à gestão econômico-financeira (sustentabilidade), aferida por parâmetros utilizados amplamente no setor financeiro, tratados como elementos de uma política de incentivos para assegurar a trajetória de sustentabilidade da concessão. A partir do princípio contratual de que os processos tarifários consideram como receita da distribuidora a soma de uma parcela não gerenciável (VPA) e de parcela gerenciável (VPB), a busca por maior simplicidade e clareza diz respeito ao estrito cumprimento dos critérios contratuais, com retorno à prática da regulação de serviço pelo preço, como estabelecido pela Lei de Concessões. A aplicação dos aperfeiçoamentos propostos é realizada mediante estudos de caso de duas distribuidoras de energia elétrica em situações de qualidade e sustentabilidade distintas. O resultado ilustra que a qualidade e sustentabilidade do serviço podem ser parâmetros importantes para introdução de uma metodologia menos complexa e mais objetiva para reajuste e revisão das tarifas de fornecimento no Brasil. / The Tariff Regulation for public service distribution of electrical energy, called \"price cap\" was adopted in Brazil from the publication of Law 8.095/1995 (the Law of Concessions), therefore abandoning the \"return rate\" remuneration system practiced since the late 1950s. However, the distinction between price cap and return rate regulation was negatively affected due to practices of the regulatory agency (National Electric Energy Agency - ANEEL), which occurs not only in Brazil. As established in concession contracts, the tariffs should be preserved by the equation of initial balance \'RPI +/- X\', forecasting tariff reviews periodically by observing changes in the structure of the licensee\'s costs and market share, the levels of rates observed in similar businesses in the national and international context, as well as stimulating efficiency gains and controlling tariffs. After two decades of implementation of the system of price cap in Brazil, and after four cycles of periodic review of tariffs, it is observed that the regulator has incorporated practices of rate of return throughout the process, creating instruments of repositioning of tariffs in accordance with criteria of operational costs considered efficient and discretionary components of calculating the productivity gains (X Factor), giving the process of readjustment and revision of rates of excessive complexity. In search of greater simplicity and clarity in the tariff process in order to encourage more adequately the investment in improving the quality of service and sustainability, this Thesis presents proposals for the improvement of tariff methodology based on parameters efficiency in terms of quality of service, objectively measured by global indicators of continuity and efficiency in relation to the economic and financial management (sustainability), measured by parameters used widely in the financial sector. The improvement of the efficiency of quality is discussed under the Incentive to Quality Improvement Mechanism (MIQ) of the Brazilian tariff regulation through the \'Q\' component of Factor X. The improvements on the extent of economic and financial sustainability are treated as elements of an incentive policy to ensure a path of sustainability of the concession, given that the Brazilian regulator has not adopted explicit mechanisms of sustainability, except those specifically defined in the process of renewal of distribution concessions, pursuant to Presidential Decree n. 8.461/2015. From the contractual principle that tariff processes consider the distribution company Requested Revenue as the sum of an unmanageable portion (VPA) and manageable portion (VPB), the search for greater simplicity and clarity with respect the strict compliance with the contract criteria, returning to the practice of price cap regulation, as established by the Concessions Law. The implementation of improvements for the proposed tariff mechanisms is carried out through case studies relating to two electricity distribution companies in different quality and sustainability situations. The result of the study shows that the quality and sustainability of the service in the electricity distribution segment can be important parameters for introducing a less complex and more objective methodology for adjustment and review of electricity tariffs in Brazil.
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Tarifas de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil: aperfeiçoamento da metodologia tarifária a partir de parâmetros de continuidade do serviço, sustentabilidade econômico-financeira e simplicidade regulatória. / Electricity distribution tariffs in Brasil: improving regulatory methods from quality of service and economic-financial sustainability regulation.Erico Henrique Garcia de Brito 03 February 2017 (has links)
A partir de revisão do histórico da regulação do segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil, da revisão de conceitos de Teoria da Regulação, Distribuição de Energia Elétrica, Estrutura Tarifária, Regulação de Monopólios Naturais, Qualidade do Serviço Prestado, e Sustentabilidade Econômico-Financeira, assim como definições de Direito Administrativo, Teoria Geral de Concessões de Serviços Públicos e política de preço aplicada a monopólios naturais, aprende-se que o regime tarifário chamado de serviço pelo preço (price cap) foi adotado a partir da edição da Lei de Concessões, sendo abandonado o regime do custo do serviço (rate of return), praticado desde a década de 1950. Contudo, a distinção entre os dois regimes de regulação tarifária fica prejudicada devido às práticas do regulador, fato que ocorre não apenas no Brasil. Conforme estabelecem os contratos de concessão, as tarifas deveriam ser preservadas pela equação de equilíbrio inicial \'RPI +/- X\', sendo previstas revisões tarifárias periódicas, observadas as alterações na estrutura de custos e de mercado, os níveis de tarifas observados em empresas similares no contexto nacional e internacional, e estímulos ao ganho de eficiência e à modicidade tarifária. Passadas duas décadas da implantação do price cap, observa-se que o regulador incorporou práticas do rate of return, criando instrumentos de reposicionamento das tarifas de acordo com critérios e trajetórias de custos operacionais eficientes e componentes discricionários de cálculo do ganho de produtividade, dotando o processo de reajuste e revisão das tarifas de excessiva complexidade. Assim, buscando-se maior simplicidade e clareza nos processos tarifários, de modo a incentivar de forma mais adequada o investimento na melhoria da qualidade do serviço e na sustentabilidade da concessão, o presente trabalho propõe aperfeiçoamentos na metodologia tarifária com base em parâmetros de eficiência em relação à qualidade do serviço prestado, discutido no âmbito do Mecanismo de Incentivo à Melhoria da Qualidade (MIQ) por meio do componente \'Q\' do Fator X, e de eficiência em relação à gestão econômico-financeira (sustentabilidade), aferida por parâmetros utilizados amplamente no setor financeiro, tratados como elementos de uma política de incentivos para assegurar a trajetória de sustentabilidade da concessão. A partir do princípio contratual de que os processos tarifários consideram como receita da distribuidora a soma de uma parcela não gerenciável (VPA) e de parcela gerenciável (VPB), a busca por maior simplicidade e clareza diz respeito ao estrito cumprimento dos critérios contratuais, com retorno à prática da regulação de serviço pelo preço, como estabelecido pela Lei de Concessões. A aplicação dos aperfeiçoamentos propostos é realizada mediante estudos de caso de duas distribuidoras de energia elétrica em situações de qualidade e sustentabilidade distintas. O resultado ilustra que a qualidade e sustentabilidade do serviço podem ser parâmetros importantes para introdução de uma metodologia menos complexa e mais objetiva para reajuste e revisão das tarifas de fornecimento no Brasil. / The Tariff Regulation for public service distribution of electrical energy, called \"price cap\" was adopted in Brazil from the publication of Law 8.095/1995 (the Law of Concessions), therefore abandoning the \"return rate\" remuneration system practiced since the late 1950s. However, the distinction between price cap and return rate regulation was negatively affected due to practices of the regulatory agency (National Electric Energy Agency - ANEEL), which occurs not only in Brazil. As established in concession contracts, the tariffs should be preserved by the equation of initial balance \'RPI +/- X\', forecasting tariff reviews periodically by observing changes in the structure of the licensee\'s costs and market share, the levels of rates observed in similar businesses in the national and international context, as well as stimulating efficiency gains and controlling tariffs. After two decades of implementation of the system of price cap in Brazil, and after four cycles of periodic review of tariffs, it is observed that the regulator has incorporated practices of rate of return throughout the process, creating instruments of repositioning of tariffs in accordance with criteria of operational costs considered efficient and discretionary components of calculating the productivity gains (X Factor), giving the process of readjustment and revision of rates of excessive complexity. In search of greater simplicity and clarity in the tariff process in order to encourage more adequately the investment in improving the quality of service and sustainability, this Thesis presents proposals for the improvement of tariff methodology based on parameters efficiency in terms of quality of service, objectively measured by global indicators of continuity and efficiency in relation to the economic and financial management (sustainability), measured by parameters used widely in the financial sector. The improvement of the efficiency of quality is discussed under the Incentive to Quality Improvement Mechanism (MIQ) of the Brazilian tariff regulation through the \'Q\' component of Factor X. The improvements on the extent of economic and financial sustainability are treated as elements of an incentive policy to ensure a path of sustainability of the concession, given that the Brazilian regulator has not adopted explicit mechanisms of sustainability, except those specifically defined in the process of renewal of distribution concessions, pursuant to Presidential Decree n. 8.461/2015. From the contractual principle that tariff processes consider the distribution company Requested Revenue as the sum of an unmanageable portion (VPA) and manageable portion (VPB), the search for greater simplicity and clarity with respect the strict compliance with the contract criteria, returning to the practice of price cap regulation, as established by the Concessions Law. The implementation of improvements for the proposed tariff mechanisms is carried out through case studies relating to two electricity distribution companies in different quality and sustainability situations. The result of the study shows that the quality and sustainability of the service in the electricity distribution segment can be important parameters for introducing a less complex and more objective methodology for adjustment and review of electricity tariffs in Brazil.
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The role of legal frameworks in enabling transparency in water utilities' regulationMova Al'Afghani, Mohamad January 2012 (has links)
This thesis evaluates transparency in the context of water utilities’ regulation by comparing legal frameworks in three jurisdictions: Victoria (Australia), England (United Kingdom) and Jakarta (Indonesia). Each of these jurisdictions is selected because of their particular ownership and regulatory model. The thesis analyses whether specific ownership or regulatory models will have implications for transparency. The terms “transparency” and “water utilities’ regulation” are first defined and form the thesis’ analytical framework. This is then applied against the three jurisdictions compared. By evaluating each of the three jurisdictions, the thesis expects to provide explanation on how transparency is enabled or inhibited by the legal frameworks. The thesis recommends a solution by comparing the three jurisdictions and generating “lessons learned”.
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Přirozené monopoly v elektroenergetice a plynárenství (právní aspekty) / Natural monopolies in Electricity and Gas Sectors (the legal aspects)Kadlecová, Eliška January 2017 (has links)
The purpose of this diploma thesis is to use relevant economic knowledge for the analysis of the key legal aspects of the natural monopoly, particularly the main theoretical aspects thereto. The interpretation is not limited to principle features, however, it covers also the related issues. The text is focused mainly on electricity and gas industries. Apart from applicable law and legal books, the relevant case law of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Administrative Court of Czech Republic has been also a significant source of knowledge hereto. The European Union legal regulations and expert opinions of the European Commission have been taken into account as well. The diploma thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is focused on economic aspects of the applicable law. It provides thorough overview concerning the model and its introduction into reviewed fields. The principal information, historical background and view of the critics are introduced. This chapter also labels the entities under the Czech law that are considered to be the natural monopolies. Furthermore, three basic fields of legal institutes that are subject to subsequent review are outlined. The second chapter defines elementary terms relevant for further research. Specifically, it covers the distribution,...
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Kritická analýza energetické politiky EU a její dopady na tržní subjekty / Critical Analyze of EU Energy Policy and its Impact on Market SubjectsMüllerová, Petra January 2011 (has links)
Diplomová práce se zaměřuje na kritické zhodnocení současné energetické politiky Evropské Unie a její dopady na účastníky trhu s energetickými komoditami, především s důrazem na energetické společnosti a koncové spotřebitele.
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The interplay of sector regulators and competition authorities in regulating competition in telecomunications : the south African caseKhosa, Miyelani 04 1900 (has links)
The privatisation and liberalisation of telecommunications throughout the
world has resulted in the growing involvement of competition authorities in
telecommunications regulation, alongside telecommunications sector-specific
regulators. The existence of both sector specific rules and competition rules has brought
about a critical institutional challenge. The increased role of competition authorities in
the telecommunications sector raises the issue of inconsistent jurisdiction in the sector.
Conflicts are therefore inevitable in the absence of clear delineation of jurisdiction. The
South African model for regulation in the telecommunications sector entails a sharing of
jurisdiction between the sector-specific regulator, the Independent Communications
Authority of South Africa (ICASA), and the competition-wide regulator, the Competition
Commission. The study thus determines the interplay between the Competition
Commission and ICASA as well as the competitiveness of South African
telecommunications. / Communication Science / M.A. (International Communication))
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The interplay of sector regulators and competition authorities in regulating competition in telecomunications : the south African caseKhosa, Miyelani 04 1900 (has links)
The privatisation and liberalisation of telecommunications throughout the
world has resulted in the growing involvement of competition authorities in
telecommunications regulation, alongside telecommunications sector-specific
regulators. The existence of both sector specific rules and competition rules has brought
about a critical institutional challenge. The increased role of competition authorities in
the telecommunications sector raises the issue of inconsistent jurisdiction in the sector.
Conflicts are therefore inevitable in the absence of clear delineation of jurisdiction. The
South African model for regulation in the telecommunications sector entails a sharing of
jurisdiction between the sector-specific regulator, the Independent Communications
Authority of South Africa (ICASA), and the competition-wide regulator, the Competition
Commission. The study thus determines the interplay between the Competition
Commission and ICASA as well as the competitiveness of South African
telecommunications. / Communication Science / M.A. (International Communication))
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