Private healthcare financing in South Africa has undergone several regulatory reforms, the most recent of which saw the enactment of the Medical Schemes Act No. 131 of 1998. The stated reforms, most especially open enrolment and community rating, were touted by the government as necessary to address the undesirable effects of adverse selection. However, it was never questioned whether in fact adverse selection is a feature of the South African medical schemes landscape. Adverse selection is found to be absent. Thus, government’s supposition that adverse selection, as a consequence of the deregulation that took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s, is responsible for the deterioration in medical scheme coverage for the elderly, unhealthy or poor is fallacious. Since the ostensible reason for the current legislation does not stand up to scrutiny, regulatory capture is offered as the plausible alternative explanation for the promulgation of the current legislation governing medical schemes business.

This dissertation develops three game-theoretic models in each of its three chapters to explore the strategic implications of transparency in the administrative state. Each model contains a similar set of three players: a political principal, an agent representing an agency or a bureaucrat, and an interested third party. The models consider the utility of transparency as a tool for mitigating regulatory capture, in which the third party influences the agent to serve its interest rather than the principal's. Chapter 1, "Transparency and Media Scrutiny in the Regulatory Process," models transparency as the volume of records that the media receives from the agent, which raises the likelihood of news alleging low costs to the interest group after the agent's proposal of lax regulation. Such reports cost these two players and may deter the group from capturing the agent. Among other things, the model describes costs due to distorted policy proposals and loss of information when greater transparency causes inaccurate reports to increase along with accurate ones. In Chapter 2, "Transparency and Power in Rulemaking," transparency is a requirement for the agent to disclose an item of information, such as his message from the regulated party or his signal about the cost of regulation. The agent can always disclose this information, but doing so may increase the principal's power to set regulation higher than he or the regulated party desires. A key result is that transparency is not necessary for the principal to know as much as the agent does but may discourage the generation of the message or signal. Chapter 3, "A Reverse Rationale for Reliance on Regulators," suggests that an agent can benefit a principal not by gathering information from an outsider that she cannot access, but by preventing her from obtaining or acting on this information. The agent benefits the principal when he induces additional effort in the outside party's information generation because he is more adversarial toward that party than she is. Mandatory disclosure of the agent's information is harmful because it effectively allows the outsider to communicate directly with the principal and provide lower quality information.

The Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW) pilot project will be only the second operating offshore wind project in the United States when it enters service later this year. This gives Virginia, a state criticized for a weak regulatory environment and environmental policy that has been slow to embrace renewable energy, an opportunity to take a leadership position in the development of this zero-carbon resource. One explanation for the CVOW project's emergence is the Diffusion of Innovation Theory (DIT), which relates the rate of adoption of novel solutions to factors such as relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability – all factors which play, to varying degrees, in favor of this project. Another explanation involves an inversion of Regulatory Capture Theory (RCT). RCT posits that regulated industries capture otherwise neutral regulating bodies, to the detriment of the generic public interest. Others argue that RCT underplays the degree to which regulators prioritize the interests of the regulated community over the public interest, defending a Climate of Capitulation Theory (CCT). While Virginia has recently taken an aggressively pro-wind policy position as it competes with other states to serve as a hub for the offshore wind industry and responds to voter interests in sustainability, the CVOW project problematizes RCT. It also suggests that a real-world climate of capitulation may not always work against the public interest. Judiciously combined with DIT, CCT can explain how external pressures on Virginia government, combined with internal pressures exerted by public opinion in relation to the development of the offshore wind industry, are steering 'capitulation' in directions that assist the public interest in sustainability. In the real world of energy politics, and against RCT, regulators are and have never been neutral, and therefore liable to capture. In a climate of capitulation, and setting aside other questions of the public interest, the willingness of regulators to serve the interests of the regulated community can, when taking external and internal factors into account, redound to the public interest in sustainability. / Master of Arts / Virginia has historically been criticized for a weak regulatory environment and for having environmental policies that have been slow to embrace renewable energy. Yet, the state is about to become home to just the second offshore wind project in America and plans are moving forward on a proposal to build the largest offshore wind project in North America off the Commonwealth's coast by 2026. This thesis explores the factors that led to the development of the Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW) pilot project and how Virginia became a major player in this zero-emission clean energy resource. One explanation is provided by the Diffusion of Innovation Theory (DIT) which details how innovative solutions take hold and examines factors which can accelerate adoption rates. Another explanation is found by considering an inversion of Regulatory Capture Theory (RCT). RCT is premised on the idea that regulated industries can hold sway over the regulating bodies, often to the detriment of the generic public interest. A variation of RCT focused on Virginia environmental policy, Climate of Capitulation Theory (CCT), explains how Virginia regulators have, at times, not provided strong enough environmental protections. However, the CVOW project shows how the regulated community, policy makers and public opinion are coming together to position Virginia at the forefront of the offshore wind industry and how the willingness of regulators to serve the interests of the regulated community can serve the interests of both the public and the environment, as well.

Le but de l’étude est de mettre en question la capture de régulation par les intérêts concentrés de la finance dans les débats sur les mesures à prendre après la crise du crédit partie des États-Unis en 2008. Les décideurs publics de ce pays et de l’Union européenne ont entrepris des efforts de réforme ambitieux pour mieux protéger les consommateurs de services financiers. Les débats au Congrès des États-Unis et au Parlement européen se sont achevés sur des décisions importantes concernant la réglementation du crédit. Fortement politisés, ils avaient suscité un lobbying intense des groupes d’intérêt de la finance et de la société civile, où normalement ces derniers auraient été tenus pour beaucoup plus faibles que leurs adversaires. Paradoxalement, une coalition de la société civile aux moyens modestes a réussi à convaincre les décideurs de la nécessité du changement et à contrecarrer les efforts du lobby financier pour l’empêcher. Qu’est-ce qui explique que des acteurs faibles et périphériques l’ont emporté sur des acteurs riches et puissants ? / The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2008. Policymakers in the EU and the US set ambitious reform efforts in motion to better protect consumers of financial services. Decisions to reform credit regulations marked the end of highly politicized reform debates in the US Congress as well as in the European Parliament, involving lobbying from business associations and civil society groups, in which proponents of reforms would normally have been considered to be much weaker than their opponents. Paradoxically, a poorly-resourced civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent regulatory change. What, then, explains that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors?

The strengthening of the entrepreneurial landscape has been viewed as a means to national economic growth, wealth creation as well as job creation. Good examples exists where government deliberate actions have contributed to these kind of positive growth, yet this research exposes the rigour and hard work needed to bring about this success. The rigour stems from the pursuit of a holistic approach which involves the strengthening of the six domains of entrepreneurship ecosystem growth as posited in literature, while the hard work is related to the discipline and expertise required to pilot such initiative. Research has shown that many countries may be looking for entrepreneurship in the wrong places. Funding availability is only a part of a thriving entrepreneurship ecosystem, the strengthening of other domains can help an ecosystem grow more sustainably. The role of government in driving the entrepreneurship ecosystem can be restricted and channeled towards government performing it traditional role of providing the enabling environment and allowing the private sector drive the ecosystem. Where the growth of the entrepreneurship ecosystem is led by public initiative, it may be better to jettison the idea of the individual firm’s development and pursue the strengthening of the ecosystem in all it domains.

The State delegates the provision of an important number of services of general interest for society, and the State delegates them to private economic operators. However, in these circumstances the need for regulation in order to achieve allocative efficiency underlies as a duty of the State.In this article, the author presents how the criminal offence of collusion is a way of regulatory capture, and how it brings along negative consequences for the social welfare and progress. The author also reaches a conclusion concerning which is the legal right protected with the aforementioned crime. / El Estado delega la prestación de una serie de servicios de interés general para la sociedad en agentes económicos privados. Sin embargo, en estas circunstancias subyace como deber del Estado la necesidad de regulación en aras de conseguir eficiencia asignativa.En el presente artículo, el autor expone cómo el delito de colusión es una forma de captura del regulador, y cómo ello trae consigo consecuencias negativas para el bienestar y progreso social, además de presentar cuál es el bien jurídico que se protege en el mencionado delito.

The development of new innovations in explosives was an important part of the industrialization process from the mid-nineteenth century. The establishment of the world´s first nitroglycerin factory – Nitroglycerin Aktiebolaget (NA) in Stockholm in 1864 started a process replacing gunpowder with nitroglycerin and from 1868 by the safer invention dynamite. This affected both the long-term relationships between the mining industry and the powder mills and the demand from new industries for efficient and safe explosives. Even though the explosives industry was a small industry, it was of great importance for many other industries and for economic transformation. With dynamite and its successors, society also faced new risks. As a result, an extensive legislation was developed at an early stage which was supplemented with further supervision from a government authority in various organizations from 1895. The aim of the thesis is to investigate and analyze the major decision-making processes of the Swedish civilian explosives industry during the period 1858-1950. The purpose of the work is to contribute to gaining knowledge about how the society´s regulation of different industries has evolved and how state and private actors have acted in the development of new regulations. The work is structured around three main questions. The first question is about how the Swedish explosives industry developed during the period. How did the technological development of the industry and the explosives look like and had this any impact on the questions the actors within the industry drove? The second question is about how the dynamite industry was regulated. What did the regulations contain and how was the control organized? How did rights and obligations look like and how was the industry affected by this? The third question concerns the regulatory process itself. How and why did the regulations change and which actors were involved in the various changes? How did the Government and the actors act and can we see shifts over time between their different roles and interests? The study concludes that NA was the actor that, by using different methods, managed to gain the greatest influence over the regulatory process. Although the traditional established powder mill industry competed with NA at an early stage, it was nevertheless the initial, high-tech company that was involved in creating new national regulations in negotiation with the regulating authorities. This was a process of regulatory capture where NA, by combining both direct and indirect capture methods, managed to gain influence over regulations in the long run. A parallel but slightly different characteristic of this regulatory capture process is risk minimization for the public. Despite the occurrence of regulatory capture the regulations developed in a kind of a co-regulation system where the regulators became dependent on NA to provide the technical and practical expertise needed to build the necessary regulatory framework.

This thesis examined the regulation of ‚revolving doors' at European Union institutions, i.e. the fluctuation of personnel between public and private sectors, which threatens the independence of public administration. It adopts the research design of exploratory case study and the methods of doctrinal legal research and qualitative document analysis to build an overview of post-employment rules imposed on public officials of the European Commission, European Parliament, Council and European Central Bank. Contrary to common conceptions, the rules are based on 'hard law' norms. Further, the types of revolving door moves which are prohibited vary among the institutions. Majority of the institutions enjoy a wide discretion in the implementation of the rules but seem to consider them as an internal matter, leaving a lot to be desired from a transparency standpoint. Lastly, a hypothesis of prioritization of revolving door risks by institutions is derived for further inquiry.

La thèse examine les configurations d'acteurs et d'organisations impliquées dans la régulation de l'accès au marché des médicaments en France et en Angleterre, en charge du contrôle scientifique et administratif de la fixation du prix et du remboursement de ces produits. Cette activité s'autonomise de l'appréciation clinique de leur qualité, de leur efficacité et de leur innocuité (dominant la régulation de leur approbation sur le marché) au cours des années 1980. / This thesis examines the configurations of actors and organizations involved in the regulation of the market access for drugs in France and England. Since the mid-1980s, this process has entailed the development of administrative and scientific controls over the fixing of the price and the conditions of reimbursement of these products. These controls have become autonomus from clinical appreciation of their quality, efficacity and safety that dominate approval regulation as a whole.

Submitted by Rachel Lopes Telésforo (rachel@tclaw.adv.br) on 2017-03-15T19:58:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 RLT - DISSERTACAO MESTRADO - 2017.docx: 1963235 bytes, checksum: 3dcbac03c54376081f5116490cd805fa (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Publicação Direito Rio (publicacao.direitorio@fgv.br) on 2017-03-16T13:47:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 RLT - DISSERTACAO MESTRADO - 2017.docx: 1963235 bytes, checksum: 3dcbac03c54376081f5116490cd805fa (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-22T19:56:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RLT - DISSERTACAO MESTRADO - 2017.docx: 1963235 bytes, checksum: 3dcbac03c54376081f5116490cd805fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 / Technologic innovation is inevitable. Regulation, optional. All over the world, economic trends emerge every moment. Regarding the individual transport system of passengers, focus of this work, sharing economy brought paradigmatic disruptions, as occurred with the arrival of Uber device that offers similar services to taxis and promises to reduce ― or even eliminate ― existing market failures for years. Taxi Market is known for taxis upregulation, and until then, little competition and low consumer satisfaction index. Uber´s presence brought greater expectations of quality, but in the opposite direction of the success with users, the regulator follow the following cycle of intervention all over the world: (i) Immediate app’s prohibition; (ii) Uber’s indirect prohibition, according regulation in accordance with the traditional system/ 'a la taxi' (planning permissions and other mechanisms) and (iii) studies to introduction of a specific regulation, that put together technologic benefices and real attendance to public interest. To look more closely to the cycles, this paper analyzed the regulator’s posture in 23 megacities all over the world, according definition of United Nations – UN, that exemplified agent´s conduct in the cities with more than seven million habitants. Faced with said interventions, this paper has concluded that there is a strong regulatory capture in the transport of passenger’s market ― and there was made a theoretical approach of the Public Choice Theory ― since the first and second cycles evidence benefices of small groups of interest in the sector, rather than the mass. Besides that, since technology can reduce problems involving situations of monopolies, asymmetric information and negative externalities, there is no reason to justify the necessity of maintenance of the regulation, already considered excessive in said market. Also, it is worth mentioning that the regulatory actions were directly countered not only by the popular opinion, but mainly by force of judicial decisions all over the world, that by means of preliminary injunctions prevented abrasive reactions of those agents, and that indicates that judiciary sector is not captured. The third cycle of regulatory intervention indicates a way of interconnection between collaborative economies and urban solutions with the objective of the collective benefice. Studies all over the world points the necessity of regulatory alternatives that can conciliate the public interest with the comprehension of the technologic progress. However, to achieve the third cycle of regulation, it is necessary that the regulator abandon the character merely supervisory and assumes a behavior more analytical and proactive, with the objective of finding regulatory alternatives able to bring gains in infrastructure and urbanization. / A inovação tecnológica é inevitável. A regulação, opcional. Ao redor do mundo, tendências econômicas surgem a cada instante. No que tange ao sistema de transporte individual de passageiros, foco do presente trabalho, a economia de compartilhamento trouxe rompimentos paradigmáticos, como o que ocorreu com a chegada do dispositivo Uber, que oferece serviços semelhantes ao de táxis e reduz ― chegando em alguns casos, a eliminar ― falhas de mercado existentes há anos. O mercado de táxis é conhecido pela alta regulação, tendo até então, pouca concorrência e baixo índice de satisfação do consumidor. A presença do Uber trouxe maior expectativa de qualidade, mas em contramão ao sucesso junto aos usuários, o regulador segue o seguinte ciclo de intervenção reguladora, ao redor do mundo: (i) proibição imediata do aplicativo; (ii) proibição indireta do Uber, por meio de regulação feita de acordo com o sistema tradicional/ 'a la táxi' (concessão de alvarás, dentre outros mecanismos) e (iii) estudos para implementação de uma regulação específica, que une os benefícios tecnológicos ao real atendimento do interesse público. Para analisar mais profundamente esses ciclos, estudou-se a postura do regulador em 23 megacidades ao redor do mundo, conforme padrão definido pelas Organização das Nações Unidas – ONU, o que exemplificou a conduta dos agentes em cidades com mais de sete milhões de habitantes. Diante de tais intervenções, chegou-se à conclusão de que existe forte captura regulatória no sistema de transporte de passageiros ― tendo sido feita uma abordagem da Teoria da Escolha Pública ― já que os dois primeiros ciclos apontam benefícios de pequenos grupos de interesse no setor, em detrimento do coletivo. Além disso, se a tecnologia é capaz de reduzir falhas envolvendo situações de monopólios situacionais, assimetrias de informação e externalidades negativas, não haveria outro motivo que justificasse a necessidade na manutenção da regulação, já tida como excedente no mercado em apreço. Válido mencionar que as ações regulatórias foram prontamente combatidas não apenas pela opinião popular, mas principalmente por meio de decisões judiciais ao redor do mundo, que por meio de liminares impediram reações mais abrasivas de tais agentes, e o que aponta que tal setor não se encontra capturado. O terceiro ciclo de intervenção regulatória indica um caminho de interconexão entre as economias de colaboração com medidas urbanas que busquem beneficiar o coletivo. Estudos ao redor do mundo evidenciam a necessidade de alternativas regulatórias que possam conciliar o interesse público com a compreensão da natureza do progresso tecnológico. No entanto, para que se chegue a tal ciclo interventivo, é necessário que o regulador abandone o caráter meramente fiscalizatório e assuma comportamento mais analítico e proativo, no sentido de aplicar alternativas regulatórias que impliquem em medidas que representem ganhos em infraestrutura e urbanização.