Development of concepts for victory through exercises, simulations and force comparison is a continuously ongoing process in military organizations. A complementing method of contributing to concepts for victory can be made through systematic testing of existing theories which prescribes such concepts. This can provide knowledge regarding the validity of a theory and provide fundamental insights concerning which basic factors contributes to victory in naval combat. In this essay Wayne P. Hughes Six Cornerstones are tested through a qualitative case study of the battle of the Nile in 1798 and the Falklands campaign in 1982 to test its explanatory value for victory. The results show findings of the theory in both cases and larger deviations only occurred between two cornerstones. The largest deviations occurred between the cornerstones which contained specific descriptions for successful actions. The cornerstones which described success in a general manner and as desired effects were more applicable in the cases. This strengthens the fact that a recipe for specific actions in combat hardly can prescribe general success. The results also show that general descriptions can be viewed valuable for what it excludes, not for what it specifically prescribes. More research has to be done to say something further regarding the validity of the theory.

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The aim of this dissertation is to show how counter missile tactics for a fast attack craft armed with missiles [FAC(M)] against a surface-to-surface, fireand- forget missile [SSM] can be optimised. As a result the ship and missile will be modelled as generic concepts while the environment will be a chosen area of operations. The applicable methodology is to simulate the ship, missile and environment as well as the interactions between them. At the same time, the ship will be carrying out combinations of five separate missile counter measures. The methodology is then to build a dynamic simulation model to optimise soft kill tactics by a generic F AC(M) against a generic SSM in the chosen environment and evaluate the outcome of the simulation by viewing the experiment as a 25 factorial design and to analyse it accordingly. / Operations Research / M.Sc. (Operations Research)

L’évolution du débat sur la pensée navale en Angleterre de la décennie 1880, suivant la fin d’une période d’intenses changements technologiques dans les marines de guerre est marquée par le déclin d’un mode de réflexion matériel et l’ascension, à partir des années 1885 et 1886, de l’école historique de John Knox Laughton. Selon la méthode matérielle, populaire au cours de la période de transformation technique, la guerre sur mer est entièrement tributaire du Progrès, tandis que, pour les tenants de la méthode historique, des principes et des leçons immuables la régissent. À travers l’évolution de ce débat, on constate l’introduction, par la Jeune École française, d’une perspective matérialiste et de la stratégie navale comme objet de réflexion, et son exploitation par l’école historique anglaise. L’émergence de la stratégie comme sujet de débat coïncide donc avec le triomphe de l’école historique. Croyant que la torpille allait démocratiser la puissance navale en empêchant le belligérant le plus puissant d’user de sa maîtrise des mers, la Jeune École connut un succès fulgurant qui déborda des côtes françaises et atteint l’Angleterre. Néanmoins, les matérialistes anglais, demeurant beaucoup plus modérés que les français, furent finalement marginalisés par une école historique utilisant les exagérations de la Jeune École, dont les insuffisances sont apparues lors des manœuvres de l’été 1886, pour disqualifier entièrement la méthode matérielle. Étudiant les débats du Royal United Service Institution Journal, ce mémoire démontre l’existence, en Angleterre, au cours de la décennie 1880, d’un débat polarisé au contraire d’une historiographie ne montrant que l’ascension des précurseurs de Mahan et de l’école historique. / Great Britain saw in the 1880s, at the end of a period of intense technical change and before the publication of Mahan’s classic on Sea Power, the decline of the material way of thinking about naval affairs and the rise, from the years 1885 and 1886, of the historical school of John Knox Laughton. Proponents of a material method established the idea that technological change altered naval warfare in a fundamentally way. They were, however, opposed by the partisans of a historical method who supported the idea that naval warfare is set on some timeless principles which can be discovered by the use of the methods of the new historical profession. Throughout the decade, the material method, successful in an era of rapid technological change, quickly subsumed to Mahan’s precursors. In a debate originally dominated by tactics, we observe the introduction of strategy by the French materialist Jeune École. Consequently, strategy became the core of the historical school and seems closely linked to the rise of strategy as a subject of reflection. The Jeune École believed that the torpedo would democratize Sea Power in making the powerful navies to use its mastery over the oceans. The Jeune École’s original success was so great, in France and abroad, that it influenced the English’s debate. Although materialists in Great Britain where more moderate than in France, they finally got marginalize by the historical school using the Jeune École’s wildest claims to disqualify the materialist point of view. Studying the debates through the Royal United Service Institution Journal, this thesis shows the existence, in Great Britain, of a debate centered on two method of thinking naval warfare and contributes to reassess current historiography which still focuses solely on the rise of Mahan’s precursors.

L’évolution du débat sur la pensée navale en Angleterre de la décennie 1880, suivant la fin d’une période d’intenses changements technologiques dans les marines de guerre est marquée par le déclin d’un mode de réflexion matériel et l’ascension, à partir des années 1885 et 1886, de l’école historique de John Knox Laughton. Selon la méthode matérielle, populaire au cours de la période de transformation technique, la guerre sur mer est entièrement tributaire du Progrès, tandis que, pour les tenants de la méthode historique, des principes et des leçons immuables la régissent. À travers l’évolution de ce débat, on constate l’introduction, par la Jeune École française, d’une perspective matérialiste et de la stratégie navale comme objet de réflexion, et son exploitation par l’école historique anglaise. L’émergence de la stratégie comme sujet de débat coïncide donc avec le triomphe de l’école historique. Croyant que la torpille allait démocratiser la puissance navale en empêchant le belligérant le plus puissant d’user de sa maîtrise des mers, la Jeune École connut un succès fulgurant qui déborda des côtes françaises et atteint l’Angleterre. Néanmoins, les matérialistes anglais, demeurant beaucoup plus modérés que les français, furent finalement marginalisés par une école historique utilisant les exagérations de la Jeune École, dont les insuffisances sont apparues lors des manœuvres de l’été 1886, pour disqualifier entièrement la méthode matérielle. Étudiant les débats du Royal United Service Institution Journal, ce mémoire démontre l’existence, en Angleterre, au cours de la décennie 1880, d’un débat polarisé au contraire d’une historiographie ne montrant que l’ascension des précurseurs de Mahan et de l’école historique. / Great Britain saw in the 1880s, at the end of a period of intense technical change and before the publication of Mahan’s classic on Sea Power, the decline of the material way of thinking about naval affairs and the rise, from the years 1885 and 1886, of the historical school of John Knox Laughton. Proponents of a material method established the idea that technological change altered naval warfare in a fundamentally way. They were, however, opposed by the partisans of a historical method who supported the idea that naval warfare is set on some timeless principles which can be discovered by the use of the methods of the new historical profession. Throughout the decade, the material method, successful in an era of rapid technological change, quickly subsumed to Mahan’s precursors. In a debate originally dominated by tactics, we observe the introduction of strategy by the French materialist Jeune École. Consequently, strategy became the core of the historical school and seems closely linked to the rise of strategy as a subject of reflection. The Jeune École believed that the torpedo would democratize Sea Power in making the powerful navies to use its mastery over the oceans. The Jeune École’s original success was so great, in France and abroad, that it influenced the English’s debate. Although materialists in Great Britain where more moderate than in France, they finally got marginalize by the historical school using the Jeune École’s wildest claims to disqualify the materialist point of view. Studying the debates through the Royal United Service Institution Journal, this thesis shows the existence, in Great Britain, of a debate centered on two method of thinking naval warfare and contributes to reassess current historiography which still focuses solely on the rise of Mahan’s precursors.

The aim of this dissertation is to show how counter missile tactics for a fast attack craft armed with missiles [FAC(M)] against a surface-to-surface, fireand- forget missile [SSM] can be optimised. As a result the ship and missile will be modelled as generic concepts while the environment will be a chosen area of operations. The applicable methodology is to simulate the ship, missile and environment as well as the interactions between them. At the same time, the ship will be carrying out combinations of five separate missile counter measures. The methodology is then to build a dynamic simulation model to optimise soft kill tactics by a generic F AC(M) against a generic SSM in the chosen environment and evaluate the outcome of the simulation by viewing the experiment as a 25 factorial design and to analyse it accordingly. / Operations Research / Operations Management / M.Sc. (Operations Research)